2020 Georgia Code
Title 9 - Civil Practice
Chapter 3 - Limitations of Actions
Article 2 - Specific Periods of Limitation
§ 9-3-22. Enforcement of Rights Under Statutes, Acts of Incorporation; Recovery of Wages, Overtime, and Damages

All actions for the enforcement of rights accruing to individuals under statutes or acts of incorporation or by operation of law shall be brought within 20 years after the right of action has accrued; provided, however, that all actions for the recovery of wages, overtime, or damages and penalties accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime shall be brought within two years after the right of action has accrued.

(Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 233, § 12; Code 1863, § 2857; Code 1868, § 2865; Code 1873, § 2916; Code 1882, § 2916; Civil Code 1895, § 3766; Civil Code 1910, § 4360; Code 1933, § 3-704; Ga. L. 1943, p. 333, § 1.)

- Time limitation on bringing of action by employee to recover difference between wages actually paid and state minimum wage, § 34-4-6.

Time limitation on action to recover wages not paid as result of sex discrimination, § 34-5-5.

- For article, "Some Rescission Problems in Truth-In-Lending, as Viewed From Georgia," see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 315 (1971). For article surveying local government law in 1984-85, see 37 Mercer L. Rev. 313 (1985). For survey article on trial practice and procedure for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 439 (2003). For annual survey of labor and employment law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 251 (2005).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Rights Under Statutes
• Recovery for Wages, Overtime, and Other Employment Issues

General Consideration

Purpose of section.

- Evident purpose of this section is to fix a period of limitation for special cases not provided for by general statute of limitations or otherwise, when rights accruing to "individuals" are sought to be enforced. McDaniel v. Kelley, 61 Ga. App. 105, 5 S.E.2d 672 (1939).

- Before enactment of Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 233, § 12, from which this section was codified, there was of force in this state no statute prescribing a limitation as is fixed by the enactment; hence, the legislature enacted a plain and unambiguous statement of the law, which was intended to relieve the feeling of uncertainty and doubt theretofore existing. Nixon v. Nixon, 196 Ga. 148, 26 S.E.2d 711, answer conformed to, 69 Ga. App. 667, 26 S.E.2d 722 (1943).

This section provides omnibus time provision for all statutorily created remedies which do not themselves specify an applicable limitation period. McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979).

- Word "suits" (now "actions"), as used in this section, is general term denoting any legal proceeding in court. Nixon v. Nixon, 196 Ga. 148, 26 S.E.2d 711, answer conformed to, 69 Ga. App. 667, 26 S.E.2d 722 (1943).

- The 20-year statute of limitation of this section has reference only to rights which arise under legislative enactment, and which would not exist except for some Act of the legislature. Williams v. Clemons, 178 Ga. 619, 173 S.E. 718 (1934); Houston v. John Doe, 136 Ga. App. 583, 222 S.E.2d 131 (1975); McMillian v. City of Rockmart, 653 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1981).

This section applies to cases in which a special liability is created by a special charter or statute. Williams v. Clemons, 178 Ga. 619, 173 S.E. 718 (1934).

- Statutory liability is one that depends for its existence and creation upon special enactment of a statute and not upon contract of the parties on which an additional remedy by statute is given. Pare v. Mahone, 32 Ga. 253 (1861); Savannah & Ogeechee Canal Co. v. Shuman, 98 Ga. 171, 25 S.E. 415 (1896); Peavy v. Turner, 107 Ga. 401, 33 S.E. 409 (1899); Wimbush v. Curry, 8 Ga. App. 223, 68 S.E. 951 (1910); McDaniel v. Kelley, 61 Ga. App. 105, 5 S.E.2d 672 (1939).

Right arising under statute, in contemplation of this section, must arise in virtue of provisions of the statute and not in virtue of contract between the parties. Nixon v. Nixon, 196 Ga. 148, 26 S.E.2d 711, answer conformed to, 69 Ga. App. 667, 26 S.E.2d 722 (1943).

- Limitation of this section was enacted for rights of action given to individuals by special legislative Acts, such as statute of incorporation. Hendryx v. E.C. Atkins & Co., 79 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1935).

This section refers to statutes that confer rights upon specified individuals or designated class of individuals and not upon general public as a whole. Nixon v. Nixon, 196 Ga. 148, 26 S.E.2d 711, answer conformed to, 69 Ga. App. 667, 26 S.E.2d 722 (1943).

