William E. Brock, Secretary of Labor, Petitioner, v. L.r. Willson & Sons, Inc., Respondent, Internationalassociation of Bridge, Structural and Ornamentaliron Workers, et al., Intervenors, 773 F.2d 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

The Secretary of Labor petitions here for review of an order issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHRC" or "Commission") under the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982), vacating a citation issued to L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc. ("Willson") for failure to use perimeter netting to protect against exterior falls on a structural steel erection site in violation of 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926.105(a) (1984) [hereinafter Sec. .105(a) ]. We find that the Commission misconstrued our decision in L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc. v. Donovan, 685 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Willson I ] in interpreting Sec. .105(a). That section, properly applied, was violated by Willson's failure to provide any form of protection against exterior fall hazards. Since this is the only conclusion that can be drawn from the record before us, we remand with directions to reinstate the citation against Willson.

On July 17 and 21, 1980, OSHA Compliance Officer John Wiseman inspected a construction site at 9th and G Streets in Washington, D.C. where Willson was performing steel erection work on the YWCA building. Wiseman observed two employees at the perimeter of the building, approximately ninety and one hundred feet above the ground, who were not wearing safety belts or otherwise protected from the dangers of exterior falls by perimeter netting. A temporary steel floor was in place at the eighth floor level, one and two floors below the two employees, but the deck did not extend beyond the perimeter of the building. The employees were "connectors," ironworkers who climb vertical steel columns where horizontal steel beams are lifted up to them with a crane. They guide the beams into place, bolt them, and then climb out on the beams in order to release the line connecting the beam to the crane.¹  Connectors cannot wear safety belts while connecting because they need mobility in order to avoid being struck and injured by the beams.

As a result of the inspection, Willson was issued a number of citations, only one of which is involved here. That citation charged Willson with a serious violation of a general construction industry standard, 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926.105(a) (1984), which requires that " [s]afety nets shall be provided when workplaces are more than 25 feet above the ground ... where the use of ladders, scaffolds, catch platforms, temporary floors, safety lines, or safety belts is impractical." A serious violation exists when "there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result" from the violation. 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1982).

The administrative law judge (ALJ) chose not to decide the question of whether 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926.750(b) (1984) [hereinafter Sec. .750(b) ], a fall protection regulation under the Subpart R steel erection standards,²  preempted enforcement of the more general construction industry standard in Sec. .105(a). Instead, he concluded that the two standards, "when construed separately and together ... [do not] provide a steel erector with fair warning that he must obey the general standard by installing so-called perimeter nets." A. at 20. The ALJ's notice analysis also rested in part on voluminous record evidence which he felt raised a concern that "lack of enforcement [of Sec. .105(a) ] lulled the industry into a false sense of security." A. at 35. Alternatively, the ALJ found that if Willson was on notice that Sec. .105(a) applied, the company had complied with the regulation by installing temporary floors. A. at 38.

OSHRC affirmed the ALJ's decision to vacate the citation, but on different grounds. L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc., 11 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) 2182 (Rev.Comm'n 1984). First, the Commission concluded that steel erection standard Sec. .750(b) was specifically applicable to the hazard of falling and so preempted enforcement of the general construction standard Sec. .105(a). Id. at 2184. OSHRC acknowledged that its conclusion was contrary to this court's decision in Willson I, and so went on to assume that Sec. .105(a) applied. Purportedly basing its interpretation of Sec. .105(a) on Willson I, the Commission held that use of one of the listed safety devices was "impractical," so as to require use of perimeter netting, only if the device did not provide protection during a substantial portion of the work day. Id. at 2184-85. Using this rationale, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's vacation of the citation, finding that the Secretary had not met his burden of proving the violation because he presented almost "no evidence which would indicate the amount of time during the work day that the employees would work on the outside perimeter." Id. at 2185.

This petition for review followed.

