2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 10 - Civil Practice and Procedure Generally
Article 4 - Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents
§ 9-10-91. Grounds for Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident

A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident or his or her executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he or she were a resident of this state, if in person or through an agent, he or she:

1. Transacts any business within this state;
2. Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act;
3. Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or omission outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
4. Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within this state;
5. With respect to proceedings for divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, or other domestic relations action or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph shall not change the residency requirement for filing an action for divorce; or
6. Has been subject to the exercise of jurisdiction of a court of this state which has resulted in an order of alimony, child custody, child support, equitable apportionment of debt, or equitable division of property if the action involves modification of such order and the moving party resides in this state or if the action involves enforcement of such order notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party.

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 343, § 1; Ga. L. 1970, p. 443, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1304, § 1; Ga. L. 2010, p. 822, § 1/SB 491; Ga. L. 2011, p. 562, § 3/SB 139.)

The 2010 amendment, effective July 1, 2010, in the introductory paragraph, inserted "or her", inserted "or she" twice, and substituted "this state" for "the state"; in paragraph (5), substituted "divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, or other domestic relations action" for "alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action for divorce" near the beginning and inserted ", notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one of the original parties from this state and as to all obligations arising from alimony, child support, apportionment of debt, or real or personal property orders or agreements, if one party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this state" to the end of the first sentence; and added paragraph (6).

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, deleted "or" from the end of paragraph (4); in paragraph (5), in the first sentence, deleted a comma following "action or" and deleted ", notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one of the original parties from this state and as to all obligations arising from alimony, child support, apportionment of debt, or real or personal property orders or agreements, if one party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this state" from the end, and in the last sentence, substituted "; or" for a period; and, in paragraph (6), deleted ", notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one of the original parties from this state," following "equitable division of property" in the middle and deleted a comma following "this state" near the end.

- Revival of judgment against nonresident, § 9-12-67.

Binding effect of child custody decrees on certain nonresidents, §§ 19-9-44,19-9-45.

Exemption of witnesses from arrest and service of process, § 24-13-96.

Extent of state jurisdiction to persons within state limits, § 50-2-21.

- For article discussing convergence of standards governing limits of state's personal jurisdiction and applicability of state substantive law, see 9 J. of Pub. L. 282 (1960). For article, "The Length of the Long Arm," see 9 J. of Pub. L. 293 (1960). For article, "The Georgia Long Arm Statute: A Significant Advance in the Concept of Personal Jurisdiction," see 4 Ga. St. B. J. 13 (1967). For article summarizing law relating to jurisdiction and venue over domestic and foreign corporations in Georgia, and service therein, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (1970). For article, "Foreign Corporations in Georgia," see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 243 (1973). For article discussing decisions relating to application of long arm statute to corporations, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (1977). For article discussing 1976 to 1977 developments in Georgia's long arm statute, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 265 (1977). For article examining waiver of objections to venue and lack of personal jurisdiction by default, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 181 (1978). For article discussing venue and jurisdictional requirements for third-party practice, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 13 (1978). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of business associations from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (1978). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 239 (1978). For article examining the significance of distinguishing between tort and contract in Georgia, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 303 (1978). For article discussing Georgia's long arm statute, prejudgment attachment and habeas corpus, with respect to judicial developments in practice and procedure in the fifth circuit, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 925 (1979). For article surveying judicial developments in Georgia's trial practice and procedure laws, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 249 (1979). For article discussing use of Georgia long arm statute in defamation cases, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 951 (1980). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1980). For article surveying developments in Georgia trial practice and procedure from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 275 (1981). For survey article on domestic relations, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (1982). For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982). For article surveying 1981-1982 Eleventh Circuit cases involving civil practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 1363 (1983). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 127 (1983). For annual survey of law on trial practice and procedure, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 315 (1983). For article, "Georgia's Domestic Relations Long-Arm Statute, Circa 1986," see 23 Ga. St. B.J. 74 (1987). For annual survey of law of domestic relations, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 179 (1986). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (1986). For article, "Enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Congress Legislates Finality for Child Custody Decrees," see 1 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 157 (1985). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 469 (1990). For annual survey of domestic relations, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 243 (1991). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 43 Mercer L. Rev. 441 (1991). For article, "Trial Practice and Procedure," see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 1317 (1993). For essay, "Connecting Defendant's Contact and Plaintiff's Claim: The Doctrine of Specific Jurisdiction and the Matrimonial Domicile Provisions of the Georgia Long-Arm Statute," see 11 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 303 (1995). For article, "Business Associations," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 109 (2001). For article, "Domestic Relations Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 265 (2001). For annual survey of appellate practice and procedure, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 61 (2004). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 221 (2004). For article, "Personal Jurisdiction in Georgia Over Claims Arising from Business Conducted Over the Internet," see 11 Ga. St. B.J. 21 (No. 7, 2006). For article, "Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves: An Update on Personal Jurisdiction in Georgia Over Claims Arising from Business Conducted Over the Internet," see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 6 (No. 1, 2006). For article, "Recent Decision: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Colemon: Broad Reading of Innovative Clinical Leads to General Personal Jurisdiction Under Georgia's Long-Arm Statute," see 43 Ga. L. Rev. 1321 (2009). For article, "Aviation Law: A Survey of Recent Trends and Developments," see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 585 (2010). For annual survey of law on trial practice and procedure, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 339 (2010). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 305 (2012). For annual survey on business corporations, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 61 (2012). For article, "2014 Georgia Corporation and Business Organization Case Law Developments," see 20 Ga. St. Bar. J. 26 (April 2015). For article, "2015 Georgia Corporation and Business Organization Case Law Developments," see 21 Ga. St. Bar. J. 30 (Apr. 2016). For annual survey on business associations, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 33 (2017). For annual survey on business associations, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 19 (2018). For note discussing the 1970 amendments to the long arm statute as an enlargement of in personam jurisdiction, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 451 (1971). For note discussing problems with venue in Georgia, and proposing statutory revisions to improve the resolution of venue questions, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 254 (1972). For note advocating the adoption of a statute incorporating the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 744 (1973). For note analyzing the long arm statute and suggesting some reforms, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 149 (1976). For note appraising the Georgia domestic relations long-arm statute, see 18 Ga. L. Rev. 691 (1984). For note discussing the standard to be applied to determine whether there is personal jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs in a class action suit, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 965 (1984). For note, "Georgia's Not-so-long Arm Statute: Exposing the Myth," 6 Ga. State U.L. Rev. 487 (1990). For note, "What Constitutes Minimum Contact in Cyberspace After CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson: Are New Rules Necessary for a New Regime?," see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 521 (1997). For note, "Getting Personal With Our Neighbors - A Survey of Southern States' Exercise of General Jurisdiction and A Proposal for Extending Georgia's Long-Arm Statute," see 25 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1177 (2009). For comment on O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 106, 169 S.E.2d 827 (1969), see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 202 (1969). For comment on Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971), see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 414 (1972). For comment on Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973), see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 164 (1973). For comment on White v. Henry, 232 Ga. 64, 205 S.E.2d 206 (1974), see 26 Mercer L. Rev. 317 (1974). For comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S. Ct. 591, 62 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1980), regarding minimum contacts and state jurisdiction, see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 19 (1980). For comment, "Jurisdiction over Nonresidents in Georgia: Crowder v. Ginn," see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 201 (1982). For comment, "Stepping Back to Move Forward: Expanding Personal Jurisdiction by Reviving Old Practices," see 67 Emory L.J. 809 (2018).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Constitutional Aspects and "Minimum Contacts"
• Grounds for Jurisdiction over Nonresidents

General Consideration

Analysis of law.

- For comprehensive analysis of Georgia's long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, see Hayes v. Irwin, 541 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857, 105 S. Ct. 185, 83 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1984).

- Restricting this section to natural persons would in large measure frustrate the objective of affording a local forum to Georgia citizens who have causes of action arising from the local activity of those residing out of state; the exclusion of corporations would have no basis in history or logic and would be contrary to the raison d'etre of the long arm. Wilen Mfg. Co. v. Standard Prods. Co., 409 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1969) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Purpose of this section is to protect Georgia residents from the torts of foreign corporations suffered within this state. Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 provides alternate means of service to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 upon one who was a resident of Georgia at the time the cause of action arose and who subsequently moved to another state before service could be perfected in Georgia. Stone v. First Nat'l Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207 (1981).

This section applies to nonresident corporations. Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- An out-of-state corporation that is authorized to do business in the state at the time claim arises is "resident" for purposes of personal jurisdiction; thus, such corporation may sue or be sued to the same extent as a resident corporation without regard to provisions of the long-arm statute. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 262 Ga. 599, 422 S.E.2d 863 (1992).

Words "or his executor or administrator" in this section could only refer to natural person, and cannot reasonably be construed to include corporations. Bauer Int'l Corp. v. Cagle's, Inc., 225 Ga. 684, 171 S.E.2d 314 (1969) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

This section provides for something less than the "doing business" or contacts rule which required a regular and systematic course of activity in a state to qualify for jurisdiction in that state. Droke House Publishers, Inc. v. Aladdin Distrib. Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Jurisdiction conferred by this section embraces all theories of relief related to the jurisdiction-generating event. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Arrow Aluminum Castings Co., 510 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Focus under this section is on what nonresident defendant has done in Georgia, not on the character of the plaintiff's activities. Fowler Prods. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 413 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Ga. 1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- In actions sounding in tort, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 will support the exercise of personal jurisdiction only if either the tortious act or the resulting injury occurred in Georgia. Where both the tortious acts alleged and the resulting injuries occurred outside of Georgia, § 9-10-91 will not support jurisdiction. Stacy v. Hilton Head Seafood Co., 688 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1988).

Commission of single act might in certain circumstances justify the assertion of jurisdiction by a state over a nonresident defendant. Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1983).

- In determining whether it had jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, trial court did not err in considering such issues as whether the corporation transacted any business in the state, whether it maintained an office or agents here, where negotiations took place, where goods were shipped, whether there was a course of dealing between the parties, whether minimum contacts were shown between the corporation and the state, and whether it had availed itself of any benefits of state law. Hoesch Am., Inc. v. Dai Yang Metal Co., 217 Ga. App. 845, 459 S.E.2d 187 (1995).

In determining whether the defendant has established the minimum contacts necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction, the court looks to whether the defendant has done some act to avail the defendant of the law of the forum state, and whether the claim is related to those acts. SES Indus., Inc. v. Intertrade Packaging Mach. Corp., 236 Ga. App. 418, 512 S.E.2d 316 (1999).

When the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, continuous and systematic conduct contacts, when the contacts give rise to the claims in a given case, will support specific jurisdiction, but the contacts are not necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction; jurisdiction will still be proper under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) and satisfy due process if a corporation engages in a single in-state transaction and that transaction undergirds the plaintiff's claims. Perrigo Co. v. Merial Ltd., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2016).

In determining personal jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1), foresee- ability is not transacting business and may not be imported into the latter's analysis. Perrigo Co. v. Merial Ltd., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2016).

- In the Amerireach.com decision the Georgia Supreme Court stated a three-part inquiry for whether jurisdiction exists under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has stated that the first prong of the three-part inquiry satisfies the transacting business requirement of the long arm statute and the second and third prongs satisfy federal due process. Crawford v. Harvard Publ'g Co., F.3d (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2018).

Jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may be exercised under this section when: (1) the nonresident has purposefully done some act or consummated some transaction with or in the forum but the actual act or omission resulting in the injury need not have occurred in this state; the defendant need not be physically within the forum when this act or transaction occurs, and a single such instance may suffice; (2) the Georgia plaintiff must have a legal cause of action in tort against the nonresident, which arises out of, or results from, the purposeful activity of the defendant involving this state; a resident is the victim of a "tortious act" when the resident suffers an injury due to an act or omission of negligence occurring outside this state; and (3) if the requirements of (1) and (2) are satisfied, the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident must be "reasonable." Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399, 227 S.E.2d 266 (1976); Robinson v. Ravenel Co., 411 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Ga. 1976); National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- When a nonresident engages in some activity with or in the forum, even a significant single transaction, whether the nonresident is physically present or not, and as a result business is transacted or a tortious injury occurs, a jurisdictional "contact" exists between that nonresident and the forum. Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399, 227 S.E.2d 266 (1976); Attwell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 954, 100 S. Ct. 1607, 63 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1980); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1980); Cocklereece v. Moran, 500 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Bankhead Enters., Inc. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 642 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1981).

- In a publisher's suit to collect fees for advertising published in the Yellow Pages against an Ohio advertiser, the trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, because personal jurisdiction was based on a forum selection clause in the parties' contract, and personal jurisdiction could be waived. YP, LLC v. Ristich, 341 Ga. App. 381, 801 S.E.2d 80 (2017).

- For the purposes of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, actions brought in federal court for copyright infringement are considered tort actions. CNN, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Ga. 1989).

In a trademark infringement case in which the alleged infringer moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the trademark holder unsuccessfully argued that the district court had jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1); the alleged infringement of the holder's mark from its website and alleged wrongful copying in California of one or more pages of the holder's website did not provide the district court with long-arm jurisdiction over the alleged infringer in Georgia. Tortious conduct engaged in over the internet occurs where the offending computer is used, which, in the present case, was in California. FisherBroyles, LLP v. Juris Law Group, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2015).

- The limits on the exercise of jurisdiction are not "mechanical or quantitative" but are to be found only in the requirement that the provisions made for this purpose must be fair and reasonable in the circumstances, and must give to the defendant adequate notice of the claim against the defendant, and an adequate and realistic opportunity to appear and be heard in a defense. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973).

- It seems reasonably clear that when a corporation commits a tort within a state, jurisdiction over the corporation by the state for the consequences of the tort will be upheld; where action is for a nontortious act, the answer is less clear, and will turn on the number of contacts the defendant has with the state, and a balancing of the convenience to the plaintiff of action against the inconvenience thus caused to the defendant. Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ga. 1969).

- In determining whether in personam jurisdiction exists over nonresident corporation under this section, nonresident must have purposeful contacts with the forum state to the extent that the maintenance of the action does not offend fair play and substantial justice. Interstate Paper Corp. v. Air-O-Flex Equip. Co., 426 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D. Ga. 1977) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

This section restricts jurisdiction to causes of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section. Thorington v. Cash, 494 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Regardless of when the right to a claim accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations, the jurisdictional right under this section derives from the occurrence of one of the enumerated acts; thus, the time when one of the enumerated acts occurs is the time to be used in determining what provision of this section should be applied. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 125 Ga. App. 845, 189 S.E.2d 459 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973); Standard v. Meadors, 347 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Jurisdiction is not acquired merely because a nonresident transacts business in the state or happens to own, use, or possess real estate or commits a tortious act; the claim itself must have arisen from the transaction of the business, from the use, ownership, or possession of the real estate, or from the tortious act. J.C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 125 Ga. App. 832, 189 S.E.2d 453 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145 (1973).

Under this section, court must look to time of act complained of to ascertain what provision of the section would be germane. J.C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 125 Ga. App. 832, 189 S.E.2d 453 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Act on which jurisdiction is based for third-party complaint must be related to cause of action, and, therefore, court must look to the time of such act to determine what the parties' rights were and are under this section. J.C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 125 Ga. App. 832, 189 S.E.2d 453 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Sections involving limitations of action and this section are not in pari materia and do not involve similar principles. J.C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 125 Ga. App. 832, 189 S.E.2d 453 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Where subsequent sales of defendant's aircraft in Georgia are carried on by independent distributors, not by agents of defendant, these sales do not constitute sales by the defendant "in person or through an agent." Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1970).

- This section does not confer jurisdiction upon courts for a tort action against a foreign corporation whose sole contact with Georgia is that its officers, directors, and stockholders are residents of the state, and where both the tort and injury occur outside the boundaries of Georgia. Davis v. Haupt Bros. Gas Co., 131 Ga. App. 628, 206 S.E.2d 598 (1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Mere telephone or mail contact with out-of-state defendant, or even defendant's visits to state, is insufficient to establish the purposeful activity with Georgia required by O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Wise v. State Bd. for Examination, 247 Ga. 206, 274 S.E.2d 544, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 804, 102 S. Ct. 76, 70 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1981), overruled in part by Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005).

- Trial court erred in denying a South Carolina resident's motion to set aside a stalking permanent protective order issued against the resident. The Georgia court did not have personal jurisdiction over the nonresident under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 for stalking because the resident did not, in sending harassing emails from South Carolina, engage in conduct in Georgia. Huggins v. Boyd, 304 Ga. App. 563, 697 S.E.2d 253 (2010).

There is no express language in this section that would prevent nonresident plaintiff from using it to bring action in Georgia against a nonresident defendant. Schuehler v. Pait, 239 Ga. 520, 238 S.E.2d 65 (1977) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Petition brought against nonresident where service and venue are dependent upon this section must allege facts to state a cause of action; otherwise, the court is without jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. Brown v. Olen, 226 Ga. 492, 175 S.E.2d 838 (1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Although an action to recover contribution is in the nature of an independent action which can be maintained only in the county of the residence of the alleged joint tortfeasor, the effect of this section is to place the venue of a third-party complaint in the county where the tortious act occurred, thus making a nonresident tortfeasor amenable to action in such county. Grosser v. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 620, 188 S.E.2d 412 (1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- In the case of a suit brought against six members of a joint venture, four of whom were Georgians and two of whom were Texans, as to the resident joint defendants, suit was not proper in the county where the business of the nonresidents was transacted but had to be brought in the county where residents resided. The Texans were not "residents" for venue purposes and "nonresidents" for long-arm purposes; they were simply nonresidents. Weitzel v. Griffin & Assocs., 192 Ga. App. 89, 383 S.E.2d 653 (1989).

- In an action by a nonresident corporation against nonresident defendants for fraudulent inducement and conversion growing out of a contract for the construction of a plant in Georgia, neither defendant was subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Georgia where the evidence showed that they did not regularly solicit business or derive revenue from goods used or services rendered in the state, and that any out-of-state acts or omissions did not have any in-state consequences within the meaning of the long-arm statute. Taeger Enters., Inc. v. Herdlein Technologies, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 740, 445 S.E.2d 848 (1994).

- Where residents and nonresidents are joint obligors or joint tortfeasors, action against them may be brought in any county in the state in which jurisdiction can be obtained over the nonresident defendant. Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

Nonresident corporation is, for purposes of action, resident of county of state in which it has an office, agent, and place of business, and an action will lie against such corporation and a resident joint tortfeasor in such county, even though the resident joint tortfeasor resides in a different county. Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).

Plaintiff may rest on jurisdictional allegations in complaint unless defendant controverts those allegations with factual showing; in that event, the plaintiff has the burden of going forward with sufficient factual evidence to establish a prima facie showing of the jurisdictional allegations. National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

Plaintiff must prove the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

- In bank action to recover on third renewal of a loan made to a partnership in Georgia, Georgia court had jurisdiction over New York resident who executed a partnership agreement stating that the partners were all Georgia residents, that the partnership was to have its principal place of business in Georgia, and that the agreement was to be governed by Georgia law and who executed a certificate of authority that the individual was a general partner and that any partner was authorized to borrow money and to enter commercial banking agreements on behalf of the partnership although the individual never came to Georgia. Bloise v. Trust Co. Bank, 170 Ga. App. 405, 317 S.E.2d 249 (1984).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 does not provide jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in independent proceedings to change child custody. Baker v. Ashburn, 179 Ga. App. 757, 347 S.E.2d 660, aff'd, 256 Ga. 507, 350 S.E.2d 437 (1986).

