2021 Georgia Code
Title 17 - Criminal Procedure
Chapter 14 - Restitution and Distribution of Profits to Victims of Crimes
Article 1 - Restitution
§ 17-14-8. Apportionment of Payments for Fines and Restitution; Payment to Victims

1. In any case in which a court sentences an offender to pay restitution and a fine, if the court permits the offender to pay such restitution and fine in other than a lump sum, the clerk of any superior court of this state, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or other official who receives such partial payments shall apply not less than one-half of each payment to the restitution before paying any portion of such fine or any forfeitures, costs, fees, or surcharges provided for by law to any agency, department, commission, committee, authority, board, or bureau of state or local government.
2. The clerk of any court of this state, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or other official who receives partial payments for restitution shall pay the restitution amount to the victim as provided in the restitution order not later than the last day of each month, provided that the amount exceeds $100.00. If the amount does not exceed $100.00, the clerk of any court of this state, community supervision officer, county or Department of Juvenile Justice juvenile probation officer, probation officer serving pursuant to Article 6 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, or other official may allow the amount of restitution to accumulate until such time as it exceeds $100.00 or until the end of the next calendar quarter, whichever occurs first.

(Code 1933, § 27-3008, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1382, § 1; Ga. L. 2005, p. 88, § 5/HB 172; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-36/HB 310.)

- Ga. L. 2005, p. 88, § 1/HB 172, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Crime Victims Restitution Act of 2005.'"

Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.

- For annual survey article discussing developments in criminal law, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 209 (1999). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Hearing.

- Statutory purpose of the hearing and the entering of specific written findings is to allow the court to determine whether the court will order restitution and, if so, in what amount. Westmoreland v. State, 192 Ga. App. 173, 384 S.E.2d 249 (1989).

- Former Code 1933, §§ 27-3008 - 27-3010 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 17-14-8 -17-14-10) contemplated a hearing and specific written findings by the court in determining whether the court will order restitution and the amount thereof; thus, the statutory provisions on restitution do not deny defendant's due process rights to a hearing on the damage issue. Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980).

O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8 contemplates a hearing and specific written findings by the court in determining whether the court will order restitution. Patterson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 85, 289 S.E.2d 270 (1982); Taylor v. State, 182 Ga. App. 494, 356 S.E.2d 216 (1987); Britt v. State, 232 Ga. App. 780, 503 S.E.2d 653 (1998).

- Sentence imposing restitution on a defendant cannot stand in the absence of a presentence hearing. Thompson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 471, 367 S.E.2d 320 (1988); Owens v. State, 187 Ga. App. 262, 369 S.E.2d 919 (1988); Radford v. State, 223 Ga. App. 312, 477 S.E.2d 428 (1996); Isaac v. State, 237 Ga. App. 723, 516 S.E.2d 575 (1999).

In a case of child molestation, the trial court erred in ordering restitution without holding a restitution hearing and that portion of the defendant's probationary sentence which imposed reimbursement for psychological counseling of the victims required vacating and remand for a hearing on the issue of restitution in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8. Potts v. State, 207 Ga. App. 863, 429 S.E.2d 526 (1993).

- That portion of the defendant's sentence which imposed restitution as a condition of probation was reversed and remanded to the trial court with direction that a hearing on the issue of restitution be held at which O.C.G.A. § 17-14-9, regarding the amount, and the factors in O.C.G.A. § 17-14-10 were to be considered, and the trial court was further directed that the written finding required by O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8 be made. Murphy v. State, 182 Ga. App. 791, 357 S.E.2d 147 (1987).

- When the appeal's court is unable to discern from the designated record any written findings as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8(a), the portion of the sentence imposing restitution will be vacated and remanded to the trial court for the preparation of written findings in compliance with that section. Howard v. State, 213 Ga. App. 542, 445 S.E.2d 532 (1994).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 17-14-1 et seq., written findings are no longer required when ordering an offender to make restitution; as a result, Garrett v. State, 175 Ga. App. 400, 333 S.E.2d 432 (1985), and its progeny, are disapproved to extent those cases were authority for any cases involving restitution orders issued on or after July 1, 2005, the effective date of the Crime Victims Restitution Act of 2005, O.C.G.A. § 17-14-1 et seq. McCart v. State, 289 Ga. App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008).

- Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in concluding that the defendant caused the $5,306.28 in damages to a stolen truck since the defendant was found in possession of the truck, and therefore the defendant was responsible for all damages that the truck incurred; as a result, the trial court properly ordered the defendant to pay a judgment of restitution in the amount of $5,306.28. McCart v. State, 289 Ga. App. 830, 658 S.E.2d 465 (2008).

- Although O.C.G.A. § 17-14-8 requires the trial court to consider fact of tender of restitution by criminal offender to a victim before imposing the sentence, the failure of the trial court to consider this fact was not error since the sentence imposed was mandatory under the recidivist statute (O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7). Chappell v. State, 164 Ga. App. 77, 296 S.E.2d 629 (1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020).

- Because the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant, a mortgage consultant, did not intend to perform the services paid for by a client, only that conviction, out of eight entered by the jury, and the restitution order attached to the conviction, had to be reversed. Patterson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 663, 658 S.E.2d 210 (2008).

Cited in Jarrett v. State, 161 Ga. App. 285, 287 S.E.2d 746 (1982); Bridges v. State, 208 Ga. App. 555, 431 S.E.2d 164 (1993); Willard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 469, 535 S.E.2d 820 (2000); Miller v. State, 264 Ga. App. 801, 592 S.E.2d 450 (2003).