OSHRC's first ground for vacating the citation was that Sec. .105(a) does not apply to fall hazards in the steel erection industry. The rules of preemption, as specified in OSHA regulations, provide that a general construction standard like Sec. .105(a) applies to steel erectors unless another standard is specifically applicable to the same hazard. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.5(c) (1985).³  In three decisions handed down the same day, OSHRC held that Sec. .105(a) may not be applied in the steel erection industry because a Subpart R steel erection standard, 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926.750(b) (1984), is specifically applicable to the hazard of falling. Willson, 11 O.S.H.Cas. at 2184; Adams Steel Erection, Inc., 11 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) 2073, 2074-79 (Rev.Comm'n 1984), rev'd sub nom. Donovan v. Adams Steel Erection, Inc., 766 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1985); Daniel Marr & Son Co., 11 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) 2088, 2089 (Rev.Comm'n 1984), rev'd sub nom. Donovan v. Daniel Marr & Son Co., 763 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1985). This result was a reversal of the Commission's prior position that Sec. .750(b) did not preempt Sec. .105(a) with respect to exterior fall hazards in the steel erection industry. Williams Enters., Inc., 11 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) 1410, 1419 (Rev.Comm'n 1983), aff'd sub nom. Donovan v. Williams Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 170, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

While it is not clear whether Willson is even defending this portion of OSHRC's decision any longer, we address the issue briefly in order to permanently lay to rest any doubts the company and the Commission may have as to which regulation governs exterior fall hazards in the steel erection industry. Willson, respondent here and petitioner in Willson I, argued in both instances that Sec. .750(b) (1) (ii) was more specific and preempted the general construction industry standard. In Willson I this court found that Sec. .105(a) was the applicable standard, rejecting the company's argument because " [a] general standard is not preempted unless a specific standard sets forth the measures that an employer must take to protect employees from a particular hazard." 685 F.2d at 670 (emphasis added). The particular hazard at issue in Willson I was exterior falls from above the level of temporary floors or decking,⁴  and the court read Sec. .750(b) (1) (ii) to apply only to interior falls because the regulation would be satisfied by the use of temporary flooring and "it appears obvious that temporary flooring protects only against interior falls." Id. at 672. This court has consistently followed Willson I, relying on it to find that Sec. .750(b) did not preempt 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926.28(a) (1984), another one of the general construction standards, L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC, 698 F.2d 507, 511-12 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and to affirm OSHRC's aforementioned decision applying Sec. .105(a) to exterior fall hazards in the steel erection industry, Donovan v. Williams Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 170, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

On July 20, 1984, however, the Commission announced that it had changed its mind about which regulation governed exterior fall hazards in the steel erection industry. In reviewing the Commission's position as applied in this case, we recognize that an agency is entitled to change course if it gives a principled and rational reason for the reversal. Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1977). One court has taken the stricter position that OSHRC cannot, in an adjudicatory proceeding, reject the interpretation given to a regulation by the appellate court for the circuit in which the case arose. Borton, Inc. v. OSHRC, 734 F.2d 508, 510 (10th Cir. 1984). In the past, however, this court has been unable to agree on the extent of an agency's authority not to follow a statutory interpretation made by a court of appeals, so it is unclear that we would follow suit. See Yellow Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983); id. at 384-85 (Wright, J., concurring); id. at 385 (Bork, J., concurring). Fortunately, we do not need to settle the question of OSHRC's general authority to reject circuit precedent, because in this case the Commission clearly exceeded its authority by resting its decision on a rationale which is neither principled nor rational.

The Commission's reasoning has already been rejected by appellate courts reviewing the other two Sec. .105(a) steel erection cases handed down the same day as Willson. Adams Steel, 766 F.2d at 807-10; Daniel Marr, 763 F.2d at 480-84. Our decision today makes the judicial response unanimous. Like the other courts, we find that the Commission ignored the teaching of Willson I that exterior and interior falls are different hazards and that Sec. .750(b) protects only against interior falls. Adams Steel, 766 F.2d at 808-09; Daniel Marr, 763 F.2d at 482-83. We also join both courts in finding that the two cases cited by OSHRC in Adams Steel to support its reversal are inapposite.⁵  Adams Steel, 766 F.2d at 809; Daniel Marr, 763 F.2d at 483 & n. 9. Finally, we reject the Commission's unsupported and counterintuitive suggestion that the Secretary deliberately chose not to protect steel erection workers from exterior fall hazards.⁶  There is really nothing for us to add to the other courts' decisions, other than to express our hope that the Commission will finally accept the unanimous position of three courts of appeals and the Secretary of Labor that Sec. .105(a) does apply to protect workers from exterior fall hazards in the steel erection industry.