One-time purchase of goods from a company in forum state by a nonresident with no other connection to the forum state, together with visits to the forum state by employees of the purchaser to return the goods after rejecting them, does not create a sufficient contact for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Lovett & Tharpe, Inc., 786 F.2d 1055 (11th Cir. 1986).

- A Japanese manufacturer of an automobile involved in an accident which occurred in Georgia when plaintiff experienced a failure of the vehicle's braking and cruise control system was subject to jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, notwithstanding the fact that the manufacturer had employed an independent distributor of its products in the United States. Burton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ga. 1986).

Georgia courts did not have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident lessee sued by a Georgia lessor to recover damages for the lessee's alleged failure to make rental payments in accordance with a lease agreement, where the lessee's business was in South Carolina, the order was made in South Carolina, the lease contract was subsequently accepted by the lessor in its office in Georgia and the lessee mailed rental payments directly to that office. Capital Assocs. v. Gallopade Enters. Int'l, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 504, 323 S.E.2d 842 (1984).

- Trial court's dismissal of complaint due to lack of personal jurisdiction was affirmed, where the defendant was a Florida corporation which merely leased an airplane to another Florida corporation. The defendant conducted no business and engaged in no activity in Georgia except for an unrelated act after the crash occurred. McDonnell v. Roy E. Beatty & Assocs., 203 Ga. App. 807, 418 S.E.2d 95 (1992).

- A choice of laws provision in a personal guaranty executed by a nonresident was not sufficient to establish long arm jurisdiction where the guarantor was not party to the contract in question and absent the required minimum contacts with the state. Apparel Resources Int'l, Ltd. v. Amersig S.E., Inc., 215 Ga. App. 483, 451 S.E.2d 113 (1994).

- Because the defendant, during the time period in which the alleged tortious conduct took place, was a resident in the county in Georgia where the suit was filed, the trial judge was authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even though the defendant was a nonresident at the time suit was filed. Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 333 S.E.2d 852 (1985).

The tolling statute could not be applied to extend the statute of limitations in consolidated personal injury renewal actions because the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-91 and9-10-94, could be utilized to serve the driver against whom the actions had been filed as the driver was a resident of Georgia at the time the driver was involved in an auto accident with a parent and child. Dickson v. Amick, 291 Ga. App. 557, 662 S.E.2d 333 (2008).

Resident's third automobile personal injury lawsuit against a former resident was properly dismissed because service of the resident's second lawsuit was not perfected in accordance with the Georgia Long-Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, and the period of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 ran before the third lawsuit (allegedly as a renewal of the second lawsuit under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61) was filed. Coles v. Reese, 316 Ga. App. 545, 730 S.E.2d 33 (2012).

- If defendant executed a promissory note in the county where suit was filed, the fact that the defendant subsequently moved to Florida would not preclude the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Georgia Receivables, Inc. v. Murray, 214 Ga. App. 732, 448 S.E.2d 783 (1994).

Service of process outside the state upon parties defendant who are state residents is subject to the service-of-process requirements of the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, and not the Long-Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Shahan v. Scott, 259 Ga. 172, 377 S.E.2d 859 (1989).

- In action seeking to perfect Florida judgment, in absence of competent evidence of Florida Long-Arm Statute, it was appropriate that trial court apply the Georgia Long-Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Superior Fertilizer & Chem., Inc. v. Warren, 162 Ga. App. 595, 292 S.E.2d 430 (1982).

- As there is no federal statute authorizing extraterritorial service of process upon an individual nonresident defendant in a private antitrust action, service of process upon the nonresident defendants in a private antitrust case must have been in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Vest v. Waring, 565 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

- The concept of "doing business" incorporated in the federal general venue statute is narrower than the concept of "transacting business" as contained in the Georgia long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Flowers Indus., Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Int'l Pension Fund, 565 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

- Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) authorizes service of process by mail upon nonresident defendants without regard to relevant state law, such as the Georgia long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. A.I.M. Int'l, Inc. v. Battenfeld Extrusions Sys., 116 F.R.D. 633 (M.D. Ga. 1987).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 is not intended to extend long arm jurisdiction to claims, such as alimony, which arise out of the dissolution of the marriage. Warren v. Warren, 249 Ga. 130, 287 S.E.2d 524 (1982), but see paragraph added in 1983.

- Where no evidence suggests that any attempt of personal service was made or that such attempt was impossible, the movant has clearly failed to fulfill the constitutional requirement of exercising reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and personally serve a nonresident prior to moving for constructive service. Gaddis v. Dyer Lumber Co., 168 Ga. App. 334, 308 S.E.2d 852 (1983).

- In a products liability action against a nonresident foreign corporation arising out of an airplane crash in another state, jurisdiction over the corporation was limited by the long-arm statute and, since the corporation was not authorized to transact business in the state, does not have a registered agent for service of process in the state, and did not have the required minimum contacts with the state, there was no basis to exert jurisdiction. Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. Sanders, 218 Ga. App. 1, 460 S.E.2d 94 (1995).

- Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) suggests that the legislature intended to accord any special treatment to fiduciaries acting on behalf of a corporation or to insulate the fiduciaries from long-arm jurisdiction for acts performed in a corporate capacity, and such special treatment is one of those requirements which has occasionally been engrafted onto O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) and which conflicts with the statute's literal language; thus, to the extent that the decisions apply the "fiduciary shield" doctrine or its equivalent, the Georgia Court of Appeals cases of Southern Electronics Distributors v. Anderson, 232 Ga. App. 648 (1998), and Girard v. Weiss, 160 Ga. App. 295 (1981), are hereby overruled, and the federal cases of Club Car v. Club Car (Quebec) Import, 362 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 2004), Canty v. Fry's Electronics, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (N.D. Ga. 2010), and United States for Use and Benefit of WFI Ga. v. Gray Ins. Co., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1320, (N.D. Ga. 2010), will not be followed. Amerireach.com, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. 261, 719 S.E.2d 489 (2011).

Both the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, and constitutional fairness concerns adequately protect corporate employees and officers, and the fiduciary shield doctrine unfairly prejudices plaintiffs who have valid claims against those individuals who have acted in a corporate capacity in Georgia; as with other corporate officers, those courts which follow the "fiduciary shield" rule either apply the rule to members of a limited liability company (LLC) or make an exception to avoid injustice, and accordingly, for the same reasons that the "fiduciary shield" doctrine is rejected with respect to other corporate officers, the rule is also rejected to members of an LLC but to be subject to the forum court's jurisdiction, a member's own activities must satisfy the minimum contacts test. Amerireach.com, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. 261, 719 S.E.2d 489 (2011).

- Because service of process of a consolidated declaratory judgment action was not sufficiently perfected on two defendant brothers, neither waived service, and despite the fact that one brother might have had notice of the earlier action and service was attempted against the other pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 and O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94, the clear requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(7) were not dispensed with; hence, the trial court erred in denying the brothers' motion to dismiss said action. Tavakolian v. Agio Corp., 283 Ga. App. 881, 642 S.E.2d 903 (2007).

- Florida prison officials who declared that they did not reside in Georgia and did not own any property, real or personal, in Georgia and who did not commit any malfeasance in Georgia, fell outside the scope of Georgia's long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Caraballo-Sandoval v. Honsted, 35 F.3d 521 (11th Cir. 1994).

Cited in American Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Bartow Indus. Dev. Corp., 42 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Hare v. United Airlines Corp., 295 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Hamilton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 119 Ga. App. 361, 167 S.E.2d 228 (1969); Dill v. Guthrie, 120 Ga. App. 527, 171 S.E.2d 359 (1969); Deacon v. Deacon, 122 Ga. App. 513, 177 S.E.2d 719 (1970); McKee v. Southern Ry., 339 F. Supp. 1199 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Evershine Prods., Inc. v. Bhavnani, 126 Ga. App. 339, 190 S.E.2d 553 (1972); Shearouse v. Paul Miller Ford Co., 127 Ga. App. 639, 194 S.E.2d 585 (1972); Hemphill v. Con-Chem, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 590, 197 S.E.2d 457 (1973); Williamson v. Perret's Farms, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 687, 197 S.E.2d 754 (1973); Railey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 875, 201 S.E.2d 628 (1973); Blackmon v. Habersham Mills, Inc., 131 Ga. App. 59, 205 S.E.2d 21 (1974); Rainwater v. Vazquez, 133 Ga. App. 173, 210 S.E.2d 380 (1974); Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 134 Ga. App. 102, 213 S.E.2d 522 (1975); Coop Mtg. Invs. Assocs. v. Pendley, 134 Ga. App. 236, 214 S.E.2d 572 (1975); Thrift v. Vi-Vin Prods., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 717, 215 S.E.2d 709 (1975); Spielberger v. Akers, 234 Ga. 815, 218 S.E.2d 751 (1975); Smiley v. Davenport, 139 Ga. App. 753, 229 S.E.2d 489 (1976); Balasco v. County of San Diego, 150 Ga. App. 482, 231 S.E.2d 485 (1976); Eco-Rez, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 141 Ga. App. 90, 232 S.E.2d 587 (1977); Independent Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Prods., Inc., 141 Ga. App. 518, 233 S.E.2d 874 (1977); Davis v. Transairco, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 544, 234 S.E.2d 134 (1977); Shaw v. Cousins Mtg. & Equity Invs., 142 Ga. App. 773, 236 S.E.2d 919 (1977); Storey v. Seffelaar & Looyen, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 873, 237 S.E.2d 236 (1977); Atlanta Whses., Inc. v. Housing Auth., 143 Ga. App. 588, 239 S.E.2d 387 (1977); C-R-S, Inc. v. M.J. Soffe Co., 146 Ga. App. 200, 245 S.E.2d 884 (1978); Jackson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 147 Ga. App. 178, 248 S.E.2d 239 (1978); Marvin L. Walker & Assocs. v. A.L. Buschman, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 851, 250 S.E.2d 532 (1978); Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Reynolds, 147 Ga. App. 810, 250 S.E.2d 556 (1978); Shackelford v. Central Bank, 148 Ga. App. 494, 251 S.E.2d 569 (1978); Executive Jet Sales, Inc. v. Jet Am. Inc., 148 Ga. App. 475, 252 S.E.2d 54 (1978); Riordan v. W.J. Bremer, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 411 (S.D. Ga. 1979); Ramsey Winch Co. v. Trust Co. Bank, 153 Ga. App. 500, 265 S.E.2d 848 (1980); Ney-Copeland & Assocs. v. Tag Poly Bags, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 256, 267 S.E.2d 862 (1980); Borg-Warner Health Prods., Inc. v. May, 154 Ga. App. 482, 268 S.E.2d 770 (1980); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Graphic Mach., Inc. v. H.M.S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 158 Ga. App. 599, 281 S.E.2d 343 (1981); Hurt v. Cypress Bank, 9 Bankr. 749 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Pannell v. Pannell, 162 Ga. App. 96, 290 S.E.2d 184 (1982); Williams v. Parnell, 162 Ga. App. 573, 292 S.E.2d 425 (1982); Smith v. Griggs, 164 Ga. App. 15, 296 S.E.2d 87 (1982); Jarmon v. Murphy, 164 Ga. App. 763, 298 S.E.2d 510 (1982); Bracewell v. Nicholson Air Servs., Inc., 680 F.2d 103 (11th Cir. 1982); Schwind v. Gordon, 93 F.R.D. 517 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Kilsheimer v. State, 250 Ga. 549, 299 S.E.2d 733 (1983); Davis Mud & Chem., Inc. v. Pilgrim, 165 Ga. App. 738, 302 S.E.2d 423 (1983); Nicholson v. First Inv. Co., 705 F.2d 410 (11th Cir. 1983); Southwire Co. v. Trans-World Metals & Co., 735 F.2d 440 (11th Cir. 1984); Treadwell v. Lackey, 576 F. Supp. 1526 (M.D. Ga. 1984); Flight Int'l Group, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 583 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Unger v. Bryant Equip. Sales & Servs., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 364, 326 S.E.2d 483 (1985); Young v. Lindsey Credit Corp., 176 Ga. App. 733, 337 S.E.2d 457 (1985); Gant v. Gant, 254 Ga. 239, 327 S.E.2d 723 (1985); Sierra Club v. Leathers, 754 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1985); Thornwood Lease Plan, Inc. v. Action Ad of Tidewater, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Flint v. Gust, 184 Ga. App. 242, 361 S.E.2d 722 (1987); Heath v. Heath, 257 Ga. 777, 364 S.E.2d 272 (1988); Behar v. Aero Med Int'l, Inc., 185 Ga. App. 845, 366 S.E.2d 223 (1988); W.S. McDuffie & Assocs. v. Owens, 682 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Stephens v. Coleman, 712 F. Supp. 1571 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Dora-Clayton Agency, Inc. v. Forjay Broadcasting Corp., 193 Ga. App. 340, 387 S.E.2d 617 (1989); Boyce v. Boyce, 259 Ga. App. 831, 388 S.E.2d 524 (1989); Bailey v. Hall, 199 Ga. App. 602, 405 S.E.2d 579 (1991); Lee v. Muller, 200 Ga. App. 139, 407 S.E.2d 108 (1991); McKin v. Gilbert, 208 Ga. App. 788, 432 S.E.2d 233 (1993); Lightsey v. Nalley Equip. Leasing, Ltd., 209 Ga. App. 73, 432 S.E.2d 673 (1993); Cobb County v. Jones Group, 218 Ga. App. 149, 460 S.E.2d 516 (1995); Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Allegiant Physicians Servs. v. Sturdy Mem. Hosp., 926 F. Supp. 1106 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Dana Augustine, Inc. v. Parkman, 226 Ga. App. 881, 487 S.E.2d 697 (1997); Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 231 Ga. App. 11, 497 S.E.2d 596 (1998); King v. Barrios, 257 Ga. App. 538, 571 S.E.2d 531 (2002); Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, 291 F.3d 738 (11th Cir. 2002); Daniels v. Barnes, 289 Ga. App. 897, 658 S.E.2d 472 (2008); Gowdy v. Schley, 317 Ga. App. 693, 732 S.E.2d 774 (2012); Artson, LLC v. Hudson, 322 Ga. App. 859, 747 S.E.2d 68 (2013); Pandora Franchising, LLC v. Kingdom Retail Group, LLLP, 299 Ga. 723, 791 S.E.2d 786 (2016).

This section is not unconstitutional; it does not deprive a nonresident of due process of law. O.N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp., 232 Ga. 256, 206 S.E.2d 437 (1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

There is no violation of due process or underlying principles of traditional fairness and substantial justice when reasonable notice and opportunity to defend are present. Bosworth v. Cooney, 156 Ga. App. 274, 274 S.E.2d 604 (1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 452 U.S. 956, 101 S. Ct. 3101, 69 L. Ed. 2d 966 (1981).

This section is coterminus with the due process clause. Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Stanley v. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 354 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Harris v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 372 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1983); Interstate Paper Corp. v. Air-O-Flex Equip. Co., 426 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D. Ga. 1977); Process Control Corp. v. Witherup Fabrication & Erection, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

This section contemplates that jurisdiction shall be exercised over nonresidents to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process. Granite & Quartzite Centre, Inc. v. M/S Virma, 374 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Ga. 1974); Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 379, 227 S.E.2d 266 (1976); Value Eng'r Co. v. Gisell, 140 Ga. App. 44, 230 S.E.2d 29 (1976); Cox v. Long, 143 Ga. App. 182, 237 S.E.2d 672 (1977); Interstate Paper Corp. v. Air-O-Flex Equip. Co., 426 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D. Ga. 1977); Jet Am., Inc. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 145 Ga. App. 258, 243 S.E.2d 584 (1978); Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. v. Thompson, 244 Ga. 300, 260 S.E.2d 9 (1979); Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979); Shingleton v. Armor Velvet Corp., 621 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1980); National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Bankhead Enters., Inc. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 642 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1981); Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981); National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel, 514 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Lyons Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 519 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Intent of this section is to extend personal jurisdiction to perimeters or full limits allowed under the federal Constitution. Greenfield v. Portman, 136 Ga. App. 541, 221 S.E.2d 704 (1975); Jimerson v. Price, 411 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Ga. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 428 F. Supp. 673 (M.D. Ga. 1977).(see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Test to determine whether personal jurisdiction has been exercised consistent with dictates of due process is two-pronged: (1) the defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice and (2) the defendant must purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its law. Bigelow-Sanford, Inc. v. Gunny Corp., 649 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1981).

There is no objective test by which to judge facts of particular case to determine if the assertion of in personam jurisdiction exceeds the limits of constitutional due process. Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1983).

Generally, in long arm cases, court must decide if activities in question fall within scope of the state statute, and, if so, whether the due process clause of U.S. Const., Amend. 14 is satisfied by an inclusive construction. Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ga. 1969).

- The extent to which federal due process limits state jurisdiction over nonresidents and foreign corporations is a question of federal law, governed primarily by the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and state decisions on that question are not binding upon a federal court. Process Systems v. Dixie Packaging Co., 137 Ga. App. 452, 224 S.E.2d 103 (1976).

§ 9-10-91 to be applied to limits of due process. - Within the bounds of fairness and substantial justice to the defendant, this section will be applied to the limits of due process so that those who invoke the protection or benefits of the laws of Georgia, or who injure citizens or property in Georgia, will be made to answer therefore in the Georgia courts. Value Eng'r Co. v. Gisell, 140 Ga. App. 44, 230 S.E.2d 29 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

In diversity case it is appropriate for federal court to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporation if the state court may do so in compliance with state law and the due process requirements of the United States Constitution. Bankhead Enters., Inc. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 642 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1981).

Use of this section by local court in serving process on nonresident defendant is not unconstitutional for failing to give defendant a reasonable time to prepare and file defendant's answer where it allowed the defendant more time, not less, than the defendant would have been entitled to in superior court under general law. Action Indus., Inc. v. Redisco, Inc., 122 Ga. App. 754, 178 S.E.2d 735 (1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Due process is satisfied if action is based on a contract which has substantial connection with forum state. Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979); Bosworth v. Cooney, 156 Ga. App. 274, 274 S.E.2d 604 (1980), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 452 U.S. 956, 101 S. Ct. 3101, 69 L. Ed. 2d 966 (1981).

This section involves substantive rights and therefore cannot be applied retroactively. Buckhead Doctors' Bldg., Inc. v. Oxford Fin. Cos., 120 Ga. App. 516, 171 S.E.2d 365 (1969); Amos v. Bowers, 121 Ga. App. 801, 175 S.E.2d 877 (1970); J.C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 125 Ga. App. 832, 189 S.E.2d 453 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145 (1973); Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 125 Ga. App. 845, 189 S.E.2d 459 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973); Standard v. Meadors, 347 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ga. 1972). But see Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.D.C., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 cannot be applied retroactively. Outlaw v. John R. Bartlett Found., 166 Ga. App. 381, 304 S.E.2d 507 (1983).

