Haywood v. Hathaway, No. 12-1678 (7th Cir. 2016)
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Haywood, an inmate at Illinois’s Shawnee Correctional Center, accused a teacher of attacking him. Guards charged him with making false statements. A disciplinary panel found him guilty, ordered him transferred to segregation for two months, and revoked one month of good‐time credit. He was subsequently transferred to a different prison and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment violations and that his conditions of confinement in segregation were cruel and unusual, violating the Eighth Amendment. The district court rejected both claims, dismissing the First Amendment claim because the disciplinary panel’s decision, which affected the duration of Haywood’s confinement, had not been set aside on collateral review or by executive clemency. The court cited Supreme Court holdings that section 1983 cannot be used to seek damages when relief necessarily implies the invalidity of a criminal conviction or prison discipline that remains in force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the First Amendment theory and reversed with respect to the Eighth Amendment theory, remanding for consideration under the deliberate indifference standard.The warden had actual knowledge of the unusually harsh weather, had been apprised of the specific problem with Haywood’s cell (the windows would not shut), and had toured the segregation unit.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 12 1678 SEYON R. HAYWOOD, Plaintiff Appellant, v. JODY HATHAWAY, Defendant Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 3:09 cv 00807 MJR SCW — Michael J. Reagan, Chief Judge. ____________________ ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2013 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 29, 2016 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Seyon Haywood, formerly an inmate at Illi nois’s Shawnee Correctional Center, accused his auto mechan ics teacher of attacking him. Guards charged him with mak ing false statements. A disciplinary panel found him guilty and ordered him transferred to segregation for two months; the panel also revoked one month of good time credit. After 2 No. 12 1678 these events he was transferred to a different prison, where he remains in custody. Haywood contends in this proceeding under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that these penalties violate his right to speech, protected by the Constitution’s First Amendment (applied to states by the Fourteenth). He also alleges that the conditions of his con finement in segregation were cruel and unusual, violating the Eighth Amendment (again applied via the Fourteenth). The district court dismissed the first claim on the pleadings and granted summary judgment to defendants on the second. The only defendant against whom Haywood still seeks damages is Jody Hathaway, Shawnee’s Warden during Haywood’s time there. The district court dismissed the First Amendment claim because the disciplinary panel’s decision, which affected the duration of Haywood’s confinement, had not been set aside on collateral review or by executive clemency. The Supreme Court held in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), that §1983 cannot be used to seek damages when relief necessarily im plies the invalidity of a criminal conviction that remains in force. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), extends this ap proach to prison discipline. Haywood offers two responses: first, that his good time credits have now been restored, and, second, that he has waived any challenge to the duration of his confinement and therefore (he contends) should be al lowed to seek damages. Although Haywood maintains that his good time credits were restored while this appeal has been pending, the forms that Haywood has submitted show only the Department of Corrections’s calculation of his projected release date, not whether the disciplinary board’s decision has been vacated in No. 12 1678 3 the manner Heck and Edwards require. At all events, things that happen after a district court’s decision do not demon strate that the court erred. Heck and Edwards hold that a §1983 claim does not accrue until the conviction or discipline had been set aside. Once that occurs, the prisoner has the time al lowed by the statute of limitations (two years in Illinois) to commence suit. A dismissal under Heck and Edwards is with out prejudice to litigation after a conviction or disciplinary sanction is annulled. As for his waiver of any challenge to the duration of con finement: that’s irrelevant because no matter what a prisoner demands, or waives, §1983 cannot be used to contest the fact or duration of confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). From its outset, this suit has been a quest for money damages. That’s not all. The holding of Heck and Ed wards is that a claim under §1983 does not accrue as long as it would imply the invalidity of a conviction or disciplinary sanction that affects the duration of custody. If the claim has not accrued, it cannot matter what relief a prisoner seeks. Yet if it is possible to seek damages while waiving other relief, this must mean that the claim accrues immediately and the statute of limitations runs from the time of the events said to be wrongful. That would surprise the many prisoners who wait patiently until they are entitled to sue under Heck, for if Hay wood is right the time to do so could have expired. Haywood relies on Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2006), which held that a prisoner who foreswears any contest to the length of his confinement may use §1983 to seek dam ages. The Second Circuit understood “the purpose of the Heck favorable termination requirement [to be] to prevent prison 4 No. 12 1678 ers from using §1983 to vitiate collaterally a judicial or admin istrative decision that affected the overall length of their con finement”. 