Our task here is to assess whether OSHRC's decision to vacate the citation against Willson was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1982). The first step is to decide whether OSHRC correctly interpreted Sec. .105(a) as applied to the steel erection industry. As in all OSHA cases, we abide by "the wellsettled principle that the Act is to be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose of 'assur [ing] so far as possible ... safe ... working conditions.' " Willson I, 685 F.2d at 674. In cases involving interpretation of regulations, "an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is often of 'controlling weight,' [although] this deference is due only when the interpretation is 'reasonable and consistent with the regulation.' " Miller v. Bond, 641 F.2d 997, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citations omitted). This principle is not easily adapted to OSHA regulations, however, because OSHA divides responsibilities between the Secretary of Labor, who promulgates the regulations, and the Commission, which adjudicates their meaning in specific cases.⁷  Even according the Commission's interpretation the degree of deference we would give to the agency that had promulgated the regulation, however, we could not uphold the interpretation of Sec. .105(a) used to vacate Willson's citation. OSHRC's reading of that section is neither reasonable nor consistent with the language of the regulation, nor is it consistent with the Commission's interpretation of the same regulation in other cases.

Section .105(a) requires the use of perimeter netting only when the other listed safety devices are "impractical" to use. OSHRC, purportedly relying on our decision in Willson I, concluded that the Secretary had failed to prove that temporary floors, one of the listed safety devices, were impractical in this case. OSHRC interpreted Willson I to hold that a safety device is impractical only if the Secretary proves that the device did not provide protection during a substantial portion of the work day. Thus, it reasoned, temporary floors were impractical only if employees spent a substantial portion of the work day at the perimeter of the building, a conclusion the Commission said it could not draw from the evidence in the record. 11 O.S.H.Cas. at 2184-85. The analysis which follows explains how OSHRC's reasoning misinterpreted this court's decision in Willson I.

The Willson I court found that Sec. .105(a)'s requirement of perimeter netting was triggered where the listed safety devices were "impractical," meaning "both 'not practical' and 'not actually used.' " 685 F.2d at 675. The "not actually used" prong of the definition of impractical reflects a long line of judicial and Commission decisions holding that Sec. .105(a) is violated if none of the listed safety devices is being used. The Secretary has the burden of proving all the elements of an OSHA violation, Willson I, 685 F.2d at 673, but makes out his "prima facie case as to a violation of Sec. 1926.105(a) by showing that no means of protection listed in the standard was used to protect employees exposed to a fall in excess of 25 feet." Havens Steel Co., 1978 O.S.H.Dec. (CCH) p 22,689 at 27,385 (Rev.Comm'n 1978), aff'd without opinion, 607 F.2d 493 (D.C. Cir. 1979). OSHRC has continued to adhere to this definition of a prima facie case under Sec. .105(a) in recent cases. Williams Enters., Inc., 11 O.S.H.Cas. 1410, 1419 (Rev. Comm'n 1983), aff'd sub nom. Donovan v. Williams Enters, Inc., 744 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Courts have similarly held that the Secretary meets his burden under Sec. .105(a) with a showing that none of the listed devices was actually used. Cleveland Consol., Inc. v. OSHRC, 649 F.2d 1160, 1163, 1165 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming Commission finding of serious violation of Sec. .105(a) because connectors had no fall protection); Brennan v. Southern Contractors Service, 492 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1974) ("failure to use any of such devices is a proper predicate for the imposition of sanctions"). Interpreting the phrase "impractical" in Sec. .105(a) to include "not actually used" is consistent with the language of the regulation and the remedial purpose of the Act. As one court has explained,

[T]he regulation contemplates that one of the listed safety devices will be used when the described danger of height is involved.... [T]he standard is not intended to point out escape routes by which no device need be used if one of the alternative devices can be shown to be practical even though not in fact used.