- In an action on promissory notes executed in 1965, prior to the effective date of the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, inasmuch as that statute cannot be applied retroactively, the court must look at defendant's post-1966 Georgia activities to determine if they had sufficient minimum contacts within the state regarding the unsecured promissory notes to enable a court of this state to acquire jurisdiction over them. Outlaw v. John R. Bartlett Found., 166 Ga. App. 381, 304 S.E.2d 507 (1983).

Nonresident corporation may be subjected retroactively to jurisdiction of this state and court by virtue of this section. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.D.C., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ga. 1971). But see Buckhead Doctors' Bldg., Inc. v. Oxford Fin. Cos., 120 Ga. App. 516, 171 S.E.2d 365 (1969) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- The statutory scheme established by Georgia clearly anticipates activities of a foreign corporation within the state that would encompass the "minimum contacts" necessary to confer jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, but which do not require the foreign corporation to qualify to transact business. Al & Dick, Inc. v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 633 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

- Trial court properly declined to assert personal jurisdiction over Italian insurer not authorized to transact business in the state, with its place of business in Italy, where policy had been issued to insured, another Italian company, who had requested the only contact either party had with Georgia, an intermediate stop of the shipment in Atlanta. Simplex-Rapid v. Italia Assicurazioni, 209 Ga. App. 121, 433 S.E.2d 309 (1993).

This section is in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed. Taylor v. Jones, 123 Ga. App. 476, 181 S.E.2d 506 (1971); J.C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 125 Ga. App. 832, 189 S.E.2d 453 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Jurisdiction must be predicated on existence of ties among defendants, this state, and the litigation so that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Lyons Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 519 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

Reach of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 is a question of state law, and federal courts are required to construe it as would the Georgia Supreme Court. Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981).

In a diversity action, when the courts of the forum state have interpreted its long-arm statute to confer jurisdiction to the limits allowed by federal due process, state law need not be applied, and the court need only address due process concerns with respect to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Urspruch v. Greenblum, 968 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1996).

- Each defendant's contacts with Georgia must be assessed individually. The rules are: (1) the nonresident must purposefully avail the nonresident of the privilege of doing some act or consummating some transaction with or in the forum; (2) the plaintiff must have a legal cause of action against the nonresident, which arises out of, or results from, the activity or activities of the defendant within the forum; and (3) if (and only if) the requirements of Rules 1 and 2 are established, a "minimum contact" between the nonresident and the forum exists; the assumption of jurisdiction must be found to be consonant with the due process notions of "fair play" and "substantial justice." In other words, the exercise of jurisdiction based upon the "minimum contact" must be "reasonable." Kendrick v. Parker, 258 Ga. 210, 367 S.E.2d 544 (1988); State v. Reeves, 205 Ga. App. 656, 423 S.E.2d 32, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 423 S.E.2d 32 (1992).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 requires greater contacts between the defendant and the forum in contract cases than in tort cases. GECC v. Scott's Furn. Whse. Showroom, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

- In a diversity action to collect on accounts receivable obtained from a carpet manufacturer, among which accounts were a nonresident's obligations for carpet purchased, the court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, although constitutional minimum contacts existed, because jurisdiction was not permitted by the long-arm statute (this section), the only "contacts" of the defendant consisting of the following: (1) the defendant regularly attended trade fairs in Georgia; (2) it visited a manufacturer's mill in Georgia to determine whether it would buy carpet; (3) the defendant returned to another state and placed orders with the manufacturer; (4) the defendant sent its trucks into Georgia to pick up the carpet; (5) during this trip, the defendant hauled goods for Georgia residents unrelated to the carpet transaction; and (6) relating to this trucking business, the defendant maintained a certificate of authority and a registered agent. Irving Com. Corp. v. Sound Floor Coverings, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Ga. 1984) Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1980).

- The only requirement of this section is that the act or acts of the nonresident giving rise to the cause of action must have some relationship to the State of Georgia; there must be minimum contacts with this state. Davis Metals, Inc. v. Allen, 230 Ga. 623, 198 S.E.2d 285 (1973); North Peachtree I-285 Properties, Ltd. v. Hicks, 136 Ga. App. 426, 221 S.E.2d 607 (1975); Tri B Mfg., Inc. v. R.V. Seating, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 600, 269 S.E.2d 94 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- "Minimum contacts" requirement for in personam jurisdiction applies to in rem jurisdiction as well. Lyons Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 519 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

In order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction over the interest of persons in a thing. Lyons Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 519 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

- Only if a nonresident defendant has such "minimum contacts" with the state that the maintenance of action against it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, or if the defendant has performed some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, may the forum, consistent with due process, extend its long arm to embrace it. Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Nonresident defendant is subject to jurisdiction of Georgia courts only if the nonresident has established "minimum contacts" in this state so that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Swafford v. Avakian, 581 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959, 99 S. Ct. 1500, 59 L. Ed. 2d. 772 (1979); Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. v. Thompson, 244 Ga. 300, 260 S.E.2d 9 (1979).

Under this section, jurisdiction can be exercised only where certain minimum contacts with forum state are present. Harris v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 372 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

The exercise of jurisdiction over defendant would offend notions of fair play and justice where defendant neither lived in Georgia nor filed any action related to her divorce in the Georgia courts. She could not have expected to be haled into a Georgia court merely because seven years earlier she sent a California wage assignment order to the United States Army payroll headquarters in Indiana which resulted in her receiving a portion of plaintiff's military pay which would otherwise have been forwarded to him in Georgia. Millard v. Millard, 204 Ga. App. 399, 419 S.E.2d 718 (1992).

However minimal the burden of defending in foreign tribunal, defendant may not be called upon to do so unless the defendant has had the "minimum contacts" with that state which are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over the defendant. Harris v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 372 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ga. 1974).

Unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state; the application of this rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Harris v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 372 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Fowler Prods. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 413 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Ga. 1976).

- Where the unilateral actions of a forum plaintiff merely involve or somehow relate to a nonresident who has in no way conducted some activity with or in the state, there may be a "connection" between the nonresident and the plaintiff but there is no "contact" between the nonresident and the forum such that jurisdiction will lie. Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399, 227 S.E.2d 266 (1976); Attwell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 954, 100 S. Ct. 1607, 63 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1980); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1980); Cocklereece v. Moran, 500 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

- The mere allegation that, as a result of an act or omission by a nonresident outside this state, an injury has occurred to a Georgia plaintiff does not establish a "contact" with this forum in the absence of an implicit or explicit showing of activity with or in Georgia by the nonresident. Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399, 227 S.E.2d 266 (1976); Attwell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 954, 100 S. Ct. 1607, 63 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1980).

In order to satisfy constitutional requirement of procedural due process, it must be shown that the nonresident defendant has some "minimum contact" with the forum state so as to make that state's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979); Bosworth v. Cooney, 156 Ga. App. 274, 274 S.E.2d 604 (1980), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 452 U.S. 956, 101 S. Ct. 3101, 69 L. Ed. 2d 966 (1981).

Where a corporate officer of a golf cart distributor acted in a purposeful fashion, created continuing personal obligations between the officer and a golf cart manufacturer on behalf of the distributor, and was far from being a passive party in the distributor's business dealings with the manufacturer, the officer was subject to personal jurisdiction under the Georgia long-arm statute and the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (S.D. Ga. 2003), aff'd, 362 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 2004).

- Georgia trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over State of South Carolina and South Carolina Department of Corrections for claims unrelated to their contacts with the forum state. State v. Reeves, 205 Ga. App. 656, 423 S.E.2d 32, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 423 S.E.2d 32 (1992).

The relationship between a Spanish corporation that owned a resort in the Dominican Republic and its contacts with Georgia - which included an Internet web site - and the negligence of a taxi driver who allegedly injured the taxi's passengers, residents of Georgia who had been vacationing at the resort, was too tenuous to permit jurisdiction over the corporation in Georgia. Sol Melia v. Brown, 301 Ga. App. 760, 688 S.E.2d 675 (2009).

Existence of personal jurisdiction depends upon presence of reasonable notice to defendant that action has been brought and upon a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum state as to make it fair to require defense of the action in the forum. Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979).

- The trial court correctly held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant, a Florida corporation, in a tort claim where both the allegedly tortious act and the resulting injury occurred outside Georgia - the mere residence of plaintiff within the state was insufficient to establish minimum contacts. Smith v. Air Ambulance Network, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 75, 427 S.E.2d 305 (1993).

- Contracts to deliver cargo to a Georgia port, in and of themselves, did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia to justify the exercise of specific in personam jurisdiction over Danish shipping partnerships in Georgia. Francosteel Corp. v. M/V Charm, 19 F.3d 624 (11th Cir. 1994).

- The same minimum contacts based upon the activities conducted by the employee of a foreign corporation lose no efficacy because the corporation's own Georgia-based employee is suing it for commissions earned in part by virtue of the employee's work in Georgia on behalf of the corporation. Pascavage v. Can-Do, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 566, 344 S.E.2d 261 (1986).

- By negotiating and signing within the geographic boundaries of Georgia an agreement which provided the protection of the laws of Georgia to the parties, a Florida motel company president established a sufficient "minimum contact" with the state. Tampa Motel Mgt. Co. v. Stratton of Fla., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 135, 366 S.E.2d 804 (1988).

Nonresident's involvement in a conspiracy to defraud a Georgia corporation constituted sufficient contacts with Georgia to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident. Georgia Gulf Corp. v. Ward, 701 F. Supp. 1556 (N.D. Ga. 1987).

- French corporation established sufficient contacts within Georgia to subject it to jurisdiction on a patent infringement claim, where its American subsidiary demonstrated allegedly infringing machines at trade shows in the state, and the corporation's sales personnel were present at those shows. Gerber Garment Technology, Inc. v. Lectra Sys., 699 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

Collection of operating expenses by mail alone failed to establish the requisite minimum contacts by non-resident defendant corporation for purposes of exercising personal jurisdiction. Burt v. Energy Servs. Inv. Corp., 207 Ga. App. 210, 427 S.E.2d 576 (1993).

- When a defendant had the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state for that state to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant during the original litigation, those same contacts were sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction to the trial court for any revival action concerning the judgment entered in the course of the original litigation. Kaylor v. Turner, 210 Ga. App. 2, 435 S.E.2d 233 (1993).

- See A.L. Williams & Assocs. v. D.R. Richardson & Assocs., 98 F.R.D. 748 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

Evidence showed that security deed holder was personally served outside the state with the former property owner's declaratory judgment action in the same manner as in Georgia for a defendant who was subject to personal jurisdiction because the security deed holder had sufficient contact with Georgia in that the holder held a security deed to Georgia property that the former property owner claimed had to be canceled under Georgia law. Lebbos v. Davis, 256 Ga. App. 1, 567 S.E.2d 345 (2002).

- South Carolina automobile dealer who retained a Georgia attorney to represent the dealer in matters relating to the sale of the dealership, in connection with a possible suit over title to South Carolina land, and in connection with proceedings before the South Carolina department of consumer affairs defending alleged violations of South Carolina law, did not have minimum contacts with Georgia sufficient to allow the superior court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the dealer. Hyatt v. Broyles, Dunstan & Dunstan, 198 Ga. App. 109, 400 S.E.2d 665 (1990).

Federal and state-law claims of a company with a principal place of business in Georgia against a Florida physician were based on the physician's alleged involvement in a series of medical articles and advertisements claiming that a particular medical device was 86 percent effective; however, the company did not satisfy the company's burden of establishing the district court's personal jurisdiction over the physician under Georgia's long-arm statute. The physician's only contacts with Georgia included a single visit to a doctor's office to conduct training on the medical device and one or two related phone calls; because neither the business trip nor the phone calls were related to or gave rise to the company's claims against the physician, the company did not establish that the physician's actual contacts with Georgia arose out of or related to the company's allegations against the physician. N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2009).

Although South Carolina defendants met the requirements of Georgia's long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, the defendants did not deliberately engage in significant activities in Georgia and did not have fair warning that the defendants might be haled into court in Georgia simply by hiring Georgia lawyers to handle litigation that occurred in Massachusetts. Therefore, the defendants were not subject to suit in Georgia by a company that provided expert witness and consulting services to the defendant in the Massachusetts litigation. Schmidt v. JPS Indus., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2011).

- Former wife had the requisite "minimum contacts" in Georgia, in a suit brought by her former husband to enforce an alleged oral contract to pay her share of the marital indebtedness, where she exercised the privilege of jointly conducting business activities in Georgia and enjoyed the benefits and protection of the laws of Georgia. Calhoun v. Somogyi, 190 Ga. App. 502, 379 S.E.2d 595 (1989).

Florida corporation purposefully established the requisite minimum contacts with Georgia, where it made a single, calculated visit to the state which resulted in a contract with a Georgia firm to manufacture and sell ladies' handbags. Complete Concepts, Ltd. v. General Handbag Corp., 880 F.2d 382 (11th Cir. 1989).

Connecticut corporation's contacts with Georgia were sufficient, where it purposefully directed mailings to Georgia residents in an attempt to obtain an economic advantage over its local competitor, and it solicited customers in Georgia and contracted with a sales representative whose territory included Georgia. Quikrete Cos. v. Nomix Corp., 705 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 34 F.3d 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

New York defendant had the required minimum contacts with Georgia, where the defendant contacted plaintiff, a Georgia corporation, the parties entered into an agreement, after negotiations were conducted over the telephone, and defendant made two trips to plaintiff's company, at which time a modification of commission rates was negotiated and executed. Electronic Transaction Network v. Katz, 734 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Ga. 1989).

South Carolina advertising agency which entered into contracts with Georgia television stations to air commercials on behalf of a client, from which the agency profited financially, had sufficient contacts with Georgia to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Semaphore Adv., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 715 (S.D. Ga. 1990).

Defendant shareholders, all Ohio residents, established the requisite minimum contacts by executing agreements in Georgia through an agent, thereby submitting themselves to personal jurisdiction of the Georgia court. Booksing v. Holley, 210 Ga. App. 869, 437 S.E.2d 857 (1993).

- Georgia plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over California defendant, where all the dealings between the parties were through the mail, or by telephone or facsimile machine, there was no personal contact, and the defendant never entered Georgia. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. BSE Mgt., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1990).

Where a nonresident's sole contacts with Georgia were telephoning and sending a facsimile that contained false information to a day care center, thus causing a tort to be perpetrated on a resident, such actions have repeatedly been held to be insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under the Georgia long arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Worthy v. Eller, 265 Ga. App. 487, 594 S.E.2d 699 (2004).

Because a foreign corporation did not independently perform any acts in Georgia that would subject it to the state's long-arm jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, the trial court properly dismissed a domestic corporation's contract and tort claims. Catholic Stewardship Consultants, Inc. v. Ruotolo Assocs., Inc., 270 Ga. App. 751, 608 S.E.2d 1 (2004).

In the context of truck driver's Bivens action against the former director of the credentialing program office for the Transportation Security Administration, claiming that the revocation of the driver's hazardous material endorsement violated the driver's Fifth Amendment rights, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the director because Georgia's long-arm statute and the requirements of due process were not satisfied; three or four one-day trips, occurring over the span of six years did not demonstrate continuous and systematic general business contacts between the director and the driver's cause of action simply did not arise out of, or relate to, the director's contacts with Georgia. Mahmud v. Oberman, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2007), aff'd, 262 Fed. Appx. 935 (11th Cir. 2008).

- Because a seller sued an Illinois limited liability company (LLC) on an open account, long-arm jurisdiction over the LLC under the "transacting business" section of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) was reasonable and comported with due process. The LLC initiated the relationship with the seller and handled payment, the goods were delivered in Georgia to a Georgia apartment complex controlled by a related Georgia entity, and there was a long course of dealing between the parties. Home Depot Supply, Inc. v. Hunter Mgmt., LLC, 289 Ga. App. 286, 656 S.E.2d 898 (2008).

Grounds for Jurisdiction over Nonresidents

1. Transacting Business

Where jurisdiction over nonresident is posited under paragraph (1) of this section, due process must be satisfied by the existence of "minimum contacts" of the nonresident with the state in which the nonresident is sued. Newman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

For purposes of this section, "transacting business" requires some minimum contacts with the state which should be decided on the individual circumstances of each case. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 125 Ga. App. 845, 189 S.E.2d 459 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- A showing that a nonresident defendant has "transacted any business" in Georgia, and that a cause of action arises therefrom, ipso facto satisfies the minimum contact requirement. Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399, 227 S.E.2d 266 (1976).

Because an Iowa bank transacted some business in the State of Georgia, even if only with one of its account holders, and because that business was sufficient to meet the constitutional standard for minimum contacts, the trial court did not err in denying the bank's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; moreover, even if the bank did not regularly conduct business or engage in a persistent course of conduct in Georgia, it sought to derive economic benefit from its interstate business activity involving the account holder so that the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over it based on this one transaction was not unlawful. First Nat'l Bank of Ames, Iowa v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., 280 Ga. App. 337, 634 S.E.2d 88 (2006).

Without the actions of a corporation, a salesman acting as the corporation's agent would not have been in a position to receive a limited liability company's (LLC's) checks or to fail to deliver title to a truck to the LLC. As these actions occurred in Georgia, the corporation was not forced to litigate there solely as a result of "random, fortuitous, or attenuated" contacts; it did business in Georgia sufficient to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporation under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1). ATCO Sign & Lighting Co., LLC v. Stamm Mfg., 298 Ga. App. 528, 680 S.E.2d 571 (2009).

Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a Canadian citizen pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 based on allegations that the nonresident - as a company's founder, leader, and majority shareholder - purposefully sought to acquire a Georgia business, drain the business's value for that citizen and the citizen's various entities, and leave the company bereft for the company's creditors. Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 411 Bankr. 805 (N.D. Ga. 2009).

In a suit brought by an insurer seeking legal and equitable recission of an aviation insurance policy, the trial court properly denied the out-of-state insureds' motion to dismiss premised on lack of personal jurisdiction because the evidence showed that the insureds, through their agent, transacted business in Georgia and they were not being forced to litigate in Georgia because of random, fortuitous, or attenuated circumstances. Lima Delta Co. v. Global Aero., Inc., 325 Ga. App. 76, 752 S.E.2d 135 (2013).

Sale of goods in another state, knowing that they will be resold in Georgia, is a purposeful activity sufficient to establish a "contact" with Georgia. University of Iowa Press v. Urrea, 211 Ga. App. 564, 440 S.E.2d 203 (1993).

Term "transacting any business" as used in this section is not limited by its definition in Title 14. Patron Aviation, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 154 Ga. App. 13, 267 S.E.2d 274 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraph (1) of this section applies to matters in contract, not to those sounding in tort. Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Whitaker v. Krestmark of Ala., Inc., 157 Ga. App. 536, 278 S.E.2d 116 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs. v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005); Lutz v. Chrysler Corp., 691 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1982) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

The "transacts any business" test of paragraph (1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 applies only to contract claims. Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081, 110 S. Ct. 1813, 108 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1990).

