Justia.com Opinion Summary: In this juvenile delinquency case, the prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal seeking the Supreme Court's review of a magistrate's order suppressing certain statements made by the juvenile during a police interrogation. Because the magistrate's suppression order was never reviewed and adopted (with or without modification) by the district court before the appeal was filed, the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.
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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
February 6, 2012
2012 CO 5
No. 11SA98 – People v. S.X.G. – 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2011) - Interlocutory Appeals in
Criminal Cases; 19-1-108(5.5), C.R.S. (2011) – Petitions for Review of Magistrate’s
Order in Delinquency Cases; 19-2-903(2), C.R.S. (2011) – Interlocutory Appeals in
Delinquency Cases; and C.A.R. 4.1 – Interlocutory Appeals in Criminal Cases
In this juvenile delinquency case, the prosecution filed an interlocutory appeal
under sections 19-2-903(2) and 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2011), and C.A.R. 4.1, seeking the
supreme court’s review of a juvenile magistrate’s order suppressing certain statements
made by a juvenile during a police interrogation. Because the juvenile magistrate’s
suppression order was never reviewed and adopted (with or without modification) by
the district court, as is required by section 19-1-108(5.5) and C.R.M. 7(a)(10)-(11) before
an appeal may be filed, the supreme court lacks appellate jurisdiction under sections 1612-102(2) and 19-2-903(2) to review the merits of the suppression ruling. Accordingly,
the appeal is dismissed.
Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
101 West Colfax Avenue, Suite 800 • Denver, Colorado 80202
2012 CO 5
Supreme Court Case No. 11SA98
Interlocutory Appeal
Montezuma County District Court 11JD7
Honorable Douglas Walker
Appellant:
The People of the State of Colorado,
v.
Juvenile-Appellee:
S.X.G.
Appeal Dismissed
en banc
January __, 2012
Attorneys for Appellant:
Russell Wasley, District Attorney
Andrew Hughes, Assistant District Attorney,
Cortez, Colorado
Attorneys for Appellee:
John Baxter, Alternate Defense Counsel
Durango, Colorado
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1
In this juvenile delinquency case, the prosecution has filed an interlocutory
appeal under sections 16-12-102(2), 19-1-108(5.5), 19-2-903(2), C.R.S. (2011), and C.A.R.
4.1, seeking our review of a juvenile magistrate’s order suppressing certain statements
made by S.X.G. during a police interrogation.
¶2
Section 19-2-903(2) expressly authorizes the prosecution in a delinquency case to
appeal “any decision of the trial court as provided in section 16-12-102, C.R.S.” Section
16-12-102(2) permits the prosecution to file an interlocutory appeal in the supreme court
from “a ruling of the trial court . . . granting a motion to suppress an extrajudicial
confession or admission” if the prosecution certifies that the appeal is “not taken for
purposes of delay and the evidence is a substantial part of the proof of the charge
pending against the defendant.” Before such an appeal may be filed in the supreme
court, however, section 19-1-108(5.5) and Colorado Magistrate Rule (C.R.M.) 7(a)(11)
require a petition for review of the magistrate’s order to be timely filed and decided in
accordance with the Colorado Rules for Magistrates.
Under C.R.M. 7(a)(10), the
reviewing judge “shall adopt, reject, or modify the initial order or judgment of the
magistrate by written order, which order shall become the order or judgment of the
district court.”
¶3
In this case, the record reveals that the prosecution timely filed a petition for
review of the magistrate’s suppression order with the district court pursuant to section
19-1-108(5.5).
However, the district court did not adopt, reject, or modify the
magistrate’s order; it instead concluded that it lacked authority to review an
1
interlocutory order of the magistrate. Because the juvenile magistrate’s suppression
order was never reviewed and adopted by the district court, as is required by section
19-1-108(5.5) and C.R.M. 7(a)(11) before an appeal may be filed, we lack appellate
jurisdiction under sections 16-12-102(2) and 19-2-903(2) to review the merits of the
suppression ruling. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
The prosecution filed a petition in delinquency against S.X.G., alleging acts which,
¶4
if committed by an adult, would constitute the offenses of second degree burglary,1
criminal mischief,2 and theft.3 On March 4, 2011, S.X.G. moved to suppress certain
statements he made to a police detective during an investigatory interview on the
grounds that they were improperly obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), and section 19-2-511(1), C.R.S. (2011), which generally provides that
statements or admissions of a juvenile made during a custodial interrogation are
inadmissible against the juvenile unless the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or legal or
physical custodian was present during the interview and also advised of the juvenile’s
Miranda rights.
On March 30, 2011, the juvenile magistrate held a suppression hearing and heard
¶5
testimony from law enforcement officers, S.X.G., and S.X.G.’s mother, who had been
present during the custodial interrogation. On April 1, 2011, the juvenile magistrate
§ 18-4-203(1), C.R.S. (2011).
§ 18-4-501, C.R.S. (2011).
3 § 18-4-401(1), (2)(b), C.R.S. (2011).
1
2
2
issued an order suppressing statements S.X.G. made during the second part of his
interview, following an approximately two-hour break in the questioning.