Southern Colo. Prestress Co. v. OSHRC, 586 F.2d 1342, 1350 (10th Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original).

OSHRC did not analyze Sec. .105(a) in terms of the "not actually used" test, although the Secretary contends that this is the applicable standard. Willson's argument, implicitly adopted by the Commission, is that temporary floors--one of the listed devices--were used. What the company--and the Commission--have overlooked is that Sec. .105(a) applies to the steel erection industry only in part. A more specific regulation, Sec. .750(b), continues to govern interior fall hazards at steel erection sites. In applying the "not actually used" test when Sec. .105(a) has been partially preempted, the question to be asked is whether one of the listed devices designed to protect against the cited hazard was actually used.

This interpretation of the word "impractical" as refined by the "not actually used" test is supported by both the Willson I preemption analysis and by prior interpretations of Sec. .105(a). Because more general standards only apply "to the extent that none of such particular standards applies," 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.5(c) (2) (1985) (emphasis added), the Willson I court held that the issue in preemption analysis "is not whether Subpart R [on steel erection] provides any exterior fall protection standards, but rather whether it provides standards to guard against the particular exterior fall hazard for which Willson was cited," 685 F.2d at 672. Those parts of Sec. .105(a) which are not preempted by Sec. .750(b) are supposed to fill the gaps left by the Subpart R regulations, so any fall protection provided under Sec. .105(a) must be considered "practical" only if it protects "against the particular exterior fall hazard" that Sec. .750(b) does not guard against.

Prior interpretations of Sec. .105(a) also support a reading that focuses on the ability of a listed device to provide protection against the cited fall hazard. The Commission has acknowledged that Sec. .105(a) "is not satisfied simply by the use of one of the devices listed in that section without regard to whether such use provides adequate fall protection to employees." National Indus. Constructors, Inc., 9 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) 1871, 1872 (Rev. Comm'n 1981). Accord OSHA Instruction STD 3-3.1 (July 18, 1983), reprinted in [1982-83 Developments] Empl. Safety & Health Guide (CCH) p 12,855 at 17,165 (Secretary's enforcement directive which specifies that " [t]he requirements of [Sec. .105(a) ] are met only if use of one of the listed devices provides adequate fall protection to employees."). Adequate fall protection has not been provided merely because one of the listed devices has been used. Morgan & Culpepper, Inc. v. OSHRC, 676 F.2d 1065, 1069 (5th Cir. 1982) (use of scaffolds not a defense). Instead, for one of the listed devices to provide adequate or practical fall protection that device must be capable of providing protection against the type of hazard to which employees are exposed.

The easiest way to analyze Sec. .105(a) when it has been partially preempted by Sec. .750(b) is to cross off the Sec. .105(a) list those safety devices which do not protect against the cited hazard, in this case exterior falls from above temporary floors. While no other court has explicitly used this methodology of crossing devices such as temporary floors off the Sec. .105(a) list, other decisions have adopted this interpretation sub silentio by finding Sec. .105(a) violations by steel erectors even though temporary flooring was being used. Donovan v. Adams Steel Erection, Inc., 766 F.2d 804, 805 (3d Cir. 1985) (floor 20 feet below employees); Donovan v. Daniel Marr & Son, Inc., 763 F.2d 477, 479 (1st Cir. 1985) (floor 40 feet below employees); Donovan v. Williams Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 170, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (floors 40, 47, and 58 feet below employees).⁸ 

Temporary floors are effectively omitted from the Sec. .105(a) list when that regulation is cited in response to an exterior fall hazard in the steel erection industry, because such floors only protect against interior falls. Because none of the other devices listed in Sec. .105(a) were actually used to protect against exterior fall hazards, see infra at 1388, Willson violated Sec. .105(a).