467 F.3d at 104. To disavow any collateral attack on the conviction or revocation of good time credits is to take the situation outside Heck, the court concluded. We do not agree with that conclusion, which no other circuit has adopted (though none has expressly rejected it, either). Heck and Edwards say that a challenge is not possible as long as it is inconsistent with the validity of a conviction or disciplinary sanction. See also Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004): “a §1983 suit for damages that would ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of the fact of an inmate’s conviction, or ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of the length of an inmate’s sentence, is not cognizable under §1983 unless and until the inmate obtains favorable termination of a state, or federal ha beas, challenge to his conviction or sentence.” This is a version of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel), under which the out standing criminal judgment or disciplinary sanction, as long as it stands, blocks any inconsistent civil judgment. See Simp son v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2006); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 1999). It is a rationale considerably different from the one that Peralta attributed to the Court. In Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 392 (2007), the Justices em phasized another of Heck’s rationales: [Heck] analogized [the §1983] suit to one for malicious prosecu tion, an element of which is the favorable termination of criminal proceedings. [512 U.S.] at 484. We said: “[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by ac tions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sen tence invalid, a §1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction No. 12 1678 5 or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal author ized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a con viction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cog nizable under §1983. Id., at 486–487 (footnote omitted).” We rested this conclusion upon “the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Id., at 486. “‘Congress,’” we said, “‘has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate rem edy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement, and that specific determination must over ride the general terms of §1983.’” Id., at 482 (quoting Preiser v. Ro driguez, 411 U. S. 475, 490 (1973)). Nothing in Heck, Edwards, or any of the Court’s later decisions suggests that the “favorable termination” element that the Court thought essential can be elided by a plaintiff’s disavow ing a kind of relief that Preiser holds is never available under §1983 in the first place. The approach taken in Peralta is in compatible with Heck and its successors; Peralta is function ally what would happen if the whole sequence were over ruled and only Preiser left standing. Peralta is incompatible not only with the Supreme Court’s decisions but also with McCurdy v. Sheriff of Madison County, 128 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1997), which held that a plaintiff cannot sidestep Heck by conceding a conviction’s validity. Our deci sion in Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 435–36 (7th Cir. 2012), which holds that a prisoner cannot avoid Heck by waiting un til the sentence expires and it is too late to file a collateral at tack, also is irreconcilable with the Second Circuit’s view that a §1983 suit for damages is permissible whenever it cannot 6 No. 12 1678 end in a decision that changes the length of a person’s confine ment. We decline to follow Peralta, which did not mention McCurdy and therefore created a conflict among the circuits, perhaps unintentionally. We shall stick with the established law of this circuit. Haywood’s Eighth Amendment claim is unaffected by Heck. He contends that the cell in which he was held during his 60 day term of segregation had a broken window and that, when the prison’s power failed during a storm in January 2010, the heat went off and the temperature fell below freez ing. Haywood maintains that the guards refused to repair the window or provide adequate clothing and blankets. Instead, he asserts, the guards made conditions worse by turning on the ventilation system (which he calls “the blowers”). Wind aggravates the effect of cold by increasing the speed at which heat is removed from exposed skin. According to Haywood, power and heat were off for four days, and when power was restored the cell remained frigid and the guards continued to ignore his request to fix the win dow or provide blankets, a coat, or any other means of warmth. If circumstances were as Haywood asserts, then the prison violated his constitutional rights. Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997); Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1991). See also Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (discussing standards of liability un der the Eighth Amendment in medical care situations). There may be reasons to doubt Haywood’s account—if the cell was as cold and his clothing as skimpy as he relates, he would have suffered frostbite or death, yet he is alive and whole— but on motion for summary judgment we must accept the declarations in his affidavit. No. 12 1678 7 The district court granted summary judgment not because it discounted Haywood’s evidence or thought the conditions acceptable, but because of the identity of the sole defendant: the warden. Haywood did not sue (or, if he did sue, did not serve) the guards and other persons responsible for climate control. He sued only the top of the organization, and the dis trict court concluded that the warden cannot be personally li able under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009), that organizational heads and other supervisors are not vicariously liable for their subordinates’ misdeeds. They are liable for their own acts but not deriva tively liable for other persons’ acts. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), supplies the sub stantive rule of decision. There “the Supreme Court held that prison officials have a duty to ‘ensure that inmates receive ad equate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.’” Estate of Miller ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984, 989 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). To determine whether an in mate’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated by a depriva tion, we examine the alleged violation both objectively and subjectively. First, the deprivation alleged must be objectively, sufficiently serious. Second, the mental state of the prison of ficial must have been one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. The first element is satisfied when the plaintiff shows that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 2001). There is no question that the circumstances described by Haywood satisfy this element. 8 No. 12 1678 To meet the second element, a plaintiff must show that “‘the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to in mate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the infer ence.’” Estate of Miller, 680 F.3d at 989 (quoting Sanville, 266 F.3d at 734. A plaintiff need not “prove that his complaints … were ‘literally ignored,’; rather, he must show only that de fendants’ responses to it were so plainly inappropriate as to permit the inference that the defendants intentionally or reck lessly disregarded his needs.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)). Our en banc decision in Pet ties took this approach to medical care claims, and it is equally applicable to related claims under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Haywood brought forth evidence in opposition to Warden Hathaway’s motion for summary judgment that Warden Hathaway knew both of the extreme cold in the segregation unit and the causes of that cold. Specifically, the warden knew of the ice storm that caused the prison to lose power, see R.87 4 (Warden Hathaway’s answers to interrogatories) at 16; he was apprised that Haywood could not shut his window, see R.1 at 19 (Emergency Grievance attached as exhibit to Com plaint) (“There is lots of air coming in through the windows because the seals on the outside are broken.”); and he person ally toured the segregation unit at least once between January and March 2009, see R.87 4 at 22 (“Defendant did go to Segre gation during this time frame [between January 9, 2009, and March 9, 2009].”). No. 12 1678 9 The extent of the warden’s response to this information, however, was that he “enured [sic] that the generators were operating properly and had maintenance perform periodic temperature checks.” Id. at 23. Nothing in the record indicates how frequently Warden Hathaway had maintenance perform temperature checks, whether those were performed during or after the power outage, or, indeed, whether any were per formed apart from the check of the unit on January 23—one of the warmest days of the winter. Moreover, the fact that the generators were operational would have little effect on the temperature of the unit if, as Haywood testified, the windows in the unit would not close. The warden’s “plainly inappro priate” responses to Hathaway’s grievance, to the extreme weather, and to the situation in the segregation unit allow the inference that he was deliberately indifferent to the extreme cold suffered by Haywood and the other prisoners. See Hayes, 546 F.3d at 524. Our dissenting colleague reads Iqbal and Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), to support a contrary result. We do not believe, however, that Iqbal or Vance alters the standards set forth in Farmer v. Brennan. Indeed, Iqbal rec ognizes that “[t]he factors necessary to establish a Bivens vio lation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.” 556 U.S. at 676. In Iqbal, the Bivens claim alleged was “invidious discrimination” on the basis of race, religion, and national origin “in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments.” Id. In such situations, the Court explained, “our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose,” id., and “a su pervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discrimina tory purpose” is not sufficient, id. at 677. Iqbal simply did not 10 No. 12 1678 speak to standards of liability for Eighth Amendment viola tions, for Iqbal had not made a claim under that provision, and the Court certainly gave no indication of discontent with the settled law set forth in Farmer. Moreover, even if it had signaled an intent to depart from Farmer, the Supreme Court has admonished us not to anticipate its future steps. See, e.g., Bosse v. Oklahoma, No. 15–9173 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2016) (collecting authority). This court’s decision in Vance is not without its ambigui ties. But one thing is clear: it must be read to conform to Farmer, the governing authority. It cannot be read, as the dis sent does, as altering the standards of Farmer. In Vance, the plaintiffs alleged “torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, … presented as Fifth Amendment substantive due process claims,” Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated en banc, 701 F.3d 193, and sought damages from the former Secretary of Defense. The specific question before the court was “whether the federal judiciary should create a right of action for damages against soldiers (and oth ers in the chain of command) who abusively interrogate or mistreat military prisoners, or fail to prevent improper deten tion and