2022 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 10 - Civil Practice and Procedure Generally
Article 4 - Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents
§ 9-10-91. Grounds for Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident

A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident or his or her executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he or she were a resident of this state, if in person or through an agent, he or she:

1. Transacts any business within this state;
2. Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act;
3. Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or omission outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
4. Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within this state;
5. With respect to proceedings for divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, or other domestic relations action or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph shall not change the residency requirement for filing an action for divorce; or
6. Has been subject to the exercise of jurisdiction of a court of this state which has resulted in an order of alimony, child custody, child support, equitable apportionment of debt, or equitable division of property if the action involves modification of such order and the moving party resides in this state or if the action involves enforcement of such order notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party.

History. Ga. L. 1966, p. 343, § 1; Ga. L. 1970, p. 443, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1304, § 1; Ga. L. 2010, p. 822, § 1/SB 491; Ga. L. 2011, p. 562, § 3/SB 139.

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in the introductory paragraph, inserted “or her”, inserted “or she” twice, and substituted “this state” for “the state”; in paragraph (5), substituted “divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, or other domestic relations action” for “alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action for divorce” near the beginning and inserted “, notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one of the original parties from this state and as to all obligations arising from alimony, child support, apportionment of debt, or real or personal property orders or agreements, if one party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this state” to the end of the first sentence; and added paragraph (6).

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, deleted “or” from the end of paragraph (4); in paragraph (5), in the first sentence, deleted a comma following “action or” and deleted “, notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one of the original parties from this state and as to all obligations arising from alimony, child support, apportionment of debt, or real or personal property orders or agreements, if one party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this state” from the end, and in the last sentence, substituted “; or” for a period; and, in paragraph (6), deleted “, notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one of the original parties from this state,” following “equitable division of property” in the middle and deleted a comma following “this state” near the end.

Cross references.

Revival of judgment against nonresident, § 9-12-67 .

Binding effect of child custody decrees on certain nonresidents, §§ 19-9-44 , 19-9-45 .

Exemption of witnesses from arrest and service of process, § 24-13-96 .

Extent of state jurisdiction to persons within state limits, § 50-2-21 .

Law reviews.

For article discussing convergence of standards governing limits of state’s personal jurisdiction and applicability of state substantive law, see 9 J. of Pub. L. 282 (1960).

For article, “The Length of the Long Arm,” see 9 J. of Pub. L. 293 (1960).

For article, “The Georgia Long Arm Statute: A Significant Advance in the Concept of Personal Jurisdiction,” see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 13 (1967).

For article summarizing law relating to jurisdiction and venue over domestic and foreign corporations in Georgia, and service therein, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (1970).

For article, “Foreign Corporations in Georgia,” see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 243 (1973).

For article discussing decisions relating to application of long arm statute to corporations, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (1977).

For article discussing 1976 to 1977 developments in Georgia’s long arm statute, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 265 (1977).

For article examining waiver of objections to venue and lack of personal jurisdiction by default, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 181 (1978).

For article discussing venue and jurisdictional requirements for third-party practice, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 13 (1978).

For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of business associations from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (1978).

For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 239 (1978).

For article examining the significance of distinguishing between tort and contract in Georgia, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 303 (1978).

For article discussing Georgia’s long arm statute, prejudgment attachment and habeas corpus, with respect to judicial developments in practice and procedure in the fifth circuit, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 925 (1979).

For article surveying judicial developments in Georgia’s trial practice and procedure laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 249 (1979).

For article discussing use of Georgia long arm statute in defamation cases, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 951 (1980).

For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1980).

For article surveying developments in Georgia trial practice and procedure from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 275 (1981).

For survey article on domestic relations, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (1982).

For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982).

For article surveying 1981-1982 Eleventh Circuit cases involving civil practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1363 (1983).

For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 127 (1983).

For annual survey of law on trial practice and procedure, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 315 (1983).

For article, “Georgia’s Domestic Relations Long-Arm Statute, Circa 1986,” see 23 Ga. St. B.J. 74 (1987).