Every statute specifically conferring rights upon individual or class to which individual belongs is embraced in this section. Nixon v. Nixon, 196 Ga. 148, 26 S.E.2d 711, answer conformed to, 69 Ga. App. 667, 26 S.E.2d 722 (1943).

Statute involved must be special enactment which creates liability in favor of particular individuals for 20-year limitation period to apply. Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ga. 1972).

This section is not applicable to rights conferred by law upon members of public at large, and as such, 20-year limitation period provided by this section has no application. Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 392 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Ga. 1974).

This section applies only to rights of action given to individuals by special legislative Acts and is not applicable in cases when a wrong against the public must first be done before a person can be injured. Greene v. Lam Amusement Co., 145 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ga. 1956); McMillian v. City of Rockmart, 653 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1981).

In order to bring case within 20-year limitation period provided by this section, the liability must be one expressly created in favor of individual or class to which plaintiff belongs, as distinguished from one arising under general law in favor of all persons who might be injured. Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 392 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Ga. 1974).

Rights of action within this section are those given to individuals by special legislative Acts, such as a statute of incorporation, but not actions based upon invasion of plaintiff's personal rights, which are common with all other persons, when as part of the public the plaintiff has right of action for injuries sustained. Service Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 170 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1959), aff'd, 268 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1959).

- Bank was properly granted summary judgment in an interpleader action involving competing claims between the bank and a widow to the proceeds of a life insurance policy as the decedent, the widow's spouse, had assigned the policy to the bank as collateral for a loan in 1977 and, despite having had the debt discharged in bankruptcy, the bank was not precluded to recover the bank's collateral. Further, the bank's right to recover did not accrue until the decedent's death; therefore, the statutes of limitation had not expired. Miller v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 292 Ga. App. 189, 663 S.E.2d 756 (2008).

Cited in Thornton v. Lane, 11 Ga. 459 (1852); Banks v. Darden ex rel. Jerrenaud, 18 Ga. 318 (1855); Georgia Mfg. & Paper Mill Co. v. Amis, 53 Ga. 228 (1874); Redd v. Davis, 59 Ga. 823 (1877); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nunnally, 86 Ga. 503, 12 S.E. 578 (1891); Brunswick Term. Co. v. National Bank, 99 F. 635 (4th Cir. 1900); Bigby v. Douglas, 123 Ga. 635, 51 S.E. 606 (1905); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Huson, 5 Ga. App. 529, 63 S.E. 597 (1909); Harris v. Black, 143 Ga. 497, 85 S.E. 742 (1915); Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Luke, 19 Ga. App. 100, 90 S.E. 1041 (1916); Butler v. Mobley, 170 Ga. 265, 152 S.E. 229 (1930); Harrison v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 185 Ga. 556, 195 S.E. 750 (1937); Wideman v. Blanchard & Calhoun Realty Co., 50 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Ga. 1943); De Kalb County v. Cloud, 72 Ga. App. 454, 33 S.E.2d 908 (1945); Lee v. Southern Airways, Inc., 202 Ga. 454, 43 S.E.2d 547 (1947); Walden v. Bale, 78 Ga. App. 226, 50 S.E.2d 844 (1948); Smith v. Sanders, 208 Ga. 405, 67 S.E.2d 229 (1951); Vinson v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 208 Ga. 813, 69 S.E.2d 866 (1952); Crow v. McCallum, 215 Ga. 692, 113 S.E.2d 203 (1960); Stephens v. Moran, 21 Ga. 4, 142 S.E.2d 845 (1965); Nation v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 380, 145 S.E.2d 265 (1965); Modern Carpet Indus., Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 125 Ga. App. 150, 186 S.E.2d 586 (1971); Searcy v. Godwin, 129 Ga. App. 827, 201 S.E.2d 670 (1973); Ross v. GMC, 391 F. Supp. 550 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974); Woods v. Local 613, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 404 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1975); EEOC v. NCR Co., 405 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Bingham v. Advance Indus. Sec., Inc., 138 Ga. App. 875, 228 S.E.2d 1 (1976); Champion v. Wells, 139 Ga. App. 759, 229 S.E.2d 479 (1976); Johnson v. City of Albany, 413 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Independent Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Prods., Inc., 141 Ga. App. 518, 233 S.E.2d 874 (1977); Strozier v. GMC, 442 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Holcombe v. Gunby, 241 Ga. 105, 243 S.E.2d 65 (1978); Grimes v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1381 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Ryder Truck Lines, 160 Ga. App. 650, 288 S.E.2d 1 (1981); Dowdell v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 107 (M.D. Ga. 1981); Hill v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 591 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Balkcom v. Jones County, 196 Ga. App. 378, 395 S.E.2d 889 (1990); Buskirk v. State, 267 Ga. 769, 482 S.E.2d 286 (1997); Williams v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 478, 640 S.E.2d 35 (2007).