interrogation.” Vance, 701 F.3d at 195. We answered this question in the negative. We further observed that “[e]ven if we were to create a common law damages remedy against military personnel and their civilian superiors, former Secre tary Rumsfeld could not be held liable.” Id. at 203. We ob served that Farmer rejected a contention that wardens (or guards) can be liable just because they know that violence occurs in prisons and don’t do more to prevent it on an institution wide basis. To get any where, Vance and Ertel would need to allege that Rumsfeld knew No. 12 1678 11 of a substantial risk to security contractors’ employees, and ig nored that risk because he wanted plaintiffs (or similarly situated persons) to be harmed. Id. at 204. This dicta overstates Farmer’s holding. Farmer in structs that the deliberate indifference standard “is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result”: We hold … that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an exces sive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substan tial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the infer ence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 837. In any event, the standard articulated in Vance is satisfied here. The evidence showed that Warden Hathaway had actual knowledge of the unusually harsh weather conditions, that he had been apprised of the specific problem with the physical condition of Haywood’s cell (i.e., the windows would not shut), and that, during the time period of Haywood’s com plaint, the warden toured the segregation unit himself. These facts establish that Warden Hathaway’s response was not simply “plainly inappropriate,” but that Haywood’s com plaints “literally [were] ignored” by the individual in the po sition to remedy them. Hayes, 546 F.3d at 524 (internal quota tion marks omitted). In short, there simply is no evidence that, in Iqbal, the Su preme Court overruled or limited Farmer. See Minneci v. Pol lard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 625 (2012) (noting Farmer’s deliberate in difference standard). Vance, as well, has no direct application 12 No. 12 1678 to this case. Vance concerned the possibility of holding the cab inet secretary of a federal department responsible for the im plementation of policy at the individual level—a far cry from holding the administrator of a single facility liable for known deficiencies that directly threatened the welfare of prisoners for whom he was responsible. See 730 ILCS 5/3 6 2 (“A chief administrative officer shall be responsible for all persons as signed to the institution or facility.”). Vance did not alter—nor could it alter—the standards set forth in the Court’s Eighth Amendment caselaw. Indeed, since Vance, we have continued to apply Farmer to allegations of unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678, 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying Farmer to claims brought against the warden and other prison officials who were involved in the decision to impose a behavior action plan that resulted in un constitutional conditions of confinement). Consistent with our approach in Townsend, other courts of appeals have determined that, post Iqbal, Farmer’s deliberate indifference standard continues to govern claims of un con stitutional conditions of confinement brought against super visory prison officials. See Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316–20 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that deliber ate indifference standard “for imposing supervisory liability based on an Eighth Amendment violation is consistent with Iqbal” and collecting cases), reversed on other grounds under the name Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015) (holding that defendants were entitled to official immunity and not ad dressing the merits); see also Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying Farmer’s deliberate indifference standard to evaluate liability of prison official post Iqbal). No. 12 1678 13 The judgment is affirmed with respect to the First Amend ment theory and reversed with respect to the Eighth Amend ment theory. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 14 No. 12 1678 EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. I agree with the court’s disposition of Haywood’s First Amendment claim but not with its conclusion that Warden Hathaway can be per sonally liable for cold temperatures in his cell. Haywood seeks to hold the warden directly (rather than derivatively) liable on the theory that he filed two grievances alerting the warden to the cold. But Iqbal concludes that knowledge is not enough. [Respondent argues that supervisors] can be liable for “knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates’ use of dis criminatory criteria to make classification decisions among de tainees.” Iqbal Brief 45–46. That is to say, respondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s [misconduct] amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We reject this argument. Respondent’s conception of “supervisory liability” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that [supervisors] may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents. In a §1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants—the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. 556 U.S. at 677. We applied this principle in Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 203–05 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), when holding that notice to the Secretary of Defense about subordinates’ misconduct did not expose the Secretary to damages for fail ing to ensure that it stopped. The Secretary may be liable for unlawful policies but does not guarantee that lawful policies are carried out correctly. See also, e.g., Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2009), which holds that prison officials who receive and respond to prisoners’ grievances do not become vicariously liable just because they fail to ensure that the grievances are properly redressed. Just as a prison’s warden No. 12 1678 15 in Illinois is responsible for all employees, 730 ILCS 5/3 6 2, so a Secretary of Defense has full authority over all of his subor dinates. 