2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 5 - Libel and Slander
§ 51-5-2. Newspaper Libel Defined; Publication Prerequisite to Recovery

1. Any false and malicious defamation of another in any newspaper, magazine, or periodical, tending to injure the reputation of the person and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, shall constitute a newspaper libel.
2. The publication of the libelous matter is essential to recovery.

(Ga. L. 1893, p. 131, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 3835; Civil Code 1910, § 4431; Code 1933, § 105-703.)

- For article, "The Supreme Court on Privacy and the Press," see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 215 (1978). For annual survey of tort law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 385 (2006). For annual survey on law of torts, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (2009). For annual survey of law on torts, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 317 (2010).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Construction of Words
• Electronic Publication
• Damages
• Jury Issues

General Consideration

Libel is either per se or per quod.

- Defamatory words which are actionable per se are those which are recognized as injurious on their face - without the aid of extrinsic proof. However, if words do not appear defamatory on their face but become defamatory only by the aid of extrinsic facts, the words are not defamatory per se, but per quod, and are said to require innuendo. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 302 S.E.2d 692, cert. vacated, 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S. Ct. 2343, 80 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1984).

In considering whether a writing is defamatory as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals looks not at the evidence of what the extrinsic circumstances were at the time indicated in the writing, but at what construction would be placed upon it by the average reader. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 302 S.E.2d 692, cert. vacated, 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S. Ct. 2343, 80 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1984).

Legislature intended this section to provide one cause of action, and only one for combined process of printing and publishing, and thus the number of readers does not increase the one libel, nor constitutes multiple causes of action. Rives v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 220 Ga. 485, 139 S.E.2d 395 (1964).

Publication coming within definition of this section is actionable without any averment of special damage to the plaintiff or of actual malice on the part of the defendant. Southland Publishing Co. v. Sewell, 111 Ga. App. 803, 143 S.E.2d 428 (1965).

Publication of matter which is false and malicious is libelous if publication tends to injure the reputation. Horton v. Georgian Co., 175 Ga. 261, 165 S.E. 443 (1932).

It is true that, if an article tends in any way, by any reasonable construction, to be a malicious defamation of the plaintiff, tending to injure the plaintiff's reputation and expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, such as suggesting that the plaintiff was indicted for a crime involving moral turpitude when, as a matter of fact, the plaintiff was not, the article should be considered as libelous yet, if the article be only a fair report of the action of the grand jury, it cannot be considered as such. Constitution Publishing Co. v. Andrews, 50 Ga. App. 116, 177 S.E. 258 (1934).

A false defamation of another, by means of a newspaper publication which may tend to injure the reputation of any individual and expose the individual to either hatred, contempt, or ridicule is libelous. Southland Publishing Co. v. Sewell, 111 Ga. App. 803, 143 S.E.2d 428 (1965).

- The publication of a statement in writing, which is untrue, and which may tend to injure the reputation of another and expose the person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, will be presumed to have been a malicious publication until sufficient evidence has been produced to rebut the presumption. Horton v. Georgian Co., 175 Ga. 261, 165 S.E. 443 (1932).

Defamatory words must refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be the plaintiff though the words used may at first sight appear only to apply to a class of individuals, and not to be specially defamatory of any one member of that class, still an action may be maintained by any one individual of that class who can satisfy the jury that the words referred especially to the plaintiff. The words must be capable of bearing such special application, or the judge should stop the case. Davis v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 93 Ga. App. 633, 92 S.E.2d 619 (1956).

- Although a specific intent by one publishing a libel against another to refer to or injure the latter is not ordinarily necessary to constitute a cause of action, it is nevertheless true that the public reading a libelous newspaper, or those to whom the libel is uttered, must understand the words to refer to the plaintiff; and that even when the defamatory matter shows that the name of the person libeled is identical with the name of the plaintiff, it must appear from the face of the petition that the plaintiff is the person to whom reference was made. Minday v. Constitution Publishing Co., 52 Ga. App. 51, 182 S.E. 53 (1935).

Headline and body of article must be considered together. Floyd v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 102 Ga. App. 840, 117 S.E.2d 906 (1960).

Words which, if merely spoken, would not be actionable in absence of special damage may be libelous when printed if they are false and tend to injure the reputation and bring one into public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Ordinarily, general damages only need be alleged in an action for libel. Floyd v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 102 Ga. App. 840, 117 S.E.2d 906 (1960).

