2020 Georgia Code
Title 34 - Labor and Industrial Relations
Chapter 9 - Workers' Compensation
Article 1 - General Provisions
§ 34-9-1. Definitions

As used in this chapter, the term:

1. "Board" means the State Board of Workers' Compensation.
2. "Employee" means every person in the service of another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, except a person whose employment is not in the usual course of the trade, business, occupation, or profession of the employer; and, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, minors are included even though working in violation of any child labor law or other similar statute; provided, however, that nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as repealing or altering any such law or statute. Any reference to any employee who has been injured shall, if the employee dies, include such employee's legal representatives, dependents, and other persons to whom compensation may be payable pursuant to this chapter. All firefighters, law enforcement personnel, and personnel of emergency management or civil defense agencies, emergency medical services, and rescue organizations whose compensation is paid by the state or any county or municipality, regardless of the method of appointment, and all full-time county employees and employees of elected salaried county officials are specifically included in this definition. There shall also be included within such term any volunteer firefighter of any county or municipality of this state, but only for services rendered in such capacity which are not prohibited by Code Section 38-3-36 and only if the governing authority of the county or municipality for which such services are rendered shall provide by appropriate resolution for inclusion of such volunteer firefighters; any volunteer law enforcement personnel of any county or municipality of this state who are certified by the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council, for volunteer law enforcement services rendered in such capacity which are not prohibited by Code Section 38-3-36 and only if the governing authority of the county or municipality for which such services are rendered shall provide by appropriate resolution for inclusion of such volunteer law enforcement personnel; any person who is a volunteer member or worker of an emergency management or civil defense organization, emergency medical service, or rescue organization, whether governmental or not, of any county or municipality of this state for volunteer services, which are not prohibited by Code Section 38-3-36, rendered in such capacity and only if the governing authority of the county or municipality for which such services are rendered shall provide by appropriate resolution for inclusion of such volunteer members or workers; and any person certified by the Department of Public Health or the Georgia Composite Medical Board and registered with any county or municipality of this state as a medical first responder for any volunteer first responder services rendered in such capacity, which are not prohibited by Code Section 38-3-36 and only if the governing authority of the county or municipality for which such services are rendered shall provide by appropriate resolution for inclusion of such responders. The various elected county officers and elected members of the governing authority of an individual county shall also be included in this definition, if the governing authority of such county shall provide therefor by appropriate resolution. For the purposes of workers' compensation coverage, employees of county and district health agencies established under Chapter 3 of Title 31 are deemed and shall be considered employees of the State of Georgia and employees of community service boards established under Chapter 2 of Title 37 shall be considered to be employees of the state. For the purpose of workers' compensation coverage, members of the Georgia National Guard and the State Defense Force serving on state active duty pursuant to an order by the Governor are deemed and shall be considered to be employees of this state. A person shall be an independent contractor and not an employee if such person has a written contract as an independent contractor and if such person buys a product and resells it, receiving no other compensation, or provides an agricultural service or such person otherwise qualifies as an independent contractor. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, any officer of a corporation may elect to be exempt from coverage under this chapter by filing written certification of such election with the insurer or, if there is no insurer, the State Board of Workers' Compensation as provided in Code Section 34-9-2.1. For purposes of this chapter, an owner-operator as such term is defined in Code Section 40-2-87 shall be deemed to be an independent contractor. Inmates or persons participating in a work release program, community service program, or similar program as part of the punishment for violation of a municipal ordinance pursuant to Code Section 36-32-5 or a county ordinance or a state law shall not be deemed to be an employee while participating in work or training or while going to and from the work site or training site, unless such inmate or person is employed for private gain in violation of Code Section 42-1-5 or Code Section 42-3-50 or unless the municipality or county had voluntarily established a policy, on or before January 1, 1993, to provide workers' compensation benefits to such individuals. Individuals who are parties to a franchise agreement as set out by the Federal Trade Commission franchise disclosure rule, 16 C.F.R. 436.1 through 436.11, shall not be deemed employees for purposes of this chapter.
3. "Employer" shall include the State of Georgia and all departments, instrumentalities, and authorities thereof; each county within the state, including its school district; each independent public school district; any municipal corporation within the state and any political division thereof; any individual, firm, association, or public or private corporation engaged in any business, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, and the receiver or trustee thereof; any electric membership corporation organized under Article 4 of Chapter 3 of Title 46 or other cooperative corporation engaged in rural electrification, including electric refrigeration cooperatives; any telephone cooperative organized under Part 3 of Article 2 of Chapter 5 of Title 46 or other cooperative or nonprofit corporation engaged in furnishing telephone service; the legal representative of a deceased employer using the service of another for pay; and any person who, pursuant to a contract or agreement with an employer, provides workers' compensation benefits to an injured employee, notwithstanding the fact that no common-law master-servant relationship or contract of employment exists between the injured employee and the person providing the benefits. If the employer is insured, this term shall include his insurer as far as applicable.
4. "Injury" or "personal injury" means only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and shall not, except as provided in this chapter, include a disease in any form except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, "injury" and "personal injury" shall include the aggravation of a preexisting condition by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, but only for so long as the aggravation of the preexisting condition continues to be the cause of the disability; the preexisting condition shall no longer meet this criteria when the aggravation ceases to be the cause of the disability. "Injury" and "personal injury" shall not include injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee for reasons personal to such employee, nor shall "injury" and "personal injury" include heart disease, heart attack, the failure or occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels, stroke, or thrombosis unless it is shown by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence, which shall include medical evidence, that any of such conditions were attributable to the performance of the usual work of employment. Alcoholism and disabilities attributable thereto shall not be deemed to be "injury" or "personal injury" by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Drug addiction or disabilities resulting therefrom shall not be deemed to be "injury" or "personal injury" by accident arising out of and in the course of employment except when such addiction or disability resulted from the use of drugs or medicines prescribed for the treatment of the initial injury by an authorized physician. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, and solely for members of the Georgia National Guard and State Defense Force, an injury arising in the course of employment shall include any injury incurred by a member of the Georgia National Guard or State Defense Force while serving on state active duty or when traveling to and from state active duty.

