2020 Georgia Code
Title 51 - Torts
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 51-1-6. Recovery of Damages Upon Breach of Legal Duty

When the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2896; Code 1868, § 2902; Code 1873, § 2953; Code 1882, § 2953; Civil Code 1895, § 3809; Civil Code 1910, § 4405; Code 1933, § 105-103.)

- Liability for acts of intoxicated persons, § 51-1-40.

- For article, "Labor and Employment Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 349 (2001). For annual survey on torts, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 287 (2012). For article, "2018 Georgia Corporation and Business Organization Case Law Developments," see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 36 (June 2019). For note, "Spoliating the Adverse Inference Instruction: The Impact of the 2015 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(E)," see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 917 (2017). For comment on Buttrum v. Buttrum, 98 Ga. App. 226, 105 S.E.2d 510 (1958), holding that an unemancipated minor child may maintain an action in tort against a parent for personal injuries provided that it is a willful and malicious act so cruel as to constitute forfeiture of parental authority, see 21 Ga. B. J. 559 (1959). For comment on Cox v. DeJarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961), allowing recovery in tort from the liability insurance policy of a charity, see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 463 (1963). For comment on Williams v. Hospital Auth., 119 Ga. App. 626, 168 S.E.2d 336 (1969), see 6 Ga. St. B. J. 209 (1969). For comment on Parker v. Vaughan, 124 Ga. App. 300, 183 S.E.2d 605 (1971), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 244 (1971).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Applicability to Specific Cases
• Pleading and Practice

Section does not create a cause of action; it simply authorizes the recovery of damages for breach of a legal duty and did not apply in an action brought under O.C.G.A. § 36-33-4. City of Buford v. Ward, 212 Ga. App. 752, 443 S.E.2d 279 (1994).

- Trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings to a bank as to a customer's negligence claim because the allegations of the complaint, taken as true, established the elements of negligence; the Gramm-Leach-Biley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a), imposed a legal duty upon the bank to protect the customer's confidential personal information, and a duty imposed by a federal statute such as the GLBA was a duty imposed by law under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6. Jenkins v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 314 Ga. App. 257, 724 S.E.2d 1 (2012).

Georgia Court of Appeals erred in holding that a violation of an alleged duty imposed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq., gave rise to a cause of action for negligence under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 because no duty was imposed against a bank under § 6801(a) to protect a customer's confidential information. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162, 744 S.E.2d 686 (2013).

- Legislature allowed for contempt, garnishment, and income withholding to enforce child support obligations and did not intend to create additional implied remedies under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 for violation of O.C.G.A. § 19-10-1, the child abandonment statute. Therefore, a wife was not entitled to recover damages from her ex-husband's parents for her husband's violation of O.C.G.A. § 19-10-1. Bridges v. Wooten, 305 Ga. App. 682, 700 S.E.2d 678 (2010).

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 is designed to provide a cause of action for the breach of a legal duty when one does not otherwise exist as indicated by the plain language of the statute that it operates when "no cause of action is given in express terms." Cruet v. Emory Univ., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2000).

- Cable company employee who was injured when a guy wire owned by the cable company came loose and struck the employee while the employee was working on a utility pole owned by a power company failed to establish negligence per se under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 because the employee did not specify any statute, ordinance, or regulation that the power company violated. Schaff v. Snapping Shoals Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 330 Ga. App. 161, 767 S.E.2d 807 (2014).

- Although O.C.G.A. § 51-10-6 expressly provided for a civil recovery for thefts, under Georgia case law, the statute could not be used to establish a civil remedy for the specific crime of theft by conversion. Nor had O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 been used to create a civil remedy for violations of the theft by conversion statute. Thomas Concrete of Ga., Inc. v. Osbourne (In re Osbourne), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2017).

- When there is fraud or breach of a legal or private duty accompanied by any damage, the law gives a right to recover damages, even only nominal damages, as compensation. Holmes v. Drucker, 201 Ga. App. 687, 411 S.E.2d 728 (1991).

- Creditor would not necessarily be entitled to a claim in the full amount of the creditor's materialman's liens under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361 but, rather, would only be entitled to recover the damages the creditor suffered pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 due to the debtor's crime of false swearing, which would be the value of liens lost, which in turn depended on the value of the properties to which the liens attached and the existence of any superior liens on those properties. In the absence of an established underlying claim, summary judgment in the creditor's favor on the creditor's nondischargeability claims was not warranted. Thomas Concrete of Ga., Inc. v. Osbourne (In re Osbourne), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2017).

Commission or omission of act by the defendant, and damage to the plaintiff in consequence thereof, must unite to give one good cause of action. No one of these facts by itself is a cause of action against the defendant. Pinholster v. McGinnis, 155 Ga. App. 589, 271 S.E.2d 722 (1980).

Liability in every tort case rests upon breach of duty and resultant injury or damage to one to whom duty is owed. Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

Regardless of age or capacity of injured person, if there is no breach of legal duty on the part of the defendant toward such person, there can be no legal liability. Augusta Amusements, Inc. v. Powell, 93 Ga. App. 752, 92 S.E.2d 720 (1956).

Duty imposed by law means either duty imposed by a valid statutory enactment of the legislature or duty imposed by recognized common-law principle declared in the reported decisions of the appellate courts of the state or jurisdiction involved. Mauldin v. Sheffer, 113 Ga. App. 874, 150 S.E.2d 150 (1966).

Occupational Safety and Health Act regulations by definition constitute a duty under the law and breach of those regulations is a violation of law. The regulations should be admissible not merely as "standards" of performance, but as evidence of legal duty, violation of which may give a cause of action under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6, though, in this case, the trial court ruled judiciously in excluding evidence of OSHA regulations that was cumulative to the ordinary care evidence that was allowed. Cardin v. Telfair Acres of Lowndes County, Inc., 195 Ga. App. 449, 393 S.E.2d 731 (1990).

- Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations are admissible not merely as "standards" of performance, but as evidence of legal duty, violation of which may give a cause of action under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6; however, applicability in a particular case and relevancy, depend on the relationship of the parties. Dupree v. Keller Indus., Inc., 199 Ga. App. 138, 404 S.E.2d 291, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 404 S.E.2d 291 (1991).

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulates obligations between an employer and its employees; thus, evidence of a violation of an OSHA regulation by a contractor hired by the city water and sewer department was not pertinent in a negligence action against the contractor by a city employee. Brantley v. Custom Sprinkler Sys., 218 Ga. App. 431, 461 S.E.2d 592 (1995).

- OSHA standards for the construction of stairs provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.24(f) applied to an office building in which an employee fell. The trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on these standards because the evidence presented issues for the jury to resolve regarding whether the employer violated the stair safety standards, which were admissible not merely as standards of performance but as evidence of legal duty. Smith v. CSX Transp., Inc., 306 Ga. App. 897, 703 S.E.2d 671 (2010), aff'd 289 Ga. 903, 717 S.E.2d 209 (2011).

- In a product's liability and negligence action brought following a fire at a chicken processing plant, the trial court erred by denying summary judgment motions by a manufacturer and an insulation services company with regard to the owners' negligence per se claims because the owners failed to establish that a breach of any duty in the Georgia Life Safety Code was the proximate cause of the injury. R & R Insulation Servs. v. Royal Indem. Co., 307 Ga. App. 419, 705 S.E.2d 223 (2010).