The
magistrate concluded that S.X.G. and his mother did not freely, knowingly, and
intelligently waive their rights before the second part of S.X.G.’s interview.
The
magistrate also concluded that (1) the detective’s comment to S.X.G.’s mother, “Now,
Mom, I want you to just bear with him during this, okay,” and his statement to S.X.G. to
“go ahead,” effectively “usurped the role of the parent” in the interview by suggesting
to the parent that she should be silent and allow S.X.G. to respond; (2) the intent of the
detective’s statement was to influence the mother to withhold guidance to the juvenile;
and (3) the detective’s comment interfered with the exercise of the juvenile’s and the
mother’s rights.
¶6
On April 5, 2011, the prosecution timely filed a petition for review of the
magistrate’s suppression order with the district court under section 19-1-108(5.5) and
simultaneously requested a stay of the bench trial set for the next day, pending the
district court’s review of the magistrate’s order. The prosecution contended that (1) the
magistrate erroneously applied a “clear and convincing evidence” standard of review;
(2) the detective was not required to re-advise the juvenile and his mother of their
Miranda rights before the second half of the interview; (3) the detective was not
required to advise the juvenile in advance about the subject matter of the interview; (4)
the detective’s statement to S.X.G.’s mother did not overbear the will of either the
3
parent or the juvenile and did not usurp the role of the parent; and (5) under the totality
of the circumstances, the juvenile’s statements were voluntary.
¶7
That same day, the district court denied the request to stay the trial, concluding
that it lacked authority to review an interlocutory order of the magistrate.
¶8
On April 6, 2011 (the scheduled trial date), the prosecution filed this interlocutory
appeal, invoking our interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under sections 16-12-102(2)
and 19-2-903(2), and C.A.R. 4.1. Both parties proceeded to brief the merits on appeal
without addressing the propriety of our appellate jurisdiction or whether the district
court properly declined to review the magistrate’s order.
II. Analysis
¶9
Because we must always satisfy ourselves that we have jurisdiction to hear an
appeal, we may raise jurisdictional defects sua sponte, regardless of whether the parties
have raised the issue. See J.P. Meyer Trucking & Constr., Inc. v. Colo. Sch. Dists. Self
Ins. Pool, 18 P.3d 198, 201 n.3 (Colo. 2001).
¶10
Here, the statutory prerequisite for filing an interlocutory appeal in this court has
not been satisfied, because the district court declined to address the prosecution’s
petition for review, concluding that it lacked authority to review the magistrate’s
suppression order. Because the district court never adopted the magistrate’s order
(with or without modification), we do not have appellate jurisdiction under sections 1612-102(2) and 19-2-903(2), which only permit our interlocutory review of a “trial court”
order. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941) (noting that
4
courts should “scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which
the statute has defined”).
¶11
“As a general matter, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment of a
district, probate or juvenile court. See C.A.R. 1(a)(1). An appellate court does not
review interlocutory orders absent specific authorization by statute or rule.” City of
Grand Junction v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 960 P.2d 675, 678 (Colo. 1998). In this
juvenile delinquency context, interlocutory review of a trial court order is authorized by
sections 16-12-102(2), 19-2-903(2), and C.A.R. 4.1.
¶12
Section 19-2-903(2) provides that “[t]he prosecution in a delinquency case may
appeal any decision of the trial court as provided in section 16-12-102, C.R.S.”
(emphasis added). In turn, section 16-12-102(2) provides that in criminal cases “[t]he
prosecution may file an interlocutory appeal in the supreme court from a ruling of the
trial court . . . granting a motion to suppress an extrajudicial confession or admission if
the prosecution certifies to the judge who granted such motion and to the supreme
court that the appeal is not taken for the purposes of delay and the evidence is a
substantial part of the proof of the charge pending against the defendant.” (emphasis
added); see also C.A.R. 4.1(a) (“The state may file an interlocutory appeal in the
supreme court from a ruling of a district court . . . granting a motion to suppress an
extra-judicial confession or admission . . . .” (emphasis added)).
¶13
When a juvenile magistrate has granted the suppression motion, section 19-1108(5.5) of the Children’s Code expressly requires a party to file a petition for review of
5
the magistrate’s order with the district court before such an appeal may be filed in the
supreme court. § 19-1-108(5.5) (“A petition for review shall be a prerequisite before an
appeal may be filed with the . . . Colorado supreme court.”); see also C.R.M. 7(a)(11)
(“Appeal of an order or judgment of a district court magistrate may not be taken to the
appellate court unless a timely petition for review has been filed and decided by a
reviewing court in accordance with these Rules.”).4
Under C.R.M. 7(a)(10), the reviewing judge shall, by written order, “adopt, reject,
¶14
or modify” the magistrate’s initial order; the reviewing judge’s order then shall become
the order of the district court. This order may then be appealed. C.R.M. 7(a)(11).5 Only
if the district court adopts, with or without modification, the magistrate’s order
granting the suppression motion, does this court have interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction under sections 16-12-102(2) and 19-2-903(2). See, e.g., People ex rel. R.A.,
C.R.M. 7(a) requires that an order entered “in a proceeding in which consent is not
necessary” must be reviewed by the district court prior to any appeal. By contrast,
C.R.M. 7(b) provides that an order entered “with consent of the parties in a proceeding
in which such consent is necessary” may be appealed pursuant to the Colorado Rules of
Appellate Procedure in the same manner as an order of judgment of a district court. We
conclude that C.R.M. 7(a), not C.R.M. 7(b), governs here. Section 19-1-108(1) authorizes
the juvenile court to appoint a magistrate to hear “any case or matter under the court’s
jurisdiction” (with certain exceptions not relevant here), and such statutory authority of
the juvenile magistrate is not conditioned upon the consent of the parties. Moreover,
section 19-1-108(5.5) expressly requires a petition for review as a prerequisite to an
appeal of a magistrate’s order in juvenile delinquency cases, regardless of the existence
of actual consent of the parties.