Rights Under Statutes

Not applicable to migrant workers' breach of contract claims.

- Contrary to the employers' argument, the state law breach of contract claims of guest workers from Mexico arising prior to July 11, 2003, were not barred by the two-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 because 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(14) specified that the workers held contract claims for underpayment, the six-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 applied; the workers' state law breach of contract claims were filed on July 11, 2005, easily within six years of the dates the claims accrued, and so the claims were timely filed under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, and were not subject to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. Morales-Arcadio v. Shannon Produce Farms, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2006).

- The 20-year statute of limitation is clearly applicable to a statutory liability or penalty. Bankers Fid. Life Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 106 Ga. App. 305, 126 S.E.2d 887 (1962).

When action was brought on independent statutory remedy afforded by Ga. L. 1976, p. 1564, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 33-22-14(a)), relating to return of unearned insurance premiums, predicated on statutory obligation contained therein, and the statutory remedy was not a codification of a remedy existing at common law but was one arising solely from statute, former Code 1933, § 3-704 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22) applied. Perry & Co. v. Knight Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 128, 253 S.E.2d 808 (1979).

Claim by retired fireman for payment of monthly pension, being for a liability fixed by statute, was one to which the 20-year period of limitation applies. Pierce v. Rhodes, 208 Ga. 554, 67 S.E.2d 771 (1951).

- Former Civil Code 1895, § 3766 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22) made applicable to action by state to collect back taxes by former Civil Code 1895, § 3777 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-1). Georgia R.R. & Banking v. Wright, 124 Ga. 596, 53 S.E. 251 (1906), rev'd on other grounds, 207 U.S. 127, 28 S. Ct. 47, 52 L. Ed. 134 (1907).

- The 20-year statute of limitations for contribution actions is governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 441 S.E.2d 868 (1994).

Claim for contribution maintainable under a 20-year statute of limitations, based on an earlier medical malpractice action and alleging that x-ray studies were negligently interpreted by the defendant radiologist, was barred by the five-year statute of repose for medical malpractice cases. Krasaeath v. Parker, 212 Ga. App. 525, 441 S.E.2d 868 (1994).

Actions for contribution and indemnity are governed by the 20-year statute of limitations contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Union Carbide Corp. v. Thiokol Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Rolleston v. Cherry, 226 Ga. App. 750, 487 S.E.2d 354 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1107, 118 S. Ct. 1677, 140 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1998).

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 is applicable only to rights which arise under legislative enactment and which would not exist except for some act of the legislature; thus, it is not applicable to claims for the right of contribution filed by one co-maker of a debt against another pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-7-50, which arises not out of statutory enactment, but is a claim based in equity. Gray v. Currie, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Nov. 21, 2005).

- Subcontractor's claim against a consultant for contribution was given by statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32(a), and the subcontractor's claim for indemnity arose by operation of law. Therefore, the subcontractor's suit for contribution and indemnity against the consultant was a claim to enforce rights that accrued by operation of law or a statute and was subject to a 20-year statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Saiia Constr., LLC v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., 310 Ga. App. 713, 714 S.E.2d 3 (2011).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(f), in a subrogation action by an insurer to recover personal injury payments made to its insured, the insurer is bound by the two-year statute of limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33, not the 20-year limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Whirl v. Safeco Ins. Co., 241 Ga. App. 654, 527 S.E.2d 262 (1999).

- Rights of beneficiary of member of insurance company, contained in charter and bylaws, come within scope of this section. Georgia Masonic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 63 Ga. 471 (1879) (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22).

- Subrogation of insurance claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents are statutory and are subject to the 20-year statute of limitation. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 163 Ga. App. 20, 293 S.E.2d 509 (1982).

When charter provision confers right of action upon persons injured by failure of company to repair its canal, this section is applicable. Savannah & Ogeechee Canal Co. v. Shuman, 98 Ga. 171, 25 S.E. 415 (1896) (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22).

- This section and not statute of limitations in Maryland applies to action in Maryland against stockholder in Georgia corporation to enforce liability as stockholder as created by corporate charter. Brunswick Term. Co. v. National Bank, 99 F. 635 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 178 U.S. 611, 20 S. Ct. 1029, 44 L. Ed. 1215 (1900) (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22).

