2022 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 6 - Sexual Offenses
§ 16-6-3. Statutory Rape

1. A person commits the offense of statutory rape when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with any person under the age of 16 years and not his or her spouse, provided that no conviction shall be had for this offense on the unsupported testimony of the victim.
2. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, a person convicted of the offense of statutory rape shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years; provided, however, that if the person so convicted is 21 years of age or older, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years. Any person convicted under this subsection of the offense of statutory rape shall, in addition, be subject to the sentencing and punishment provisions of Code Section 17-10-6.2.
3. If the victim is at least 14 but less than 16 years of age and the person convicted of statutory rape is 18 years of age or younger and is no more than four years older than the victim, such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

History. Ga. L. 1918, p. 259, §§ 1, 2; Code 1933, §§ 26-1303, 26-1304; Code 1933, § 26-2018, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 715, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 957, § 3; Ga. L. 1996, p. 871, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1115, § 3; Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 10/HB 1059.

Cross references.

Actions for childhood sexual abuse, § 9-3-33.1 .

Testimony as to child’s description of sexual contact or physical abuse, § 24-8-820 .

Visitation with minors by convicted sexual offenders while imprisoned, § 42-5-56 .

Editor’s notes.

Ga. L. 1995, p. 957, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Child Protection Act of 1995’. ”

Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 1/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “The General Assembly finds and declares that recidivist sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an extreme threat to the public safety. Many sexual offenders are extremely likely to use physical violence and to repeat their offenses; and some sexual offenders commit many offenses, have many more victims than are ever reported, and are prosecuted for only a fraction of their crimes. The General Assembly finds that this makes the cost of sexual offender victimization to society at large, while incalculable, clearly exorbitant. The General Assembly further finds that the high level of threat that a sexual predator presents to the public safety, and the long-term effects suffered by victims of sex offenses, provide the state with sufficient justification to implement a strategy that includes:

“(1) Incarcerating sexual offenders and maintaining adequate facilities to ensure that decisions to release sexual predators into the community are not made on the basis of inadequate space;

“(2) Requiring the registration of sexual offenders, with a requirement that complete and accurate information be maintained and accessible for use by law enforcement authorities, communities, and the public;

“(3) Providing for community and public notification concerning the presence of sexual offenders;

“(4) Collecting data relative to sexual offenses and sexual offenders;

“(5) Requiring sexual predators who are released into the community to wear an electronic monitoring system for the rest of their natural life and to pay for such system; and

“(6) Prohibiting sexual predators from working with children, either for compensation or as a volunteer.

“The General Assembly further finds that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexual offenders and in protecting children from predatory sexual activity, and there is sufficient justification for requiring sexual offenders to register and for requiring community and public notification of the presence of sexual offenders. The General Assembly declares that in order to protect the public, it is necessary that the sexual offenders be registered and that members of the community and the public be notified of a sexual offender’s presence. The designation of a person as a sexual offender is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes. Likewise, the designation of a person as a sexual predator is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from findings by the Sexual Offender Registration Review Board and a court if requested by a sexual offender.”

Ga. L. 2006, p. 379, § 30(c)/HB 1059, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “The provisions of this Act shall not affect or abate the status as a crime of any such act or omission which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act repealing, repealing and reenacting, or amending such law, nor shall the prosecution of such crime be abated as a result of such repeal, repeal and reenactment, or amendment.”

Law reviews.

For note, “Pedophilia, Exhibitionism, and Voyeurism: Legal Problems in the Deviant Society,” see 4 Ga. L. Rev. 149 (1969).

For article recommending more consistency in age requirements of laws pertaining to the welfare of minors, see 6 Ga. St. B.J. 189 (1969).

For article, “Misdemeanor Sentencing in Georgia,” see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 8 (2001).

For note on the 2003 amendment to this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 100 (2003).

For survey article on criminal law and procedure for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (2003).

For annual survey of criminal law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 153 (2004).

For note, “Can’t Do the Time, Don’t Do the Crime?: Dixon v. State, Statutory Construction, and the Harsh Realities of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing in Georgia,” see 22 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 519 (2005).

For note, “Calling on the Legislature: Dixon v. State and Georgia’s Statutory Scheme to Protect Minors from Sexual Exploitation,” see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 777 (2005).

For article, “The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload,” see 55 Emory L.J. 691 (2006).

For article on the 2006 amendment of this Code section, see 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 11 (2006).

For article, “Inconsistencies in Georgia’s Sex-Crime Statutes Teach Teens that Sexting is Worse than Sex,” see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 405 (2016).

For annual survey on criminal law, see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 69 (2019).