- This Code section provides a cause of action for violations of statutes that are intended to benefit the party bringing the suit. Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S. Ct. 167, 116 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1991).

Plaintiff, staff member at defendant's school, was not within class of protected persons contemplated by the child abuse reporting statute ( § 19-7-5), and his claim for damages under this Code section could not survive summary judgment. Odem v. Pace Academy, 235 Ga. App. 648, 510 S.E.2d 326 (1998).

Same duty may arise from different basic obligations imposed by law upon several defendants. Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 101 S.E.2d 770 (1957), aff'd, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958).

In determining whether a rule illustrates duty of defendant, its scope will not, by implication, be extended beyond its clear and obvious meaning. McGinnis v. Shaw, 46 Ga. App. 248, 167 S.E. 533 (1933).

It is never to be presumed that a person will commit a wrongful act or will act negligently or improperly. Porter v. Patterson, 107 Ga. App. 64, 129 S.E.2d 70 (1962).

- Negligence or breach of duty is not to be anticipated, but until the contrary is shown it is to be presumed that every man obeys the mandates of the law and performs all of the person's social and official duties. Porter v. Patterson, 107 Ga. App. 64, 129 S.E.2d 70 (1962).

- When the petition discloses a promise of something to occur in the future the element of futurity is not fatal to a cause of action when in connection with a promise a false representation has been made. Bishop v. Greene, 62 Ga. App. 126, 8 S.E.2d 448 (1940).

- Though an act may be in itself lawful, yet, if in its effects or consequences, it is productive of any injury to another, it subjects the party to this action. Carpenter v. Williams, 41 Ga. App. 685, 154 S.E. 298 (1930).

Liability does not depend upon anticipating particular injury or that a particular person would be injured. Aretz v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd, 660 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981).

- When knowledge among the parties is nearly, if not precisely, equal, and a warning from the defendants would have been met with the response "I know," there arises no duty to warn of a potential danger. McNish v. Gilbert, 184 Ga. App. 234, 361 S.E.2d 231 (1987).

Before negligence can be actionable it must be proximate cause of or part of proximate cause of injury received. Aretz v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd, 660 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981).

Proximate cause is not last act or cause or nearest act to the injury; it is negligent act that actively aids in producing the injury as direct and existing cause. Aretz v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd, 660 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981).

- General rule is that when there has intervened between the defendant's negligence and the injury an independent, illegal act of a third person producing the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred, such independent criminal act should be treated as the proximate cause, insulating and excluding the negligence of the defendant. The rule is inapplicable if the original wrongdoer had reasonable grounds for apprehending that such criminal act would be committed. Decker v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 F. Supp. 34 (M.D. Ga. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982).

Causal connection between original negligence and injury not broken by intervening act of third person when same reasonably foreseen by original wrongdoer. Aretz v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Ga. 1977), aff'd, 660 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981).

Proof that the plaintiff's impaired condition was not the proximate result of the defendant's negligence demands a verdict in favor of the defendant. Pinholster v. McGinnis, 155 Ga. App. 589, 271 S.E.2d 722 (1980).

Action based upon negligence is not cognizable under Georgia law when the alleged damages are economic. A.J. Kellos Constr. Co. v. Balboa Ins. Co., 495 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ga. 1980).

Violation of O.C.G.A. § 9-2-5(a), prohibiting prosecution of two simultaneous actions for the same cause against the same party, would not give rise to a cause of action for damages, since the statute does not impose upon the plaintiffs a substantive legal duty but rather is simply a procedural matter. Hose v. Jason Property Mgt. Co., 178 Ga. App. 661, 344 S.E.2d 483 (1986).

- Damages for the failure of a party to carry out the purported terms of an oral contract for the sale of realty were not authorized. Zappa v. Basden, 188 Ga. App. 472, 373 S.E.2d 246, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 913, 373 S.E.2d 246 (1988).

- Hospital has a legal duty to follow the hospital's existing bylaws and any alleged breach of that duty can be asserted as a cause of action under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6. Rowell v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., Inc., 338 Ga. App. 603, 791 S.E.2d 183 (2016).

- No private cause of action lies for false statements made in judicial proceedings. Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S. Ct. 167, 116 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1991).

Code Section16-10-20, which prohibits the making of false statements in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of state government or the government of any political subdivision of the state, was enacted for the protection of the state itself - not private parties, and it does not create a civil cause of action. Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 855, 112 S. Ct. 167, 116 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1991).

Judgment in favor of a bank customer whose identity was stolen by a bank employee was reversed because the Georgia Court of Appeals erred in holding that a violation of an alleged duty imposed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq., gave rise to a cause of action for negligence under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 because no duty was imposed against a bank under § 6801(a) to protect a customer's confidential information. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins, 293 Ga. 162, 744 S.E.2d 686 (2013).

- Charge imposed under the Georgia Emergency Telephone 911 Service Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-5-120 et seq., was a tax as a matter of law, and counties did not have the required legislative authority under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. III(a), to sue telephone companies to recover charges not collected from subscribers; neither the Act nor the tort statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 51-1-6 and51-1-8, provided such authority. Bellsouth Telecoms., LLC v. Cobb County, 305 Ga. 144, 824 S.E.2d 233 (2019).

- Summary judgment for town and railway was properly denied as to proximate cause as neither eyewitness of a train-truck accident had a continuous, direct view of the area in which the decedent allegedly did not stop the truck. Town of Register v. Fortner, 274 Ga. App. 586, 618 S.E.2d 26 (2005).

Cited in Henderson v. Nolting First Mtg. Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 193 S.E. 347 (1937); Donaldson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E. 213 (1938); Sikes v. Foster, 74 Ga. App. 350, 39 S.E.2d 585 (1946); Hamby v. Edmunds Motor Co., 80 Ga. App. 209, 55 S.E.2d 743 (1949); Dale Elec. Co. v. Thurston, 82 Ga. App. 516, 61 S.E.2d 584 (1950); Studdard v. Evans, 108 Ga. App. 819, 135 S.E.2d 60 (1964); Giacalone v. Tuggle, 141 Ga. App. 123, 232 S.E.2d 589 (1977); Oden & Sims Used Cars, Inc. v. Thurman, 250 Ga. App. 709, 301 S.E.2d 673 (1983); Hodges v. Tomberlin, 170 Ga. App. 842, 319 S.E.2d 11 (1984); Sofet v. Roberts, 185 Ga. App. 451, 364 S.E.2d 595 (1987); Marcoux v. Fields, 195 Ga. App. 573, 394 S.E.2d 361 (1990); Jairath v. Dyer, 154 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 1998); Sakas v. Settle Down Enters., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2000); Project Control Servs., Inc. v. Reynolds, 247 Ga. App. 889, 545 S.E.2d 593 (2001); Draper v. Reynolds, 278 Ga. App. 401, 629 S.E.2d 476 (2006); Ellison v. Southstar Energy Servs., LLC, 298 Ga. App. 170, 679 S.E.2d 750 (2009); Baker v. Harcon, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 749, 694 S.E.2d 673 (2010); Pulte Home Corp. v. Simerly, 322 Ga. App. 699, 746 S.E.2d 173 (2013); Gobran Auto Sales, Inc. v. Bell, 335 Ga. App. 873, 783 S.E.2d 389 (2016); Bellsouth Telecomms., LLC v. Cobb County, 352 Ga. App. 110, 834 S.E.2d 124 (2019); Handberry v. Manning Forestry Servs., LLC, 353 Ga. App. 150, 836 S.E.2d 545 (2019).