If words are slanderous would not become less defamatory by publishing in writing, though words which might not be actionable per se as slander may be libelous per se when put in writing or print. Griffin v. Branch, 116 Ga. App. 627, 158 S.E.2d 452 (1967).

Certain newspaper publications are privileged but the privilege is not absolute; it is conditional only and the "liberty of the press" will not authorize a violation of this section. Horton v. Georgian Co., 175 Ga. 261, 165 S.E. 443 (1932).

- To fit within the zone of protection afforded "news", an account must be factually accurate. Maples v. National Enquirer, 763 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ga. 1990).

- As long as facts in a newspaper column is not misstated, distorted or arranged so as to convey a false and defamatory meaning, there is no liability for a somewhat less than complete report of the truth, even if the newspaper happens to recognize an element of humor in the situation reported and conveys this, either impliedly or expressly, as well as some of its own editorial opinions in that regard. Mathews v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 116 Ga. App. 337, 157 S.E.2d 300 (1967).

Whether or not libelous material is read is immaterial once it is shown that it was exposed to public view. Rives v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 220 Ga. 485, 139 S.E.2d 395 (1964).

- The fact that the defendant's newspaper published the alleged libelous charge as a statement made by another person constitutes no justification. Kirkland v. Constitution Publishing Co., 38 Ga. App. 632, 144 S.E. 821 (1928), aff'd, 169 Ga. 264, 149 S.E. 869 (1929).

Intention of defendant newspaper in publishing alleged libel is immaterial unless the publication be privileged or unless the words, which are otherwise entirely innocent and unambiguous, are alleged to contain a covert meaning. Southeastern Newspapers, Inc. v. Walker, 76 Ga. App. 57, 44 S.E.2d 697 (1947).

One publication is only one libel, but each new printing of paper and its exposure to public view constitutes new libel actionable at law under this section. Rives v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 220 Ga. 485, 139 S.E.2d 395 (1964).

In publication of multi-editioned newspaper, there exists separate cause of action for each edition containing allegedly libelous material. Cox Enters., Inc. v. Gilreath, 142 Ga. App. 297, 235 S.E.2d 633 (1977).

Bearer of libel is as guilty as its author so far as publication is concerned. Crowe v. Constitution Publishing Co., 63 Ga. App. 497, 11 S.E.2d 513 (1940).

- If a reporter has knowledge of the falsity of statements attributed to the plaintiff in an article, this knowledge can be imputed to the newspaper-employer as the rule in Georgia in libel is that the malicious conduct of an employee is imputed to the employer, provided it is within the scope of the employee's authority. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 302 S.E.2d 692, cert. vacated, 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S. Ct. 2343, 80 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1984).

- One who publishes matter concerning a family in its collective capacity, which is so framed as to make defamatory imputations against all members of the family, assumes the risk of its being libelous as to any member thereof because the libel applies to each individual member throughout the class by the use, without discrimination, of the collective appellation. Leathers v. Constitution Publishing Co., 50 Ga. App. 137, 177 S.E. 261 (1934).

- When newspaper article refers to two or more members of family, one of them in order to maintain action, had to show application of language used to the member. Leathers v. Constitution Publishing Co., 50 Ga. App. 137, 177 S.E. 261 (1934).

- Statements which could be considered to lower the plaintiff's reputation as a dutiful father, since the statements portrayed him as furnishing the intimate details of his daughter's grief for publication in a national tabloid, could form the basis of a libel complaint, even though the plaintiff personally was not the subject of the article containing the statements. Maples v. National Enquirer, 763 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ga. 1990).

- In a declaration claiming damages for words calculated to injure the plaintiff's reputation as an attorney at law, it is not sufficient to allege that the defendant was an attorney, it must be stated and proven that the words were used "in reference to his profession." Aiken v. Constitution Publishing Co., 72 Ga. App. 250, 33 S.E.2d 555 (1945).

Trial court may, as matter of law, hold that newspaper article complained of is not libelous. Aiken v. May, 73 Ga. App. 502, 37 S.E.2d 225 (1946).

In newspaper libel cases, when no substantial danger to reputation is apparent, summary judgment is appropriate since the press should be more carefully guarded against exposure to liability for defamation than when clearly defamatory content warns it of liability. Southard v. Forbes, Inc., 588 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832, 100 S. Ct. 62, 62 L. Ed. 2d 42 (1979).