B. The "Substantial Portion of the Work Day" Test

OSHRC did not undertake this type of analysis to determine whether any of the safety devices listed in Sec. .105(a) were actually used to protect against the hazard for which Willson was cited. Instead, the Commission treated temporary floors as being actually used and looked to the other portion of the Willson I definition of impractical. Actual use alone does not fulfill the requirements of Sec. .105(a) so as to excuse an employer from using safety nets: the protection device used must also be "practical." The court in Willson I held that whether the safety belts used in that case were practical as protective devices depended on the amount of time during the work day that they could be used. The court's conclusion was that "the inability to use safety belts during a significant period of the work day renders them 'impractical' within the meaning of section .105(a)." 685 F.2d at 675.

OSHRC misinterpreted the "substantial portion of the work day" test, id., by applying it where no listed device was actually used. The test was applied in Willson I only because there was evidence in the record that one of the listed devices which could protect against exterior fall hazards--safety belts--was actually being used. The "substantial portion of the work day" test plays no role when no exterior fall protection device is actually used; as explained previously, see supra at p. 1383, the Secretary makes a prima facie case of a Sec. .105(a) violation just by showing that no such devices were used. The Commission therefore erred in requiring the Secretary to go beyond its showing that no exterior fall protection devices were actually used and prove that employees were exposed to exterior fall hazards for a substantial portion of the work day.

OSHRC's interpretation of Sec. .105(a) allows employers to expose employees to exterior fall hazards without providing any form of protection as long as the hazard does not exist for a substantial portion of the work day. While the Willson I court rejected the Secretary's argument that Sec. .105(a) requires employers "to provide continuous fall protection by means of a combination of the fall protection devices listed therein," 685 F.2d at 674, the court did not sanction the practice of using no fall protection devices for extended periods of time. Because Willson I was "not a case where the evidence establishes that the nature of the work precluded the use of safety belts most or even some of the time," id. at 675, the court concluded that the employer could not be required to provide nets to bolster the practical protection already provided by safety belts for a substantial portion of the work day. That holding does not, however, mean that nets are not required when the employer's failure to provide any form of fall protection has the effect of precluding the use of protective devices all of the time.

The Commission's decision effectively excuses employers from the requirement of providing one of the listed devices if the exterior fall hazard happens to be of short duration. This interpretation of Sec. .105(a) is not supported by the language of the regulation, which requires the use of one of the listed devices without regard to the duration of the fall hazard.⁹  Such an interpretation has correctly been rejected by the Fifth Circuit. Morgan & Culpepper, Inc. v. OSHRC, 676 F.2d 1065, 1069 (5th Cir. 1982) ("the existence of an unsafe condition for only a short duration" is not a defense to a charge of violating Sec. .105(a)); see also Austin Bldg. Co. v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that a similar regulation requiring use of personal protective equipment to protect against exterior falls of less than 25 feet "makes no exception for hazardous conditions of short duration"). OSHRC's interpretation also violates the principle that " [OSHA] standards must be construed ... to protect the employees." GAF Corp. v. OSHRC, 561 F.2d 913, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

This court has not applied the "substantial portion of the work day" test of impracticability when no protection has been provided against exterior falls; thus, we recently affirmed a citation under Sec. .105(a) without discussing the test or the duration of the hazard. Williams Enterprises, 744 F.2d at 177-79. Similarly, two appellate courts, which adopted the reasoning of Willson I in analyzing the relationship between Sec. .105(a) and Sec. .750(b), reinstated citations under Sec. .105(a) in the steel erection industry without discussing the "substantial portion of the work day" test. Adams Steel, 766 F.2d at 807-10; Daniel Marr, 763 F.2d at 480-84. As in those cases, we need not use the "substantial portion of the work day" test in applying the Willson I interpretation of Sec. .105(a) to this case, because no exterior fall protection devices were actually used.¹⁰ 