- The denial of defendant's motion to dismiss cannot be sustained on the ground that the defendant was transacting business within the purview of subsection (1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. White v. Roberts, 216 Ga. App. 273, 454 S.E.2d 584 (1995).

- The transacting business clause under subsection (1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 applies only to contract claims, and where plaintiff asserted tort claims against truck driver for father's death in negligence, the district court did not have personal jurisdiction under subsection (1); nor could defendant truck driver be reached under subsections (2) and (3), where the alleged tortious act and injury occurred in South Carolina. Mathews v. Rail Express, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Ga. 1993).

Trips into state by nonresident agent after consummation of business do not constitute transacting of business under the long-arm statute. Pennington v. Toyomenka, Inc., 512 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1975).

- By including tortious action under paragraph (2) of this section, the legislature could not have meant for a cause of action in tort to arise from the transaction of business under paragraph (1) of this section as well. Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraph (1) of this section does not apply to tortious conduct. Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraph (1) of this section has been held applicable only to cases sounding in contract, and the cause of action must arise from the very transaction of business which forms the basis for personal jurisdiction. Standard v. Meadors, 347 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Where duty breached arises solely from contract, personal jurisdiction cannot be based on "tortious injury" committed in this state. Unistrut Ga., Inc. v. Faulkner Plastics, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 305, 217 S.E.2d 611 (1975).

The "transacting business" provision of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 is inapplicable to tort actions. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).

- The scope of the "transacts any business" portion of the long arm statute does not extend to include noncommercial claims arising from personal relationships. Garvey v. Mendenhall, 199 Ga. App. 241, 404 S.E.2d 613, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 404 S.E.2d 613 (1991).

California resident's social visits to Georgia were not sufficient to subject the Californian to the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts in a paternity and breach of promise action. Garvey v. Mendenhall, 199 Ga. App. 241, 404 S.E.2d 613, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 404 S.E.2d 613 (1991).

- Under this section, jurisdiction over a nonresident exists on the basis of transacting business in this state: if the nonresident has purposefully done some act or consummated some transaction in this state; if the cause of action arises from or is connected with such act or transaction, and if the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this state does not offend traditional fairness and substantial justice. Davis Metals, Inc. v. Allen, 230 Ga. 623, 198 S.E.2d 285 (1973); O.N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp., 232 Ga. 256, 206 S.E.2d 437 (1974); Granite & Quartzite Centre, Inc. v. M/S Virma, 374 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Ga. 1974); Porter v. Mid-State Homes, Inc., 133 Ga. App. 706, 213 S.E.2d 10 (1975); Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979); Attwell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 954, 100 S. Ct. 1607, 63 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1980); Atlas Aviation, Inc. v. Hungate, 153 Ga. App. 517, 265 S.E.2d 851 (1980); Patron Aviation, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 154 Ga. App. 13, 267 S.E.2d 274 (1980); Bosworth v. Cooney, 156 Ga. App. 274, 274 S.E.2d 604 (1980); Gold Kist, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1980); Manton v. California Sports, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

In cases arising out of actions ex contractu, an individual's contract with an out-of-state party alone cannot automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party's home forum. Prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum. Klein v. Allstate Ins. Co., 202 Ga. App. 188, 413 S.E.2d 777 (1991), aff'd, 262 Ga. 599, 422 S.E.2d 863 (1992).

Because prior judicial precedent improperly limited the scope of the transacting business element of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1), the court of appeals did not fully consider whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the bank; consequently, the Georgia Supreme Court reinterpreted the statute and overruled conflicting decisions. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005).

Because nothing in O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) limits its application to contract cases, requires the physical presence of the nonresident in Georgia, or minimizes the import of a nonresident's intangible contacts with the state, the Supreme Court of Georgia overrules all prior cases that fail to accord the appropriate breadth to the construction of the "transacting any business" language of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1). Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005).

In a manufacturer's breach of contract action alleging nonpayment by a nonresident corporation for two shipments received at the manufacturer's Georgia facility, personal jurisdiction over the nonresident corporation was appropriate under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) because the nonresident corporation transacted business in Georgia by sending purchase orders to the manufacturer in Georgia, requesting delivery by customer pickup at the manufacturer's plant in Georgia, directing third parties to accept delivery of the goods in Georgia, taking legal title to the goods in Georgia, and promising to pay money in Georgia on the two shipments in question. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, 593 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 158, 178 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2010).

- Trial court erred in dismissing a customer's action against an organization on the ground that the customer failed to join a corporation as a party because the order did not show that the trial court considered the factors listed in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(b), and the corporation was doing business in the state sufficient to confer jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1); the corporation participated in a safari auction, which was advertised to the customer in Georgia, and numerous email messages were exchanged between the corporation in Africa and the customer in Georgia. Wright v. Safari Club Int'l, 307 Ga. App. 136, 706 S.E.2d 84 (2010).

- Georgia court had personal jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) over a Nebraska company that operated a website through which student-athletes, including Georgia residents, registered to become clients and which hired a Georgia resident as an independent contractor to help obtain more Georgia clients, which the resident did; the suit stemmed from the procurement of the Georgia clients. American College Connection, Inc. v. Berkowitz, 332 Ga. App. 867, 775 S.E.2d 226 (2015).

- Where plaintiff judgment creditor filed suit against defendants for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and other torts relating to representations that the debtor, under a settlement agreement in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, was to pay funds held in a segregated account to the creditor, the officers' argument that there was no personal jurisdiction over them failed because the first officer was alleged to have personally participated in a tort on behalf of the corporation by filing a false affidavit with the bankruptcy court, and the second officer, as the president of the debtor and the only person able to act on its behalf, was alleged to have personally participated in every false representation and intentional failure to perform the debtor's obligations, and thus the creditor had sufficiently alleged that the officers personally participated in tortious activity on behalf of the debtor. Clough Mktg. Servs. v. Main Line Corp., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. May 10, 2007).

- Company president did not fall within the reach of the state long-arm statute because the employee failed to show that the president personally transacted any business in the state and the mere fact that the individual was the president of a company that did business in the state was insufficient to establish jurisdiction. Canty v. Fry's Elecs., Inc., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2010).

- Trial court did not err in denying a motion filed by a corporate president and the president's spouse to dismiss a corporation's action against them or, in the alternative, to transfer the case because the trial court's application of the relation-back statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c), did not violate the constitutional right of the president and the spouse to be sued in the county where they resided under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; because the president and the wife were not residents of Georgia when the suit was filed, the proper venue had to be determined pursuant to Georgia's Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-91 and9-10-93. Cartwright v. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc., 312 Ga. App. 890, 720 S.E.2d 200 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0600, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 306 (Ga. 2012).

- Where plaintiff's theory of liability is predicated on contractual breach and there is no claim of any tortious act or omission by defendant foreign corporation occurring either in or outside Georgia, inquiry in determining whether foreign corporation is subject to in personam jurisdiction under this section is limited to whether the corporation was transacting business within Georgia and, if so, whether it had sufficient contacts to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process. Interstate Paper Corp. v. Air-O-Flex Equip. Co., 426 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D. Ga. 1977); Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Lyons Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 519 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Outlaw v. John R. Bartlett Found., 166 Ga. App. 381, 304 S.E.2d 507 (1983); Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Barton, 169 Ga. App. 821, 315 S.E.2d 17 (1984) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

As to jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer and designer of automobiles, see Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 965 F.2d 1014 (11th Cir. 1992), modified on other grounds, 985 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907, 113 S. Ct. 2334, 124 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1993).

In product liability suit, Georgia's exercise of personal jurisdiction over French manufacturer of automobiles was consistent with Georgia law and with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment since the manufacturer designed the car in question for the Georgia market, advertised that car in Georgia, established channels for customers in Georgia to seek advice about the car, and maintained a distribution network by which the cars were brought to Georgia, thus establishing minimum contacts with Georgia sufficient to satisfy due process requirements; and since Georgia's exercise of jurisdiction over the manufacturer comported with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Vermeulen v. Renault U.S.A., Inc., 975 F.2d 746 (11th Cir. 1992), revised 985 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907, 113 S. Ct. 2334, 124 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1993).

- To the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state; the exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to an action brought to enforce them, in most instances, can hardly be said to be undue. Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979).

This section requires that the defendant's liability arise out of the business transacted. Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1970); Castleberry v. Gold Agency, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 694, 185 S.E.2d 557 (1971); Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 125 Ga. App. 845, 189 S.E.2d 459 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973); Fulghum Indus., Inc. v. Walterboro Forest Prods., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1973); Fowler Prods. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 413 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Wise v. State Bd. for Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects, 247 Ga. 206, 274 S.E.2d 544, overruled in part by Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs. v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 804, 102 S. Ct. 76, 70 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1981) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Personal jurisdiction could be exercised, consistent with due process, over nonresidents who negotiated the terms of loan documents and other contracts with a Georgia resident in Georgia. Ralls Corp. v. Huerfano River Wind, LLC, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2014).

- A defendant is not subject to in personam jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this section where it has never transacted business within Georgia out of which liability would arise. Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Trend is to construe long arm "transacting any business" statutes most liberally and to uphold the jurisdiction of the court of the plaintiff's residence in actions arising, either directly or indirectly, out of such transactions. Davis Metals, Inc. v. Allen, 230 Ga. 623, 198 S.E.2d 285 (1973); Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979); Bosworth v. Cooney, 156 Ga. App. 274, 274 S.E.2d 604 (1980).

It is a mistake to assume that the trend to construe "transacting any business" liberally heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Fowler Prods. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 413 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Ga. 1976).

To obtain personal jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this section, cause of action must arise from the act of transacting the business within Georgia. Fulghum Indus., Inc. v. Walterboro Forest Prods., Inc., 477 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Basic requirement of "any" business transaction under this section is that transaction have "some relationship, some connection with the cause of action, and there must be minimum contacts with the state." Unistrut Ga., Inc. v. Faulkner Plastics, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 305, 217 S.E.2d 611 (1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

This section permits personal jurisdiction over nonresident if the nonresident or the nonresident's agent "transacts any business" in the state; the cause of action must arise from the transactions upon which the court bases the exercise of its long arm jurisdiction, and other business which defendant might have done in Georgia is not relevant. Luxury Air Serv., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 78 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Where the defendant initiated contact with the plaintiff and a concentrated period of negotiations occurred concerning the exact specifications of the custom-made piece of equipment being sought by the defendant, the equipment then being built on an accelerated schedule, and the defendant's plant manager traveling to the plant for inspection and finalization of the contract, personal jurisdiction over the defendant was established. SES Indus., Inc. v. Intertrade Packaging Mach. Corp., 236 Ga. App. 418, 512 S.E.2d 316 (1999).

A trial court properly found that personal jurisdiction existed against an automobile manufacturer, despite the fact that the manufacturer's principal place of business was located in California as the manufacturer: (1) had a registered agent in the State of Georgia; (2) transacted business in Georgia through the agent; and (3) made judicial admissions that the manufacturing was in the business of designing, testing, and manufacturing motor vehicles for use in Georgia as well as the United States. Moreover, the exercise of jurisdiction over the manufacturer was reasonable and did not violate notions of fair play and substantial justice. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Colemon, 290 Ga. App. 86, 658 S.E.2d 843 (2008).

- The transacting of business in Georgia requires only that the defendant engage in a transaction as a result of some purposeful involvement with Georgia. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1980).

Given the defendant's consistent and purposeful personal dealings with the Georgia corporation, dealings which bestowed substantial benefits to the defendant and induced substantial action by the Georgia corporation to its detriment, the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. White House, Inc. v. Winkler, 202 Ga. App. 603, 415 S.E.2d 185 (1992); Habersham Metal Prods. Co. v. Huntsville Fastener & Supply, Inc., 216 Ga. App. 646, 455 S.E.2d 356 (1995).

- If a nonresident corporation purposefully seeks to avail itself of business opportunities in Georgia, the resulting business transactions have the requisite connection with Georgia to sustain jurisdiction, regardless of whether the nonresident itself comes into the state or has agents or independent contractors effect this result. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 623 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1980).

Evidence of sales by the foreign corporation in Georgia demonstrating purposeful activity that related either directly or indirectly to the subject of the suit was sufficient to show "minimum contacts" by the corporation with the state warranting the exercise of personal jurisdiction. HTL Sp. Z O.O. v. Nissho Corp., 245 Ga. App. 625, 538 S.E.2d 525 (2000).

- Georgia long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1), allowed a Georgia court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a guarantor who lived in residences in California and Arizona because the guarantor transacted business in Georgia by purposefully guarantying a note in Georgia. Furthermore, the creditor's suit arose from the act of guaranty, and the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of Georgia did not offend traditional fairness and substantial justice. Robertson v. CRI, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 757, 601 S.E.2d 163 (2004).

Trial court did not err in denying the guarantors' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction a bank's action to recover on promissory notes securing loans to a limited liability company (LLC) and on guaranties of those loans because the guarantors transacted business in Georgia within the meaning of the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1), and given the guarantors' purposeful personal dealings with the bank, dealings which bestowed substantial benefits to the guarantors and induced substantial action by the bank to the bank's detriment, neither reasonableness nor fair play nor substantial justice would be offended by haling the guarantors into a Georgia court and exercising jurisdiction over the guarantors; the guarantors understood that the LLC was formed for the sole purpose of developing property in Georgia, the bank's claims arose out of the guarantors' Georgia activities, the guarantors pointed to no evidence showing that litigating the action in Georgia would unduly burden the guarantors, and Georgia had an interest in adjudicating the dispute because the dispute involved both a significant loss suffered by a Georgia financial institution and real property located in the state. Paxton v. Citizens Bank & Trust of W. Ga., 307 Ga. App. 112, 704 S.E.2d 215 (2010).

- Defendants transacted business in Georgia sufficient to satisfy the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1), because powers of attorney which the defendants executed were valid, and hence defendants' guarantees - signed by the defendants' agent - were valid. The guarantee agreements constituted sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia to satisfy due process without offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Bank of Ozarks v. Kingsland Hospitality, LLC, F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Oct. 5, 2012).

Corporate personality is legal fiction, and corporate "act," "contact," or "presence" may be consummated only through personnel authorized to act for it; presence in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given. Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 804, 102 S. Ct. 76, 70 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1981); Wise v. State Bd. for Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects, 247 Ga. 206, 274 S.E.2d 544, overruled in part by Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs. v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005).

- Where the court has determined two subsidiaries and their parent corporation have acted as mere alter egos of one another, the transactions of the subsidiary in such a situation are properly attributable to the parent for jurisdictional purposes. Najran Co. v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D. Ga. 1986).

When an alleged injured party asserted product liability claims against a defunct manufacturer of a gas container and its parent company, the manufacturer had sufficient contacts with Georgia for personal jurisdiction, and the alleged injured party alleged enough for the court to find that discovery was warranted on the claim that the parent company actually designed the gas container, and the claim that the defunct manufacturer served as the mere alter ego of the parent company. Williamson v. Walmart Stores, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Apr. 8, 2015).

- Trial court erred in denying hotel entities' motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction as the evidence did not show they entered any agreements with the corporation in Georgia or that they transacted any business in Georgia, and the fact that the corporation's parent company had a separate affiliate with dealings in Georgia and an interest in the hotel entities was insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over the hotel entities. Yukon Ptnrs, Inc. v. Lodge Keeper Group, Inc., 258 Ga. App. 1, 572 S.E.2d 647 (2002).

- Business of a defendant in Georgia, which is unrelated to the contract being sued upon by the plaintiff, is irrelevant to the existence of jurisdiction under this section. Fulghum Indus., Inc. v. Walterboro Forest Prods., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- The fact that a California company's president attended a trade show that was held in Atlanta on one occasion was fortuitous, and could not be said to constitute transacting business in Georgia without a showing that the president's attendance was important to the performance of the contract. Mayacamas Corp. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 190 Ga. App. 892, 380 S.E.2d 303, writ of certiorari vacated, 259 Ga. 455, 385 S.E.2d 412 (1989).

Activities subsequent to cause of action sufficient to constitute transacting business in state will not furnish a jurisdictional basis. J.C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 125 Ga. App. 832, 189 S.E.2d 453 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145 (1973).

- Activity under paragraph (1) of this section must be more extensive than activity which will support a finding of a "contact" with Georgia for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction in a tort claim under paragraph (2) of this section. Swafford v. Avakian, 581 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959, 99 S. Ct. 1500, 59 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- When a nonresident defendant enters Georgia to negotiate with a plaintiff who is resident and present within the state, the nonresident defendant has voluntarily chosen to deal commercially with a person in whose welfare the forum state has an interest. Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ga. 1969).

- Substituted service on a nonresident who enters into a single contract of purchase by signing same in a state or mailing it to a resident thereof is not valid. Newman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ga. 1971).

- Where plaintiff was employed by persons acting as agents for all three defendant corporations to attempt to sell Florida realty in this state, the three corporations have interlocking directors and control, and the contracts, when executed, created contractual obligations with in-state residents which contracts are of pecuniary benefit to all three corporations, the evidence is sufficient to hold the defendants liable in this state for transacting business within the state. Palm Beach Inv. Properties, Inc. v. Dingman, 126 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E.2d 906 (1972).

Transfer of personal property confers in personam jurisdiction only where such transfer of personalty has some connection with the forum state beyond mere fact of ownership in the state. Lyons Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 519 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

- Where the facts establish a fairly continuous course of representation and/or of organizing on the part of a defendant union in this forum, in that a union in the recent past has chartered a local in the federal district and sued in the state to enforce rights against an employer, and the union is engaged in organization of a plaintiff cable television news network's workers in Atlanta, these contacts go beyond those required to sustain in personam jurisdiction, under paragraph (1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. CNN, Inc. v. ABC, 528 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

- The plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, that the plaintiff purchased a ticket for an out-of-state airline flight, aboard a plane owned and operated by a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Georgia, from an airline corporation with its headquarters in Georgia, at a ticket office of the state corporation in Georgia, and was subsequently injured while deplaning at the conclusion of the out-of-state flight, were sufficient to support an inference that the foreign corporation had subjected itself to the jurisdiction of courts sitting in Georgia and that the defendant had sufficient contacts with Georgia to satisfy all statutory and constitutional requirements for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction, which allegations were not overcome by proof that the sale of tickets in Georgia was an isolated and individual event. Bracewell v. Nicholson Air Servs., Inc., 748 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1984).

- Where a nonresident defendant's contact with Georgia was that under the defendant's contract with a nonresident plaintiff the most important performance of the contract, i.e., delivery of school buses and payment for them, occurred in Georgia when defendant was present in the state, this contact was minimal but sufficient to satisfy the transacting-any-business requirement of paragraph (1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Prosser v. Hancock Bus Sales, Inc., 181 Ga. App. 642, 353 S.E.2d 529 (1987).