- An article charging a public officer with unbecoming and improper conduct merely to get fees, tends to expose the officer to public contempt within the provisions of this section. Augusta Evening News v. Radford, 91 Ga. 494, 17 S.E. 612, 44 Am. St. R. 53, 20 L.R.A. 533 (1893).

- Former police officer sued a newspaper for libel based on a letter to the editor the newspaper printed. As a public figure, the officer had to establish actual malice on the part of the newspaper under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(9) and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), but failed to do so because the statements at issue were opinions that were not susceptible of being proved true or false. Evans v. Sandersville Georgian, Inc., 296 Ga. App. 666, 675 S.E.2d 574 (2009).

- Trial court's denial of summary judgment motions filed by a newspaper and a reporter in a libel action brought by a healthcare worker was error because truthful reports of information received from any arresting officer or police authorities were conditionally privileged under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-7(8), and the articles at issue accurately reflected statements in a police investigative report and made by a sheriff; the reporter's affidavit reflected that the reporter accurately reported statements made by the sheriff, and the healthcare worker did not come forward with any evidence to rebut the reporter's affidavit. Additionally, reading a headline in conjunction with one of the articles, the average reader would have believed that the healthcare worker had been arrested and charged with aiding another to escape from custody, which was true at the time. Cmty. Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. King, 299 Ga. App. 267, 682 S.E.2d 346 (2009).

- Summary judgment in favor of a newspaper in a father's defamation case was proper because the newspaper's statements that accurately reflected an incident report prepared by police officers and the father's arrest warrant were privileged, a statement that the father was trying to protect the daughter by preparing a false lab report and making false statements was the opinion of the writer, and thus was not libelous, and a statement that the father was removed from a position with the police department's crimestoppers the day of the arrest was substantially true, since the father was removed one week after the arrest, and was therefore not false for purposes of defamation. Austin v. PMG Acquisition, LLC, 278 Ga. App. 539, 629 S.E.2d 417 (2006).

Summary judgment was properly granted for the newspaper defendants on a teenager's libel claim as the statement that the teenager's window had to be nailed shut to prevent the teenager from letting boys in the teenager's room was privileged as it was based on information received from police authorities; the teenager did not come forward with evidence of malice. Torrance v. Morris Publ'g Group, LLC, 281 Ga. App. 563, 636 S.E.2d 740 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 160 (Ga. 2007).

Decision granting summary judgment in favor of a newspaper corporation and various reporters on a decedent's claims of libel was proper as a reasonable reader would have understood information allegedly linking the decedent to a bombing was preliminary in nature and published during the very early stages of an ongoing investigation into the bombing. Bryant v. Cox Enters., 311 Ga. App. 230, 715 S.E.2d 458 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1916, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 37 (Ga. 2012).

- A publication is made in a newspaper, of the proceedings of a judicial trial, in which appear what purport to be slanderous remarks of counsel, made during the progress of the case, which were not in fact made by the counsel, the publisher is liable to the party aggrieved. Atlanta News Publishing Co. v. Medlock, 123 Ga. 714, 51 S.E. 756, 3 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1139 (1905).

Omission of information from a statement admittedly published will not support an action for libel. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Strickland, 185 Ga. App. 306, 363 S.E.2d 834 (1987), cert. denied, 185 Ga. App. 910, 363 S.E.2d 834 (1988).

Cited in Abernathy v. News Publishing Co., 45 Ga. App. 693, 165 S.E. 924 (1932); Barwick v. Wind, 203 Ga. 827, 48 S.E.2d 523 (1948); Shiver v. Valdosta Press, 82 Ga. App. 406, 61 S.E.2d 221 (1950); Savannah News Press, Inc. v. Grayson, 102 Ga. App. 59, 115 S.E.2d 762 (1960); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965); Morton v. Stewart, 153 Ga. App. 636, 266 S.E.2d 230 (1980); Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. 47, 279 S.E.2d 254 (1981); Mathis v. Cannon, 276 Ga. 16, 573 S.E.2d 376 (2002).

When words are clear and unambiguous, they will be construed in their ordinary and natural sense, and a court will hold as a matter of law that they are not libelous, however, the courts have extended the rule, with regard to the necessity of alleging the intention of the author of the allegedly libelous matter, to include those situations where though the words are clear and unambiguous they are used with a covert meaning and the author intended in such covert sense. Southeastern Newspapers, Inc. v. Walker, 76 Ga. App. 57, 44 S.E.2d 697 (1947).