Applicability to Specific Cases

1. Duty of Care Imposed

- While a carrier of passengers is not bound to keep up a continuous inspection, or to know at every moment the condition of every part of its cars, yet inspection of the cars should be adequate and sufficient, and should be made with such frequency as the liability to impairment reasonably requires and as is practically possible consistent with the conduct of its business. Leslie v. Georgia Power Co., 47 Ga. App. 723, 171 S.E. 395 (1933).

- It is the legal duty of a common carrier to receive and transport a person who has purchased a ticket over its lines, to the destination called for by the ticket, and should a carrier, in violation of the duty so imposed upon it, illegally expel a passenger from its bus and wrongfully refuse to carry the passenger to the passenger's destination, the carrier would be liable to the passenger for damages proximately resulting therefrom. Daigrepont v. Teche Greyhound Lines, 189 Ga. 601, 7 S.E.2d 174 (1940).

- Corporation is the creature of the law, and the rights and privileges conferred upon it by the state, in theory at least, were granted not only for its own private benefit, but also for the benefit and good of the public; and in accepting them it impliedly, at least, agreed to carry out the purposes or objects of its creation, and assumed a duty or obligation towards the public which it will, under the law, be required to discharge. Lawrence v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 49 Ga. App. 444, 176 S.E. 75 (1934).

- When the petitioner was placed in an extremely dangerous situation, from which the petitioner could not extricate oneself, by reason of the negligence of the defendant, the defendant owed the petitioner the duty of exercising ordinary care in extricating the petitioner from the wreckage of the petitioner's automobile. Western & A.R.R. v. Groover, 42 Ga. App. 200, 155 S.E. 500 (1930).

- Lessee in possession who willfully violates the lessee's duty to deliver the premises to the landlord at the end of the lessee's term is not liable in tort to a lessee whose possession was to commence at that time. Kokomo Rubber Co. v. Anderson, 33 Ga. App. 241, 125 S.E. 783 (1924).

Manufacturer who bottles beverage for public consumption is under legal duty not to negligently allow foreign substance which is injurious to the human stomach, such as bits of broken glass, to be present in a bottle of the beverage when the bottle is placed on sale. Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152, 110 Am. St. R. 157, 1 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1178 (1905); Beckham v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co., 25 Ga. App. 592, 103 S.E. 857 (1920).

- In connection with a sale of goods having a potentiality of doing harm by normal, intended, and nonnegligent use, when there is no fiduciary relationship between the seller and the purchaser, and no fraud, it is the duty of the seller to warn the purchaser at the time of sale and delivery, and a breach occurs at this time if there is a failure to warn. Everhart v. Rich's, Inc., 229 Ga. 798, 194 S.E.2d 425 (1972), answer conformed to, 128 Ga. App. 319, 196 S.E.2d 475 (1973).

- Defendant, merely because the defendant was working as a section foreman on the railroad, owed no individual duty to the public in the matter of keeping the right of way free from ignitable growth. The defendant did owe a duty to the defendant's master to properly perform the defendant's duties, and if there was embraced in such duties the obligation to keep the right of way free from ignitable growth there would be a liability on the defendant's part to the defendant's master for failure to perform the defendant's agreement. Knight v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 4 F. Supp. 713 (S.D. Ga. 1933), aff'd, 73 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1934).

- Both public and private hospitals have a legal duty not to abridge or refuse to follow existing bylaws concerning staff privileges; radiologist could assert a cause of action against a hospital for failure to follow existing bylaws with regard to termination of the radiologist staff privileges. St. Mary's Hosp. v. Radiology Professional Corp., 205 Ga. App. 121, 421 S.E.2d 731, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 901, 421 S.E.2d 731 (1992).

Summary judgment was granted in favor of a hospital in a doctor's O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 suit alleging that the hospital breached a legal duty to the doctor because the hospital followed its by-laws in the investigation of the doctor's application for reappointment and the doctor's surgical complications rate. Lee v. Hosp. Auth. of Colquitt County, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (M.D. Ga. 2004).

Doctor was not entitled to recover damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 because the doctor signed a contract that clearly stated that, at its expiration, the doctor agreed to the removal of the hospital privileges and waived the rights to contest the removal under the hospital's bylaws; the exclusivity contract was not void as against public policy or an illegal restraint of trade because the law allowed the hospital to enforce contracts in order to properly administer the hospital. Whitaker v. Houston County Hosp. Auth., 272 Ga. App. 870, 613 S.E.2d 664 (2005).

- Georgia recognizes a private cause of action under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 for a claim of injury due to false swearing. Wilson v. State, 317 Ga. App. 171, 730 S.E.2d 500 (2012).

Although no statute contained an express provision for a civil remedy for the crime of false swearing, case law held that O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 provided a civil remedy. However, summary judgment was not warranted in favor of either the creditor or the debtor on the creditor's nondischargeability claims because there was an issue of fact as to whether the debtor knowingly and willfully signed a false affidavit. Thomas Concrete of Ga., Inc. v. Osbourne (In re Osbourne), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2017).

- Government's motion to dismiss was properly granted in a case brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., in which: (1) a podiatrist served a residency program at a Veterans Administration (VA) hospital that lasted two years; (2) then passed a certifying examination, but was denied certification because the second year of residency at the VA hospital had not been accredited by the Council on Podiatric Medical Education; (3) the podiatrist relied on Georgia's negligence per se statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6, to establish the duty element of the podiatrist's negligence; and (4) the podiatrist contended that a Veterans Health Administration Handbook 1122.1 established a legal duty requiring the podiatric residency program director to obtain certification of the VA hospital's podiatric residency program and that the director negligently failed to do so; therefore, they were not the product of procedures which Congress prescribed as necessary prerequisites to giving regulations the binding effect of law. Morris v. United States, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2007).

- Law enforcement officer owes a tort duty to a member of the general public injured by a drunk driver when the officer allows the noticeably intoxicated driver to continue operating the motor vehicle. Landis v. Rockdale County, 206 Ga. App. 876, 427 S.E.2d 286 (1993).

- Patient did not present any evidence that the dentist had violated any statute, regulation, or ordinance regarding an injection that the dentist provided to the patient, at the patient's request, to numb pain; thus, the trial court did not err in granting partial summary judgment to the dentist, at least regarding the patient's negligence per se claim. Pope v. Davis, 261 Ga. App. 308, 582 S.E.2d 460 (2003).

- Motion to dismiss a disabled university student's claim against a builder and architect for breach of a legal duty was granted since the only involvement that both the builder and architect had was in the design or construction of the apartment in which the student resided. Barker v. Emory Univ., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. June 24, 2003).

