2021 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 12 - Verdict and Judgment
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 9-12-9. Judgment to Conform to Verdict

Judgment and execution shall conform to the verdict.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 3482; Code 1868, § 3504; Code 1873, § 3562; Code 1882, § 3562; Civil Code 1895, § 5333; Civil Code 1910, § 5928; Code 1933, § 110-301.)

- For article comparing sections of the Georgia Civil Practice Act (Ch. 11, of this title) with preexisting provisions of the Georgia Code, see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 295 (1967).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Amendment of judgment to conform to verdict.

- Judgment must conform to reasonable intendment of verdict upon which the judgment is based and the judgment may be amended by order of the court in order to conform to the verdict, even after execution has been issued. Frank E. Wood Co. v. Colson, 43 Ga. App. 265, 158 S.E. 533 (1931).

Judgment entered on jury verdict in favor of the homeowners had to require the repair of the dam at issue so that it impounded a lake with the normal pool elevation that the evidence reflected was the elevation prior to an emergency partial breach of the dam as the issue for resolution was the action to be taken by the dam owners to comply with an order of the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Natural Resources Department without diminishing the homeowners' property interest in the homeowners' irrevocable easement. Forsyth County v. Martin, 279 Ga. 215, 610 S.E.2d 512 (2005).

Judgment must follow true meaning and intent of finding of the jury. Taylor v. Taylor, 212 Ga. 637, 94 S.E.2d 744 (1956); King v. Cox, 130 Ga. App. 91, 202 S.E.2d 216 (1973); DOT v. Great S. Enters., Inc., 137 Ga. App. 710, 225 S.E.2d 80 (1976).

Trial court erred by entering judgment on the jury's first verdict in a property owner's action for trespass and nuisance because the trial court had the authority and duty to instruct the jury to reconsider the verdict once a substantial error in the charge was discovered even though the owner had not objected to the trial court's actions, and the charges and the verdict form created substantial uncertainty about the meaning of the jury's initial decision; the initial failure to charge on O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(g) was harmful because the jury's initial decision showed an intent to reduce the owner's award by only 50 percent, not 100 percent, but once the jury was fully instructed, the jury confirmed that intent in the second verdict, and the trial court was required to enter judgment in accordance with that intent. Bailey v. Annistown Rd. Baptist Church, Inc., 301 Ga. App. 677, 689 S.E.2d 62 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0669, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 468 (Ga. 2010).

Decree should follow special verdict so far as facts are found on the issues presented, and the decree should be based thereon in connection with the facts admitted in the pleadings. Law v. Coleman, 173 Ga. 68, 159 S.E. 679 (1931).

- It is not true that no decree can be rendered unless the verdict contains finding of all facts upon which the verdict can be based; judge in rendering a decree can grant no relief contrary to the findings of fact made by the jury. Law v. Coleman, 173 Ga. 68, 159 S.E. 679 (1931).

In determining whether a judgment conforms to the verdict, judgment must be construed with reference to pleadings and the evidence. Taylor v. Taylor, 212 Ga. 637, 94 S.E.2d 744 (1956); DOT v. Great S. Enters., Inc., 137 Ga. App. 710, 225 S.E.2d 80 (1976).

When verdict conformed to pleadings and was authorized thereby, it would have been improper to have sustained the defendants' motion for an order making the judgment in the case conform to the verdict rendered by the jury. Maxwell v. Summerville Lumber Co., 87 Ga. App. 405, 74 S.E.2d 111 (1953).

- Verdict may not be amended in matters of substance after the verdict has been received and recorded, and the jury has dispersed; this is nonetheless true in a case wherein the court had directed what the verdict should be. Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 151 Ga. App. 898, 262 S.E.2d 151 (1979).

Verdict against a bank branch which was in fact a corporate nonentity could not be amended by the trial court to substitute the main bank as the party against whom the verdict was to be considered rendered. Harrell v. Bank of S., 174 Ga. App. 384, 330 S.E.2d 147 (1985).

- Judgment based on jury's verdict cannot be set aside by a motion to set aside as long as the verdict upon which the judgment is based stands and has not been set aside by proper procedure. Adams v. Morgan, 114 Ga. App. 180, 150 S.E.2d 556, cert. dismissed, 222 Ga. 820, 152 S.E.2d 693 (1966).

Verdict that is contradictory and repugnant is void, and no valid judgment can be entered thereon. Four Oaks Homes, Inc. v. Smith, 153 Ga. App. 326, 265 S.E.2d 76 (1980).

Verdicts must have a liberal construction, and should be so construed as to stand, if practicable; and the judge may examine the entire pleadings, the admissions in the answer, and all undisputed facts in making a final decree. Law v. Coleman, 173 Ga. 68, 159 S.E. 679 (1931).

- Although there was no procedure under Georgia law by which two separate judgments could be rendered from a single verdict, a bankruptcy court could limit automatic stay relief in a manner that would prevent the creditors from collecting any portion of a verdict in a state court civil action arising from an automobile accident that was in excess of the debtor's policy limits. Creditors could then file a renewed motion for stay relief to the extent that the creditors sought to pursue, or encourage the debtor to pursue, a bad faith claim against the debtor's insurer for failure to settle the case within the debtor's policy limits. Bruch v. Hall (In re Hall), Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2014).

Parol proof cannot furnish a ground of amendment of judgment. Frank E. Wood Co. v. Colson, 43 Ga. App. 265, 158 S.E. 533 (1931).

Judge is not empowered to completely change verdict by allowing interest to a damage award which the jury has denied in the jury's verdict. Taylor v. Taylor, 212 Ga. 637, 94 S.E.2d 744 (1956); Giant Peanut Co. v. Carolina Chem., Inc., 133 Ga. App. 229, 211 S.E.2d 155 (1974), later appeal, 135 Ga. App. 597, 218 S.E.2d 305 (1975).

