2021 Georgia Code
Title 40 - Motor Vehicles and Traffic
Chapter 5 - Drivers' Licenses
Article 2 - Issuance, Expiration, and Renewal of Licenses
§ 40-5-20. (See Editor's Notes) License Required; Surrender of Prior Licenses; Local Licenses Prohibited

1. No person, except those expressly exempted in this chapter or in Chapter 6 of this title, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid driver's license under this chapter for the type or class of vehicle being driven.Any person who is a resident of this state for 30 days shall obtain a Georgia driver's license before operating a motor vehicle in this state. Any court having jurisdiction over traffic offenses in this state shall report to the department the name and other identifying information of any individual convicted of driving without a license.This Code section shall not apply to a person driving with a suspended license or license that has been revoked.Any person convicted of violating this Code section shall be punished as provided in subsection (a) of Code Section 40-5-121; provided, however, that if:
   1. Such person is driving with a driver's license issued by this state that has been expired for less than 31 days at the time of the offense and he or she produces in court a driver's license that would have been valid at the time of the offense, he or she shall not be guilty of such offense; and
   2. Such person is driving without a valid driver's license or receipt issued by the department reflecting issuance, renewal, replacement, or reinstatement in his or her possession but he or she has a valid driver's license, Code Section 40-5-29 shall apply to such offense.
2. No person, except those expressly exempted in this chapter, shall steer or, while within the passenger compartment of such vehicle, exercise any degree of physical control of a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid driver's license under this chapter for the type or class of vehicle being towed.
3. 1. 1. Any person who applies for a driver's license, instruction permit, or limited driving permit shall indicate on such application whether he or she is in possession of any other valid driver's license or permit issued pursuant to this title or from any other jurisdiction.
      2. Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no person shall receive a driver's license unless and until such person surrenders to the department all valid licenses or permits in such person's possession issued to him or her pursuant to this title or by any other jurisdiction. The department shall physically mark any surrendered license or permit in a manner which makes it apparent that such license or permit is no longer valid and return the license or permit to such person.
      3. The department shall issue a receipt to a person eligible to be issued a driver's license, instruction permit, or limited driving permit pursuant to the requirements of this title. Such receipt shall satisfy the requirements of subsection (a) of Code Section 40-5-29 regarding proof of eligibility to operate a motor vehicle until the person has received his or her permanent driver's license, instruction permit, or limited driving permit.
      4. If a surrendered driver's license was issued by another jurisdiction, the department shall forward the surrendered license information to the previous jurisdiction.
      5. Except as provided for in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no person shall be permitted to have more than one valid driver's license at any time.
   2. Any noncitizen who is eligible for issuance of a driver's license, instruction permit, or limited driving permit pursuant to the requirements of this title and is in possession of a valid driver's license or permit issued by a foreign jurisdiction may be issued a driver's license, instruction permit, or limited driving permit without surrendering the foreign driver's license or permit. This exemption shall not apply to a person who is required to terminate any previously issued driver's license pursuant to federal law. The department shall make a notation on the driving record of any person who retains a foreign driver's license, and this information shall be made available to law enforcement officers and agencies on such person's driving record through the Georgia Crime Information Center.
4. Any person licensed as a driver under this chapter may exercise the privilege thereby granted upon all streets and highways in this state and shall not be required to obtain any other license to exercise such privilege by any county, municipality, or local board or body having authority to adopt local police regulations.

(Code 1933, § 68B-201, enacted by Ga. L. 1975, p. 1008, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 4; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1250, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1045, § 1; Ga. L. 2008, p. 1137, § 2/SB 350; Ga. L. 2008, p. 1154, § 1/SB 488; Ga. L. 2009, p. 65, § 1/SB 196; Ga. L. 2014, p. 710, § 2-1/SB 298; Ga. L. 2014, p. 745, § 7/HB 877; Ga. L. 2017, p. 184, § 1/HB 136.)