For annual survey of law of domestic relations, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 179 (1986).

For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (1986).

For article, “Enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Congress Legislates Finality for Child Custody Decrees,” see 1 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 157 (1985).

For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 469 (1990).

For annual survey of domestic relations, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 243 (1991).

For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 441 (1991).

For article, “Trial Practice and Procedure,” see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1317 (1993).

For essay, “Connecting Defendant’s Contact and Plaintiff’s Claim: The Doctrine of Specific Jurisdiction and the Matrimonial Domicile Provisions of the Georgia Long-Arm Statute,” see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 303 (1995).

For article, “Business Associations,” see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (2001).

For article, “Domestic Relations Law,” see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 265 (2001).

For annual survey of appellate practice and procedure, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 61 (2004).

For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 221 (2004).

For article, “Personal Jurisdiction in Georgia Over Claims Arising from Business Conducted Over the Internet,” see 11 Ga. St. B.J. 21 (No. 7, 2006).

For article, “Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves: An Update on Personal Jurisdiction in Georgia Over Claims Arising from Business Conducted Over the Internet,” see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (No. 1, 2006).

For article, “Recent Decision: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Colemon: Broad Reading of Innovative Clinical Leads to General Personal Jurisdiction Under Georgia’s Long-Arm Statute,” see 43 Ga. L. Rev. 1321 (2009).

For article, “Aviation Law: A Survey of Recent Trends and Developments,” see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 585 (2010).

For annual survey of law on trial practice and procedure, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 339 (2010).

For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 305 (2012).

For annual survey on business corporations, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 61 (2012).

For article, “2014 Georgia Corporation and Business Organization Case Law Developments,” see 20 Ga. St. Bar. J. 26 (April 2015).

For article, “2015 Georgia Corporation and Business Organization Case Law Developments,” see 21 Ga. St. Bar. J. 30 (Apr. 2016).

For annual survey on business associations, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 33 (2017).

For annual survey on business associations, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 19 (2018).

For note discussing the 1970 amendments to the long arm statute as an enlargement of in personam jurisdiction, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 451 (1971).

For note discussing problems with venue in Georgia, and proposing statutory revisions to improve the resolution of venue questions, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 254 (1972).

For note advocating the adoption of a statute incorporating the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 744 (1973).

For note analyzing the long arm statute and suggesting some reforms, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 149 (1976).

For note appraising the Georgia domestic relations long-arm statute, see 18 Ga. L. Rev. 691 (1984).

For note discussing the standard to be applied to determine whether there is personal jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs in a class action suit, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 965 (1984).

For note, “Georgia’s Not-so-long Arm Statute: Exposing the Myth,” 6 Ga. State U.L. Rev. 487 (1990).

For note, “What Constitutes Minimum Contact in Cyberspace After CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson: Are New Rules Necessary for a New Regime?,” see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 521 (1997).

For note, “Getting Personal With Our Neighbors — A Survey of Southern States’ Exercise of General Jurisdiction and A Proposal for Extending Georgia’s Long-Arm Statute,” see 25 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1177 (2009).

For comment on O’Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 106 , 169 S.E.2d 827 (1969), see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 202 (1969).

For comment on Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 414 (1972).

For comment on Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58 , 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973), see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 164 (1973).

For comment on White v. Henry, 232 Ga. 64 , 205 S.E.2d 206 (1974), see 26 Mercer L. Rev. 317 (1974).

For comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559 , 62 L. Ed. 2 d 490 (1980), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S. Ct. 591 , 62 L. Ed. 2 d 516 (1980), regarding minimum contacts and state jurisdiction, see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 19 (1980).

For comment, “Jurisdiction over Nonresidents in Georgia: Crowder v. Ginn,” see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 201 (1982).

For comment, “Stepping Back to Move Forward: Expanding Personal Jurisdiction by Reviving Old Practices,” see 67 Emory L.J. 809 (2018).