4
If timely review in the district court is not requested, the magistrate’s initial order or
judgment becomes the order or judgment of the district court, and any appeal of that
order is barred. C.R.M. 7(a)(12).
5
6
937 P.2d 731, 734 (Colo. 1997) (reviewing a district court’s order “affirming” the
magistrate’s order granting a motion to suppress statements of a juvenile defendant).
Indeed, any other appeal would not be a “ruling of the trial court . . . granting a motion
to suppress an extrajudicial confession or admission.” § 16-12-102(2); see also § 19-2903(2); C.A.R. 4.1(a).
¶15
In this case, the district court erroneously concluded that it lacked authority to
address the prosecution’s request for review, reasoning that C.R.M. 7 permits review
only of final orders or judgments, and the magistrate’s suppression order did not
qualify as a final order, citing People v. Hernandez, 155 Colo. 519, 395 P.2d 733 (Colo.
1964). The court further observed that orders issued by magistrates are reviewable
upon the grounds set forth in C.R.C.P. 59, which pertains to post-trial motions. Finally,
the district court noted that this court specifically held in People ex rel. P.L.V., 172 Colo.
269, 270, 472 P.2d 127, 128 (1970), that interlocutory appeals are not available in
delinquency matters. The district court acknowledged that this court’s more recent
decision in People ex rel. R.A., 937 P.2d at 739, concerned an interlocutory appeal in a
delinquency case, but noted that the propriety of such an appeal was not addressed in
that decision. The district court’s order made no reference to section 19-2-903(2).
¶16
First, whether a magistrate’s order constitutes a “final order” within the meaning
of C.R.M. 7(a)(3) does not preclude a district court from addressing a petition for review
of that order if, upon adoption by the district court, that order is properly subject to an
interlocutory appeal pursuant to sections 16-12-102(2) and 19-2-903(2). To conclude
7
otherwise would render these interlocutory appeal statutes meaningless in juvenile
cases involving magistrate orders.
In other words, if “[t]he prosecution in a
delinquency case may appeal any decision of the trial court as provided in section 1612-102,” as expressly authorized by section 19-2-903(2), then the magistrate rules cannot
be construed to bar the prosecution from seeking statutorily authorized interlocutory
review of a suppression order simply because that suppression order was entered by a
juvenile court magistrate instead of the juvenile court judge.
¶17
Second, the reference in section 19-1-108(5.5) to C.R.C.P. 59 (which governs posttrial motions) presumably is meant to give the district court procedural guidance when
ruling on the request for review; in any event, this reference cannot be construed to
negate the jurisdictional statutes and rules that specifically permit interlocutory
appeals.
¶18
Third, our 1970 decision in People ex rel. P.L.V. has no application to this case. In
1987, the legislature enacted section 19-2-602(2), recodified in 1996 at section 19-2-903(2),
which expressly allows the prosecution in delinquency proceedings to file the
interlocutory appeals provided for in section 16-12-102(2), including the one here. See
ch. 138, sec. 1, § 19-2-602(2), 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 695, 728 (effective Oct. 1, 1987); ch.
283, sec. 1, § 19-2-903(2), 1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1595, 1657 (effective Jan. 1, 1997); see also
People ex rel. R.A., 937 P.2d at 734, 736 (addressing, without discussing jurisdiction, an
interlocutory appeal of a juvenile magistrate’s order granting a suppression motion,
where that order had been reviewed and adopted by the district court).
8
¶19
Here, because the district court did not adopt (with or without modification) the
magistrate’s suppression order, the statutory prerequisite for an interlocutory appeal
has not been met and there is no trial court order for us to review.
III. Conclusion
¶20
Because we lack appellate jurisdiction and cannot exercise any appellate
jurisdiction until the petition for review is decided in accordance with C.R.M. 7(a), we
dismiss the appeal. Cf. In re Marriage of Moore, 107 P.3d 1150, 1151 (Colo. App. 2005).
Nothing in this opinion precludes the prosecution in this case from seeking
reconsideration in the district court of the original, timely-filed petition for review, or
S.X.G. from filing a brief in opposition in accordance with C.R.M. 7(a)(7).
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