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, rewrote paragraph (c)(1), which read: "(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection and in Code Section 40-5-32, no person shall receive a driver's license unless and until such person surrenders to the department all valid licenses in such person's possession issued to him or her by this or any other jurisdiction. All surrendered licenses issued by another jurisdiction shall be destroyed. The license information shall be forwarded to the previous jurisdiction. No person shall be permitted to have more than one valid driver's license at any time."; and, in paragraph (c)(2), rewrote the first sentence, which read: "Any noncitizen who is eligible for issuance of a driver's license pursuant to the requirements of this chapter may be issued a driver's license without surrendering any driver's license previously issued to him or her by any foreign jurisdiction.", and, in the second sentence, deleted "is applying for a commercial driver's license or who" following "a person who".

For application of this statute in 2020, see Executive Order 03.25.20.01.

A listing of Executive Orders issued in 2020 and 2021 can be found at https://gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders.

- For note on the 2002 amendment of this Code section, see 19 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 277 (2002).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1937, p. 322 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20 prohibits both residents and nonresidents from driving any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without a valid driver's license, defendant's claim that under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1(15) the defendant could not be considered a resident of Georgia was irrelevant. Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 549 S.E.2d 503 (2001).

- Right to operate motor vehicle upon public highways of this state is merely qualified right which can be exercised by obtaining a license from the state. Keenan v. Hardison, 245 Ga. 599, 266 S.E.2d 205 (1980); Ward v. State, 188 Ga. App. 372, 373 S.E.2d 65 (1988).

- Reading the definition of "resident" in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1(15) and O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a) in pari materia, shows that the intention of the General Assembly was not to exempt undocumented aliens from the requirement of obtaining a Georgia driver's license but to permit visitors, with no intention of becoming residents, to drive here without obtaining a Georgia license. Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 537 S.E.2d 784 (2000).

Statutes barring illegal aliens residing in Georgia from obtaining a Georgia driver's license does not deprive the aliens of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001).

Denial of defendant's, an undocumented alien, motion to quash was affirmed because limiting the safe harbor provision of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20 to the production at trial of a Georgia driver's license was a rational part of the enforcement scheme, allowing the presumption created by a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-29(b) to be automatically rebutted only when the evidence that the driver in fact had a valid license when cited was most indisputable and readily evaluated by the factfinder. Castillo-Solis v. State, 292 Ga. 755, 740 S.E.2d 583 (2013).

- Driver with a Mexican driver's license did not have standing to challenge O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20 as conflicting with the 1943 Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic because the Mexican did not have an international license as required by the Convention and O.C.G.A. § 40-5-21(a)(2) and the license the Mexican produced did not meet the requirements of the Convention. Medina v. State, 312 Ga. App. 399, 718 S.E.2d 323 (2011).

- Mere fact of imposing a license requirement does not constitute state infringement on any right of locomotion which an individual may have to travel on public ways as a common-law freeman. Lebrun v. State, 255 Ga. 406, 339 S.E.2d 227 (1986).

- If an officer stops a vehicle in the good faith belief that a traffic violation has been committed, the officer's ultimate failure to issue a traffic citation will not preclude the traffic offense from evincing the reasonable suspicion which served to justify the officer's initial stop of the vehicle. Once a stop is effected, a defendant is subject to custodial arrest for operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license. State v. Chambers, 194 Ga. App. 609, 391 S.E.2d 657 (1990).

- Proof that defendant was driving on city streets was sufficient to show defendant was driving on a "highway" so as to sustain a conviction for driving without a license as city streets fit within the broad definition of "highway" under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20 making it a violation to drive without a license. Scott v. State, 254 Ga. App. 728, 563 S.E.2d 554 (2002).

Driving with expired driver's license is a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a); O.C.G.A. § 40-5-120(7) (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-120(4)) makes such a violation a misdemeanor. Littlejohn v. State, 165 Ga. App. 562, 301 S.E.2d 917 (1983).

- There existed no reversible error when the defendant was accused of (and subsequently convicted of) driving a vehicle without a valid license, but the offense on which the jury was charged concerned the failure to have a valid license in one's possession at all times while operating a motor vehicle (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-29) and the presumption thereby raised that the driver had no valid license. Roberts v. State, 173 Ga. App. 614, 327 S.E.2d 743 (1985).

