Notice: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) States Unpublished Orders Shall Not Be Cited or Used As Precedent Except to Support a Claim of Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel or Law of the Case in Any Federal Court Within the Circuit.james W. Codling, Also Known As Cork, Also Known As Corky,petitioner-appellant, v. United States of America, Respondent-appellee, 91 F.3d 146 (7th Cir. 1996)

ORDER

James Codling pleaded guilty to one count of money laundering. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i). Before accepting Codling's plea, the district judge asked Codling if he understood that by pleading guilty he faced a maximum possible term of 20 years' imprisonment. Codling replied that he did. The judge sentenced Codling to 97 months' imprisonment. Codling did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

Codling then filed a motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his guilty plea was invalid because the judge failed to inform him of the minimum sentence that he would be required to serve. The district court denied Codling's motion, first because Codling had procedurally defaulted by not raising the issue on direct appeal, and second because there is no mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i).

A defendant who pleads guilty may nevertheless seek collateral relief from his conviction by challenging the voluntary and intelligent character of his guilty plea. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). Nevertheless, in order to preserve such a challenge, the defendant must raise his arguments on direct appeal. McCleese v. United States, 75 F.3d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1996). Failure to do so results in a procedural default barring review, absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Id.

Codling failed to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on direct appeal, so on collateral review, he must demonstrate cause and prejudice. In his brief on appeal, Codling makes no serious attempt to address the issue of his procedural default. He makes one rather inarticulate reference to the fact that his attorney did not object to the district judge's failure to advise Codling of a statutory minimum sentence. (Appellant's Br. 11). Even if we liberally construed this single reference as a claim that his attorney's incompetence was the cause of his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal, the brief contains no indication of how Codling suffered actual prejudice as a result. Because Codling has failed to establish cause and prejudice for his procedural default, review of his claim is foreclosed. McCleese, 75 F.3d at 1181. Nevertheless, it is clear that Codling's claim is entirely without merit. At the change of plea hearing, the district court informed Codling that he faced up to 20 years in prison. The court mentioned no statutory minimum sentence because 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (1) (A) (i) provides for none.¹ 

AFFIRMED.