- Trial court erred in granting an adult entertainment club's motion for summary judgment in a dancer's action to recover damages for injuries she sustained when a customer of the club assaulted her in a private room because the dancer fell within the class of persons the DeKalb County, Ga., Code, Art. XII, § 15-402 was intended to protect from exploitation and harm, and the club's code violations were capable of having a causal connection to the dancer's injuries and damage; that was sufficient to constitute negligence per se. Womack v. Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc., 307 Ga. App. 323, 705 S.E.2d 199 (2010).

- Suits by classes of former and current members of distribution electric membership corporations (EMCs) seeking to recover millions of dollars in patronage capital from two wholesale EMCs were dismissed because the members lacked privity with the wholesale EMCs, and there was no legal duty under O.C.G.A. § 46-3-340(c) or the EMCs' bylaws requiring distribution of the patronage capital to the members. Walker v. Oglethorpe Power Corp., 341 Ga. App. 647, 802 S.E.2d 643 (2017), overruled on other grounds, Hanham v. Access Mgmt. Group L.P., 305 Ga. 414, 825 S.E.2d 217 (2019).

- Bank's alleged actions in paying a check over a forged endorsement, depositing the funds in new accounts, and failing to observe reasonable commercial standards, were not violations of any legal right of, or duty owed to, the payee of the check who had never received delivery of the check, and the payee suffered no damages from these actions. Thus, the actions did not give rise to a tort claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-1, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6, or O.C.G.A. § 51-1-8. Jenkins v. Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 309 Ga. App. 562, 711 S.E.2d 80 (2011).

2. Breach of Legal Duty

Failure to insure property.

- Recovery has been allowed in this state for failure to keep property insured when the defendant is shown to be plaintiff's agent. Sutker v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 648, 155 S.E.2d 694 (1967).

Absent actionable fraud and deceit, it appears settled that there is no liability in tort for failure of the defendant insurance agent or broker to procure or have renewed a policy of insurance when the defendant is the insurance company's agent and not the plaintiff's agent. Sutker v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 648, 155 S.E.2d 694 (1967).

- An auction company's failure to comply with an ordinance requiring the company to pay for traffic signals at a railroad crossing on the road leading to the company's property gave rise to a claim of negligence per se under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6; the traffic-related zoning conditions were meant to protect those who were required to negotiate the railroad crossing, and the accident at issue, when a car passing through the crossing was struck by a train, was precisely the type of danger the conditions were intended to guard against. Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 650 S.E.2d 709 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1876, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 156 (Ga. 2008).

- When evidence shows that a large number of occupants of a hotel building were injured as a result of a fire therein, and that the hotel was maintained in a condition which was violative of an applicable city ordinance which required various safety precautions against the hazard of fire, the owner, who acquired the hotel while it was under a written lease to others for a number of years, which lease gave to the lessees the exclusive possession except to authorize and require the owner to enter and make repairs required by law, would be guilty of negligence per se and liable for the injuries resulting from such negligence. Irwin v. Willis, 202 Ga. 463, 43 S.E.2d 691 (1947).

- Failure of employer to obtain a certificate of occupancy (COO) before opening a facility in which an employee worked was negligence per se as to the employee but not as to the employee's children, as the law requiring a COO was designed to protect those working or otherwise conducting business in the building; furthermore, there was no causal connection between the failure to obtain a COO and an accident when the car in which the children were riding was struck by a train as the car traveled down the road leading to the facility. Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 650 S.E.2d 709 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1876, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 156 (Ga. 2008).

- Reliance by either the employee or the employer on insurance companies' inspections is sufficient to give rise to a cause of action in tort for negligent inspection by the insurance companies. Huggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 245 Ga. 248, 264 S.E.2d 191 (1980).

- Innkeepers breached the legal duties imposed by O.C.G.A. §§ 30-4-2 and43-21-3 when the innkeepers prohibited a vision impaired individual and the individual's service dog from staying at their hotel. Accordingly, the individual's proposed amended complaint alleged all the elements necessary for recovery under the theory of negligence per se and O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6. Amick v. BM & KM, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2003).

- Violation of the right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right of the individual. It is a tort, and it is not necessary that special damages should have accrued from its violation in order to entitle the aggrieved party to recover. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).

When there was no agent or servant of the defendant actually present in the hospital room during the time that it is alleged that the plaintiff was holding intimate, personal, and private conversations, but it is admitted by the defendant that it caused a receiving set to be installed in the plaintiff's room, and what was said and done by the plaintiff was listened to and recorded by the defendant's agent, at its direction, by means of the receiving set and earphones, this conduct was as effectively an intrusion upon or an invasion of the privacy of the plaintiff as if the agent had actually been in the room. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).

In the offense of the invasion of the privacy of another, the gravamen or essence of the action is not publication or commercialization of the information obtained. There is nothing in the decided cases of this state, which indicates any such limitation or qualification of the right, and a person's privacy is invaded even though the information obtained be restricted to the immediate transgressor. Publication or commercialization may aggravate, but the individual's right to privacy is invaded and violated nevertheless in the original act of intrusion. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).

Malicious injury to business of another will give right of action to the injured party. Southern Ry. v. Chambers, 126 Ga. 404, 55 S.E. 37, 7 L.R.A. (n.s.) 926 (1906).

This state recognizes a cause of action when one maliciously and wrongfully, and with intent to injure, harms the business of another. The essential thing is the intent to cause the result. If the actor does not have this intent, the actor's conduct does not subject the actor to liability under this rule even if it has the unintended effect of deterring the third person from dealing with the other. Bodge v. Salesworld, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 65, 267 S.E.2d 505 (1980).

- Manufacturer or someone not in privity with the consumer or user of the manufacturer's product would incur liability if damage is proximately caused by the manufacturer's willful or wrongful acts or omissions. Koppers Co. v. Parks, 120 Ga. App. 551, 171 S.E.2d 639 (1969).

Consumer or user of a product may recover if through a failure to exercise ordinary care on the part of a manufacturer or someone not in privity with the user the product is imperfect, defective, or not as represented when placed on the market, and damage to the consumer or user is proximately caused thereby. Koppers Co. v. Parks, 120 Ga. App. 551, 171 S.E.2d 639 (1969).

- Defective structure in a highway which causes injury to a person renders the municipality liable for the damages incurred. City of Greensboro v. McGibbony, 93 Ga. 672, 20 S.E. 37 (1894).

- Summary judgment was properly entered for a consultant and a consulting firm on a bidding insurer's claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 after all of the bids for a county contract were rejected because the consultant lacked a license under O.C.G.A. §§ 33-23-1.1 and33-23-4 as the statutes requiring insurance counselors to be licensed and mandating that licensed individuals meet certain qualifications were designed to protect the insurance counselor's clients and not to protect or benefit providers of insurance; the generic statement that O.C.G.A. § 33-23-5(a) was "for the protection of the people of (Georgia)" did not expand the intent of the statute requiring licensure for counselors to benefit businesses that provided insurance. Benefit Support, Inc. v. Hall County, 281 Ga. App. 825, 637 S.E.2d 763 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0306, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 214 (Ga. 2007).

