Notice: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) States Unpublished Orders Shall Not Be Cited or Used As Precedent Except to Support a Claim of Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel or Law of the Case in Any Federal Court Within the Circuit.lokmar Y. Abdul-wadood, Plaintiff-appellant, v. Sharon Hawk, et al., Defendants-appellees, 91 F.3d 146 (7th Cir. 1996)

ORDER

Plaintiff Lokmar Y. Abdul-Wadood²  and other inmates³  filed a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants, various prison officials, violated his right to access of courts by providing deficient legal assistance or an inadequate law library, and that defendants penalized inmates who gave legal help to other inmates. The district court initially entered a default order against defendants, but later vacated that order and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), and we review that order de novo. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323, 1326 (7th Cir. 1990).

Failure to State a Claim

Abdul-Wadood's argument that the default order should not have been vacated fails, since clearly a default order does not prevent the court from looking at the complaint to see if a claim is stated. Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir. 1994) ("the entry of a default order does not ... preclude a party from challenging the sufficiency of the complaint").

In order to state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must allege that prison officials failed to assist in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law; and show "some quantum of detriment caused by the challenged conduct of state officials resulting in the interruption and/or delay of plaintiff's pending or contemplated litigation." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); see also Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 558-59 (7th Cir. 1995); Jenkins v. Lane, 977 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir. 1992).

Abdul-Wadood has utterly failed to allege the most basic element of his claim: prejudice suffered due to either pending or contemplated legal action. Absent such an allegation, dismissal is required. Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 1992). Nor is this a case where plaintiff has shown the inability to perform even preliminary research, and thus need not demonstrate specific prejudice. See Jenkins, 977 F.2d at 268; DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1988). He also fails to allege that defendants imposed sanctions against him after he assisted another inmate with legal work.⁴  Moreover, his argument that the Constitution demands that the prison paralegal must be state licensed is absurd. See Brooks v. Buscher, 62 F.3d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1995). These were simple pleading deficiencies that could have been easily remedied.⁵ 

Prison Litigation Reform Act

In light of the district court's granting Abdul-Wadood time to file an amended complaint to correct these deficiencies,⁶  and Abdul-Wadood's decision to instead stand on the obviously-insufficient pleading and file this appeal,⁷  we find the appeal frivolous.

Under the recently enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 § 804 (effective April 26, 1996), a prisoner is prohibited from bringing civil actions or appeals after he has brought three actions which are either frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Id. (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 1915(g)).

In this case, we have found that the appeal is frivolous.⁸  We hold that this counts as the second of "three or more" occasions where Abdul-Wadood has "brought an ... appeal ... that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Id.⁹ 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.