- Where the act giving rise to plaintiff's cause of action against defendants for nonpayment of loan was defendants' execution of the Georgia guaranty contract, the conditions for applicability of this section were fully satisfied. Strickland v. Foundation Life Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 614, 200 S.E.2d 306 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Neither reasonableness, fair play, nor substantial justice would be offended by haling a guarantor into a Georgia court and exercising jurisdiction over the guarantor in a lessor's action to recover the amount of a judgment the lessor obtained against a lessee for rent owed under a lease because the lease was for the rental of retail space in a Georgia shopping mall, and the guarantor personally guaranteed the rent obligations under the lease; although not all of the guarantor's contacts with the state directly related to the guaranty, the contacts did concern the business that the loan had funded and showed a nexus between the guarantor, the forum, and the transaction as a whole. and even though the consent to jurisdiction provision in the lease did not individually and directly bind the guarantor, it was relevant to show that the guarantor could anticipate being sued in a Georgia court for claims arising out of the operation of the store. Noorani v. Sugarloaf Mills L.P., 308 Ga. App. 800, 708 S.E.2d 685 (2011).

- Execution of promissory notes totalling $125,000 in favor of a resident in return for certain sums of money, while using forms supplied by a state bank, constituted "doing business" within meaning of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Barton, 169 Ga. App. 821, 315 S.E.2d 17 (1984).

Where nonresident executed note in county where suit to collect is later filed and, at the time, the nonresident was a resident of that county, the trial court is authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident pursuant to the provisions of Georgia's long arm statute. Davis v. Peoples Bank, 168 Ga. App. 383, 308 S.E.2d 871 (1983).

- Where defendants expressly agreed in a promissory note that for the purpose of service of process they would be deemed to be doing business in Georgia and subject to the jurisdiction of the state, a district court could assert personal jurisdiction over the defendants. National Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Vafla Corp., 694 F.2d 246 (11th Cir. 1982).

Continuing payment of interest on notes executed in Georgia by a Georgia trustee of a Georgia trust operating a Georgia farm, and the breach of the contracts are sufficient minimum contacts to constitute "transacting any business" in Georgia after the effective date of the Georgia long arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, and enable a court of this state to exercise jurisdiction over former members or beneficiaries of the trust. Outlaw v. John R. Bartlett Found., 166 Ga. App. 381, 304 S.E.2d 507 (1983).

Business negotiations conducted within state involving nonresident constitute required "minimum contacts" necessary for "transacting business" within the intent of this section; there is no violation of due process or the underlying principles of fair play, reasonable notice, and opportunity to defend. Delta Equities, Inc. v. Larwin Mtg. Investors, 133 Ga. App. 382, 211 S.E.2d 9 (1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Negotiations within state constituted required "minimum contacts" necessary to hold that appellee was "transacting business" within the intent of this section. Shea/Rustin, Inc. v. Home Fashion Guild Ltd., 135 Ga. App. 88, 217 S.E.2d 405 (1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Where officers and agents of defendant appeared in Georgia to observe plaintiff's plant, began negotiations in Georgia for a later purchase of plaintiff's product, and after shipment of the product appeared in the state seeking advice on the application of the product, the requirements of paragraph (1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 were satisfied. Thermo-Cell S.E., Inc. v. Technetic Indus., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1122 (N.D. Ga. 1985).

- A district court could constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over seller-defendant where, even though the contract at issue was neither executed nor breached in Georgia, seller-defendant both employed agents and conducted purposeful activity within Georgia. Bigelow-Sanford, Inc. v. Gunny Corp., 649 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1981).

Exercise of specific jurisdiction over insurer was proper as: (1) the insurer inclusion of Georgia within its covered territory for uninsured motorist coverage was related to the insured's cause of action; (2) the insurer purposefully availed itself of the privileges and benefits of providing insurance coverage in Georgia and the entire United States; and (3) the insurer also reasonably should have foreseen being haled into court in Georgia because its policy covered the entire United States. McGow v. McCurry, 412 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2005).

Trips into state by nonresident agent after consummation of business do not constitute transacting of business under the long-arm statute. Pennington v. Toyomenka, Inc., 512 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1975).

- Counterclaim defendant's trips to Georgia to meet with defendant's president and to visit the offices of a business venture, with emails that counterclaim defendant sent to defendant's president regarding formation and initial operations of venture, were sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts. requirement, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1). Lowdon PTY Ltd. v. Westminster Ceramics, LLC, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2008).

- Trial court correctly concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the attorney as the attorney did not maintain an office in Georgia, advertise in Georgia, derive a substantial income from services rendered in Georgia, or engage in a persistent course of conduct within Georgia; accordingly, the attorney had done none of the acts which had to be done to be subjected to personal jurisdiction of a Georgia court. Gee v. Reingold, 259 Ga. App. 894, 578 S.E.2d 575 (2003).

- When a manufacturer from another state sells its product, particularly one with a hazardous potential, to a wholesaler customer from Florida knowing that its product will ultimately be sold in that customer's wholesale outlets in Georgia, it should reasonably expect to be haled into court in Georgia for an injury caused in the state by that product. Continental Research Corp. v. Reeves, 204 Ga. App. 120, 419 S.E.2d 48 (1992).

- In defendant's motion to transfer from Maryland to Georgia, the transferee court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1), because the matter involved the defendant's rental of a crane from the plaintiff for a construction project located in Georgia and, as such, the defendant transacted business in Georgia so as to satisfy the Georgia long-arm statute; the exercise of personal jurisdiction also comported with due process given the extent of defendant's presence in Georgia. Elliot AmQuip, LLC v. Bay Elec. Co., F. Supp. 2d (DC June 2, 2011).

- Defendant's trips from Florida to Georgia to negotiate contract of sale and escrow contract, and execution of the escrow contract in Georgia, provided sufficient "minimum contact" within the meaning and intent of this section. Bosworth v. Cooney, 156 Ga. App. 274, 274 S.E.2d 604 (1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 452 U.S. 956, 101 S. Ct. 3101, 69 L. Ed. 2d 966 (1981) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

In a Georgia golf cart manufacturer's action against a Canadian golf cart distributor and its president, the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the president where the president had sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia under the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1); the president's contacts with Georgia went beyond the visits to Georgia as president of the distributorship because the president engaged in negotiations with the manufacturer for the underlying distribution agreements as well as a personal guaranty. Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Imp., Inc., 362 F.3d 775 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1002, 125 S. Ct. 618, 160 L. Ed. 2d 461 (2004).

- Defendant's minimal contacts in this state did not subject defendant to the jurisdiction of the Georgia court, where nothing other than attempts at collection for the alleged debt which is the subject of this lawsuit occurred in Georgia. Compo Mach. Corp. v. Pants Ltd., 203 Ga. App. 728, 417 S.E.2d 443 (1992).

The debtor's contacts with Georgia were insufficient for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction where the debtor's Georgia agent drafted a promissory note with the debtor as maker but the debtor was a resident of Florida, the note in question was executed in Florida, the note was payable in the Bahamas, the creditor was a Cayman corporation, and the note originally had been executed as payment of rent for a residence in the Bahamas. International Capital Realty Inv. Co. v. West, 234 Ga. App. 725, 507 S.E.2d 545 (1998).

Where plaintiff initiated a letter agreement with the nonresident defendant which called for delivery of railcars to defendant outside of Georgia and no representative of defendant visited Georgia in connection with the performance of the agreement, defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia. Railcar, Ltd. v. Southern Ill. Railcar Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 1999).

Trial court erred in denying summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 to a guarantor in a company's action to collect on a promissory note; the guarantor was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, as the guarantor was a resident of Illinois and was never in Georgia during the course of the negotiations, the guarantor did not initiate or solicit the sale of a restaurant to the guarantor's son, and the guarantor agreed to guaranty the note only after a company requested the guarantor's guaranty as a condition of the sale, and therefore the guarantor did not purposefully utilize the privilege of doing business in Georgia. Stuart v. Peykan, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 46, 581 S.E.2d 609 (2003).

Copyright infringement suit against a website was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) because there were insufficient contacts with the state since the website did not own any property or have any employees in the state and the website generated very little revenue from the website's few Georgia users. Imageline, Inc. v. Fotolia LLC, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2009).

Hotel's maintenance of an Internet website with a reservation system alone did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts to assert specific personal jurisdiction over the hotel, and the record contained no evidence showing that the hotel's owner advertised or solicited business in Georgia and, thus, the trial court did not err in determining that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the owner under Georgia's Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Pascarelli v. Koehler, 346 Ga. App. 591, 816 S.E.2d 723 (2018).

- Mere telephone or mail contact with an out-of-state defendant, or even the defendant's visits to this state, are insufficient to establish the purposeful activity with Georgia required by O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Commercial Food Specialties, Inc. v. Quality Food Equip. Co., 176 Ga. App. 892, 338 S.E.2d 865 (1985).

- Where officials of a defendant foreign corporation enter Georgia to investigate the possibility of entering into a contract with a Georgia plaintiff to design and manufacture machinery to be installed at defendant's plant in South Carolina, inspect two similar plants and look over plaintiff's operation in Georgia, visit plaintiff's headquarters in order to observe the manufacture of the machinery, and undertake part of the negotiations in Georgia, such activities taken either in isolation or in totality, do not constitute "minimum contacts" that satisfy the constitutional test for exercise of jurisdiction. Fulghum Indus., Inc. v. Walterboro Forest Prods., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1973).

Negotiation of contract within state is sufficient in itself under Georgia law to enable a Georgia court to acquire jurisdiction. Fowler Prods. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 413 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Ga. 1976).

Execution of even a single contract may, in certain circumstances, satisfy the minimum contacts test. Stanley v. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 354 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ga. 1973).

- Trial court erred in dismissing a physician's complaint against a health and nutrition multi-level distribution company's officers alleging violations of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., and the Georgia Sale of Business Opportunities Act (SBOA), O.C.G.A. § 10-1-410 et seq., on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because in response to requests for admissions, the company admitted that the company was a "multilevel distribution company" as defined in the SBOA, that the provisions of the SBOA, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-415(c)(4), applied to any agreement made in Georgia, that the officers were founding members of the company and were officers when the physician became a marketer; the officers also admitted that the physician's cancellation rights under Georgia law were generally known to the officers, and the complaint was sufficient to state a claim against the officers. Walker v. Amerireach.com, 306 Ga. App. 658, 703 S.E.2d 100 (2010), aff'd in part, 290 Ga. 261, 719 S.E.2d 489 (2011).

Court of appeals did not err in ruling that a trial court had personal jurisdiction over the officers of a limited liability company (LLC) in a physician's action alleging that the officers violated the Sale of Business Opportunities Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-415(d)(1), because the allegations of a physician's complaint were sufficient to withstand the attack on the trial court's jurisdiction over the officers on the ground that the officers acted in their corporate capacities; the "fiduciary shield" doctrine did not apply, and the allegations in the complaint supported a finding that the officers were "primary participants" in the LLC's transaction of business within the state, that the cause of action arose from or was connected with such act or transaction, and that the "minimum contacts" test was therefore met. Amerireach.com, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. 261, 719 S.E.2d 489 (2011).

- Trial court erred by denying an out-of-state company's motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction because the company met the company's burden of showing a lack of minimum contacts needed to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, and that conclusion was consistent with other jurisdictional authority holding that ownership of a resident nursing home subsidiary by an out-of-state parent corporation without more is insufficient to obtain jurisdiction of the parent corporation. Drumm Corp. v. Wright, 326 Ga. App. 41, 755 S.E.2d 850 (2014).

- Jurisdiction is not conferred upon a nonresident who merely contracts with a Georgia resident. Rather, the nonresident must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in Georgia from which the claim arises or to which the claim is related. Further, the exercise of jurisdiction must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. A.I.M. Int'l, Inc. v. Battenfeld Extrusions Sys., 116 F.R.D. 633 (M.D. Ga. 1987).

Where parties allegedly negotiated at least three times, twice in Atlanta, such negotiations involved discussions as to both the terms of a contract and the modification of these terms, commission rates and sales territories were discussed and agreed upon, and these negotiations and the resulting contract prompted plaintiffs to represent themselves as defendants' agents and as such to consummate substantial sales of defendants' products, but defendants failed to pay commissions allegedly due plaintiffs, defendants purposefully established sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state and the plaintiffs' claim arose from such contacts, thus enabling the court to properly assert in personam jurisdiction over the defendants, including foreign nationals, without offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. A.I.M. Int'l, Inc. v. Battenfeld Extrusions Sys., 116 F.R.D. 633 (M.D. Ga. 1987).

Texas corporation which entered into an agency agreement with a Georgia insurer, solicited and issued insurance contracts underwritten by the insurer, and collected premiums on the contracts, "transacted business" in Georgia within the meaning of the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Evans v. American Surplus Underwriters Corp., 739 F. Supp. 1526 (N.D. Ga. 1989).

Massachusetts corporation was subject to long-arm jurisdiction based on employee search contract entered into with Georgia personnel company where corporation initiated the contact between the parties through company's office in Atlanta and induced company to perform services to its financial detriment, to the benefit of the corporation. Garrett Assocs., Inc. v. Mediplex Group, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 738, 434 S.E.2d 568 (1993).

Trial court erred in granting a lender's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction because the trial court had personal jurisdiction pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1); the lender negotiated the transaction in Georgia, decided to require a guaranty from a Georgia resident, and sent loan documents to the guarantor in Georgia for the purpose of availing itself of the guarantor's financial resources in Georgia to consummate the closing of the underlying transaction; the lender's conduct in negotiating with a Georgia broker and sending documents to a Georgia resident for execution in Georgia provided fair warning that the lender could be subject to suit in Georgia. Crossing Park Props., LLC v. JDI Fort Lauderdale, LLC, 316 Ga. App. 471, 729 S.E.2d 605 (2012).

Mere contracting with Georgia resident is insufficient to extend the long arm of Georgia courts. Fowler Prods. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 413 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Ga. 1976).

- Where a nonresident defendant executed an agreement in the defendant's home state, the resident plaintiff traveled to the defendant's home state for the only meeting of the parties, and the agreement contemplated further work on a vehicle which was to occur in the defendant's home state, this did not constitute the transaction of business within the state of Georgia and personal jurisdiction over the defendant was properly denied. Phears v. Doyne, 220 Ga. App. 550, 470 S.E.2d 236 (1996).

A Tennessee corporation was transacting business in Georgia where it commenced negotiations for an employment contract in Georgia which resulted in hiring a Georgia resident to transact business in Georgia, where the company president and other employees came to Georgia over a period of several years regarding company business, and where the president was personally involved in handling two accounts in the Atlanta area. Pascavage v. Can-Do, Inc., 178 Ga. App. 566, 344 S.E.2d 261 (1986).

- Where a foreign corporation defendant contracted with a Georgia resident after the Georgia resident had come into its home state to solicit its business and after negotiations leading to consummation of the contract had taken place there, the foreign corporation cannot fairly be said to have subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Georgia by transacting any business within it. Fowler Prods. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 413 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Ga. 1976).

- The negotiation and execution of agreements outside the forum state, which affect a domestic corporation under the laws of the forum and which delimit a resident party's control over that corporation, will not, without more, confer in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident party to the agreements. Lyons Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 519 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

- Where there are no negotiations or contracts entered into in the forum state, with respect to the goods that are the subject matter of litigation, there have not been sufficient "contacts" with the forum state to comply with the transacting business requirement of this section. Berry v. Jeff Hunt Mach. Co., 148 Ga. App. 35, 250 S.E.2d 813 (1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- While an out-of-state corporation's first visit to Georgia might be considered as part of contract negotiations, such limited contact alone is not enough to sustain the exercise of Georgia's long arm jurisdiction; a second visit which occurred after the sales contract was signed and the purchase finalized, does not relate to the contract giving rise to the action, and it cannot provide a basis for the exercise of long arm jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this section. Luxury Air Serv., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 78 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- The manufacture and shipment of merchandise for delivery in Georgia places the merchandise in the stream of commerce for resale at retail to Georgia citizens; and placing the merchandise in that stream pursuant to a warranty-indemnity contract amounts to "transacting any business" in Georgia under paragraph (1) of this section. J.C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Placing merchandise in the stream of commerce for resale at retail to Georgia citizens, pursuant to a warranty-indemnity contract, amounts to "transacting any business" in Georgia under paragraph (1) of this section. Granite & Quartzite Centre, Inc. v. M/S Virma, 374 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Ga. 1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- In five consolidated aviation wrongful death cases and one aviation property case, the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by an out-of-state damper part seller as the seller's activities in placing the seller's dampers into the stream of commerce by manufacturing, selling, and delivering the parts for resale were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process and to confer jurisdiction over the company. Vibratech, Inc. v. Frost, 291 Ga. App. 133, 661 S.E.2d 185 (2008), overruled on other grounds by Bowen v. Savoy, 308 Ga. 204, 839 S.E.2d 546 (2020).

- Manufacturer could not place its products in the stream of commerce with the intent of achieving nationwide sales and conduct its commercial activity in support of its sales goals through a contractual process with an independent contractor, thereby insulating itself from the jurisdiction of Georgia courts. Continental Research Corp. v. Reeves, 204 Ga. App. 120, 419 S.E.2d 48 (1992).

- Third-party defendant, by placing its merchandise in the stream of Georgia commerce under an agreement to indemnify its purchaser for damages caused the latter by the merchandise, has availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Georgia, and it must therefore respond for breach of its agreement in the Georgia forum. J.C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co., 230 Ga. 140, 196 S.E.2d 145 (1973).

When coupled with a warranty-indemnity contract, shipping goods into Georgia constitutes "transacting business." Pennington v. Toyomenka, Inc., 512 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1975).

- The manufacture and shipment of merchandise covered by a warranty-indemnity contract by a nonresident defendant for delivery in Georgia places the merchandise in the stream of Georgia commerce and amounts to "transacting any business" in Georgia under this section. Patron Aviation, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 154 Ga. App. 13, 267 S.E.2d 274 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- New Jersey cleaning solvent manufacturer, which shipped its product to an independent distributor who then controlled where it was ultimately sent, was not amendable to suit under the Georgia long arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, for injuries sustained by a user. Bond v. Octagon Process, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 710 (M.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1232, 111 S. Ct. 2855, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1023 (1991).

Nebraska firm which lent money to a Tennessee cattle broker was not subject to long-arm jurisdiction in a Georgia cattle dealer's action alleging fraud, libel and tortious interference with contractual relations, where the broker's regular business conduct in Georgia was not attributable to the firm, and the firm's conduct of mailing checks and telephoning into Georgia were insignificant. James Whiten Livestock, Inc. v. Western Iowa Farms, Co., 750 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd, 948 F.2d 731 (11th Cir. 1991).

- Internet car seller purposefully transacted business in the State of Georgia when its agent conducted business negotiations with a buyer who lived in Georgia and when the seller delivered the vehicle in the state, so as to have established sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Georgia to authorize Georgia's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the seller under the Georgia long arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91; moreover, the state court correctly resolved the factual conflict created by the seller's affidavits and supporting documentation in favor of the buyer so as to find, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, that the buyer had not been provided with, nor agreed to, that part of the agreement containing the forum selection clause. Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 279 Ga. App. 515, 631 S.E.2d 734 (2006).

"Transacting business" is not involved where sole local performance is delivery of items ordered to Georgia. Pennington v. Toyomenka, Inc., 512 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1975).