(Ga. L. 1920, p. 167, §§ 2, 45; Ga. L. 1922, p. 185, § 1; Code 1933, §§ 114-101, 114-102; Ga. L. 1943, p. 401, § 1; Ga. L. 1946, p. 103; Ga. L. 1950, p. 324, § 1; Ga. L. 1950, p. 404, § 1; Ga. L. 1952, p. 167, § 1; Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 526, § 1; Ga. L. 1958, p. 183, § 1; Ga. L. 1963, p. 141, § 1; Ga. L. 1964, p. 675, § 1; Ga. L. 1967, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1163, § 1; Ga. L. 1970, p. 196, § 1; Ga. L. 1970, p. 235, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 232, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 190, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1231, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 2220, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1145, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 842, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1585, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 2360, §§ 1, 3; Ga. L. 1982, p. 2485, §§ 0.5, 5.5; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 25; Ga. L. 1984, p. 816, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1038, § 1; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1110, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1679, § 0.5; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1501, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 94, § 34; Ga. L. 1991, p. 677, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1850, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1942, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 491, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 97, § 34; Ga. L. 1994, p. 887, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1717, § 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1291, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 794, § 1; Ga. L. 2009, p. 453, § 1-4/HB 228; Ga. L. 2009, p. 859, § 2/HB 509; Ga. L. 2011, p. 705, § 6-3/HB 214; Ga. L. 2012, p. 685, § 1/HB 548; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-53/HB 310.)

The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in paragraph (2), substituted "such county" for "said county" near the end of the fifth sentence, and, in the middle of the tenth sentence, substituted "Code Section 42-3-50" for "Code Section 42-8-70". See Editor's notes for applicability.

- Ga. L. 2012, p. 685, § 1/HB 548, amended paragraph (2) of this Code section and in so doing omitted without expressing an intent to repeal or modify the amendment made to that paragraph made by Ga. L. 2011, p. 705, § 6-3/HB 214. The two amendments were not irreconcilably conflicting, and the amendment to paragraph (2) of this Code section made by Ga. L. 2011, p. 705, § 6-3/HB 214, was treated as not having been repealed by Ga. L. 2012, p. 685, § 1/HB 548.

- Exemption of corporate officer from coverage, § 34-9-2.1.

Compensation for permanent partial disability, § 34-9-263.

Compensation schedules, T. 34, C. 9, Art. 7.

State defense force, § 38-2-50 et seq.

- Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.

- For article discussing term "arising out of and in the course of employment," see 14 Ga. St. B. J. 92 (1977). For article discussing injury as a result of aggravation, see 14 Ga. St. B. J. 135 (1978). For article surveying 1978 amendments to workers' compensation law, see 15 Ga. St. B. J. 35 (1978). For article surveying developments in Georgia local government law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 187 (1981). For article surveying developments in Georgia workers' compensation law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 323 (1981). For survey article on workers' compensation, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 335 (1982). For annual survey of workers' compensation, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 431 (1986). For article, "Sexual Harassment Claims Under Georgia Law," see 6 Ga. St. B. J. 16 (2000). For article, "Workers' Compensation," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (2001). For survey article on workers' compensation law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 459 (2003). For article, "Post-Creation Checklist for Georgia Business Entities," see 9 Ga. St. B. J. 24 (2004). For annual survey of law of worker's compensation, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (2004). For annual survey of local government law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (2005). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 419 (2005). For survey article on workers' compensation law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 463 (2007). For survey article on workers' compensation law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2008). For annual survey on workers' compensation, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 399 (2009). For article on the 2011 amendment of this Code section, see 28 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 147 (2011). For annual survey on workers' compensation, see 64 Mercer L. Rev. 341 (2012). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015). For annual survey of workers' compensation, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 287 (2015). For annual survey on decisions impacting workers' compensation, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 357 (2017). For annual survey on workers' compensation, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (2018). For note discussing compensation under this chapter for original injuries aggravated by subsequent injury, continued employment, or ordinary activity, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 325 (1979). For note on 1991 amendment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 109 (1992). For note on 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 285 (1992). For note on 1993 amendment of this article, see 10 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 152 (1993). For review of 1996 workers' compensation legislation, see 13 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 233 (1996). For comment on United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Stapleton, 37 Ga. App. 707, 141 S.E. 506 (1928), see 1 Ga. B. J. 53 (1927). For comment on United States Cas. Co. v. Richardson, 75 Ga. App. 496, 43 S.E.2d 793 (1947), see 10 Ga. B. J. 374 (1948). For comment on American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Benford, 77 Ga. App. 93, 47 S.E.2d 673 (1948), see 11 Ga. B. J. 79 (1948). For comment on McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 54 S.E.2d 471 (1949), see 12 Ga. B. J. 208 (1949). For comment on Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Cowan, 85 Ga. App. 816, 70 S.E.2d 386 (1952), see 4 Mercer L. Rev. 216 (1952). For comment on Hanson v. Globe Indem. Co., 85 Ga. App. 179, 68 S.E.2d 179 (1951), see 14 Ga. B. J. 484 (1952). For comment on City of Brunswick v. Edenfield, 87 Ga. App. 434, 74 S.E.2d 133 (1953), see 15 Ga. B. J. 499 (1953). For comment on Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Marks, 88 Ga. App. 167, 76 S.E.2d 507 (1953), see 16 Ga. B. J. 215 (1953). For comment on Delta C. & S. Airlines v. Perry, 94 Ga. App. 107, 93 S.E.2d 771 (1956), see 19 Ga. B. J. 235 (1956). For comment on Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275, 92 S.E.2d 103 (1956), see 19 Ga. B. J. 237 (1956). For comment on Commissioners of Rds. & Revenue v. Davis, 213 Ga. 792, 102 S.E.2d 180 (1958), see 20 Ga. B. J. 540 (1958). For comment on Thomas v. United States Cas. Co., 218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749 (1962), see 26 Ga. B. J. 126 (1963). For comment criticizing Pike v. Maryland Cas. Co., 107 Ga. App. 49, 129 S.E.2d 78 (1962), see 26 Ga. B. J. 131 (1963). For comment on Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964). For comment on Commercial Constr. Co. v. Caldwell, 111 Ga. App. 1, 140 S.E.2d 298 (1965), see 2 Ga. St. B. J. 135 (1965). For comment criticizing Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312, 160 S.E.2d 424 (1968), see 20 Mercer L. Rev. 473 (1969). For comment on Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 176 S.E.2d 925 (1970), see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 497 (1971). For comment on General Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bellflower, 123 Ga. App. 864, 182 S.E.2d 678 (1971), see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 449 (1972). For comment criticizing Wilkie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 714, 185 S.E.2d 783 (1971), see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 703 (1972). For comment, "The Rights of the Lent Servant Against the General or Special Employer," in light of Forrester v. Scott, 125 Ga. App. 245, 187 S.E.2d 323 (1972), and United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Forrester, 126 Ga. App. 762, 191 S.E.2d 787 (1972), see 9 Ga. St. B. J. 556 (1973). For comment, "Georgia's Mental Block in Workers' Compensation," see 36 Mercer L. Rev. 971 (1985).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Employer and Employee Relationship
• Injury by Accident Arising Out of and in Course of Employment
• A. In General
• B. Heart Attacks
• C. Cerebral Hemorrhages
• D. Other Illnesses