- General statute of limitations, providing that an action to enforce a right accruing to an individual under state statute must be brought within 20 years after the action accrues, governs a cause of action arising solely under the Sale of Business Opportunities Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-410 et seq., since the act itself contains no statute of limitations. Hornsby v. Phillips, 190 Ga. App. 335, 378 S.E.2d 870, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 898, 378 S.E.2d 870 (1989).

This section does not apply to actions under § 10(b) of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.), as this section applies only to special legislative statutes and acts of incorporation which confer rights upon particular individuals or a particular class of individuals and not to statutes which deal with the personal legal rights of the public at large. Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22).

- Four-year period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31 was applicable for purposes of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, not the 20-year period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Kason Indus. v. Component Hdwe. Group, 120 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 1997).

- Supreme Court of Georgia is not persuaded that the Georgia legislature intended the period of limitation for bringing an enforcement action pursuant to the Payday Lending Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-17-1, et seq., to be governed by the one-year limitation period for forfeiture actions pursuant to the usury laws; instead, the Court concludes the remedies set forth in the Payday Lending Act are governed by the 20-year statute of limitation set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-1. W. Sky Fin., LLC v. State of Ga. ex rel. Olens, 300 Ga. 340, 793 S.E.2d 357 (2016).

Right to recover for "injury or damages" contemplated by Uninsured Motorist Act (se now O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11) existed at common law and was not created anew by the legislature. Houston v. John Doe, 136 Ga. App. 583, 222 S.E.2d 131 (1975).

Penalty under O.C.G.A. § 47-17-60. - In mandamus action brought by Board of Commissioners of Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund against county commissioners to collect penalty under Ga. L. 1975, p. 578, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 47-17-60) for failure to pay amounts due, the one-year limitation of former Code 1933, § 3-714 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-28), and not the 20-year limitation of former Code 1933, § 3-704 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22), applied. Busbee v. Gillis, 241 Ga. 353, 245 S.E.2d 304 (1978).

- This section does not apply to an action on a contract of subscription to capital stock. McDonell v. Hines, 28 Ga. App. 197, 110 S.E. 505 (1922).

- As the object of O.C.G.A. § 36-9-2, requiring the entry of contracts of conveyance on the minutes of a public official's records, is to give information to the public, the statute of limitation in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 was inapplicable because the action arose from a claim that a public officer had failed to perform the officer's official duty. Dade County v. Miami Land Co., 253 Ga. 776, 325 S.E.2d 750 (1985).

- This section does not apply to an action for mileage tickets. South Georgia Ry. v. South Ga. Grocery Co., 17 Ga. App. 349, 86 S.E. 939 (1915).

- This section does not apply to an action by a carrier for interstate freight charges. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Malsby Co., 22 Ga. App. 595, 96 S.E. 710 (1918).

- Former Civil Code 1895, § 3766 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22) did not apply to enforcement of attorney's lien created by former Civil Code 1895, § 2814 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14). Peavy v. Turner, 107 Ga. 401, 33 S.E. 409 (1899).

When charter declares that "at the time of suits," stockholders shall be individually liable for ultimate payment of debts of bank, in given proportion, this section does not begin to run in favor of stockholders until after date of such a suit. Wheatley v. Glover, 125 Ga. 710, 54 S.E. 626 (1906).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 did not apply to a subrogation claim filed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11.1(c), which allows an insurer who has paid worker's compensation benefits to assert the employee's cause of action against a third party who caused the injuries. Newsome v. Department of Admin. Servs., 241 Ga. App. 357, 526 S.E.2d 871 (1999).

Five-year medical malpractice statute of repose, not 20-year limitations period for contribution actions, applied and barred the subrogee's contribution action against the joint tortfeasor which the subrogee filed more than 10 years after the injury occurred that gave rise to the underlying medical malpractice action for which the joint tortfeasor and the medical center were found liable for damages as the five-year statute of repose better served the facts of the case and the law, which sought to eliminate stale claims, allow for the provision of quality healthcare, and related considerations. Pilzer v. Va. Ins. Reciprocal, 260 Ga. App. 736, 580 S.E.2d 599 (2003).

Trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings to the companies in a former employee's action alleging violations of O.C.G.A. § 34-7-2 because the employee did not file an action claiming that a forfeiture clause in a stock incentive plan constituted a violation of wage requirements within the relevant two-year statute of limitations provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22, and the action was therefore time barred. Milhollin v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 272 Ga. App. 267, 612 S.E.2d 72 (2005).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 applies under § 1981 of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1983).

Since the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not contain its own statute of limitations, it is well settled that the period of limitations to be used is the most analogous one provided by state law. The applicable limitations period for first amendment and due process claims is not the six-month period provided by O.C.G.A. § 45-19-36 for filing an administrative complaint for unlawful discrimination committed by a public employer; the most analogous limitations period provided by Georgia law for these claims appears to be either the one provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 (enforcement of statutory rights) or the one provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (injuries to person or reputation). Cook v. Ashmore, 579 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

Appropriate Georgia state statute of limitations to be borrowed in a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 (rights under statutes), not O.C.G.A. § 45-19-36 (unlawful labor practice). Solomon v. Hardison, 746 F.2d 699 (11th Cir. 1984).

Appropriate state statute of limitations to be "borrowed" in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. East Cent. Health Dist. v. Brown, 752 F.2d 615 (11th Cir. 1985).

Recovery for Wages, Overtime, and Other Employment Issues

Action based on common-law grounds not within this section.

- Action based on complaint setting forth alternative claims based on express contract and quantum meruit, involving rights recognized under common law and codified from common law, is not action "for the recovery of wages" within meaning of this section, which has reference to rights arising solely from statute. Bass v. Hilts S. Equip. Co., 151 Ga. App. 883, 261 S.E.2d 787 (1979).

- As a class of retirees had a right to retirement pay from the Teachers Retirement System of Georgia that arose from their contracts of employment and not from a statutory right, the six-year limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 applicable to contract matters was controlling; the 20-year limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 was not the correct limitations period to apply in the circumstances. Teachers Ret. Sys. v. Plymel, 296 Ga. App. 839, 676 S.E.2d 234 (2009).

Employment discrimination action is governed by two-year limitation period provided under this section. Carter v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 392 F. Supp. 494 (S.D. Ga. 1974).

In a suit for wages by municipal employees seeking recovery as authorized by a municipal ordinance, the action must be brought within two years. City of Atlanta v. Adams, 256 Ga. 620, 351 S.E.2d 444 (1987).

- When federal laws create rights to back pay as part of general remedial relief, this section applies. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).

Two-year period of limitations provided by this section, and not alternative 20-year period, governs portion of federal civil rights suits regarding recovery of back pay. Stroud v. Delta Airlines, 392 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844, 98 S. Ct. 146, 54 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1977).

This section may bar recovery of back pay in actions brought by federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ga. 1975).

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint for recovery of back pay is a private action and is thus bound by this section, the applicable state statute of limitations. EEOC v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls' Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1976); EEOC v. Upjohn Corp., 445 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ga. 1977).

Two-year limitations period under this section is applicable to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Roberts v. H.W. Ivey Constr. Co., 408 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Harris v. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 479 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ga. 1979).

When actions brought under federal civil rights statutes are seeking back pay as part of general remedial relief, this section, which governs actions for unpaid wages, applies. Grimes v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1381 (N.D. Ga. 1979).

Federal civil rights claim for back pay is not barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22since the plaintiff first exhausted the plaintiff's state administrative remedies, the statute of limitations being tolled from the date the plaintiff begins to pursue the plaintiff's state administrative remedies until the date of the final decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. Brown v. Ledbetter, 569 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 alleging plaintiff's former employer wrongfully denied the plaintiff severance pay and certain reemployment assistance allegedly given to other employees because of the plaintiff's race had to be filed within two years after the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the alleged discrimination occurred. Greason v. Southeastern R.R. Associated Bureaus, 650 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ga. 1986).

Limitations periods of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 are not tolled by the pendency of a Title VII employment discrimination charge. Calloway v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 642 F. Supp. 663 (M.D. Ga. 1986), appeal dismissed, 831 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1987).

Employment discrimination actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Calloway v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 642 F. Supp. 663 (M.D. Ga. 1986), appeal dismissed, 831 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1987).

In an employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the 20-year period of limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 applies to claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and the two-year period of limitation applies to claims for damages. Stafford v. Muscogee County Bd. of Educ., 688 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1982).