10 U.S.C. §113(b). Yet Vance held that insufficient to make the Secretary liable for failing to prevent their miscon duct. No one contends that Warden Hathaway had a policy that authorized, or even tolerated, subjecting prisoners to freezing temperatures. To the contrary, it is undisputed that, when he received Haywood’s first grievance, he directed one of the prison’s engineers to find out what was happening. The engi neer told the warden that the temperature in Haywood’s cell was 75° F, and the warden then dismissed the grievance. If the engineer was lying, he might face liability, but it is impossible to see how the warden himself could be liable—and that con clusion would hold even if Iqbal had come out the other way and held that supervisors can be liable just because they know that subordinates are misbehaving. Haywood’s description of the blowers as “torture” does not add anything, because air movement at 75° is hardly an intolerable condition of confine ment. And Haywood’s second complaint to the warden also does not add anything, not only because of Iqbal but also be cause the record shows that it did not reach the warden’s desk until March 9, 2010, the day that Haywood was returned to the general population. Nothing the warden did, or omitted, in response to the second grievance could have affected Hay wood. Prisoners need to sue the persons responsible for the con ditions of which they complain. A warden is an easy target— his name is known, and it is easy to achieve service of process. But decisions such as Iqbal and Vance mean that liability rests with the people who injure prisoners; the top of a bureaucratic 16 No. 12 1678 hierarchy is the wrong person to sue, unless the claim con cerns the prison’s formal policies or other decisions that the warden took personally. I do not read Iqbal or Vance as incompatible with Farmer, which did not address the question whether supervisors can be liable for failing to cure problems created or ignored by their subordinates. By contrast, Iqbal and Vance do address that situation. We observed in Vance that a supervisor does not become liable just because someone sends him a message no tifying him that bad things are going on. That’s what plaintiffs alleged in Vance, and a panel held the allegation sufficient, but the en banc court held it legally insufficient. 701 F.3d at 203– 05. (Part IV of Vance, which announces this conclusion, cannot be dismissed as dictum; it was an alternative holding. The fact that a court gives two independently sufficient reasons for a disposition does not mean that each is dictum because the other would have sufficed; on that approach, the whole opin ion could be dismissed as dictum.) Vance shows that supervisors are entitled to delegate. The top of an organization must be able to allocate duties without being personally liable if subordinates mess up. Warden Hathaway delegated. He sent an engineer to diagnose the sit uation and fix any problem. The engineer reported that there was no problem. Haywood chose not to sue the engineer, the engineer’s subordinates, or the personnel who should have repaired any broken window, but Haywood’s choice cannot mean that the warden becomes personally liable for his sub ordinates’ inaction or ineptitude. My colleagues are among many federal judges who prefer an approach under which notice to a supervisor is enough to create personal liability. The Supreme Court encountered No. 12 1678 17 such an approach in Iqbal and disapproved it. When a panel of this court adopted that approach in Vance, the court took the case en banc and disapproved it. As my colleagues ob serve, decisions in other circuits have continued to impose su pervisory liability when notice does not lead to a remedy. They cite Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 320 (3d Cir. 2014), and Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014), and might have added a citation to Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, rehearing en banc denied, 808 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2015). Barkes has been reversed on immunity grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015), and the Justices did not tell us their view of the merits; Colwell concerned supervisors’ policies and not just failure to control subordinates, so its bearing on our dis pute is doubtful; but Turkmen deals with both policy creation and subordinate control in one package. The grants of certiorari in Turkmen set the stage for a new look at the question whether and when supervisors (includ ing Hasty, a prison’s warden) can be liable for failing to pre vent or rectify misconduct by guards and other subordinates. See Zilgar v. Turkmen, No. 15–1358 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2016) (consol idated with Ashcroft v. Turkmen, No. 15–1359, and Hasty v. Turkmen, No. 15–1363). The sort of dispute represented by Haywood’s Eighth Amendment claim is now in the hands of the Supreme Court. Turkmen may be decided on other grounds (the lead argument is that the Second Circuit erred in implying a Bivens remedy against supervisors, while §1983 supplies an express remedy in our case), but even so Turkmen may reflect on the circumstances under which heads of organ izations who are alerted to problems but don’t fix them can be liable for that failure. They ducked in Barkes, a summary re versal, but may conclude that resolution is due in Turkmen, which will be briefed and argued.
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