General Consideration

Constitutionality.

- For constitutionality of the 1922 amendment, see Athens Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Kinney, 160 Ga. 1, 127 S.E. 290 (1925).

For unconstitutionality under the former Constitution of 1877 of the definition of employers to include counties, on the grounds that the permitted uses of county taxes at that time did not include workers' compensation (which use is now constitutionally permitted), see Floyd County v. Scoggins, 164 Ga. 485, 139 S.E. 11, 53 A.L.R. 1286 (1927); Perdue v. Maryland Cas. Co., 43 Ga. App. 853, 160 S.E. 720 (1931); Morgan County v. Craig, 213 Ga. 742, 101 S.E.2d 714 (1958); Commissioners of Rds. & Revenues v. Davis, 213 Ga. 792, 102 S.E.2d 180 (1958), for comment, see 20 Ga. B. J. 540 (1958); Fortson v. Clarke County, 97 Ga. App. 410, 103 S.E.2d 597 (1958).

Provision of this section that the term "employers" shall include any municipal corporation within the state and any political division thereof does not violate the constitutional prohibition against granting any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation, or association. City of Macon v. Benson, 175 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26 (1932).

Provision making this state and the various departments thereof "employers" within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), and therefore subject to its provisions, is not unconstitutional insofar as the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) is concerned, as failing to provide sufficient procedural machinery for notice and service to make the state or its departments subject thereto. State Hwy. Dep't v. Turner, 198 Ga. 795, 32 S.E.2d 805 (1945).

Because the Workers' Compensation Act's, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., differing treatment of dependent and non-dependent heirs is not irrational and serves the legitimate government purpose of workers' compensation, the Act's limitation on recovery by non-dependent heirs does not violate the due process or equal protection rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Barzey v. City of Cuthbert, 295 Ga. 641, 763 S.E.2d 447 (2014).

- Summary judgment was properly granted to the employer with regard to a non-dependent parent's claim for benefits for the death of an adult child under the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., because the mother was a non-dependent heir and the Act's limitation on the recovery of non-dependent heirs under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265(b)(1) did not violate the mother's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Barzey v. City of Cuthbert, 295 Ga. 641, 763 S.E.2d 447 (2014).

- Legislature, in enacting the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), did not intend to enforce compensation for injury out of one's own business and property. Denis Aerial Ag-Plicators, Inc. v. Swift, 154 Ga. App. 742, 269 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

- Purpose of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is a humanitarian measure providing relief to the injured employee and protecting employers from excessive damage awards; this law should be liberally interpreted by the court to carry out this purpose. Atha v. Jackson Atlanta, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 433, 283 S.E.2d 654 (1981).

Purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., is to alleviate the suffering of injured workers and their families by providing immediate and certain financial assistance, regardless of whether the injury resulted from the fault of the employer, as long as the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Southern Elec., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 718, 434 S.E.2d 507 (1993).

- Words of this section must be construed reasonably and liberally with a view of applying the beneficent provisions of the workers' compensation law so as to effectuate its purposes, and to extend them to every class of workman and employee that can fairly be brought within the provisions of the law. Lee v. Claxton, 70 Ga. App. 226, 28 S.E.2d 87 (1943).