There is no relevant federal statute of limitation for 42 U.S.C. § 1981 actions, so the controlling period is that stated in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22, the most appropriate one provided by state law. Evans v. Meadow Steel Prods., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

Two-year limitations period for recovery of wages specified in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 applies to federal employment discrimination claims for back pay, and the 20-year limitations period to enforce individual statutory rights applies to federal employment discrimination claims for equitable relief. Mack v. W.R. Grace Co., 578 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Ga. 1983), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 805, 105 S. Ct. 62, 83 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1984); Buffington v. General Time Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1186 (M.D. Ga. 1988).

Employment discrimination actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 most closely resemble state-law "suits for the enforcement of rights accruing to individuals under statutes" and therefore are governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984).

- Limitation of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 applies to actions for wages brought by municipal employees pursuant to municipal ordinances; the trial court correctly determined that a portion of a mechanic's wage claims were time barred pursuant to § 9-3-22. Willis v. City of Atlanta, 265 Ga. App. 640, 595 S.E.2d 339 (2004).

- When Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint seeks recovery of back pay, this section begins to run from last act of discrimination. EEOC v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls' Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1976).

Filing of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge tolls statute of limitations. Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1983).

Limitations period for EEOC complaint is tolled from filing of charge with EEOC until notice is given the charging party that conciliation efforts have failed. EEOC v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls' Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1976).

This section does not bar Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from seeking injunctive relief. EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ga. 1975).

Action seeking to recover reasonable value of services, less credit for partial payment in form of reduced rentals, clearly came under four-year limitation of former Code 1933, § 3-706 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25), and was not an action "for the recovery of wages" under former Code 1933, § 3-704 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22). Parks v. Brissey, 114 Ga. App. 563, 151 S.E.2d 896 (1966).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 governed employees' claims under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.c. § 1051 et seq., for backpay, front pay, and reinstatement. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 990 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1992).

- In a class action in which migrant farm workers' state law breach of contract claims against farmers were in reality wages or contract for wages set by statute, farmers' motion to dismiss the state law claims was granted as to claims before 2004, as they were barred by the two-year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Antonio-Candelaria v. Gibbs Farms, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2008).

Plaintiffs, who were Mexican temporary farm workers, filed a breach of contract claim against defendant employer, alleging the employer violated the terms of an immigration clearance order, which promised compliance with all employ- ment-related law and reimbursement for certain expenses and payment of wages on a weekly basis, the six-year statute of limitations for simple contracts, provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, applied to such claims, rather than the two-year limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 as to payment of wages because regulations governing the worker program expressly stated that the job clearance order created a contract between the employer and the worker, thus invoking the six-year statute of limitations specified in § 9-3-24. Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 728 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Ga. 2010).

- Action for claims under O.C.G.A. §§ 34-7-2 and34-7-3 which accrued more than two years prior to the filing of the action was barred by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Sakas v. Settle Down Enters., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2000).

- Trial court erred in finding that all of a a state court judge's claims to recover compensation under state law, O.C.G.A. § 15-7-22, a local law, 2006 Ga. Laws 206, and a county ordinance, were barred by laches; the judge's claims were subject to the two-year limitations period in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22, meaning the judge could pursue claims on or after October 6, 2015; however, the judge was not entitled to mandamus because the judge had received all the compensation to which the judge was entitled. Cowen v. Clayton County, 306 Ga. 698, 832 S.E.2d 819 (2019).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 127.

- 54 C.J.S., Limitation of Actions, §§ 77, 171 et seq.

- Servant's right to compensation for extra work or overtime, 25 A.L.R. 218; 107 A.L.R. 705.

When cause of action between master and servant deemed to be upon a liability created by statute within contemplation of statute of limitations, 104 A.L.R. 462.

Conflict of laws as to period of limitation to enforce stockholders' statutory liability, 143 A.L.R. 1442.

Statute of limitations applicable to action to recover minimum wage, overtime compensation, or liquidated damages under Fair Labor Standards Act, 157 A.L.R. 545; 162 A.L.R. 237.

Action by passenger against carrier for personal injuries as based on contract or on tort, with respect to application of statutes of limitation, 20 A.L.R.2d 331.

What statute of limitations is applicable to a damage action under federal civil rights acts, 98 A.L.R.2d 1160.

When does cause of action accrue, for purposes of statute of limitations, against action based upon encroachment of building or other structure upon land of another, 12 A.L.R.3d 1265.

Accrual of cause of action and tolling of limitation period of § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C. § 56), 16 A.L.R.3d 637.

Reductions to back pay awards under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS § 2000e et seq.), 135 A.L.R. Fed 1.