Under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-401(2), a nonresident corporation took legal title to goods when the manufacturer tendered those goods to a third-party customer at the manufacturer's Georgia facility and issued a bill of lading listing the nonresident corporation as the consignee. Taking physical possession of the goods was not necessary; the nonresident corporation took legal title to goods located in Georgia, and that was sufficient for purposes of "transacting business" under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1). Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, 593 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 158, 178 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2010).

Plaintiff's sending of single, unsolicited letter and defendant's sending of single letter of rejection do not amount to "transacted business" under paragraph (1) of this section. Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Transacting business encompasses more than mail orders which require acceptance in nonresident's state, and would not be involved where the sole local performance was delivery of items ordered to this state. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 125 Ga. App. 845, 189 S.E.2d 459 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973).

- Transmittal of communications from a sister state to Georgia by mail, the negotiation of checks in a sister state drawn on a Georgia bank, and the employing of a Georgia law firm for legal advice subsequent to the creation of a contract, are insufficient contacts to meet the requirement of transacting any business within this state under paragraph (1) of this section. Robinson v. Ravenel Co., 411 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

For purposes of long arm jurisdiction, mailing or telephoning orders to another state does not of itself constitute the transaction of any business. Berry v. Jeff Hunt Mach. Co., 148 Ga. App. 35, 250 S.E.2d 813 (1978).

Activities of nonprofit corporation in connection with enactment of legislation do not provide sufficient basis for jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91.appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 804, 102 S. Ct. 76, 70 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1981); Wise v. State Bd. for Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects, 247 Ga. 206, 274 S.E.2d 544, overruled in part by Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs. v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005).

Residence in this state of director of defendant nonprofit corporation is not alone a basis for jurisdiction; nor does the presence in Georgia of the defendant state board confer personal jurisdiction over it, and, even if the board were a creature of the corporation, the mere residence of a subsidiary or affiliate does not, without more, establish the residence of the parent organization. Wise v. State Bd. for Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects, 247 Ga. 206, 274 S.E.2d 544, overruled in part by Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs. v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 804, 102 S. Ct. 76, 70 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1981).

- Where nonresident defendant purchased advertising space in a local newspaper in connection with the plaintiffs' claim and where plaintiffs directly paid defendant's attorney in Georgia, jurisdiction over defendant was acquired pursuant to paragraph (1) of this section. Porter v. Mid-State Homes, Inc., 133 Ga. App. 706, 213 S.E.2d 10 (1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- "Substantial connection" existed between Dutch aircraft manufacturing corporation and Georgia, where the corporation advertised in national publications, some of whose audience was presumably in Georgia, and marketed its products through a distributor which serviced its products exclusively and was licensed to do business in Georgia. Cartwright v. Fokker Aircraft U.S.A., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

National and local advertising alone would not necessarily constitute transaction of business generally within a specific state. Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979).

- Where a race car driver's booking agent was a foreign corporation which had furnished a contract between the driver and a drag strip in this state but none of the agent's personnel had ever entered the state in connection with negotiating the contract, jurisdiction over the agent was not proper in a wrongful death action based on an accident at the drag strip involving the driver. Castleberry v. Gold Agency, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 694, 185 S.E.2d 557 (1971).

Entering of judgment by state court does not constitute transaction of business on the part of one of the parties to that litigation. Hemphill v. Hemphill, 398 F. Supp. 1134 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

Georgia court lacked jurisdiction over Wisconsin residents who placed a sale advertisement in a trade paper for a customized truck and trailer pursuant to which a Georgia resident sent a $6,000 deposit toward the purchase price of a vehicle, where the sellers then refused to return the deposit after the purchaser declined to accept a substitute vehicle. Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129, 356 S.E.2d 513 (1987).

- Mere mail and telephone contacts and even defendant's visits to this state were insufficient to establish the necessary purposeful activity required under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Scovill Fasteners, Inc. v. Sure-Snap Corp., 207 Ga. App. 539, 428 S.E.2d 435 (1993).

Action of nonresident wife in bringing suit in Georgia to domesticate foreign divorce decree does not constitute "transaction of business" so as to permit Georgia courts to assert in personam jurisdiction over her in husband's subsequent actions to terminate alimony. Stone v. Stone, 254 Ga. 519, 330 S.E.2d 887 (1985).

- In an action seeking collection of a certain promissory note for which the nonresident defendant executed a guarantee in favor of the resident plaintiff, the defendant did not "transact business" in this state, and there was, accordingly, no personal jurisdiction over the defendant under the following circumstances: (1) the guaranty was neither solicited nor executed in Georgia; (2) no contract negotiations occurred within Georgia; (3) the defendant did not have any other financial dealings with the plaintiff; and (4) the guaranty contained a choice-of-law provision calling for the application of Georgia law. Algemene Bank Nederland v. Mattox, 611 F. Supp. 144 (N.D. Ga. 1985).

The collection by an out-of-state bank, through normal banking channels, of a check drawn on a Georgia bank does not constitute the transaction of business in Georgia so as to subject the out-of-state bank to the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts in a suit alleging that the check was paid on an improper endorsement. First United Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 255 Ga. 505, 340 S.E.2d 597 (1986).

In an action arising out of and resulting from the contract by which an individual assumed liability for all purchases made under plaintiff's corporate account with defendant, the individual may have transacted business in Georgia, but defendant's claim was not based on business activities in Georgia. The account contract between a New York corporation and a New Jersey resident had no connection with Georgia, and an employee's unauthorized use of one of the cards issued under the account in Georgia did not change this. Thus, the minimum contacts necessary to afford the trial court jurisdiction over the individual were not shown. Web, Inc. v. American Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 197 Ga. App. 697, 399 S.E.2d 513 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Ga. 480, 405 S.E.2d 652, vacated in part on other grounds, 201 Ga. App. 202, 410 S.E.2d 830 (1991).

There was no personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation with regard to a breach of contract claim since there was no evidence that the corporation or its CEO negotiated a letter of intent in Georgia or otherwise transacted business in the state; a single visit to Georgia by the CEO was insufficient to establish jurisdiction, and it was undisputed that all of the negotiations for the letter of intent took place on the phone or via mail or fax. ETS Payphone, Inc. v. TK Indus., 236 Ga. App. 713, 513 S.E.2d 257 (1999).

Nonresident's actions in mailing a response to the arbitration notice and a letter to the arbitrator, standing alone, were not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Galindo v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., 241 Ga. App. 78, 526 S.E.2d 141 (1999).

Nonresident company was not subject to personal jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 since it was undisputed that all of the contract negotiations took place on the phone or through the Internet, mail or fax. Object Techs., Inc. v. Marlabs, Inc., 246 Ga. App. 202, 540 S.E.2d 216 (2000).

Where plaintiffs' complaint did not allege that defendant property partnership transacted any business within Georgia, owned any property within Georgia, or committed any tortious conduct within Georgia, in arguing that the property partnership could be subject to personal jurisdiction for making loans secured by property in Georgia, plaintiffs ignored the second requirement of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3); thus, plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the requirements of the Georgia long-arm statute for personal jurisdiction over the property partnership. BMC-Benchmark Mgmt. Co. v. Ceebraid-Signal Corp., 508 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (N.D. Ga. 2007).

Father's defamation action against a foreign corporation and associated individuals was properly dismissed because the father failed to demonstrate personal jurisdiction under Georgia's long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, and personal jurisdiction did not exist under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) since the claims arose under state, not federal, law; the district court could not exercise jurisdiction under § 9-10-91(1) because the father's cause of action for defamation did not arise out of, or was connected to, any business transaction in Georgia, and § 9-10-91(3) did not authorize jurisdiction because the father failed to show that the corporation and individuals actually conducted or solicited business in Georgia, much less on a regular basis, or that they derived substantial revenue from goods used or services rendered in Georgia. Henriquez v. El Pais Q'Hubocali.com, F.3d (11th Cir. Dec. 6, 2012)(Unpublished).

In a wrongful death action against a Delaware company, the trial court erred when the court determined that Georgia courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the company because the shipment of borax was sold through a contract between the shipper and the customer, and the company had no relationship with the Georgia customer; there was no evidence that the company had ever provided services of any kind to the Georgia customer (or any customer) from a location within Georgia; and, even though the record established that the company had derived revenue from the relationship with its Georgia customer, as that revenue was not the fruit of services performed in Georgia, that alone could not satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction. Intercontinental Servs. of Del., LLC v. Kent, 343 Ga. App. 567, 807 S.E.2d 485 (2017), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 376 (Ga. 2018).

- Telephonic orders and one brief appearance at home office which was not necessary to establishment of contract do not constitute those minimal contacts necessary to establish venue. Superior Fertilizer & Chem., Inc. v. Warren, 162 Ga. App. 595, 292 S.E.2d 430 (1982).

Mere telephone or mail contact with an out-of-state defendant is insufficient to establish the activity required by O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Phillips v. Electrical Constructors of Am., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1387 (M.D. Ga. 1982).

Where the only contact was the transaction in which the defendant made one shipment of goods into Georgia on the debtor's order, this does not amount to "transacting business" in the state under the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Bonapfel v. Cascade Imperial Mills, Ltd. (In re All Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 78 Bankr. 355 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987).

Totality of circumstances did not weigh in favor of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant Alabama furniture and appliance retailers, where defendants never entered Georgia in connection with the transactions which were the subject of plaintiff's action for breach of contract, and plaintiff solicited defendants' business in Alabama. GECC v. Scott's Furn. Whse. Showroom, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ga. 1988).

Trial court correctly concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the attorney on the basis of the attorney's having transacted business in Georgia as the only Georgia-based contacts between the supplier and the attorney with respect to the Wisconsin lawsuit were telephone conversations and facsimile transmissions between the supplier in Georgia and the attorney in Tennessee, which were initiated by the supplier. Gee v. Reingold, 259 Ga. App. 894, 578 S.E.2d 575 (2003).

In a wrongful death action, the trial court erred when the court determined that Georgia courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over a Delaware company as the company did not transact any business in Georgia or avail itself of the privilege of doing business in Georgia because the company's services were provided by personnel located exclusively in Delaware; although shipments loaded by the company made their way to Georgia, those activities could not be reasonably characterized as creating a purposeful contact with Georgia; and the company's only relevant agreement was with the shipper of the product, and that agreement was limited to the services provided for the shipper in regard to the product that arrived at the Port of Wilmington. Intercontinental Servs. of Del., LLC v. Kent, 343 Ga. App. 567, 807 S.E.2d 485 (2017), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 376 (Ga. 2018).

- Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendants transacted business in Georgia sufficient to meet the requirements of Georgia's long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, because an injury suffered by the plaintiff in Georgia due to an intentional tort did not satisfy the Georgia long-arm statute's transaction of business requirement, and merely operating a website accessible in Georgia, and everywhere else, did not constitute the actual transaction of business - the doing of some act or consummation of some transaction - by the defendants in the state. Jordan Outdoor Enters., Ltd. v. That 70's Store, LLC, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2011).

- Contacts of an employee of defendant with Georgia did not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over the company in plaintiff's trademark infringement action; even though the parties might have established a commercial relationship involving certain, limited contacts in Georgia, plaintiff's claims for trademark infringement did not stem directly from those Georgia contacts. Barton Southern Co. v. Manhole Barrier Sys., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Ga. 2004).

- Defendant's website did not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction; defendant's customers were not located in Georgia, defendant received no purchase orders from persons in Georgia, the website did not allow customers to make payments or complete orders, nothing on the website showed intent to reach out to persons living in Georgia, and there was no evidence that any Georgia residents had done business with defendant. Barton Southern Co. v. Manhole Barrier Sys., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Ga. 2004).

- Trial court erred in determining that the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the ex-husband's daughter in an action for contempt of a divorce decree because the allegations sufficiently alleged that the daughter, as power of attorney for the ex-husband, had done some act or consummated some transaction in Georgia on behalf of her father as power of attorney. Sullivan v. Bunnell, 340 Ga. App. 283, 797 S.E.2d 499 (2017).

2. Tortious Acts Within State

Jurisdiction limited.

- The plain language of paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction only when the non-resident defendant "commits a tortious act or omission within this state...." White v. Roberts, 216 Ga. App. 273, 454 S.E.2d 584 (1995).

- The jurisdictional reach of paragraph (2) of this section is limited only by the ultimate constraints imposed by the due process clause. Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 confers jurisdiction where negligence occurred outside this state and the damage resulting therefrom occurred inside this state. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

Jurisdiction over a nonresident may be exercised by virtue of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 when the nonresident has purposely done some act or consummated some transaction with or in the forum, the Georgia plaintiff has a legal cause of action in tort against the nonresident, which arises out of, or results from, the purposeful activity of the defendant involving this state, and the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident is reasonable; it is plaintiff 's burden to show these jurisdictional requirements have been met. National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel, 514 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

- Reasonable anticipation of being held subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this state's courts should be prevalent where a defendant consciously chose to inflict harm on a Georgia resident. National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel, 514 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

There is no essential difference between paragraphs (2) and (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

- "Minimum contacts" may be present under paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 and jurisdiction thereunder may be appropriate even when it could not be achieved under the more stringent statutory requirements of paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Psychological Resources Support Sys. v. Gerleman, 624 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. Ga. 1985).

- The due process requirement implicit in paragraph (2) of this section is satisfied by the presence within the forum state of a "substantial number" of the manufacturer's product. Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- For purposes of due process, a nonresident who sends a defective product into the forum state or who simply places the product in the stream of commerce with reason to anticipate that it may find its way into the forum state is amenable to service of process under paragraph (2) of this section. Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Limitations similar to those present in paragraph (3) of this section are constitutionally mandated under paragraph (2) of this section. Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. v. Thompson, 244 Ga. 300, 260 S.E.2d 9 (1979); Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Yarbrough v. Estate of Yarbrough, 173 Ga. App. 386, 326 S.E.2d 517 (1985) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 confers jurisdiction over nonresident who purposefully conducts some activity in or with this state and as a result of that activity a Georgia resident suffers injury here even though the actual act or omission occurred outside this forum. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

In order to confer jurisdiction over nonresident under paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, nonresident's purposeful activity in the forum must be of a nature similar to the "contacts" prescribed in paragraph (3) of § 9-10-91. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

There was no personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation with regard to a tort claim where the corporation had no agent in Georgia and was not authorized to do business in Georgia and where, additionally, neither the corporation nor its CEO regularly conducted business in Georgia, derived substantial income from services rendered in Georgia, or engaged in a persistent course of conduct within Georgia. ETS Payphone, Inc. v. TK Indus., 236 Ga. App. 713, 513 S.E.2d 257 (1999).

Trial court did not err when the court set aside the default judgment entered against the nonresident company on grounds that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the company because the plaintiff's purported service on the company was deficient in that the entry of service form contained no indication that the individual who was served was authorized to accept service. Delta Aliraq, Inc. v. Arcturus Int'l, LLC, 345 Ga. App. 778, 815 S.E.2d 129 (2018).

Jurisdiction over nonresidents in tort actions carries no "minimum contacts" requirement. Newman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ga. 1971). But see Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ga. 1969).

The New York rule has been rejected in favor of the so-called Illinois rule: jurisdiction may attach under paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 when injury occurs in Georgia resulting from a tortious act or omission outside of Georgia. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

Mere allegation that act of nonresident outside the state, without more, that ultimately results in injury to a citizen of this state, does not establish a "contact" with this state in the absence of implicit or explicit evidence of purposefully sought activity with or in Georgia by the nonresident. National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel, 514 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Ga. 1981).

A single tort committed in forum state is sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test and to vest jurisdiction in the state where the tort was committed. Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ga. 1969). But see Newman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ga. 1971).

Where nonresident enters state and commits tort, no showing of continuous activity in jurisdiction is required, and jurisdiction over the tortfeasor is sustained by the commission of a single tort. Newman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ga. 1971).

- The nonresident must purposefully utilize the privilege of doing some act or consummating some transaction with or in the forum, the plaintiff must have a legal cause of action, and the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident must be reasonable. Swafford v. Avakian, 581 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959, 99 S. Ct. 1500, 59 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1979).

Tortious act is act of such character as to subject actor to liability under tort principles. Process Control Corp. v. Witherup Fabrication & Erection, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1977).

Cases of negligent manufacture should be considered tortious acts committed within forum state when the injury occurred there. Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1968).

State's failure to grant a speedy trial is not a "tortious act" within the purpose and intent of this section. Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Defendant is not subject to in personam jurisdiction under paragraph (2) of this section where it has never committed a tortious act in Georgia. Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Georgia court lacked jurisdiction under paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 over a German company which overhauled a used propeller and certified its airworthiness for reassembly and installation on an aircraft which subsequently crashed in Mississippi. Atlanta Propeller Serv., Inc. v. Hoffman GMBH & Co., 191 Ga. App. 529, 382 S.E.2d 109, cert. denied, 259 Ga. 361, 382 S.E.2d 355 (1989).

Paragraph (2) of this section does not apply to tortious acts occurring outside state causing injury inside state. Standard v. Meadors, 347 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Paragraph (2) of this section confers personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the cause of action arises out of defendant's commission of a tortious act within the State of Georgia. Standard v. Meadors, 347 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ga. 1972).

Commission of tortious act by nonresident outside state which causes injury within state is not a "tortious act" under this section. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 125 Ga. App. 845, 189 S.E.2d 459 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

When a father made threatening telephone calls from another state to a mother and to their child, a trial court could not exercise jurisdiction over the father under the Family Violence Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-13-1 et seq., which applied the long arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, because, under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3), even though the father committed a tortious injury in Georgia, no other factors in that section applied, and, under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2), providing long arm jurisdiction over one committing a tortious act in Georgia, while the harmful effects of the father's acts were felt in Georgia, the father never came to Georgia to commit them. Anderson v. Deas, 273 Ga. App. 770, 615 S.E.2d 859 (2005).

Defendant did not commit a tort in Georgia when, in pursuing a certificate from a federal agency, defendant's employees met with agency officials in Atlanta and submitted allegedly misappropriated documents; the alleged tort occurred not during the application process but, rather, when plaintiffs' trade secrets were allegedly purloined. Lamb v. Turbine Designs, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 1999), aff'd, 240 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2001).

Trial court did not err in dismissing the terminated employees' suit against the one business, a foreign corporation, for want of jurisdiction, as their complaint involving their alleged wrongful discharge failed to allege that the one business committed any tortious act in Georgia, and, thus, the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over the one business. Balmer v. Elan Corp., 261 Ga. App. 543, 583 S.E.2d 131 (2003), aff'd, 278 Ga. 227, 599 S.E.2d 158 (2004).

Under the Georgia long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, defendants' tortious act did not occur in Georgia because the defendants' alleged tortious conduct occurred in Arkansas, where the defendants created the websites displaying the products, and injury to the plaintiff in Georgia as a result of the defendants' conduct in Arkansas could not have been considered a tortious act or omission within Georgia for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2). Jordan Outdoor Enters., Ltd. v. That 70's Store, LLC, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2011).

- In a dispute between siblings over corporate funds, the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the two sisters from Mississippi did not contravene traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice because the brothers' claims were related directly to the sisters' purposeful acts in Georgia and the sisters reasonably could have expected to be sued in Georgia. Stubblefield v. Stubblefield, 296 Ga. 481, 769 S.E.2d 78 (2015).