Section must be liberally construed in order that its humane objectives may be effectuated. United States Asbestos v. Hammock, 140 Ga. App. 378, 231 S.E.2d 792 (1976).

Section contemplates two persons standing in opposed relationship, and not the anomaly of one person occupying the dual relationship of master and servant, employer and employee, plaintiff and defendant. Denis Aerial Ag-Plicators, Inc. v. Swift, 154 Ga. App. 742, 269 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

- Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) includes all employments and services which can reasonably be said to come under its provisions, though a forced construction of the wording thereof to accomplish this will not be indulged in. Continental Cas. Co. v. Haynie, 51 Ga. App. 650, 181 S.E. 126 (1935), aff'd, 182 Ga. 608, 186 S.E. 683 (1936).

Insurer's argument that there should be an exception to the rule making declaratory judgments unavailable when there was no future act to which such a judgment could be applied had to be rejected; the premise for the exception was that the state board of workers' compensation (board) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the underlying coverage issue, but, in fact, the board had the authority to resolve ancillary issues such as workers' compensation insurance coverage. Builders Ins. Group, Inc. v. Ker-Wil Enters., 274 Ga. App. 522, 618 S.E.2d 160 (2005).

- Jurisdiction in the broad sense attaches when an employee sustains an accidental injury in this state, and nothing prohibits such jurisdiction because of residence or contract in another state. Security Ins. Group v. Plank, 133 Ga. App. 815, 212 S.E.2d 471 (1975).

- Fact that an accident happened in South Carolina while a Georgia employee was at work did not affect the applicability of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), nor did the fact that an employee was a minor take the case outside the provisions of the law. Hockmuth v. Perkins, 55 Ga. App. 649, 191 S.E. 156 (1937).

Legislature knew that Georgia industries and businesses extend the field of their operations beyond state lines, and hence understood the plain meaning of the words "arising out of and in the course of the employment"; they therefore intended that compensation cover the entire field of operations, without regard to state lines. Slaten v. Travelers Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 1, 28 S.E.2d 280, answer conformed to, 70 Ga. App. 665, 29 S.E.2d 98 (1943), cert. dismissed, 197 Ga. 856, 30 S.E.2d 822 (1944).

Board of workers' compensation had jurisdiction to award compensation when a Georgia employer employed a Georgia resident in Ohio, through an agent of the Georgia employer, to drive a truck loaded with freight from Ohio to Georgia, and the employee was killed in the course of employment while en route to Georgia. Martin v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 215 Ga. 476, 111 S.E.2d 53 (1959).

- Heart disease, heart attacks, the failure or occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels, stroke, or thrombosis were held not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., unless the employee can show by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence, which shall include medical evidence, that any of such conditions were attributable to the performance of the usual work of employment. Henry County Bd. of Educ. v. Rutledge, 354 Ga. App. 643, 839 S.E.2d 684 (2020).

- When an employee instituted a proceeding pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., for injuries sustained when a forklift turned over on the employee, and the employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits was successful initially and on appeal, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, the two-year statute of limitation on the employee's personal injury action against the former employer was tolled for the period during which the employee pursued the employee's workers' compensation remedy. Butler v. Glen Oak's Turf, Inc., 196 Ga. App. 98, 395 S.E.2d 277, cert. denied, 196 Ga. App. 907, 395 S.E.2d 277 (1990).

- "Disability" under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) means impairment of earning capacity. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Harris, 118 Ga. App. 352, 163 S.E.2d 833 (1968).

- Compensation provided under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is not for all accidental injuries which may be sustained by employees in the course of their employment, but only for such as also arise out of the employment. Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934).

- When former insurance company covered employee when the employee first developed carpal tunnel syndrome but the employee did not become unable to work because of the syndrome until the employee's present insurance company covered the employee, there was a "new accident" and injury and the present insurance company was liable for the claim. Guarantee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wade Invs., 232 Ga. App. 328, 499 S.E.2d 925 (1998).

- Claimant seeking compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) carries the burden of showing not only that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, but that the person injured, for whose injury compensation is claimed, was at the time a servant of the employer against whom compensation is claimed. Banks v. Ellijay Lumber Co., 59 Ga. App. 270, 200 S.E. 480 (1938).

To authorize compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), it must appear that an employee's injury arose out of and in the course of employment, and that the accident was within the purview of this law; all three of these elements must concur and be proved before a recovery is authorized. Givens v. Travelers Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 50, 30 S.E.2d 115 (1944); Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Cowan, 85 Ga. App. 816, 70 S.E.2d 386 (1952), for comment, see 4 Mercer L. Rev. 216 (1952).

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c) has been not been incorporated into the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. McLendon v. Advertising That Works, 292 Ga. App. 677, 665 S.E.2d 370 (2008).

- Payment of money may be corroborative of other facts indicating employment at a given time, but is not of itself conclusive. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. App. 115, 197 S.E. 650 (1938).

Payment of wages is not necessary to bring one within the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Yellow Cab Co. v. Worrell, 155 Ga. App. 41, 273 S.E.2d 410 (1980), distinguishing, Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Windham, 209 Ga. 592, 74 S.E.2d 835 (1953), which held to the contrary, on grounds of the lack of regulatory ordinance therein.

- Mode of payment, while it may be a circumstance tending to indicate the nature of the relationship between the parties, is by no means the controlling or decisive factor to be considered in determining whether the employer-employee relationship exists. Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 176 S.E.2d 925 (1970), for comment, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 497 (1971).