- Injured motorist failed to prove that highway contractors who built a highway on-ramp were entitled to partial summary judgment as to liability on the motorist's negligence claim because the motorist failed to prove that regulations governing traffic control devices were mandatory and had the force of law, that the motorist was in a protected class, that the harm the motorist suffered was the type of harm the regulations were intended to guard against, and that the alleged negligence per se proximately caused the motorist's injuries. Hubbard v. DOT, 256 Ga. App. 342, 568 S.E.2d 559 (2002).

- Injured party was not able to recover under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 for the declarant's alleged violation of the criminal statutes, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-26, prohibiting giving a false report of a crime, and O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24, prohibiting obstructing or hindering the police, as these statutes did not provide for a civil cause of action; furthermore, the legislature had provided statutory civil remedies in the form of false arrest under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-1 and malicious prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40. Jastram v. Williams, 276 Ga. App. 475, 623 S.E.2d 686 (2005).

- When a gas company operates a franchise, and exercises rights and privileges under the laws of the state, the company is bound to furnish gas to all who apply therefor within the company's territory and agree to the company's reasonable rules and regulations, and that a refusal to do so is a tort. Lawrence v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 49 Ga. App. 444, 176 S.E. 75 (1934).

Servant, as wrongdoer, is liable individually for tort committed within scope of the master's business. Giles v. Smith, 80 Ga. App. 540, 56 S.E.2d 860 (1949).

- Loss of contract of employment resulting from failure of telegraph company to send message of acceptance gives rise to an action. Baldwin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Ga. 692, 21 S.E. 212 (1894).

- One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which one should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or one's things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from one's failure to exercise reasonable care to protect one's undertaking if (a) one's failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) one has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. Huggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 245 Ga. 248, 264 S.E.2d 191 (1980).

- Person may not willfully and purposely engage in a violation of the law and then recover damages for injury which might ensue in an attempt by lawful authorities to prevent the person from continuing such a course, when it is not claimed that the person could have been made to desist except by the exercise of force, and it is not alleged that the force used was greater than was necessary to accomplish its object. Kent v. Southern Ry., 52 Ga. App. 731, 184 S.E. 638 (1936).

- Action by a servant for a wrongful discharge from the servant's employment is in contract, and an action in tort will not lie unless the discharge was accompanied by wrongful acts amounting to a trespass. American Oil Co. v. Roper, 64 Ga. App. 743, 14 S.E.2d 145 (1941); Rhine v. Sanders, 100 Ga. App. 68, 110 S.E.2d 128 (1959).

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 did not give an employee a cause of action on the basis that the employer dismissed the employee because of the employee's "first offender" conviction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 42-8-63. Mattox v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 243 Ga. App. 894, 534 S.E.2d 561 (2000).

- At-will employee may not sue in tort under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 or O.C.G.A. § 51-1-8 for wrongful discharge based upon age discrimination. Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 528 S.E.2d 238 (2000).

Provisions of O.C.G.A. §§ 51-1-6 and51-1-8 do not create a civil action for age discrimination for an employee-at-will based upon a violation of either O.C.G.A. § 34-1-2 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 221 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2000).

- Consumer of alcohol cannot recover damages from the provider of the alcohol for injuries caused by the consumer to a third person. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985).

- Person who encourages a noticeably intoxicated person under the legal drinking age to become further intoxicated and who furnishes to such intoxicated person more alcohol, knowing that such person will soon be driving a vehicle, is liable in tort to a person injured by the negligence of such intoxicated driver. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985).

In a negligence action, the trial court did not err in charging the jury that one who provides alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated person, knowing that the person will soon be driving a vehicle, may be liable for a third person's injuries caused by the negligence of the intoxicated driver, if the alcohol was a proximate cause of the injuries. Studebaker's of Savannah, Inc. v. Tibbs, 195 Ga. App. 142, 392 S.E.2d 908 (1990).

- Widow's wrongful death action against a bar that served alcohol to her husband for 8 hours, and who then died in a one-vehicle crash, was barred by the Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40, which barred claims by consumers of alcohol; O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 did not provide a basis for such a wrongful death action. Dion v. Y.S.G. Enters., 296 Ga. 185, 766 S.E.2d 48 (2014).

- Evidence was insufficient to show that any breach of duty by a bowling alley relating to alcohol was the proximate cause of the death of a passenger in a car driven by a minor who had been served beer at the bowling alley, since there was no evidence that any employee had knowledge that the minor was intoxicated or would be driving an automobile. Kalpa v. Perczak, 658 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1987).

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 does not establish a cause of action based on the violation of O.C.G.A. § 3-3-23, the underage drinking statute. Lumpkin v. Mellow Mushroom, 256 Ga. App. 83, 567 S.E.2d 728 (2002).

- If the right to protection of a trade name exists, the injured party may seek both injunctive relief and damages. Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assocs., 254 Ga. 734, 334 S.E.2d 308 (1985).

- Plaintiff contractor's allegation that the defendant developer knowingly swore falsely in executing affidavits stating that no improvements or repairs had been made to a newly-constructed home, thereby injuring the plaintiff, set forth a cause of action for breach of the legal duty to swear truthfully. Peters v. Imperial Cabinet Co., 189 Ga. App. 337, 375 S.E.2d 635 (1988).

- Bank did not have a viable civil cause of action under the notary statute against an attorney who allegedly falsely attested that guarantee agreements were signed in the attorney's presence as even when combined with the general statutory principles of tort law, notaries had a duty to the public that did not support an actionable claim. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Morrisroe, 323 Ga. App. 248, 746 S.E.2d 859 (2013).

- Insurer's breach of O.C.G.A. § 33-3-28, requiring insurers to provide coverage information, did not create a cause of action and the right to seek damages under O.C.G.A. §§ 51-1-6 and51-1-8. Parris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Ga. App. 522, 494 S.E.2d 244 (1997).

- In a dispute between a franchisor of daycare businesses and its franchisee, the trial court erred by denying the franchisor's motion for directed verdict on the franchisee's claims for negligent misrepresentation and negligence under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 because the franchisee failed to prove that the franchisee suffered any out-of-pocket economic damages as a result of the alleged misrepresentations, which was an essential element to such claims. Legacy Academy, Inc. v. Doles-Smith Enters., 337 Ga. App. 575, 789 S.E.2d 194 (2016).

- Because the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, imposed no legal duty on individual doctors, the administratrix could not maintain a cause of action against the individual doctors under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6, and the trial court properly granted the doctors' motions to dismiss the violation of a legal duty claim. Pham v. Black, 347 Ga. App. 585, 820 S.E.2d 209 (2018).

Pleading and Practice

Sufficiency of complaint.

- Petition alleging that the defendant company and named agents and servants thereof, falsely and fraudulently impersonated the plaintiff, invaded the plaintiff's right of privacy, the plaintiff's right to the exclusive use of the plaintiff's own name, represented the plaintiff as betraying confidence and giving secret and confidential prices to a competitor of those who gave the prices, caused the plaintiff's time and that of the plaintiff's employees to be consumed, subjected the plaintiff to embarrassment and chagrin, and caused the plaintiff to be held in contempt and ridicule by the plaintiff's business associates, all for the express purpose of advancing the interest of the company set out a cause of action. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936).

