Kevin Rousey v. Robert Hilliard, et al, No. 10-2189 (7th Cir. 2011)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted November 3, 2010 Decided July 11, 2011 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge REBECCA R. PALLMEYER, District Judge* No. 10 2189 KEVIN ROUSEY, Plaintiff Appellant, v. ROBERT HILLIARD, et al., Defendants Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 08 463 GPM G. Patrick Murphy, Judge. O R D E R Kevin Rousey sued two of his supervisors from the Illinois Department of Corrections (ʺIDOCʺ) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they retaliated against him because of his political affiliation. The district court granted the defendantsʹ motion for summary judgment, finding that Rousey failed to produce any evidence that defendants retaliated against him because of his affiliation with the Republican party. Rousey appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the district court. * The Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. No. 10 2189 Page 2 I. Background Kevin Rousey began working for the Illinois Department of Corrections (ʺIDOCʺ) in June 2003, as a Major at the Big Muddy Correctional Center (ʺBig Muddyʺ). Defendant Robert Hilliard served as Assistant Warden at Big Muddy, and defendant Jay Merchant served as the Acting Warden. Both Hilliard and Merchant are Democrats, and Rousey claims that they engaged in a pattern of harassment against him because of his affiliation with the Republican party. To support his claims against Hilliard, Rousey offers a litany of alleged retaliatory acts: Hilliard instructed various other IDOC employees to file harassment charges against Rousey; Hilliard convinced a union member to submit inaccurate grievances against him; Hilliard approached Rousey in an ʺaggressive mannerʺ on one occasion; Hilliard downgraded Rouseyʹs annual evaluation to prevent Rousey from receiving a bonus; Hilliard reassigned Rouseyʹs parking spot; and Hilliard hid Rouseyʹs mail. Rouseyʹs only claim against defendant Merchant is that Merchant allegedly participated in a decision to change Rouseyʹs work schedule from the preferred 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. time slot to the undesirable 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. shift. Rousey sued Hilliard and Merchant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliating against him in violation of the First Amendment. Defendants moved for summary judgment. In ruling on that motion, the district court agreed with Rousey that his identification as an active Republican was constitutionally protected activity and that there were disputes of fact concerning whether Hilliardʹs conduct constituted a deprivation of Rouseyʹs speech rights. The court nevertheless concluded that Rousey failed to produce any evidence of his recent public political activity, and that a jury could not reasonably infer that defendants were aware of Rouseyʹs political affiliation merely from his participation in a political campaign during the 1980ʹs and his lifelong support of the Republican party. The court concluded, further, that even if defendants were aware of Rouseyʹs political affiliation, Rousey failed to show that his political affiliation caused defendantsʹ alleged conduct. On appeal, Rousey contends that the district court erred in disregarding the testimony of the Illinois State Senator Gary Forby. According to Rousey, Forby knew that Rousey was a Republican and was also well informed about the political infighting that occurred at Big Muddy. Rousey specifically relies on Forbyʹs testimony that: ʺRepublicans and Democrats beat heads with each other [at Big Muddy]. I think they are playing games with each other. . . . Same way as everyday life.ʺ Rousey now claims that Forbyʹs testimony demonstrates that given the politically charged environment at Big Muddy, Hilliard and Merchant must have known about Rouseyʹs political No. 10 2189 Page 3 affiliation. Defendants maintain that the fact, if proven, that employees at Big Muddy engage in political disputes, by itself does not support an inference that Hilliard and Merchant knew of Rouseyʹs political affiliation. II. Discussion We review a district courtʹs grant of summary judgment de novo. Egonmwan v. Cook Cnty. Sheriffʹs Depʹt, 602 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non moving party and ʺdraw all reasonable inferencesʺ in his favor. George v. Walker, 535 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a public employee must present evidence that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected speech; (2) his speech caused the employerʹs action; and (3) he suffered a deprivation because his employerʹs action was likely to deter future speech. Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Protection Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 983 (7th Cir. 2009); Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525 26 (7th Cir. 2009)). The only issue on appeal in this case is whether defendants changed Rouseyʹs working conditions because of Rouseyʹs political affiliation. The district court concluded that while Rousey may have shown that he and defendants belong to different political parties, such evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that defendants knew of Rousey s political affiliation. We agree. Both defendants deny having any knowledge of Rouseyʹs political affiliation prior to his filing this suit and there is no direct evidence to suggest otherwise. Rousey points to Senator Forbyʹs knowledge of his political affiliation and Forbyʹs testimony regarding political disagreements at Big Muddy, but those statements do not suggest that defendants were aware that Rousey is a Republican and retaliated against him for that reason. Nor has Rousey offered any other specific instances of protected speech activity from which one could infer defendants might have learned of his political affiliation; his general support of the Republican party is insufficient for this purpose. As a result, Rousey cannot demonstrate that his political affiliation was the ʺbut for causeʺ of defendantsʹ actions. Gross v. Town of Cicero, 619 F.3d 697, 704, 707 08 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff offered no evidence that defendants were aware of his protected speech). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courtʹs grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