- Except in plain and indisputable cases, the question of whether one is an employee within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1), and whether an injury received by such person was received in the course of the employment, are questions of fact for decision by the board. Employers Ins. Co. v. Bass, 81 Ga. App. 306, 58 S.E.2d 516 (1950).

- "Injury by accident," as used in former Code 1933, § 114-412 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-266), relating to compensation for a hernia, has the same meaning as in former Code 1933, §§ 114-101 and 114-102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sprayberry, 69 Ga. App. 196, 25 S.E.2d 74 (1943).

- Because a willful and malicious injury could not be established as a matter of law when the plaintiff's fall while working was not substantially certain to result from the employer's decision not to obtain proper insurance, employer's debt to the plaintiff was dischargeable in bankruptcy. Herndon v. Brock, 186 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).

- Because the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., does not provide a remedy for damage to personal property, the act does not bar an action for damages to personal property, such as an employee's clothing. To hold otherwise would deny an employee the constitutional right to due process and equal protection of the law. Superb Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Thomason, 183 Ga. App. 554, 359 S.E.2d 370, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 907, 359 S.E.2d 370 (1987).

- "Positional risk doctrine" is a corollary of the general principles defining what constitutes an accidental injury arising out of the employment; and, under it, an accidental injury arises out of the employment when the employee proves that the employee's work has brought the employee within range of the danger by requiring the employee's presence in the locale when the peril struck, even though any other person present would have also been injured irrespective of that person's employment. Any cases holding contrary to the positional risk doctrine that the danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for injuries to arise out of the employment have been overruled. Chaparral Boats, Inc. v. Heath, 269 Ga. App. 339, 606 S.E.2d 567 (2004).

Positional risk doctrine did not make a workers' compensation claimant's injuries compensable when the worker was injured in a crosswalk leading to the place of employment as the employee was not on the employer's premises and the parking lot exception did not apply. Collie Concessions, Inc. v. Bruce, 272 Ga. App. 578, 612 S.E.2d 900 (2005).

Positional risk doctrine does not make compensable an injury which occurs while an employee is going to or from work, unless the injury occurs on the premises or within the parking lot exception, even when the employer designates a particular time to come to work and a particular route or portal to use. Collie Concessions, Inc. v. Bruce, 272 Ga. App. 578, 612 S.E.2d 900 (2005).