When the injuries alleged appear to have resulted entirely from fright or shock, unaccompanied by physical contact, in order to set forth a cause of action it is necessary to show either that the injuries were the natural and proximate result of the fright or shock, that this result was or should have been foreseen with reasonable certainty by the defendant, and that the act was one of such gross carelessness, coupled with a knowledge of the probably physical results as amount to willful disregard of the consequences; or that the fright was brought about by the deliberate and malicious intention on the part of the defendant to injure the plaintiff. Towler v. Jackson, 111 Ga. App. 8, 140 S.E.2d 295 (1965).

In a suit challenging a court's electronic filing fee system, the trial court did not err when the court granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims because none of the statutes or rules cited by the plaintiff provided a private cause of action for damages arising from any violation of the respective statute or rule. Best Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Reed Elsevier Inc., 334 Ga. App. 826, 780 S.E.2d 689 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0502, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 286 (Ga. 2016).

- Original petition, when measured by the provisions of the principles of law announced in former Code 1933, §§ 105-101, 105-103, and 105-106 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 51-1-1,51-1-6, and51-1-11), set out a plaintiff and a defendant and a specific cause of complaint sufficiently to be amendable, since if the petition was defective in any wise, it was only in that it omitted to allege sufficiently facts essential to raise the duty or obligation in the cause of action, and the trial court erred in holding that there was not enough in the original petition to amend by. Cannon v. Hood Constr. Co., 91 Ga. App. 20, 84 S.E.2d 604 (1954).

- Because an express cause of action already existed as part of a remedial scheme set out by the U.S. Congress under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act (VRA), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the plaintiff may not recover O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 for any alleged violations of subject legal duties. Cruet v. Emory Univ., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2000).

Because the breach of legal duty complained of by a title processor against the state vehicle title processing agency employees was under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the ADA provided a remedial scheme and thus the processor's claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 was duplicative; O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 allowed an individual to assert a tort claim for the violation of a legal duty when a cause of action did not otherwise exist. Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2004).

- Removal to a federal court of an action brought under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 was appropriate when the plaintiff's claim ultimately hinged on the interpretation of federal law under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Jairath v. Dyer, 961 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Ga. 1996).

- Plaintiff may rely upon an act or omission as constituting negligence as a matter of fact under the circumstances, or upon the violation of a statute as amounting to negligence per se or as a matter of law; furthermore, the facts may be so pled as to show negligence of both classes in the same action. Criswell Baking Co. v. Milligan, 77 Ga. App. 861, 50 S.E.2d 136 (1948).

O.C.G.A. § 33-24-44 governed the cancellation of insurance policies but did not govern the termination of insurance agents which may have had the ancillary effect of terminating an insurance policy, and the court could not reasonably conclude that the retroactive termination of the financial planner was the harm § 33-24-44 was intended to guard against. Therefore, the financial planner did not allege a viable negligence per se claim and the negligence claims against the insurance company were required to be dismissed. Rosen v. Protective Life Ins. Co., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. May 20, 2010).

- Denial of summary judgment based on any type of tortious interference with a contractual right to exercise an option to purchase was in error since both the original and the amended complaint revealed a lack of compliance with the notice requirement regarding any alleged tortious interference of contract. Bowling v. Gober, 206 Ga. App. 38, 424 S.E.2d 335 (1992).

- Because franchisees failed to prove out-of-pocket economic damages as a result of alleged misrepresentations in offering materials regarding the franchise's projected cash flow, the franchisor's motions for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. on claims for negligent misrepresentation and negligence under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 should have been granted. Legacy Academy, Inc. v. Doles-Smith Enters., 337 Ga. App. 575, 789 S.E.2d 194 (2016).

- In a personal injury action alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., a trial court erred by denying summary judgment to a county director of public works because the consumer who tripped and fell was not disabled and, therefore, was not within the class of persons protected by the ADA. Newman v. Johnson, 319 Ga. App. 307, 733 S.E.2d 520 (2012).

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital on an anesthesiologist's claim for breach of the hospital's bylaws because the anesthesiologist unilaterally made the decision not to return to work and, therefore, a summary suspension was never imposed and within a day or two of making that decision, the anesthesiologist cancelled malpractice coverage, which disqualified the anesthesiologist from having hospital privileges under the bylaws. Rowell v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., Inc., 338 Ga. App. 603, 791 S.E.2d 183 (2016).

- Medical group's claim that a health maintenance organization was liable to the group in tort under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-6 based upon the group's breach of a legal duty to comply with Georgia's Any Willing Provider Statute, O.C.G.A. § 33-20-16, was procedurally barred by the failure to exhaust administrative remedies by first submitting the group's dispute to the Georgia Insurance Commissioner pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-20-30. Northeast Ga. Cancer Care, LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 297 Ga. App. 28, 676 S.E.2d 428 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C1241, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 805 (Ga. 2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Torts, § 10 et seq.

Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, 18 POF3d 515.

Defense of Claim Brought Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 49 Am. Jur. Trials 171.

- 86 C.J.S., Torts, § 8 et seq.

- Liability of street railway company to passenger struck by a vehicle not subject to its control, 1 A.L.R. 953; 12 A.L.R. 1371; 31 A.L.R. 572; 44 A.L.R. 162.

Liability for injury to child playing on or in proximity to automobile, 1 A.L.R. 1385; 44 A.L.R. 434.

Liability of one contracting to make repairs for damages from improper performance of the work, 1 A.L.R. 1654; 44 A.L.R. 824.

Liability for damage to other premises from fire in building where inflammable materials are stored, 5 A.L.R. 1378.

Liability of railroad company for interference with fire department while attempting to extinguish fire, 5 A.L.R. 1651.

Violation of statute or ordinance regulating movement of vehicles as affecting violator's right to recover for negligence, 12 A.L.R. 458.

Violation of statute or ordinance in relation to explosives as ground of action in favor of one injured in person or proper by explosion, 12 A.L.R. 1309.

Liability for death of, or injury to, one seeking to rescue another, 19 A.L.R. 4; 158 A.L.R. 189; 166 A.L.R. 752.

Question of proximate cause as affecting liability for damages for failure to obtain telephone connection, 19 A.L.R. 1419.

Sense of shame, or other disagreeable emotion on part of female, as essential to an aggravated or indecent assault, 27 A.L.R. 859.

Purpose in starting business to injure another as ground of action by latter, 27 A.L.R. 1417.

Liability in damages for inducing the discharge of employee, 29 A.L.R. 532.

Liability of one who makes a certificate or report, to third person who acts in reliance thereon, 34 A.L.R. 67; 68 A.L.R. 375.

Applicability to civil case of provision of penal statute creating a presumption of prima facie case, 43 A.L.R. 959.

Civil rights and liabilities as affected by failure to comply with regulations as to registration of automobile or motorcycle, or licensing of operator, 43 A.L.R. 1153; 54 A.L.R. 374; 58 A.L.R. 532; 61 A.L.R. 1190; 78 A.L.R. 1028; 87 A.L.R. 1469; 111 A.L.R. 1258; 163 A.L.R. 1375.

Liability for damage or injury by contact with structure above the surface of the street or highway, 46 A.L.R. 943; 49 A.L.R. 993.

Duty of public utility to notify patron in advance of temporary suspension of service, 52 A.L.R. 1078.

Liability of one creating dangerous condition in street or highway as affected by removal of the safeguard by a third person, 62 A.L.R. 500.