- A "tortious act" is a composite of both negligence and damage, and if damage occurs within the state then the tortious act occurs within the state within the meaning of paragraph (2) of this section; this interpretation is based on the premise that this section contemplates that jurisdiction shall be exercised over nonresident parties to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973); Swafford v. Avakian, 581 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959, 99 S. Ct. 1500, 59 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraph (2) of this section confers jurisdiction where negligence occurs outside state and damage resulting therefrom occurs inside state. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973); Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraph (3) of this section was obviously enacted to legislatively "get around" the legal reasoning on which the decisions in O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 106, 169 S.E.2d 827 (1969), and Castleberry v. Gold Agency, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 694, 185 S.E.2d 557 (1971), under paragraph (2) of this section were based. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Activity which will support a finding of a "contact" with Georgia for purposes of exercising jurisdiction under paragraph (2) of this section need not be so extensive as to meet the definition requirements of paragraph (1) of this section. Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399, 227 S.E.2d 266 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Paragraph (2) of this section confers jurisdiction over a nonresident who conducts some activity in or with this state (such as manufacture for distribution of defective goods or shipment of those goods into Georgia) and as a result of that activity a Georgia resident suffers injury here (as through contact with defectively manufactured goods shipped into this state) even though the actual act or omission (defective manufacture) occurred outside this forum. Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399, 227 S.E.2d 266 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraph (2) of this section still provides basis for jurisdiction over one committing act outside the state which causes tortious injury within the state pursuant to the Illinois rule which indicates that a tort is part negligence and part damage, and if any damage occurs within the state though the precipitating act is without the state, this section is applicable. Atlanta Coliseum, Inc. v. Carling Brewing Co., 411 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraph (2) of this section confers jurisdiction where tortious act occurs outside of State of Georgia and the damage resulting therefrom occurs inside the state; such exercise of jurisdiction is authorized to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process, which requires a showing that the nonresident defendant has some "minimum contact" with the forum state so as to make that state's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Timberland Equip., Ltd. v. Jones, 146 Ga. App. 589, 246 S.E.2d 709 (1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Paragraph (2) of this section confers jurisdiction where the negligence occurs outside the state and the damage resulting therefrom occurs inside the state, reaffirming the decision in Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973). Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. v. Thompson, 244 Ga. 300, 260 S.E.2d 9 (1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraph (2) of this section applies to tortious act or omission occurring outside Georgia causing an injury in Georgia. National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Applying paragraph (2) of this section to contractual sale would render redundant paragraph (1) of this section, which deals specifically with cases sounding in contract. Standard v. Meadors, 347 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraphs (2) and (3) deal only with "tortious conduct;" to base an action for breach of contract on either of these two paragraphs would be erroneous. Swafford v. Avakian, 581 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959, 99 S. Ct. 1500, 59 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1979).

- An airplane crash occurring in the State of Georgia, which involves no other contact with the state nor any substantive rights of Georgia citizens, would allow a nonresident plaintiff to take advantage of this section to revive a cause of action elsewhere barred by limitations. Newman v. Fleming, 331 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- In a suit filed by the Employees' Retirement System of Georgia (ERSGA) against a beneficiary, a non-resident of the State of Georgia, for overpayment of retirement funds, the trial court erred by finding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the decedent's beneficiary because, under Georgia's Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, by assisting the decedent in designating in Georgia the location to which the retirement funds should be directed by ERSGA, a Georgia resident, and then by allegedly converting overpayments made by the Georgia resident, the beneficiary was subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia as the injury alleged to have occurred was connected to the conduct the beneficiary undertook in Georgia. Employees' Ret. Sys. of Ga. v. Pendergrass, 344 Ga. App. 888, 812 S.E.2d 322 (2018).

- Where the tortious acts out of which the right to contribution arose were alleged to be committed in this state by a nonresident, this would clearly fall within the purview of this section; and there is no valid basis, in a case of this nature, to disallow the utilization of this section in a third-party claim. Gosser v. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 620, 188 S.E.2d 412 (1972).

- Where the third-party defendant as to whom service was perfected under this section contends the third-party complaint should be dismissed because a paragraph of the plaintiff's complaint seeks to recover for defamation of character, that is, that the third-party complaint seeks contribution for an act which is expressly excluded from this section, since the motion to dismiss was addressed to the complaint as a whole and since the third-party complaint is not solely involved with the action for defamation of character, it is not subject to a motion to dismiss. Gosser v. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 620, 188 S.E.2d 412 (1972).

- Where a defendant knowingly sends into a state a false statement, intending that it should there be relied upon to the injury of a resident of that state, the defendant has, for jurisdictional purposes, acted within that state. Thorington v. Cash, 494 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1974).

- Where a conspiracy involving a resident and nonresident was targeted at a Georgia resident specifically, the imputation to the nonresident of the in-state acts of the co-conspirator to satisfy requirements of the long-arm statute was not precluded by due process. Rudo v. Stubbs, 221 Ga. App. 702, 472 S.E.2d 515 (1996).

Nonresident defendant in defamation action may be subject to process if other sufficient minimum contacts with the forum exist, although a defamatory act itself may not confer in personam jurisdiction. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

The tortious act of defamation alone is insufficient to grant jurisdiction over a nonresident. Process Control Corp. v. Witherup Fabrication & Erection, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1977).

The language of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 is clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous in mandating the exclusion of an action predicated on defamation; thus, a motion to dismiss a defamation action for lack of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident should have been granted. Worthy v. Eller, 265 Ga. App. 487, 594 S.E.2d 699 (2004).

Tortious act in defamation action occurs at place where libelous material is delivered and circulated. Process Control Corp. v. Witherup Fabrication & Erection, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1977).

In defamation action, "tortious act" occurs in the state where the libelous material is distributed. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

- Paragraph (2) of this section means that Georgia courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident who commits a tortious act or omission within Georgia, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, in which case the nonresident must also have sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia other than the contacts which arise from the acts constituting the defamation. Process Control Corp. v. Witherup Fabrication & Erection, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

In a dispute alleging that the plaintiff never received full payment on proceeds from the sale of a Georgia company and past due royalties, the trial court erred in ruling that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the multinational music publishing company under Georgia's Long Arm Statute as the publishing company engaged in purposeful acts and transacted business in Georgia to the extent that it was provided fair warning that it could be subject to a Georgia court's jurisdiction because the publishing company purchased music publication rights from and made routine royalty payments to the Georgia company, leased a studio in Georgia to develop Georgia artists, and ultimately purchased the Georgia company. Weathers v. Dieniahmar Music, LLC, 337 Ga. App. 816, 788 S.E.2d 852 (2016).

Allegation that defendants concealed defect in real property located within Georgia was sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Edelschick v. Blanchard, 177 Ga. App. 410, 339 S.E.2d 628 (1985).

- In action for defamation and invasion of privacy against a New York resident who painted a pornographic picture of plaintiff for a nationally circulated magazine, the court held that it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Mays v. Laurant Publishing, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

- It is reasonable and comports with notions of "fair play" and "substantial justice" to extend a forum's long-arm statute to a nonresident individual who commits an act in the forum for which the individual can be held substantively liable, even if the individual's actions in and contacts with the forum were entirely in the individual's capacity as a corporate officer or director. Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081, 110 S. Ct. 1813, 108 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1990).

Contacts of a Connecticut corporation and its vice-president with Georgia were sufficient to invoke O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, where the vice-president met with a Georgia resident in Atlanta and made statements relating to an alleged conspiracy to restrain the trade and monopolize the sale of "media" in a tri-state area. Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081, 110 S. Ct. 1813, 108 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1990).

- Corporate officer's minimal contact with Georgia - a single phone call to a Georgia resident regarding the arrival of the officer's brother for an Atlanta meeting - was so insignificant that it did not satisfy the terms of the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081, 110 S. Ct. 1813, 108 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1990).

- Trial court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over defendant who was a Georgia resident when the defendant fraudulently induced plaintiff to marry the defendant and then apparently became domiciled in Florida for a brief period just before service was perfected. Morgan v. Morgan, 193 Ga. App. 302, 388 S.E.2d 2 (1989).

- Since services provider alleged that the corporate president, a Mississippi resident, executed a contract on behalf of the corporation in Georgia and made misrepresentations in Georgia to the services provider while executing that contract, the Georgia trial court had personal jurisdiction over the corporate president, as the services provider alleged that the corporate president could be personally liable in Georgia for engaging in a tort in Georgia on behalf of the corporation. Mitchell v. Gilwil Group, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 882, 583 S.E.2d 911 (2003).

- Georgia's Nonresident Motorist Act, O.C.G.A. § 40-12-1 et seq., did not apply when the driver was a resident of Georgia at the time of the tort, and while the injured person could have utilized the Georgia Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 et seq., the limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 was not tolled where the injured person failed to exercise due diligence, and effected service on the driver 15 months after the complaint was filed, and one year after the driver, then living in Illinois had filed an answer. Andrews v. Stark, 264 Ga. App. 792, 592 S.E.2d 438 (2003).

Paragraph (3) of this section was obviously enacted to legislatively "get around" the legal reasoning on which the decisions in O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 106, 169 S.E.2d 827 (1969), and Castleberry v. Gold Agency, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 694, 185 S.E.2d 557 (1971), under paragraph (2) of this section, were based. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- The General Assembly adopted paragraph (3) of this section, not to restrict the applicability of paragraph (2) of this section, but rather to liberalize the interpretation that this court had given to "tortious act or omission within this state." Value Eng'r Co. v. Gisell, 140 Ga. App. 44, 230 S.E.2d 29 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- The tortious act is a composite of both negligence and damage, and where the damage occurs within the state, although caused by an act committed outside the state, jurisdiction attaches. Lincoln Land Co. v. Palfery, 130 Ga. App. 407, 203 S.E.2d 597 (1973).

- It is reasonable, under "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," to subject a nonresident tortfeasor to the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts when the nonresident has one of the additional "contacts" with this state listed in paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

Rule conferring jurisdiction over nonresident tort-feasors committing tortious acts or omissions outside the state which cause injury within the state exists judicially under paragraph (2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 and legislatively under paragraph (3) of § 9-10-91. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

- Liberal construction of paragraph (2) of this section and adoption of the Illinois rule, which indicates that since a tortious act involves both negligence and damage, if damage occurs within the state then subsection (b) of this section applies, has resulted in a broader exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction than would arguably be permissible under the plain language of paragraph (3) of this section; as a result, the courts have concluded that paragraph (3) is actually superfluous. Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1983) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- The Supreme Court of Georgia adopted the Illinois rule, not as a stopgap measure to cover occurrences prior to the adoption of paragraph (3) of this section, but rather as a protective policy for Georgia's citizens, so that such citizens could seek redress in Georgia courts limited only by the parameters of due process. Atlanta Coliseum, Inc. v. Carling Brewing Co., 411 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Jurisdiction may be obtained under this section even for tortious acts outside the state if the injury produced by those acts occurred within the state. Grey v. Continental Mktg. Assocs., 315 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Trial court did not err in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for damages arising from an automobile collision based on lack of personal jurisdiction because the automobile collision in North Carolina giving rise to the litigation did not occur because the defendant owned, used, or possessed real property situated within Georgia and was not related to the defendant's visit to the campground. Stanton v. Harris, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 4, 2020).

- Where defendant's conduct in a state other than Georgia leads to an injury and a completed tort in Georgia, paragraph (3) of this section confers jurisdiction. H.K. Corp. v. Lauter, 336 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Commission of negligent act outside state causing injury within state may constitute commission of tortious act within the state. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).

- The mere allegation that as a result of an act or omission by a nonresident outside this state an injury has occurred to a Georgia plaintiff, does not establish a "contact" with this forum in the absence of an implicit or explicit showing of activity with or in Georgia by the nonresident. Cocklereece v. Moran, 500 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

- The fact that nonresident owners of a lodge in North Carolina had a contract for advertising in a Georgia newspaper did not extend jurisdiction to Georgia over a tort action for personal injuries suffered at the lodge. Allen v. Black, 214 Ga. App. 450, 447 S.E.2d 718 (1994).

Paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 does not modify the extension of paragraph (2) of § 9-10-91 to provide a basis for securing jurisdiction over one who commits an act outside the state which causes injury within the state. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

Where both the tortious act and the resulting injury occurred outside Georgia, paragraphs (2) and (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 are inapplicable. Whitaker v. Krestmark of Ala., Inc., 157 Ga. App. 536, 278 S.E.2d 116 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs. v. First Nat'l Bank, 279 Ga. 672, 620 S.E.2d 352 (2005).

- Paragraph (3) of this section does not change the right against a defendant, and thus may be applied retroactively. Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- For paragraph (3) of this section to apply as a matter of law, it is necessary that the defendant regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered in Georgia. H.K. Corp. v. Lauter, 336 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 confers personal jurisdiction over a nonresident tortfeasor who causes injury within the state by an act or omission outside the state if the tortfeasor regularly does or solicits its business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state. Spelsberg v. Sweeney, 514 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

Tort occurs in state in which product causes injury, even if it was manufactured elsewhere. Jimerson v. Price, 411 F. Supp. 102 (M.D. Ga. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 428 F. Supp. 673 (M.D. Ga. 1977).

- The forum state does not exceed its powers under the due process clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum state. National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

- By having licensed their song to a distributor, knowing that the distributor distributed or licensed the song nationally, including within the State of Georgia, defendants established sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia so that plaintiff's copyright infringement action did not violate due process guarantees. Payne v. Kristofferson, 631 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ga. 1985), But see, Gust v. Flint, 257 Ga. 129, 356 S.E.2d 513 (1987).

Georgia television network's complaint alleging copyright infringement by New York video monitoring company was subject to dismissal, where the allegations were insufficient to support a reasonable inference that defendant could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the court under paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. CNN, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Ga. 1989).

- Where plaintiff judgment creditor filed suit against defendants, a former Florida debtor in possession, its officers, and the debtor's former Florida bankruptcy law firm, for conspiracy relating to representations that the debtor, under a settlement agreement in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, was to pay funds held in a segregated account to the creditor, the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the law firm under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3) because there had been no attempt to distinguish the firm from its client the debtor and an agent could not conspire with its principal. Clough Mktg. Servs. v. Main Line Corp., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. May 10, 2007).

Shipment into this state satisfies the requirement of due process as to minimum contacts. Granite & Quartzite Centre, Inc. v. M/S Virma, 374 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Ga. 1974).

- If a party introduces an allegedly defective and dangerous article into the stream of commerce which allegedly causes injuries claimed to have been sustained in Georgia as a direct consequence of shipping the material by interstate carrier, then that party has sufficient contacts to be amenable to personal jurisdiction in this state to answer for those injuries. Value Eng'r Co. v. Gisell, 140 Ga. App. 44, 230 S.E.2d 29 (1976).

- Where alleged liability arises from the manufacture of products presumably sold in contemplation of use in Georgia, it should not matter that the purchase was made from an independent middleman or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product into the state. Jet Am., Inc. v. Gates Learjet Corp., 145 Ga. App. 258, 243 S.E.2d 584 (1978).

Foreseeability that product will cause injury in given state is not sufficient reason to hold the seller of the product subject to the jurisdiction of that state. National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ga. 1980).

- The sale of goods in another state, when the seller knows that they will be resold in Georgia, is a purposeful activity sufficient to establish a "contact" with Georgia. Showa Denko K.K. v. Pangle, 202 Ga. App. 245, 414 S.E.2d 658 (1991), cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 907, 414 S.E.2d 658 (1992).

- Where the distributors of a product are independent contractors and are not acting on behalf of defendant, none of their sales can be considered acts of the defendant. Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1970).

- Where at no time did defendant manufacture any of the defendant's aircraft in Georgia, does not do so now, nor does the defendant sell the completed aircraft in Georgia, but rather all aircraft are sold to independent distributors F.O.B. factory in Florida or Pennsylvania, and it is only when these distributors bring the aircraft into Georgia and sell them to Georgia customers that the defendant's product comes into Georgia, this section does not apply. Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- In action for trademark infringement and unfair competition, where a nonresident defendant sold $19,000.00 of allegedly infringing goods in Georgia through an agent whose orders were only accepted at defendant's manufacturing plant in another state, paragraph (3) of this section confers jurisdiction, since defendant's actions constitute the regular solicitation of business and a persistent course of conduct in Georgia, leading to the defendant's deriving substantial revenue from goods used in Georgia. H.K. Corp. v. Lauter, 336 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Under paragraph (3) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, Georgia courts have jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in defamation cases when there exists requisite minimum contacts other than commission of tort itself. Bradlee Mgt. Servs., Inc. v. Cassells, 249 Ga. 614, 292 S.E.2d 717 (1982).

- Allegations of tortious interference with a contract and of unfair competition were sufficient to invoke long-arm jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which exercised pervasive and tight control over its in-state subsidiaries (accomplished primarily through interlocking directorates, commonality of officers, and necessity of parent review and approval of subsidiary actions), rendering these subsidiaries functionally equivalent to departments or divisions of the parent corporation. Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 595 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

- Defendant's placement of relative's signature on a disinterment application, even if tortious, occurred in Alabama, and the mere mailing of the form into Georgia did not constitute a single event "in the forum" having its impact within the territory of the forum for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Metzler v. Love, 207 Ga. App. 447, 428 S.E.2d 384 (1993).

- Family Violence Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-13-1 et seq., gave Georgia courts jurisdiction over a nonresident only if the act with which the nonresident was charged met the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2), (3); further, the conduct giving rise to the offense occurred when the maker of the call spoke into the telephone; a father's daily calls to Georgia from another state to speak to the father's daughter or when the father made the calls that allegedly threatened and harassed the mother did not confer jurisdiction in Georgia. Anderson v. Deas, 279 Ga. App. 892, 632 S.E.2d 682 (2006).

- In decedent's family members' wrongful death action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(a), personal jurisdiction over defendant under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(3) and (4) comported with due process, but under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, decedent's estate administrator was not entitled to intervene and transfer was warranted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Hidalgo v. Ohio Sec. Ins. Co., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2011).

Because defendants, a New Hampshire resident and a Pennsylvania corporation, used computers outside of Georgia to access plaintiff Georgia corporation's computer file, the defendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(2). LabMD, Inc. v. Tiversa, Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Feb. 5, 2013)(Unpublished).

4. Real Property Within State

Jurisdiction over one who owns, uses, or possesses realty in state.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 confers personal jurisdiction over any nonresident as to a cause of action if the nonresident owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within the state. Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981).

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 requires that the cause of action arise from the ownership, use, or possession of real property situated within the state. Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981).

In an in rem action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of property, the court had personal jurisdiction over the nonresident grantee of the property and service on the nonresident as authorized by O.C.G.A. § 9-10-94 was proper. Forrister v. Manis Lumber Co., 232 Ga. App. 370, 501 S.E.2d 606 (1998).