Language alleged to be defamatory must be construed as a whole, that is, the words must be construed in connection with other parts of the conversation or published matter, written or printed. Thus, in determining whether a publication is libelous the headlines of the article cannot be disregarded, nor the character of display of the headlines. Constitution Publishing Co. v. Andrews, 50 Ga. App. 116, 177 S.E. 258 (1934).

The entire article or publication is to be considered, and the language used must be interpreted even by the jury in the light of its ordinary significance, unless the circumstances show that by innuendo it has another meaning which was intended by the publisher. Constitution Publishing Co. v. Andrews, 50 Ga. App. 116, 177 S.E. 258 (1934).

- Publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. So the whole item, including display lines, should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined. When thus read, if its meaning is so unambiguous as to reasonably bear but one interpretation, it is for the judge to say whether that signification is defamatory or not. If, upon the other hand, it is capable of two meanings, one of which would be libelous and actionable and the other not, it is for the jury to say, under all the circumstances surrounding its publication, including extraneous facts admissible in evidence, which of the two meanings would be attributed to it by those to whom it is addressed or by whom it may be read. Constitution Publishing Co. v. Andrews, 50 Ga. App. 116, 177 S.E. 258 (1934).

The language of an alleged libel must be construed, not by what the writer intended to mean, but by the construction which would be placed upon it by the average and reasonable reader. Whether or not an average and reasonable reader, under the circumstances, in reading the libelous article may have determined that the unnamed party referred to therein is the plaintiff in this case is a question for a jury to determine. Davis v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 93 Ga. App. 633, 92 S.E.2d 619 (1956).

When writing may be understood by average reader in either of two senses, it is proper to allege in what sense it was actually understood by the reader. Floyd v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 102 Ga. App. 840, 117 S.E.2d 906 (1960).

When the words used are capable of having two or more different meanings, the words are ambiguous, and the plaintiff may allege the meaning with which the plaintiff claims the words were published, and it is for the jury to determine whether the words were so published. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 302 S.E.2d 692, cert. vacated, 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S. Ct. 2343, 80 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1984).

- Testimony of readers of alleged defamatory language as to what the readers understood the words to mean may be admitted when the meaning is doubtful or ambiguous. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 302 S.E.2d 692, cert. vacated, 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S. Ct. 2343, 80 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1984).

Electronic Publication

Publication on website compared.

- Verdict awarding general damages in a libel suit filed by an attorney against a former client, which showed that the client published facts intimating that the attorney bribed judges, contrary to O.C.G.A. § 16-10-2, was upheld as: (1) the jury could reasonably conclude that the attorney was a limited public figure, and was properly charged on that issue; (2) the client failed to seek any remedy regarding the verdict entered; (3) the trial court did not err in prohibiting the client from offering testimony about corrupt individuals who were exposed as a result of the publication about the attorney; and (4) based on the evidence of the publication on the client's web site, neither a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the client's favor was authorized. Milum v. Banks, 283 Ga. App. 864, 642 S.E.2d 892 (2007).

When the petition alleged libel per se and injury to the plaintiff's reputation, allegation of special damages was unnecessary. Sheley v. Southeastern Newspapers, Inc., 87 Ga. App. 167, 73 S.E.2d 211 (1952).

A libel cause of action is set out if it shows the plaintiff suffered an injury to the plaintiff's reputation for which right of action no special damages are necessary. Floyd v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 102 Ga. App. 840, 117 S.E.2d 906 (1960).

- Although malice is an element in both malicious prosecution and libel and slander, the jury awarding compensatory and punitive damages against the defendant in a suit for malicious prosecution and libel and slander did not necessarily make a factual finding that the defendant acted maliciously, since the jury was charged that malice may be inferred and that malice may consist of a "general disregard of the right consideration of mankind" and that it could award punitive damages if the circumstances showed "an entire want of care, and an indifference to consequences." Daniel v. Jenkins, 70 Bankr. 408 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987).

Jury Issues

Whether statement damaged plaintiff's reputation is jury question.

- When a court cannot say, in a libel action, as a matter of law that a newspaper article does not tend to injure the plaintiff's reputation in the minds of the average reader, a jury question is presented. Floyd v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 102 Ga. App. 840, 117 S.E.2d 906 (1960).