Liability of carrier for injury to own passenger on its line through negligence of another carrier permitted to use its tracks, 74 A.L.R. 1178.

Marital or parental relation between plaintiff and member of partnership as affecting right to maintain action in tort against partnership or partners, 81 A.L.R. 1106; 101 A.L.R. 1231.

Liability for leaving contract forms accessible to stranger who, by forgery, gives such forms apparent authenticity as completed contracts, 85 A.L.R. 83.

Civil liability of bank officer or director permitting deposit after insolvency of bank, 87 A.L.R. 1402.

Increase in insurance rates or loss of opportunity to obtain insurance in consequence of another's tort as ground of liability, 92 A.L.R. 1205.

Liability of municipality for injury or damage by automobile colliding with temporary obstruction in connection with alteration or repair of street, 100 A.L.R. 1386.

Loss or theft of passenger's ticket or other token of right to transportation as affecting rights and duties of carrier and passenger, 127 A.L.R. 222.

Liability for injury to child by automobile left unattended in street or highway, 140 A.L.R. 538.

Civil and criminal liability of soldiers, sailors, and militiamen, 143 A.L.R. 1530.

Unauthorized prosecution of suit in name of another as ground of action in tort, 146 A.L.R. 1125.

Rights and remedies as between originator of uncopyrighted advertising plan or slogan, or his assignee, and another who uses or infringes the same, 157 A.L.R. 1436.

Liability for injury as affected by interference by outside agency with object, other than automobile, abandoned or temporarily left in public street or park, 158 A.L.R. 880.

Liability of irrigation district for damages, 160 A.L.R. 1165.

Customary or statutory signal from train as measure of railroad's duty as to warning at highway crossing, 5 A.L.R.2d 112.

Breach of assumed duty to inspect property as ground of liability for damage or injury to third person, 6 A.L.R.2d 284.

Liability of publisher for mistake in advertisement, 10 A.L.R.2d 686.

Duty and liability of carrier to intoxicated passenger while en route, 17 A.L.R.2d 1085.

Liability of parent or person in loco parentis for personal tort against minor child, 19 A.L.R.2d 423; 41 A.L.R.3d 904.

Liability for injury to property occasioned by oil, water, or the like flowing from well, 19 A.L.R.2d 1025.

Liability of seller of firearm, explosive, or highly inflammable substance to child, 20 A.L.R.2d 119; 75 A.L.R.3d 825; 95 A.L.R.3d 390; 4 A.L.R.4th 331.

Liability of gas company for injury or damage due to defects in service lines on consumer's premises, 26 A.L.R.2d 136.

Seller's or manufacturer's liability for injuries as affected by buyer's or user's allergy or unusual susceptibility to injury from article, 26 A.L.R.2d 963.

Shipper's liability to consignee or his employee injured while unloading car because of improper loading, 35 A.L.R.2d 609.

Liability of filling station operator, garageman, or the like, in connection with servicing vehicle with lubricants or fuel, 38 A.L.R.2d 1453.

Duty of landowner to erect fence or other device to deter trespassing children from entering third person's property on which dangerous condition exists, 39 A.L.R.2d 1452.

Liability of architect or engineer for improper issuance of certificate, 43 A.L.R.2d 1227.

Liability for injury or damage resulting from fire started by use of blowtorch, 49 A.L.R.2d 368.

Liability of public accountant, 54 A.L.R.2d 324; 46 A.L.R.3d 979.

Right to damages for exclusion from membership in social or fraternal organization, 59 A.L.R.2d 1290.

Duty and liability of vehicle drivers within parking lot, 62 A.L.R.2d 288.

Liability and suability, in negligence action, of state highway, toll road, or turnpike authority, 62 A.L.R.2d 1222.

Liability of owner or operator to adult trespasser in or on motor vehicle or equipment, 65 A.L.R.2d 798.

Liability of one drawing an invalid will, 65 A.L.R.2d 1363.

Liability to patron of scenic railway, roller coaster, or miniature railway, 66 A.L.R.2d 689.

Liability of person permitting child to have gun, or leaving gun accessible to child, for injury inflicted by the latter, 68 A.L.R.2d 782.

Amusements: liability for injury from slide or chute, 69 A.L.R.2d 1067.

Liability for injury or damage from escaping refrigerant, 74 A.L.R.2d 894.

Air carrier's liability for injury to passenger from changes in air pressure, 75 A.L.R.2d 848.

Liability of taxicab carrier to passenger injured while boarding vehicle, 75 A.L.R.2d 988.

Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended, as affecting negligence actions, 75 A.L.R.2d 1062.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by domestic or industrial soaps, detergents, cleansers, polishes, and the like, 79 A.L.R.2d 482.

Liability for property damage caused by vibrations, or the like, without blasting or explosion, 79 A.L.R.2d 966.

Railroad's liability for crossing collision as affected by fact that train or engine was backing or engine was pushing train, 85 A.L.R.2d 267.

Modern status of rule requiring actual knowledge of latent defect in leased premises as prerequisite to landlord's liability to tenant injured thereby, 88 A.L.R.2d 586.

Liability of owner or operator of theater or other place of amusement to patron injured by condition of or defect in lavatory, restroom, or toilet facilities, 88 A.L.R.2d 1090.

Failure of signaling device at crossing to operate, as affecting railroad company's liability, 90 A.L.R.2d 350.

Liability for failure to rescue seaman who has gone overboard, 91 A.L.R.2d 1032.

Duty of proprietor toward visitor upon premises on private business with or errand or work for employee, 94 A.L.R.2d 6.

Tests of causation under Federal Employers' Liability Act or Jones Act, 98 A.L.R.2d 653.

Liability of owner or operator of automobile for injury to one assisting in extricating or starting his stalled or ditched car, 3 A.L.R.3d 780.

Receiver's personal liability for negligence in failing to care for or maintain property in receivership, 20 A.L.R.3d 967.

Liability for injury or death of child social guest, 20 A.L.R.3d 1127.

Invasion of privacy by use of plaintiff's name or likeness in advertising, 23 A.L.R.3d 865.

Employer's misrepresentation as to prospect, or duration, of employment as actionable fraud, 24 A.L.R.3d 1412.

Premises liability: Proceeding in the dark on inside steps or stairs as contributory negligence, 25 A.L.R.3d 446.

Liability in tort for interference with attorney-client or physician-patient relationship, 26 A.L.R.3d 679.

Bailee's duty to insure bailed property, 28 A.L.R.3d 513.

Liability of corporate directors or officers for negligence in permitting conversion of property of third persons by corporation, 29 A.L.R.3d 660.

Right to recover damages in negligence for fear of injury to another, or shock or mental anguish at witnessing such injury, 29 A.L.R.3d 1337.

Application of rule of strict liability in tort to person rendering services, 29 A.L.R.3d 1425; 100 A.L.R.3d 1205.

Liability in connection with fire or explosion incident to bulk storage, transportation, delivery, loading, or unloading of petroleum products, 32 A.L.R.3d 1169.

Public disclosure of person's indebtedness as invasion of privacy, 33 A.L.R.3d 154.

Duty of one other than carrier or employer to render assistance to one for whose initial injury he is not liable, 33 A.L.R.3d 301.