- In a breach of contract case arising out of an LLC operating agreement, it was not clear that the jury intended to extinguish a former LLC member's interest in the operating agreement by the jury's verdict awarding the former member damages, and under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-7,9-12-9, and9-12-14, the trial court could not vary the judgment from the terms of the verdict. Kaufman Development Partners, L.P. v. Eichenblatt, 324 Ga. App. 71, 749 S.E.2d 374 (2013).

When announcement by the jury is an inquiry, and not a pronouncement, the law allows the jury all reasonable opportunity, before verdict is put on record and the jurors are discharged, to discover and declare the truth according to the judgment. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

Since the jury was confused as to whether the jurors had the power to apportion damages between two defendants, and after the jurors returned to the courtroom when the jurors intimated the jurors had found against both defendants, specifying no amounts, but that the jurors wanted to apportion damages, the judge instructed as to this issue and the jury foreperson indicated that the jury would discuss the matter further, after which the jury then left for further deliberations and returned the verdict finding only against one defendant, there was no error in entering a judgment on this verdict as it was the only "verdict" in the case. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pinyan, 155 Ga. App. 343, 270 S.E.2d 883 (1980).

- Because the jury clearly intended for the easement to encompass the new road built by the grantee, the trial court erred by amending the judgment on remand in a manner that failed to conform to the reasonable intendment of the verdict and the evidence presented at trial regarding the location of the new road. R. C. Acres, Inc. v. Mommies Properties, LLC, 338 Ga. App. 569, 790 S.E.2d 824 (2016).

- Trial judge was without authority to add interest to a judgment without a direction to do so in the verdict; since the trial court's judgment was not an accurate reflection of the jury verdict, it was proper for the court to amend the judgment to conform to the verdict. Dismuke v. Gibson, 174 Ga. App. 546, 330 S.E.2d 771 (1985).

- Prejudgment interest and attorney's fees were stricken, although the parties stipulated at the unreported charge conference that issues of attorney's fees and prejudgment interest would be withdrawn from the jury's consideration and instead would be added to the verdict by the court in the event of an award in favor of the plaintiff since the court ruled that it was error to add prejudgment interest and attorney's fees because O.C.G.A. § 9-12-9 requires that judgment and execution shall conform to the verdict. Dover v. Master Lease Corp., 203 Ga. App. 526, 417 S.E.2d 368 (1992).

- Trial court erroneously modified the jury verdict by awarding any overpayment of marital debt to the wife. In ordering that $19,861 of the house sale proceeds be paid toward non-existent debts and that the resulting overpayment then be returned to the wife, the trial court completely undermined the jury verdict by giving the wife a windfall of approximately $19,000 that the jury did not intend, while denying the mother-in-law the proceeds from the house sale awarded to her in the verdict. Blevins v. Brown, 267 Ga. App. 665, 600 S.E.2d 739 (2004).

Cited in Banks v. Kilday, 88 Ga. App. 307, 76 S.E.2d 642 (1958); Hesters v. Sammons, 106 Ga. App. 126, 126 S.E.2d 484 (1962); Jenkins v. Tastee-Freez of Ga., Inc., 114 Ga. App. 849, 152 S.E.2d 909 (1966); Willingham v. Lee, 124 Ga. App. 641, 185 S.E.2d 553 (1971); Norton Realty & Loan Co. v. Board of Educ., 129 Ga. App. 668, 200 S.E.2d 461 (1973); Jackson v. Riviera Dev. Corp., 130 Ga. App. 146, 202 S.E.2d 545 (1973); Kamor v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 133 Ga. App. 234, 211 S.E.2d 179 (1974); Jolly v. Jolly, 137 Ga. App. 625, 224 S.E.2d 807 (1976); Erdmier v. Eunice, 143 Ga. App. 505, 239 S.E.2d 192 (1977); Lowe v. Lowe, 243 Ga. 398, 254 S.E.2d 323 (1979); First Am. Bank v. Bishop, 244 Ga. 317, 260 S.E.2d 49 (1979); Turley v. Turley, 244 Ga. 808, 262 S.E.2d 112 (1979); C & W Land Dev. Corp. v. Kaminsky, 175 Ga. App. 774, 334 S.E.2d 362 (1985); Force v. McGeachy, 186 Ga. App. 781, 368 S.E.2d 777 (1988); Chastain v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 190 Ga. App. 215, 378 S.E.2d 397 (1989); First Union Nat'l Bank v. Gorlin, 194 Ga. App. 574, 390 S.E.2d 923 (1990); Meyers v. Thornton, 224 Ga. App. 326, 480 S.E.2d 334 (1997); Pinkerton & Laws, Inc. v. Macro Constr., Inc., 226 Ga. App. 169, 485 S.E.2d 797 (1997); Holmes v. Henderson, 274 Ga. 8, 549 S.E.2d 81 (2001); Navy Fed. Credit Union v. McCrea, 337 Ga. App. 103, 786 S.E.2d 707 (2016).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S.

- 49 C.J.S., Judgments, §§ 77, 78.

- Judgments enforcing contract contrary to public policy as subject to collateral attack, 30 A.L.R. 1100.

Right of one liable for death or injury to have damages awarded in judgment against him paid over to physician or nurse for medical attention given to injured or deceased person, 66 A.L.R. 711.

Power of court to add interest to verdict returned by jury, 72 A.L.R. 1150.

Right to have jury polled regarding method of reaching verdict, 86 A.L.R. 203.

Absence of accused at return of verdict in felony case, 23 A.L.R.2d 456.