Willson argues that the company "did not have reasonable notice as to the Secretary's interpretation of the requirements of Section 105(a) ... [because] despite the fact that the use of perimeter nets by steel erectors nationwide has been limited to a few construction projects, the Secretary has not enforced the interpretation of the regulations he advances here." Willson Brief at 9 n. 6. The ALJ had similarly based its decision vacating the citation on Willson's lack of notice, finding both that Sec. .105(a) was too vague when read together with Sec. .750(b) to provide adequate notice, A. at 20, 37-38, and that "lack of enforcement lulled the industry into a false sense of security," id. at 35. Willson's notice argument, while made only sketchily, seems to involve two separate claims. The first contention is that Sec. .105(a) is too vague, either facially or when read in conjunction with Sec. .750(b), to provide adequate notice. The second argument is that the Secretary's failure to apply his interpretation of Sec. .105(a) to the steel erection industry in the face of widespread non-compliance with that regulation deprived Willson of adequate notice. We reject both of these arguments and find that Willson had both actual and constructive notice that Sec. .105(a) applied in the steel erection industry and required use of one of the appropriate listed devices to protect against exterior falls.

Willson had actual notice that Sec. .105(a) required steel erectors to provide exterior fall protection because of a previous citation and an earlier inspection. The same company that is the respondent here was the petitioner in Willson I and received the Sec. .105(a) citation at issue in that case several months before the July, 1980, inspection in this case. See Willson I, 685 F.2d at 667-68. While the Willson I court admitted that "the regulations involved teeter precariously on the edge of the wall that divides adequate notice from impermissible vagueness," 685 F.2d at 676, the court found its interpretation of Sec. .105(a) to be reasonable and to adequately address Willson's notice concerns, and so proceeded to apply that interpretation to Willson's violation, id. at 674-76.¹¹  In addition, Willson was put on actual notice of the requirements of Sec. .105(a) when OSHA inspector John Wiseman spoke to a Willson vice president during a previous inspection about the necessity of using perimeter nets on structural steel jobs. A. at 187-88.

Willson did not have to be on actual notice, however, because " [t]he constitution does not demand that the employer be actually aware that the regulation is applicable to his conduct." Faultless Div. v. Secretary of Labor, 674 F.2d 1177, 1185 (7th Cir. 1982). A regulation is not so vague as to violate due process requirements as long as "the standard was sufficient to put [the employer] on notice as to the proscribed conduct." Cedar Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 587 F.2d 1303, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Section 105(a) provides clear notice that an employer is at least required to use one of the listed devices. In rejecting a notice challenge to a Sec. .105(a) violation, the Commission has found that "it is clear from the wording of the standard that the employer is under an obligation to provide employees with some means of fall protection through use of these alternative devices or provision of safety nets." National Indus. Constructors, Inc., 9 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) 1871, 1875 (Rev. Comm'n 1981). The language of Sec. .105(a) is sufficiently clear to put Willson on notice that the regulation proscribes a failure to provide any form of exterior fall protection.

Willson's argument that the industry's practice was not to use perimeter netting alludes to cases in which courts have remedied facial vagueness in OSHA standards by looking to industry custom and practice in order to derive a standard of conduct as to which the employer had notice. These courts have, however, used this practice "only when a specific standard of expected employer conduct is proposed to be derived from a very general statutory or regulatory command." Faultless, 674 F.2d at 1186-87. The regulatory command of Sec. .105(a) is specific enough so that no reference to industry practice is necessary. Daniel Marr, 763 F.2d at 484.

If Willson is arguing that widespread industry practice or the Secretary's failure to enforce the regulation in effect bars enforcement of Sec. .105(a) against the company, we soundly reject that argument. Even in cases in which industry practice is considered in interpreting OSHA standards, that practice is not dispositive when the industry has failed to provide necessary protections. This court has warned that it will act " 'to prevent an industry, which fails to take sufficient precautionary measures against hazardous conditions, from subverting the underlying purposes of the Act.' " L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC, 698 F.2d 507, 513 n. 17 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quotingBristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. OSHRC, 601 F.2d 717, 723 (4th Cir. 1979)). The Seventh Circuit has similarly rejected an employer's argument that it and the whole industry lacked notice because of the Secretary's failure to prosecute violations:

[T]he argument for reliance on industry practice would permit employers to avoid compliance with specific safety mandates by relying on the (perhaps equally objectionable) practices of their peers. Nothing in the OSH Act or its legislative history requires or permits the Secretary to await an industry consensus about unsafe conditions before moving to enforce.