Cited in Marlow v. Mayor of Savannah, 28 Ga. App. 368, 110 S.E. 923 (1922); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786 (1923); Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp. v. Wishard, 30 Ga. App. 730, 119 S.E. 429 (1923); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bacon, 30 Ga. App. 728, 119 S.E. 458 (1923); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Corbett, 31 Ga. App. 7, 119 S.E. 921 (1923); Atlanta v. Hatcher, 31 Ga. App. 633, 121 S.E. 864 (1924); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Martin, 157 Ga. 909, 122 S.E. 881 (1924); Holliday v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 32 Ga. App. 567, 124 S.E. 89 (1924); Hotel Equip. Co. v. Liddell, 32 Ga. App. 590, 124 S.E. 92 (1924); Athens Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Kinney, 160 Ga. 1, 127 S.E. 290 (1925); Rome Ry. & Light Co. v. Jones, 33 Ga. App. 617, 127 S.E. 786 (1925); Keen v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 34 Ga. App. 257, 129 S.E. 174 (1925); Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Clore, 34 Ga. App. 409, 129 S.E. 799 (1925); United States Cas. Co. v. Smith, 34 Ga. App. 363, 129 S.E. 880 (1925); Goss v. Gordon County, 35 Ga. App. 325, 133 S.E. 68 (1926); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Watts, 35 Ga. App. 447, 133 S.E. 476 (1926); Western & Atl. R.R. v. Henderson, 35 Ga. App. 353, 133 S.E. 645 (1926); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Martin, 35 Ga. App. 504, 134 S.E. 174 (1926); London Guarantee & Accident Corp. v. Wallace, 35 Ga. App. 571, 134 S.E. 334 (1926); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Sheffield, 162 Ga. 656, 134 S.E. 761 (1926); Norwich Union Indem. Co. v. Johnson, 36 Ga. App. 186, 136 S.E. 335 (1926); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557, 137 S.E. 121 (1927); United States. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Stapleton, 37 Ga. App. 707, 141 S.E. 506 (1928); Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Treadwell, 37 Ga. App. 759, 142 S.E. 182 (1928); Montgomery v. Maryland Cas. Co., 39 Ga. App. 210, 146 S.E. 504 (1929); Branch & Howard v. Georgia Cas. Co., 39 Ga. App. 319, 147 S.E. 144 (1929); Blanchard v. Savannah River Lumber Co., 40 Ga. App. 416, 149 S.E. 793 (1929); Love Lumber Co. v. Thigpen, 42 Ga. App. 83, 155 S.E. 77 (1930); City of Macon v. Whittington, 171 Ga. 643, 156 S.E. 674 (1930); Simmons v. Etowah Monument Co., 42 Ga. App. 633, 157 S.E. 260 (1931); Parker v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 174 Ga. 525, 163 S.E. 159 (1932); Porter v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ga. App. 86, 166 S.E. 675 (1932); Payton v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 47 Ga. App. 747, 171 S.E. 392 (1933); Joiner v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 48 Ga. App. 365, 172 S.E. 754 (1934); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Wigley, 179 Ga. 764, 177 S.E. 568 (1934); City Council v. Reynolds, 50 Ga. App. 842, 178 S.E. 485 (1935); Continental Cas. Co. v. Payne, 56 Ga. App. 873, 194 S.E. 428 (1937); Reid v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 58 Ga. App. 184, 197 S.E. 904 (1938); Wicker v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 59 Ga. App. 521, 1 S.E.2d 464 (1939); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Prather, 59 Ga. App. 797, 2 S.E.2d 115 (1939); Pollard v. Balon, 61 Ga. App. 406, 6 S.E.2d 400 (1939); Hall v. Georgia Milk Producers Confederation, 61 Ga. App. 676, 7 S.E.2d 330 (1940); Kendrick v. State Hwy. Bd., 62 Ga. App. 570, 8 S.E.2d 793 (1940); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Wicker, 63 Ga. App. 435, 11 S.E.2d 365 (1940); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 63 Ga. App. 438, 11 S.E.2d 367 (1940); Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 63 Ga. App. 880, 12 S.E.2d 398 (1940); Merritt v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 65 Ga. App. 826, 16 S.E.2d 612 (1941); De Loach v. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co., 70 Ga. App. 195, 27 S.E.2d 895 (1943); State Hwy. Dep't v. Bass, 197 Ga. 356, 29 S.E.2d 161 (1944); Kelley v. Newton County, 198 Ga. 483, 32 S.E.2d 99 (1944); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scoggins, 72 Ga. App. 263, 33 S.E.2d 534 (1945); McWaters v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 73 Ga. App. 586, 37 S.E.2d 430 (1946); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Allen, 74 Ga. App. 133, 38 S.E.2d 841 (1946); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Young, 77 Ga. App. 512, 48 S.E.2d 748 (1948); Flint Elec. Membership Corp. v. Posey, 78 Ga. App. 597, 51 S.E.2d 869 (1949); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fricks, 81 Ga. App. 727, 59 S.E.2d 671 (1950); Ray v. United States, 228 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1955); Walker v. Wilcox County, 95 Ga. App. 185, 97 S.E.2d 583 (1957); Royal Indem. Co. v. Coulter, 213 Ga. 277, 98 S.E.2d 899 (1957); Mosley v. George A. Fuller Co., 250 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1957); Commissioners of Rds. & Revenues v. Davis, 213 Ga. 792, 102 S.E.2d 180 (1958); Polk County v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1959); Shelton v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 101 Ga. App. 466, 114 S.E.2d 288 (1960); City of Dalton v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 216 Ga. 602, 118 S.E.2d 475 (1961); Smith v. Rich's, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 883, 123 S.E.2d 316 (1961); Oconee County v. Rowland, 107 Ga. App. 108, 129 S.E.2d 373 (1962); Elberfeld v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 109 Ga. App. 39, 134 S.E.2d 869 (1964); Jones v. City of Pembroke, 220 Ga. 213, 138 S.E.2d 276 (1964); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross, 110 Ga. App. 312, 138 S.E.2d 474 (1964); Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. McClain, 221 Ga. 60, 143 S.E.2d 165 (1965); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 527, 145 S.E.2d 615 (1965); Benefield v. Harriett & Henderson Cotton Mills, Inc., 113 Ga. App. 556, 149 S.E.2d 196 (1966); Mull v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 120 Ga. App. 791, 172 S.E.2d 147 (1969); Mull v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 226 Ga. 462, 175 S.E.2d 552 (1970); Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Sharpe, 128 Ga. App. 695, 197 S.E.2d 741 (1973); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Brown, 128 Ga. App. 813, 198 S.E.2d 348 (1973); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Barber, 128 Ga. App. 894, 198 S.E.2d 162 (1973); Yancey v. Green, 129 Ga. App. 705, 201 S.E.2d 162 (1973); Kaiser v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 629, 204 S.E.2d 375 (1974); Sims v. American Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121 (1974); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hammock, 133 Ga. App. 839, 212 S.E.2d 484 (1975); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dotson, 135 Ga. App. 128, 217 S.E.2d 329 (1975); Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Demory, 138 Ga. App. 888, 227 S.E.2d 788 (1976); Commercial Union Ass'n Co. v. Couch, 143 Ga. App. 64, 237 S.E.2d 528 (1977); Zitzman v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 298, 238 S.E.2d 282 (1977); Dixie-Cole Transf. Trucking Co. v. Fudge, 147 Ga. App. 306, 248 S.E.2d 694 (1978); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Ashbaugh, 147 Ga. App. 392, 249 S.E.2d 96 (1978); Steinberg v. Star Expansion Co., 148 Ga. App. 309, 251 S.E.2d 160 (1978); Helton v. Interstate Brands Corp., 155 Ga. App. 607, 271 S.E.2d 739 (1980); Board of Trustees v. Christy, 246 Ga. 553, 272 S.E.2d 288 (1980); Mimms v. Sisk Decorating Co., 156 Ga. App. 572, 275 S.E.2d 148 (1980); Swafford v. Transit Cas. Co., 486 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Union Carbide Corp. v. Coffman, 158 Ga. App. 360, 280 S.E.2d 140 (1981); Walsh Constr. Co. v. Frawley, 248 Ga. 151, 284 S.E.2d 434 (1981); Continental Cas. Co. v. Parker, 161 Ga. App. 614, 288 S.E.2d 776 (1982); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co., 250 Ga. 83, 295 S.E.2d 841 (1982); Long v. Marvin M. Black Co., 250 Ga. 621, 300 S.E.2d 150 (1983); Fountain v. Shoney's Big Boy, Inc., 168 Ga. App. 489, 309 S.E.2d 671 (1983); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Dean, 169 Ga. App. 277, 312 S.E.2d 156 (1983); Greene v. Transport Ins. Co., 169 Ga. App. 504, 313 S.E.2d 761 (1984); Bradshaw v. Glass, 252 Ga. 429, 314 S.E.2d 233 (1984); GMC v. Summerous, 170 Ga. App. 338, 317 S.E.2d 318 (1984); Georgia Power Co. v. Safford, 171 Ga. App. 387, 319 S.E.2d 537 (1984); Bright v. Nimmo, 253 Ga. 378, 320 S.E.2d 365 (1984); Lawrence v. Atlanta Door Co., 171 Ga. App. 741, 320 S.E.2d 627 (1984); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Hambrick, 176 Ga. App. 544, 336 S.E.2d 617 (1985); City of Atlanta v. Shaw, 179 Ga. App. 148, 345 S.E.2d 642 (1986); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Ga. 1986); G & M Quality Bldrs., Inc. v. Dennison, 256 Ga. 617, 351 S.E.2d 622 (1987); Hinkley v. Building Material Merchants Ass'n, 187 Ga. App. 345, 370 S.E.2d 201 (1988); Department of Pub. Safety v. Boatright, 188 Ga. App. 612, 373 S.E.2d 770 (1988)

Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Byrd's Elec. & Plumbing, Inc. v. Johnson, 199 Ga. App. 621, 405 S.E.2d 548 (1991); Williams v. Atlanta Family Restaurants, Inc., 204 Ga. App. 343, 419 S.E.2d 328 (1992); Rothrock v. Jeter, 212 Ga. App. 85, 441 S.E.2d 88 (1994); Zaytzeff v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 222 Ga. App. 48, 473 S.E.2d 565 (1996); Hallum v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Cieplinski v. Caldwell Elec. Contrs., Inc., 280 Ga. App. 267, 633 S.E.2d 646 (2006); MARTA v. Reid, 282 Ga. App. 877, 640 S.E.2d 300 (2006); Coker v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 290 Ga. App. 342, 659 S.E.2d 625 (2008); Coker v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 290 Ga. App. 342, 659 S.E.2d 625 (2008); Parham v. Swift Transp. Co., 292 Ga. App. 53, 663 S.E.2d 769 (2008); Rheem Mfg. v. Butts, 292 Ga. App. 523, 664 S.E.2d 878 (2008); Master Craft Flooring v. Dunham, 308 Ga. App. 430, 708 S.E.2d 36 (2011); Best Buy Co., Inc. v. McKinney, 334 Ga. App. 42, 778 S.E.2d 51 (2015).

Employer and Employee Relationship

1. In General

- Any doubt is to be resolved in favor of the existence of an employer-employee relationship rather than the employer-independent contractor relationship; thus, while the claimant is at all times cast with the burden of proof, the evidence offered will, so far as it is genuinely susceptible of construction, be given that construction which is in the claimant's favor in determining whether the claimant has carried that burden by a preponderance of the evidence. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moates, 102 Ga. App. 778, 117 S.E.2d 924 (1960); Lyons v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268, 193 S.E.2d 244 (1972); Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hornsby, 134 Ga. App. 157, 213 S.E.2d 538 (1975).

- Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is applicable only when the relationship of master and servant obtains, and only an employee whose relationship with the employer is that of a servant to a master is entitled to compensation under that law. Chandler v. Harris, 47 Ga. App. 535, 171 S.E. 174 (1933); Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934); Alexander v. Bremen, 53 Ga. App. 676, 187 S.E. 141 (1936).

There is no coverage under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) unless there is a relationship of employer and employee. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Parsley, 113 Ga. App. 830, 149 S.E.2d 848 (1966).

- "Employment" means employment with the party from whom compensation is sought. House v. Echota Cotton Mills, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 350, 199 S.E.2d 585 (1973); Slattery Assocs. v. Jones, Batson-Cook & Russell, 161 Ga. App. 389, 288 S.E.2d 654 (1982).

- Only employees who are servants fall within the definition of employee entitled to compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Banks v. Ellijay Lumber Co., 59 Ga. App. 270, 200 S.E. 480 (1938).

- Definition of the term "employee" in former Code 1933, §§ 114-101 and 114-102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1) shall be construed in connection with former Code 1933, §§ 114-107 and 114-108 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2). Continental Cas. Co. v. Haynie, 182 Ga. 608, 186 S.E. 683 (1936).

Word "employee" must be liberally construed in favor of the claimant. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Windham, 87 Ga. App. 198, 73 S.E.2d 517 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 Ga. 592, 74 S.E.2d 835 (1953).

In determining whether the plaintiffs were the defendant's employees, the purpose of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) must be considered, and to that end the law must be given liberal construction. Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958).

- Real test by which to determine whether a person is acting as the servant of another is to ascertain whether at the time when the injury was inflicted the servant was subject to such person's orders and control, and was liable to be discharged by the person for disobedience of orders or misconduct. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. App. 115, 197 S.E. 650 (1938); Adams v. Johnson, 88 Ga. App. 94, 76 S.E.2d 135 (1953).

Final test is whose work the servant was doing and under whose control the servant was doing it. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hamlin, 98 Ga. App. 167, 105 S.E.2d 481 (1958).

- Question of whether a person is an employee is one of fact, and when there is any evidence to sustain the board's finding of fact, the court should not interfere. Goolsby v. Wilson, 150 Ga. App. 611, 258 S.E.2d 216 (1979).

- Claimant, who applied for a position as a substitute bus driver with county board of education and began a two-and-a-half week training period which included both classroom and on-the-road assignments, failed to meet claimant's burden of establishing claimant was an employee of the county board of education at the time of the injury within the contemplation of the workers' compensation statutes primarily because claimant had not been guaranteed future employment even if claimant successfully completed the training, and because claimant received no compensation from the county during the training. North v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 212 Ga. App. 593, 442 S.E.2d 809 (1994).