Record title holder without agents in Georgia is subject to paragraph (4) of this section. Cox v. Long, 143 Ga. App. 182, 237 S.E.2d 672 (1977) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

Paragraph (4) of this section includes entering into transactions in connection with real property in this state. Cox v. Long, 143 Ga. App. 182, 237 S.E.2d 672 (1977) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Georgia has a manifest interest in providing redress in a controversy concerning the sale of real property situated in this state. The forum state does not share such an obvious "manifest interest" with respect to personal property. Lyons Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 519 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

Under paragraph (4) of this section, jurisdictional requirements are satisfied when substantial connection or nexus exists between the basis of the controversy and the property within this state. Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715, 250 S.E.2d 169 (1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

This section does not require that ownership, use, or possession exist at time action is commenced; rather, this section merely requires that cause of action arise from the ownership, use, or possession of real property situated within this state. Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715, 250 S.E.2d 169 (1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Where the only connection between the property owned by defendant and the claim asserted by plaintiff is that it was once an asset in an estate for which plaintiff served as executor, such a tenuous connection would not give rise to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident owner of real estate because the claim does not satisfy the requirement that it arise out of the ownership of the property. Murray v. Reese, 210 Ga. App. 352, 436 S.E.2d 79 (1993).

A nonresident debtor's ownership of closely held corporations that owned Georgia real estate was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. International Capital Realty Inv. Co. v. West, 234 Ga. App. 725, 507 S.E.2d 545 (1998).

Buyer failed to make an affirmative showing that the return of service was false because the complaint and summons were served upon the buyer at the buyer's Oregon address, and that service was proper under the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 et seq., which applied to the buyer as the owner of real property situated within Georgia; the sworn return of service found in the record, which showed that the buyer was served at the buyer's Oregon address, constituted a prima facie showing of personal service, and the buyer submitted no evidence refuting the sworn return of service. Haamid v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., 299 Ga. App. 828, 683 S.E.2d 891 (2009).

- In personam jurisdiction may be predicated on defendants' ownership, use, or possession of property even though they are nonresident defendants and no longer own the property in question; the fact that defendants divested themselves of their interest in the property prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint will not defeat the exercise of jurisdiction. Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715, 250 S.E.2d 169 (1978).

- Mere fact of title ownership of realty in Georgia will not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, which must be predicated on the existence of ties among the defendants, this state, and the litigation, so that the maintenance of the action does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715, 250 S.E.2d 169 (1978).

- In action on a note executed by nonresident purchasers for the purpose of becoming record title owners in improved Georgia realty, since the note was executed by the nonresident purchasers with full knowledge that the note would be used in conjunction with, and as an integral part of, a Georgia real estate transaction, a substantial connection with the state existed so as to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants reasonable. Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715, 250 S.E.2d 169 (1978).

- Officers of a corporation which purchased and operated real estate holdings in Georgia, who were personally within the State of Georgia when they endorsed the original promissory note, which was issued in connection with the real estate operations and expressly provided for future extensions, and where a security agreement pledging the real estate was duly recorded in Cobb County, Georgia, were within easy reach of this section. Trust Co. v. Italiano, 427 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1970) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91).

- Where plaintiffs' cause of action arose from the nonresident defendant's exercise of its power of sale of property within the state granted by security deed and the defendant had legal title to the property pursuant to former Code 1933, § 67-1301 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-14-60), jurisdiction over the defendant was acquired pursuant to Ga. L. 1970, p. 443, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91). Porter v. Mid-State Homes, Inc., 133 Ga. App. 706, 213 S.E.2d 10 (1975).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 confers jurisdiction over nonresident vendor of real property even though the nonresident owns no property in Georgia at time of service. Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981).

Jurisdiction may be affected over nonresident assignee of security deed to Georgia real property. Regante v. Reliable-Triple Cee of N.J., Inc., 251 Ga. 629, 308 S.E.2d 372 (1983).

A devisee's interest in real property is "ownership" for purposes of the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Moore v. Moore, 255 Ga. 308, 336 S.E.2d 804 (1985).

- The leasing of real property in Georgia for operation of a retail establishment and execution of a lease agreement that contained a Georgia choice of law clause created the "substantial connection," between the controversy, the lessee, and property within the state to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. Goodman v. Vilston, Inc., 197 Ga. App. 718, 399 S.E.2d 241 (1990).

5. Proceedings as to Alimony, Child Support, etc.

Legislative intent.

- The legislature intended by enacting paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 to allow children and spouses to seek modification against nonresident defendants in the same manner as if the nonresident were a resident of the state. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450, 330 S.E.2d 706 (1985).

Trial court's finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over a wife in a divorce case was error and was reversed where the husband and the wife had maintained a marital residence in Georgia for at least five years before the wife returned to Britain, where the wife had availed herself of the privilege of maintaining a matrimonial domicile in Georgia, where the husband continued to maintain his domicile in Georgia and intended to remain in Georgia, and where the husband, an Irish citizen, had obtained permanent resident alien status, had designated himself a year round Georgia resident on state tax returns, and had declared himself to be a non-resident of Britain for tax purposes. Cooke v. Cooke, 277 Ga. 731, 594 S.E.2d 370 (2004).

- Since the original decree was entered in Georgia and the ex-husband, who was seeking modification and enforcement, continued to reside in Georgia, under the plain terms of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(6), the ex-wife was amenable to the jurisdiction of Georgia courts and the Constitution did not forbid the exercise of such jurisdiction. Barker v. Barker, 294 Ga. 572, 757 S.E.2d 42 (2014).

- One who is receiving or is supposed to receive alimony is a dependent under paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450, 330 S.E.2d 706 (1985).

Residing in Georgia pursuant to military orders does not prevent a member of the military from electing to become a resident of the state. Kendrick v. Parker, 258 Ga. 210, 367 S.E.2d 544 (1988).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 is Georgia's domestic relations long-arm statute authorizing the courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party who has become a nonresident, and applies to a contempt action seeking enforcement of a Georgia alimony and child-support judgment. Braden v. Braden, 260 Ga. 269, 392 S.E.2d 710 (1990).

Exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident former husband in action for contempt and modification of Georgia divorce decree was consonant with due process notions of "fair play" and "substantial justice" because: (1) Georgia has a legitimate interest in protecting resident spouses and children; (2) the courts of Georgia remain open to appellant to enforce the appellant's rights, and the appellant enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of Georgia; (3) the inconvenience to appellant is outweighed by the inconvenience to appellee who would be forced to sue in a foreign forum on a cause of action which arose from their Georgia matrimonial domicile and their Georgia divorce; and (4) the legislature gave the courts of Georgia through paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 the authority to entertain litigation against nonresidents who incur some form of family related obligation while maintaining a matrimonial domicile or while residing within this state. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450, 330 S.E.2d 706 (1985).

Where both parties were residents of Georgia at the time of their 1986 divorce, and the wife subsequently moved to Colorado, but in 1989 filed a motion in Georgia for contempt against the husband who had remained in Georgia, the exercise of jurisdiction over the wife comported with due process notions of fair play and substantial justice. To the extent that Medeiros v. Tarpley, 258 Ga. 372, 369 S.E.2d 482 (1988) and Boyce v. Boyce, 259 Ga. 831, 388 S.E.2d 524 (1990) hold that compliance by a nonresident with a Georgia divorce decree insulates the nonresident from subjection to jurisdiction in Georgia court, they are overruled. Straus v. Straus, 260 Ga. 327, 393 S.E.2d 248 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Scruggs v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 261 Ga. 587, 408 S.E.2d 103 (1991).

Paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 is applicable to contempt action to enforce alimony judgment. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450, 330 S.E.2d 706 (1985).

A modification action for custody and child support is an independent action within the contemplation of paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. Lee v. Pace, 252 Ga. 546, 315 S.E.2d 417 (1984).

- Where a former wife had filed a divorce action in Georgia after moving out of state, and had twice filed garnishment during the three years that had passed since then, she was subject to the jurisdiction of Georgia courts for the purposes of a motion to decrease alimony. Fralix v. Cordle, 261 Ga. 224, 403 S.E.2d 793 (1991).

- Trial court lacked jurisdiction over a resident noncustodial father's action against a nonresident custodial mother seeking to modify visitation rights and to hold the mother in contempt of the visitation provisions of a Georgia decree, where personal service had not been made on the mother in Georgia. Ashburn v. Baker, 256 Ga. 507, 350 S.E.2d 437 (1986).

A nonresident parent alleged to be in contempt of the visitation provisions of a Georgia divorce judgment and who was served outside Georgia may divest the court of its power to enforce its judgment by timely asserting a defense of lack of jurisdiction. Dyer v. Surratt, 266 Ga. 220, 466 S.E.2d 584 (1996).

Jurisdiction for modification of child custody matters, which include visitation, is in the home state of the child. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, the "domestic-relations long arm statute" applies by its own terms only to actions involving alimony, child support, and division of property. Kemp v. Sharp, 261 Ga. 600, 409 S.E.2d 204 (1991).

Trial court was authorized to obtain personal jurisdiction over a child's parent under Georgia's long arm statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-90 and9-10-91(6), because the child's grandparents petitioned for visitation rights after the parent had moved to Arizona to attend college and reside there upon graduation. Oglesby v. Deal, 311 Ga. App. 622, 716 S.E.2d 749 (2011).

- The trial court lacks jurisdiction under paragraph (5) of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 over a nonresident parent on whom personal service was perfected out-of-state, in a proceeding for contempt for denial of visitation rights. Paul v. Paul, 184 Ga. App. 217, 361 S.E.2d 221 (1987).

- Fairness dictated that Georgia courts exercise jurisdiction over a wife's divorce action against her husband, who resided in Saudi Arabia, where Georgia was the only state that had any contact with the parties and their marital relationship. Beasley v. Beasley, 260 Ga. 419, 396 S.E.2d 222 (1990).

Where a husband did not present any evidence demonstrating a lack of personal jurisdiction, there was nothing to refute the wife's showing that the parties' only marital domicile in the United States was Georgia and that the husband had come back to Georgia several times in an attempt to reconcile; therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the divorce for lack of personal jurisdiction. Walters v. Walters, 277 Ga. 221, 586 S.E.2d 663 (2003).

- Where the only contact between defendant and the state after his marriage in Georgia in March 1970 occurred during the period between March 1970 and August 1971, when Georgia was the marital domicile of the couple, plus several short visits after his wife moved back to the state, there was no indication that any of the events which led to the dissolution of the marriage occurred in Georgia, and the last domicile of the parties before their separation was Nashville, Tennessee, where they had been living for several years prior to the separation in 1977, there were insufficient contacts with the state for defendant to reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Georgia. Marbury v. Marbury, 256 Ga. 651, 352 S.E.2d 564 (1987).

Where, although the husband maintained a marital residence in Georgia and the separation occurred in Georgia, the divorce decree was actually entered in Arkansas and the husband had not been a Georgia resident for nearly 20 years, his connection with the state was sufficiently attenuated under these facts that due process would be offended by the exercise of jurisdiction over his person to modify the domesticated Arkansas divorce decree. Popple v. Popple, 257 Ga. 98, 355 S.E.2d 657 (1987).

A former husband's connection with Georgia was sufficiently attenuated that due process would be offended by the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over his person to hold him in contempt of a Georgia divorce judgment, where the parties maintained no marital residence in Georgia since they separated upon moving into the state in 1975, the husband had not been a resident of Georgia for over 15 years, and the wife had not been a resident of Georgia for over four years. Paul v. Paul, 264 Ga. 434, 444 S.E.2d 770 (1994).

Nonresident former husband's phone call to his children in Georgia and to the court in regard to Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Proceedings were insufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction. Riersgard v. Morton, 267 Ga. 451, 479 S.E.2d 748 (1997).

Wife's motion to dismiss issues related to alimony, division of marital property, and attorney fees was wrongly denied as there were not sufficient minimum contacts under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(5). The wife had not lived in Georgia since 2003, she did not own any property in Georgia and had not transacted any business in Georgia since 2003, the last marital domicile was in Virginia, the circumstances giving rise to the dissolution of the marriage occurred in Virginia, and the wife's only connection with Georgia had been brief visits during which she had no contact with the husband. Ennis v. Ennis, 290 Ga. 890, 725 S.E.2d 311 (2012).

- Trial court erred by denying the husband's motion for a new trial in a divorce and child support action because the husband was not properly served with the summons and complaint as there was an absence of any evidence that service was made upon a resident of the husband's dwelling or usual place of abode in California; therefore, the court had to conclude that service was improper. Guerrero v. Guerrero, 296 Ga. 432, 768 S.E.2d 451 (2015).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, §§ 72, 83, 98, 99.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 99 et seq.

- Mandamus to compel court to assume or exercise jurisdiction where it has erroneously dismissed the cause or refused to proceed on the ground of supposed lack of jurisdiction, 4 A.L.R. 582; 82 A.L.R. 1163.

Subsequent dealing, by seller, with property sold conditionally in interstate commerce, as taking it out of the protection of the interstate commerce clause, 30 A.L.R. 417.

Power of court, in exercise of discretion, to refuse to entertain action for nonstatutory tort occurring in another state or country, 32 A.L.R. 6; 48 A.L.R.2d 800.

Jurisdiction to order performance of positive acts in another state, 71 A.L.R. 1351.

Extraterritorial enforcement of arbitral award, 73 A.L.R. 1460.

May presence within the state of bonds or other evidence of indebtedness or title sustain the jurisdiction to determine rights or obligations in them in a suit or proceeding quasi in rem and without personal jurisdiction over the parties affected, 87 A.L.R. 485.

Power of state to provide for service, other than personal, of process upon nonresident individual doing business within the state so as to subject him to judgment in personam, 91 A.L.R. 1327.

Foreign transportation company as subject to service of process in state in which it merely solicits interstate or extrastate business, 95 A.L.R. 1478.

Solicitation within state of orders for goods to be shipped from other state as doing business within state within statutes prescribing conditions of doing business or providing for service of process, 101 A.L.R. 126; 146 A.L.R. 941.

Effect of agreement by foreign corporation to install article within the state to bring transaction within state control, 101 A.L.R. 356.

Suits that may be regarded as in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction in which may rest upon constructive service, 126 A.L.R. 664.

Effect of agreement by foreign corporation to service or repair article sold or leased by it to bring transaction within state control, 126 A.L.R. 1104.

Loss, after commencement of suit, of attachment or other lien, upon which jurisdiction against nonresident defendant originally depended, as defeating jurisdiction in rem or precluding judgment in personam against defendant who appeared, 132 A.L.R. 1286.

What suits at domicil of corporation involving corporate stock or rights and obligations incident thereto are in rem, jurisdiction in which may rest upon constructive service of process against nonresidents, 145 A.L.R. 1393.

Suits and remedies against alien enemies, 155 A.L.R. 1451; 156 A.L.R. 1448; 157 A.L.R. 1449.

What amounts to doing business in a state within statute providing for service of process in action against nonresident natural person or persons doing business in state, 10 A.L.R.2d 200.

Immunity of nonresident defendant in criminal case from service of process, 20 A.L.R.2d 163.

Power of state to subject foreign corporation to jurisdiction of its courts on sole ground that corporation committed tort within state, 25 A.L.R.2d 1202.

What is an action for damages to personal property within venue statute, 29 A.L.R.2d 1270.

Jurisdiction of action at law for damages for tort concerning real property in another state or country, 30 A.L.R.2d 1219.

What constitutes doing business within state by a foreign magazine, newspaper, or other publishing corporation, for purposes other than taxation, 38 A.L.R.2d 747.

Who is subject to constructive or substituted service of process under statutes providing for such service on nonresident motorists, 53 A.L.R.2d 1164.

State's power to subject nonresident individual other than a motorist to jurisdiction of its courts in action for tort committed within state, 78 A.L.R.2d 397.

Holding directors', officers', stockholders', or sales meetings or conventions in a state by foreign corporation as doing business or otherwise subjecting it to service of process and suit, 84 A.L.R.2d 412.

Doctrine of forum non conveniens: assumption or denial of jurisdiction of contract action involving foreign elements, 90 A.L.R.2d 1109.

Prohibition as appropriate remedy to restrain civil action for lack of jurisdiction of the person, 92 A.L.R.2d 247.

Validity of service of process on nonresident owner of watercraft, under state "long-arm" statutes, 99 A.L.R.2d 287.

Choice of law in construction of insurance policy originally governed by law of one state as affected by modification, renewal, exchange, replacement, or reinstatement in different state, 3 A.L.R.3d 646.

Attorney representing foreign corporation in litigation as its agent for service of process in unconnected actions or proceedings, 9 A.L.R.3d 738.

Products liability: in personam jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturer or seller under "long arm" statutes, 19 A.L.R.3d 13.

Retrospective operation of state statutes or rules of court conferring in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign corporations on the basis of isolated acts or transactions, 19 A.L.R.3d 138.

State statutes or rules of court conferring in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents on the basis of isolated acts or transactions within state as applicable to personal representative of deceased nonresident, 19 A.L.R.3d 171.

Applicability, to actions not based on products liability, of state statutes or rules of court predicating in personam jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers or distributors upon use of their goods within state, 20 A.L.R.3d 957.

Validity, as a matter of due process, of state statutes or rules of court conferring in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign corporations on the basis of isolated business transacted within state, 20 A.L.R.3d 1201.

Construction and application, as to isolated acts or transactions, of state statutes or rules of court predicating in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign corporations upon the doing of an act, or upon doing or transacting business or "any" business, within the state, 27 A.L.R.3d 397.

Choice of law in actions arising from airplane crash in territorial waters of state, 39 A.L.R.3d 196.

Long-arm statutes: obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident parent in filiation or support proceeding, 76 A.L.R.3d 708.

Doctrine of forum non conveniens: assumption or denial of jurisdiction in action between nonresident individuals based upon tort occurring within forum state, 92 A.L.R.3d 797.

In personam jurisdiction over nonresident director of forum corporation under long-arm statutes, 100 A.L.R.3d 1108.

Long-arm statutes: in personam jurisdiction over nonresident based on ownership, use, possession, or sale of real property, 4 A.L.R.4th 955.

In personam jurisdiction under long-arm statute of nonresident banking institution, 9 A.L.R.4th 661.

In personam jurisdiction, under long-arm statute, over nonresident attorney in legal malpractice action, 23 A.L.R.4th 1044.

In personam jurisdiction, under long-arm statute, over nonresident physician, dentist, or hospital in medical malpractice action, 25 A.L.R.4th 706.

Religious activities as doing or transaction of business under "long-arm" statutes or rules of court, 26 A.L.R.4th 1176.

In personam jurisdiction, in libel and slander action, over nonresident who mailed allegedly defamatory letter from outside state, 83 A.L.R.4th 1006.

Doctrine of forum non conveniens: assumption or denial of jurisdiction of action involving matrimonial dispute, 55 A.L.R.5th 647.

Validity, construction, and application of "fiduciary shield" doctrine - modern cases, 79 A.L.R.5th 587.

Service of process by mail in international civil action as permissible under Hague Convention, 112 A.L.R. Fed. 241.

Effect of use, or alleged use, of Internet on personal jurisdiction in, or venue of, federal court case, 155 A.L.R. Fed. 535.

In personam jurisdiction, under long-arm statute, over nonresident attorney in legal malpractice action, 78 A.L.R.6th 151.

Time limit for service of process under the Hague Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, Art. 1 et seq., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 note (Hague Service Convention), 15 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 4.