When a petition presents a jury question as to whether the alleged false statements in a newspaper article, in the context alleged, would be understood by the average reader in such manner as to injure the plaintiff's reputation and subject the plaintiff to public ridicule and contempt, a cause of action for newspaper libel is stated. Floyd v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 102 Ga. App. 840, 117 S.E.2d 906 (1960).

Under allegations in libel case, it was jury question whether the newspaper charged commission of crime in printing that the plaintiff had badly treated the child by various specified acts. Crowe v. Constitution Publishing Co., 63 Ga. App. 497, 11 S.E.2d 513 (1940).

Whether the language in question charged the commission of a crime or not it was question for the jury whether it intended to injure the reputation of the plaintiff and to expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Crowe v. Constitution Publishing Co., 63 Ga. App. 497, 11 S.E.2d 513 (1940).

When in an action for libel the publication sued on is ambiguous and capable of being understood in a double sense, the one criminal and the other innocent, it is a question for the jury to determine whether or not the publication is susceptible to the criminal or the innocent interpretation under all the facts and attendant circumstances of the publication. Southeastern Newspapers, Inc. v. Walker, 76 Ga. App. 57, 44 S.E.2d 697 (1947).

When the words published are ambiguous and capable of being understood in a double sense, the one criminal and the other innocent, the plaintiff may by proper allegation aver the meaning with which the plaintiff claims that it was published and the jury may find whether it was published with that meaning or not. Sheley v. Southeastern Newspaper, Inc., 87 Ga. App. 167, 73 S.E.2d 211 (1952).

- When words are capable of two meanings, one of which would be libelous and actionable and the other not, it is for the jury to say, under all the circumstances surrounding its publication, which of the two meanings will be attributed to it by those to whom it is addressed or by whom it may be read. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 302 S.E.2d 692, cert. vacated, 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S. Ct. 2343, 80 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1984).

Except when an alleged writing is not defamatory as a matter of law, the general rule is that the issue of defamation is a matter of fact to be determined by a jury. Macon Tel. Publishing Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 302 S.E.2d 692, cert. vacated, 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S. Ct. 2343, 80 L. Ed. 2d 817 (1984).

Under Georgia law, when an article may be ascribed more than one meaning, one of which would be libelous and actionable and the other not, it is for the jury to say which meaning will be attributed to it by a reader. Maples v. National Enquirer, 763 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ga. 1990).

As a general rule, the question whether a particular publication is libelous, that is, whether the published statement was defamatory, is a question for the jury. Stalvey v. Atlanta Bus. Chronicle, Inc., 202 Ga. App. 597, 414 S.E.2d 898, cert. denied, 202 Ga. App. 907, 414 S.E.2d 898 (1992).

Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to a publisher in a former creative director's defamation suit regarding a story published that the creative director was demoted for poor performance as opposed to having stepped down voluntarily as a result of not enjoying certain executive aspects of the promotion because there was sufficient evidence to create a jury issue on each essential element of the claim, such as whether the creative director was demoted voluntarily or whether it was due to unsatisfactory performance, and the falsity of the report, which depended on whether the demotion resulted from dissatisfaction or not. However, the trial court properly granted the creative director's former employer and its chief executive officer summary judgment on an invasion of privacy claim since the creative director had signed a release after termination of employment, which expressly stated that the former employer and the chief executive officer were not liable for any invasion of privacy claim. Gettner v. Fitzgerald, 297 Ga. App. 258, 677 S.E.2d 149 (2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, §§ 223 et seq., 227 et seq.

- 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, §§ 1 et seq., 149 et seq.

- Libelous or privileged character of publication by newspaper based on matter received from news agency or regular correspondent, 86 A.L.R. 475.

Libel and slander: false news reports as to births, betrothals, marriages, divorces, or similar marital matters, 9 A.L.R.3d 559.

Actionability of false newspaper report that plaintiff has been arrested, 93 A.L.R.3d 625.

Libel by newspaper headlines, 95 A.L.R.3d 660.

Defamation: publication of "Letter to Editor" in newspaper as actionable, 99 A.L.R.3d 573.

Defamation: privilege attaching to news report of criminal activities based on information supplied by public safety officers - modern status, 47 A.L.R.4th 718.

Reportorial privilege as to nonconfidential news information, 60 A.L.R.5th 75.

Liability of newspaper for libel and slander - 21st century cases, 22 A.L.R.6th 553.