- Motion to suppress evidence seized from the defendant's car was properly denied because a uniformed officer's initial approach to the car, which had been driven to the scene of a controlled drug buy by a codefendant, was a first-tier police-citizen encounter, the car was already stopped when the uniformed officer approached and asked the codefendant for identification, the codefendant admitted that the codefendant had no driver's license or other identification, and thus the officer had reasonable suspicion that the codefendant was violating the law by driving without a license and was justified in detaining the codefendant from driving off in the vehicle; the officer also had reasonable suspicion of criminal drug activity based on the fact that an informant who was working with police to conduct the drug deal had described a two-door silver Mercedes coupe with dealer tags as the target vehicle belonging to the defendant, and police had confirmed this vehicle was just at the establishment frequented by the defendant, the codefendant drove up in the vehicle just before defendant arrived in a different car, at the very time and place designated for the drug transaction, the codefendant parked near the drug transaction and made hand signals which could have been inferred to have been counter-surveillance signals that the codefendant saw no police and that the transaction could go forward, and, because these circumstances authorized the officer to conduct an investigative detention of the codefendant and the vehicle, the bringing of a drug dog to the scene during that brief detention was proper, and when the drug dog alerted to the vehicle as containing drugs, the subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle was justified. Bowden v. State, 279 Ga. App. 173, 630 S.E.2d 792 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress because the defendant admitted to the police officer that the defendant had no visa or passport, and that the only documentation the defendant could present was a Mexican driver's license written in Spanish and the Mexican consulate card; thus, the police officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving without a license, and the arrest was lawful. Garcia-Carrillo v. State, 322 Ga. App. 439, 746 S.E.2d 137 (2013).

- As an officer's questioning of the defendant, after a traffic stop, about the defendant's length of time in Georgia was done to determine whether the defendant was in compliance with O.C.G.A. §§ 40-2-8(a) and40-5-20(a), and did not unreasonably prolong the stop, the defendant's rights under U.S. Const., amend. IV were not violated. Therefore, methamphetamine seized from the defendant's purse during the stop did not have to be suppressed. Sommese v. State, 299 Ga. App. 664, 683 S.E.2d 642 (2009).

- After the defendant drove a golf cart on a public highway with a suspended license in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a), the trial court properly instructed the jury that the defendant had to have a driver's license; the evidence sufficiently supported the suspended license conviction. Coker v. State, 261 Ga. App. 646, 583 S.E.2d 498 (2003).

- Because the defendant's learner's permit was not valid for the purpose of driving unsupervised, as the defendant was on the day of a traffic stop, the defendant could not qualify for the safe harbor under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a). Colotl v. State, 313 Ga. App. 42, 720 S.E.2d 210 (2011).

- While it is a violation of state law to operate an automobile without a driver's license, this is actionable negligence only when there is a proximate causal connection between the violation and the injury. Carpenter v. Lyons, 78 Ga. App. 214, 50 S.E.2d 850 (1948) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 322).

- Appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial with respect to the two misdemeanor traffic violations because the prejudice from trial counsel's failure to object was clear as the officer's hearsay testimony was the only evidence offered to prove the elements of the traffic offenses and had the evidence been excluded, there would not have been sufficient evidence to convict on those offenses. Taylor v. State, 337 Ga. App. 486, 788 S.E.2d 97 (2016).

- Evidence was sufficient to find that a defendant violated O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a) because it was a matter of common knowledge that "the loop" or "bypass" in a certain area was a public highway, although there was no direct testimony of that fact. Craig v. State, 276 Ga. App. 329, 623 S.E.2d 518 (2005).

Because the defendant admittedly lacked a driver's license, the tag on the car being driven was expired, and the defendant produced no evidence that the car had been recently purchased, and thus fell within the initial 30-day registration period during which a numbered license plate was not required, defendant's convictions were upheld on appeal. Arellano v. State, 289 Ga. App. 148, 656 S.E.2d 264 (2008).