Landlord's liability for damage to tenant's property caused by water, 35 A.L.R.3d 143.

Modern status of the rule absolving a possessor of land of liability to those coming thereon for harm caused by dangerous physical conditions of which the injured party knew and realized the risk, 35 A.L.R.3d 230.

Surveyor's liability for mistake in, or misrepresentation as to accuracy of, survey of real property, 35 A.L.R.3d 504.

Aviation: helicopter accidents, 35 A.L.R.3d 707.

Tort liability of public schools and institutions of higher learning for accident occurring during school athletic events, 35 A.L.R.3d 725.

Tort liability of public schools and institutions of higher learning for accidents associated with chemistry experiments, shopwork, and manual or vocational training, 35 A.L.R.3d 758.

Liability in connection with fire or explosion of explosives while being stored or transported, 35 A.L.R.3d 1177.

Tort liability of public schools and institutions of higher learning for accidents occurring during use of premises and equipment for other than school purposes, 37 A.L.R.3d 712.

Liability for injury consequent upon spraying or dusting of crop, 37 A.L.R.3d 833.

Liability of product endorser or certifier for product-cause injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 181.

Landowner's right to relief against pollution of his water supply by industrial or commercial waste, 39 A.L.R.3d 910.

Liability for alleged negligence of independent servicer or repairer of aircraft, 41 A.L.R.3d 1320.

Landlord's liability for failure to protect tenant from criminal activities of third persons, 43 A.L.R.5th 207.

Liability of public accountant to third parties, 46 A.L.R.3d 979.

Liability in damages for withholding corpse from relatives, 48 A.L.R.3d 240.

Civil liability of undertaker in connection with embalming or preparation of body for burial, 48 A.L.R.3d 261.

Employer's knowledge of employee's past criminal record as affecting liability for employee's tortious conduct, 48 A.L.R.3d 359.

Liability of hospital for injury caused through assault by a patient, 48 A.L.R.3d 1288.

Liability of oil and gas lessee or operator for injuries to or death of livestock, 51 A.L.R.3d 304.

Liability for damage to highway or bridge caused by size or weight of motor vehicle or load, 53 A.L.R.3d 1035, 31 A.L.R.5th 171.

Unsolicited mailing, distribution, house call, or telephone call as invasion of privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 457.

Liability of hospital, other than mental institution, for suicide of patient, 60 A.L.R.3d 880.

Tort or statutory liability for failure or refusal of witness to give testimony, 61 A.L.R.3d 1297.

May action for malicious prosecution be predicated on defense or counterclaim in civil suit, 65 A.L.R.3d 901.

Liability for injury or death of minor or other incompetent inflicted upon himself by gun made available by defendant, 75 A.L.R.3d 825.

Liability of hospital or similar institution for giving erroneous notification of patient's death, 77 A.L.R.3d 501.

Violation of OSHA regulation as affecting tort liability, 79 A.L.R.3d 962.

Liability of estate for tort of executor, administrator, or trustee, 82 A.L.R.3d 892.

Tort liability for wrongfully causing one to be born, 83 A.L.R.3d 15; 74 A.L.R.4th 798.

Liability of one treating mentally afflicted patient for failure to warn or protect third persons threatened by patient, 83 A.L.R.3d 1201.

Publication of address as well as name of person as invasion of privacy, 84 A.L.R.3d 1159.

Accountant's malpractice liability to client, 92 A.L.R.3d 396.

Products liability: toys and games, 95 A.L.R.3d 390.

Liability for interference with lease, 96 A.L.R.3d 862.

Liability for interference with invalid or unenforceable contracts, 96 A.L.R.3d 1294.

Common-law right of action for damage sustained by plaintiff in consequence of sale or gift of intoxicating liquor or habit-forming drug to another, 97 A.L.R.3d 528; 62 A.L.R.4th 16.

Liability for negligently causing arrest or prosecution of another, 99 A.L.R.3d 1113.

When statute of limitations begins to run as to cause of action for development of latent industrial or occupational disease, 1 A.L.R.4th 117.

Liability of one who sells gun to child for injury to third party, 4 A.L.R.4th 331.

Liability of parent for injury to unemancipated child caused by parent's negligence--modern cases, 6 A.L.R.4th 1066.

Insurer's tort liability for wrongful or negligent issuance of life policy, 37 A.L.R.4th 972.

Liability to adult social guest injured otherwise than by condition of premises, 38 A.L.R.4th 200.

Modern status of intentional infliction of mental distress as independent tort; "outrage", 38 A.L.R.4th 998.

State's liability to one injured by improperly licensed driver, 41 A.L.R.4th 111.

Personal injury or property damage caused by lightning as basis of tort liability, 46 A.L.R.4th 1170.

Social host's liability for injuries incurred by third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16.

Liability for personal injury or property damage caused by unauthorized use of automobile which had been parked with keys removed from ignition, 70 A.L.R.4th 276.

Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfering with prospective civil action, as actionable, 70 A.L.R.4th 984.

Tort liability for nonmedical radiological harm, 73 A.L.R.4th 582.

Rescue doctrine: liability of one who negligently causes motor vehicle accident for injuries to person subsequently attempting to rescue persons or property, 73 A.L.R.4th 737.

Liability of proprietor of private gymnasium, reducing salon, or similar health club for injury to patron, 79 A.L.R.4th 127.

Violation of governmental regulations as to conditions and facilities of swimming pools as affecting liability in negligence, 79 A.L.R.4th 461.

Liability for interference with physician-patient relationship, 87 A.L.R.4th 845.

Liability in tort for interference with attorney-client relationship, 90 A.L.R.4th 621.

Franchisor's tort liability for injuries allegedly caused by assault or other criminal activity on or near franchise premises, 2 A.L.R.5th 369.

Liability of travel publication, travel agent, or similar party for personal injury or death of traveler, 2 A.L.R.5th 396.

Application of statute of limitations to actions for breach of duty in performing services of public accountant, 7 A.L.R.5th 852.

Breach of assumed duty to inspect property as ground for liability to third party, 13 A.L.R.5th 289.

Motorist's liability for signaling other vehicle or pedestrian to proceed, or to pass signaling vehicle, 14 A.L.R.5th 193.

Financing agency's liability to purchaser of new home or structure for consequences of construction defects, 20 A.L.R.5th 499.

Liability for injury to customer from object projecting into aisle or passageway in store, 40 A.L.R.5th 135.

Liability of independent accountant to investors or shareholders, 48 A.L.R.5th 389.

Social host's liability for death or injuries incurred by person to whom alcohol was served, 54 A.L.R.5th 313.

Recovery for emotional distress based on fear of contracting HIV or AIDS, 59 A.L.R.5th 535.

Liability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress - ethnic, racial, or religious harassment or discrimination, 19 A.L.R.6th 1.

Liability of employer, supervisor, or manager for intentionally or recklessly causing employee emotional distress - sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, or accusations concerning sexual conduct or orientation, 20 A.L.R.6th 1.

Invasion of privacy by use of plaintiff's name or likeness in advertising - Consent and waiver, 13 A.L.R.7th 4.

What constitutes "service animal" and accommodation thereof, under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 75 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 49.