Faultless, 674 F.2d at 1187 (citations omitted).

This court can instruct OSHRC to reinstate the citation, rather than remanding for further proceedings, if only one conclusion is supportable on the record before us. Donovan v. Stafford Constr. Co., 732 F.2d 954, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Marshall v. Western Elec., Inc., 565 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1977). To prove a violation of Sec. .105(a), the Secretary must show only that (1) the workplace is twenty five feet above the ground and (2) none of the listed safety devices are practical, meaning that they are either not used or are used but not practical because they do not protect against the cited fall hazard for a substantial portion of the work day. These are findings we can easily make on this record.

In fact, the record establishes a violation of Sec. .105(a) even if we accept Willson's completely unsupported allegation that safety belts are practical when connectors are at the perimeter but not actually doing connecting, because belts were not actually used. In fact, this record is devoid of any evidence that any protection against exterior falls was ever accorded to connectors. Perimeter nets were never used. The ALJ found that "perimeter nets were not in use at the worksite," A. at 21, and Willson's superintendents told the OSHA inspector that there was no netting at the job site, A. at 82. Nor is there any record evidence that safety belts were ever worn by connectors. Both OSHA inspector John Wiseman and Willson Vice President of Operations James Willson testified that it was not safe for connectors to use safety belts while connecting because they need mobility to avoid being injured by steel beams. A. at 81-82, 139-41. Wiseman also testified that the two connectors he saw at the perimeter of the building were not wearing safety belts. A. at 68. The only conclusion to be drawn from this record is that the sole fall protection device in use at the job site was temporary flooring, which does not provide protection against exterior falls.

Willson was cited for a serious violation of Sec. .105(a). A serious violation exists "if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result." 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1982). This court has recently affirmed that the Secretary has the burden of establishing the seriousness of a violation and that OSHRC's determination as to seriousness controls " ' [i]f evidence is presented that a practice could eventuate in serious physical harm upon other than a freakish or utterly implausible occurrence of circumstances.' " Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 766 F.2d 575, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n. 33 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). Although neither the ALJ nor the Commission reached the issue of the seriousness of this violation, the ALJ affirmed serious violations of two other standards because employees were exposed to falls of 11 feet with the possibility of sustaining serious injuries such as broken bones. A. at 43-44. The Secretary also presented the opinion testimony of the inspector that the 80 foot fall hazard could cause death or serious physical harm, A. at 84, and Willson did not deny that employees would fall 88 feet if they were not wearing safety belts and fell to the exterior of the building, id. at 143. We find that the Secretary has established a serious violation of Sec. .105(a) because there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a fall from the heights involved here.¹²  Cf. Adams Steel Erection, Inc., 11 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) 2073, 2082-83 (Rev. Comm'n 1984) (Comm'r Cleary, dissenting) (would affirm ALJ's finding that exterior fall hazards of 30 and 40 feet would have caused serious injury or death to steel erection workers), rev'd sub nom. Donovan v. Adams Steel Erection, Inc., 766 F.2d 804, 812 (3d Cir. 1985) (reinstating the ALJ's determinations).

The citation alleging a serious violation of 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926.105(a) is supported by substantial evidence in the record from which only one conclusion can be drawn and it must therefore be reinstated.¹³  The Secretary has proven that Willson created a substantial probability that a worker would suffer death or serious physical harm by failing to provide any protection against exterior falls from a workplace more than 25 feet above the ground. The citation vacated by OSHRC is hereby remanded with directions that it be reinstated, and the petition for review is

Granted.