- Testimony by a police officer that someone else ran a computer check and determined that defendant did not have a driver's license was not sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for driving without a license. James v. State, 265 Ga. App. 689, 595 S.E.2d 364 (2004).

Because the state failed to present the parties' stipulation to the trier of fact and there was no other evidence that the defendant was driving without a license, insufficient evidence existed to sustain a conviction for driving without a license. Raby v. State, 274 Ga. App. 665, 618 S.E.2d 704 (2005).

- Because the defendant was being tried under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20, giving a clarifying charge to the jury on "driving without a license on the person" (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-29) was not error. Duckworth v. State, 223 Ga. App. 250, 477 S.E.2d 336 (1996), aff'd, 268 Ga. 566, 492 S.E.2d 201 (1997).

Cited in Smith v. State, 158 Ga. App. 663, 218 S.E.2d 631 (1981); Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 828, 286 S.E.2d 709 (1982); Pfeffier v. State, 173 Ga. App. 374, 326 S.E.2d 562 (1985); Cabral v. White, 181 Ga. App. 816, 354 S.E.2d 162 (1987); Spivey v. Sellers, 185 Ga. App. 241, 363 S.E.2d 856 (1987); Rogers v. State, 206 Ga. App. 654, 426 S.E.2d 209 (1992); Florence v. State, 246 Ga. App. 479, 539 S.E.2d 901 (2000); Rocha v. State, 250 Ga. App. 209, 551 S.E.2d 82 (2001); In the Interest of T. H., 258 Ga. App. 416, 574 S.E.2d 461 (2002); Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 252, 635 S.E.2d 849 (2006); Dunbar v. State, 283 Ga. App. 872, 643 S.E.2d 292 (2007); Lopez v. State, 286 Ga. App. 873, 650 S.E.2d 430 (2007); State v. Torres, 290 Ga. App. 804, 660 S.E.2d 763 (2008); Manhertz v. State, 317 Ga. App. 856, 734 S.E.2d 406 (2012); State v. McCloud, 344 Ga. App. 595, 810 S.E.2d 668 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C0899, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 577 (Ga. 2018).

Motor scooter is a motor vehicle which must be licensed before operation in Georgia, and the operator of a motor scooter is subject to the same rules as drivers of automobiles. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 485.

Go-cart is a motor vehicle; the operator of a go-cart must be licensed; the go-cart must be registered, inspected annually, and equipped with headlights, stop lights, and turn signals. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-194.

- Nonresident student is not required to obtain a Georgia driver's license in order to operate a vehicle on the public roads and highways so long as the student is at least 16 years of age and is the holder and possessor of a valid operator's or public chauffeur's license issued by the state of domicile. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-40.

- Offenses arising under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a) are designated as offenses for which those charged are to be fingerprinted. 2008 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2008-6; 2009 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2009-1.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 100, 102, 112 et seq.

- 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 319 et seq., 323, 331 et seq.

- Civil rights and liabilities as affected by failure to comply with regulations as to registration of automobile or motorcycle, or licensing of operator, 58 A.L.R. 532; 61 A.L.R. 1190; 78 A.L.R. 1028; 87 A.L.R. 1469; 111 A.L.R. 1258; 163 A.L.R. 1375; 53 A.L.R.2d 850.

Constitutionality and construction of statutes with respect to nonresident motor vehicle operators' or drivers' licenses, 82 A.L.R. 1392.

Validity of statute or ordinance relating to granting or revocation of license or permit to operate automobile, 108 A.L.R. 1162; 125 A.L.R. 1459.

Lack of proper automobile registration or operator's license as evidence of operator's negligence, 29 A.L.R.2d 963.

Construction, applicability, and effect of traffic regulation prohibiting vehicles from passing one another at street or highway intersection, 53 A.L.R.2d 850.

Validity of state statutes, regulations, or other identification requirements restricting or denying driver's licenses to illegal aliens, 16 A.L.R.6th 131.