- It matters not what the employee is called, be it a fireman or a laborer; if the employee is hired as a servant and is not a public officer, the workers' compensation law will cover the employee if the employee is otherwise qualified to be covered under the law. City of Brunswick v. Edenfield, 87 Ga. App. 434, 74 S.E.2d 133 (1953), for comment, see 15 Ga. B. J. 499 (1953).

- Working of regular hours is not necessary to be classified as an employee. American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tanner, 97 Ga. App. 122, 101 S.E.2d 875 (1958); Barbree v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 186, 123 S.E.2d 905 (1962).

- When an offer of employment does not contemplate that it be formally accepted, the relationship of employer and employee is created when the person to whom the employment is offered, in good faith, begins to perform the duties expected of the person. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Humphries, 91 Ga. App. 271, 85 S.E.2d 456 (1954).

Whether a contract creates the relationship of employer-employee or employer-independent contractor is a question of law. Lyons v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268, 193 S.E.2d 244 (1972).

- Fact that a person deducts sums for compensation insurance from payments due under a contract and thus becomes another's "employer" solely for workers' compensation purposes does not alter the common-law relationship between the parties. Hampton v. McCord, 141 Ga. App. 97, 232 S.E.2d 582 (1977).

- When the manufacturer of a commodity employs another, whether for a price per hour or by the piece, to perform a comparatively simple manual function in the process of producing the commodity, the person engaged to render such service is usually classed as an employee and not as an independent contractor. Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958).

- Employee who does work that the employer authorizes in carrying out the purpose of employment, which the employer considers beneficial to the business about which the employee is engaged to labor, acts within the scope of the latter's employment. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hamlin, 98 Ga. App. 167, 105 S.E.2d 481 (1958).

- When a servant is obliged under contract of employment to render whatever service is required of the servant in carrying on the business about which the servant is employed, an act done at the suggestion of the employer for the benefit of the business and to carry out the employer's policy and plan of conducting the business is within the scope of the employee's employment. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hamlin, 98 Ga. App. 167, 105 S.E.2d 481 (1958).

- Employee does not, in contemplation of the worker's compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), go outside employment if, when confronted with a sudden emergency, the employee steps beyond the employee's regularly designated duties in an attempt to save oneself from injury, to rescue another employee from danger, or to save the employer's property. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dallas, 39 Ga. App. 38, 146 S.E. 37 (1928).

Fact that an employee was not actually in danger of injury does not change the rule that an employee does not go outside employment, when, confronted with a sudden emergency, the employee steps beyond the employee's regular duties to save oneself from injury, to rescue another employee from danger, or to save the employer's property, if the employee acted as any reasonable person would have acted under the circumstances. Globe Indem. Co. v. Legien, 47 Ga. App. 539, 171 S.E. 185 (1933).

- Recreational or social activities are within the course of employment when: (1) they occur on the premises during a lunch or recreation period as a regular incident of the employment; or (2) employer, by expressly or impliedly requiring participation or by making the activity part of the services of an employee, brings the activity within the orbit of the employment; or (3) employer derives substantial direct benefit from the activity beyond the intangible value of improvement in employee health and morale that is common to all kinds of recreation and social life. Crowe v. Home Indem. Co., 145 Ga. App. 873, 245 S.E.2d 75 (1978).

- Obligation of the employer under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is not that of an absolute insurer, and the burden is upon the claimant to prove that an injury arose in the course of employment and also out of it. Savannah River Lumber Co. v. Bush, 37 Ga. App. 539, 140 S.E. 899 (1927).

Burden of proving the relationship of employer and employee is on the claimant. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Lamb, 56 Ga. App. 492, 193 S.E. 76 (1937); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Windham, 209 Ga. 592, 74 S.E.2d 835 (1953); Cash v. American Sur. Co., 101 Ga. App. 379, 114 S.E.2d 57 (1960).

- In determining whether the relationship of master and servant prevails in a compensation case, the same principles that exist under the common law obtain. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. App. 115, 197 S.E. 650 (1938); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Parsley, 113 Ga. App. 830, 149 S.E.2d 848 (1966).

- True test as to whether or not the relationship of employer and employee existed is whether or not the alleged employer had the right or exercised any control over the alleged employee. Brewer v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 95 Ga. App. 270, 97 S.E.2d 643 (1957).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the landscaper and the business entity on the claim that the estate administrator's wrongful death lawsuit was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a); a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the decedent was an employee of the landscaper and the business entity at the time of death as the landscaper was more of a de facto guardian in relationship to the decedent, but the landscaper also had some measure of control over the decedent because decedent was assisting the landscaper on a project even though decedent had never before worked for the landscaper and the business. Glover v. Ware, 276 Ga. App. 759, 624 S.E.2d 285 (2005).

- Test to be applied in determining whether the relationship of the parties under a contract for performance of labor is that of employer and servant or that of employer and independent contractor lies in whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner, and method of executing the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity to the contract. Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587, 173 S.E. 737 (1934); Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Martin, 53 Ga. App. 137, 185 S.E. 137 (1936); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Clements, 53 Ga. App. 622, 186 S.E. 764 (1936); Scott v. Minor, 55 Ga. App. 714, 191 S.E. 263 (1937); Durham Land Co. v. Kilgore, 56 Ga. App. 785, 194 S.E. 49 (1937); Lokey & Simpson v. Hightower, 57 Ga. App. 577, 196 S.E. 210 (1938); Elliott Addressing Mach. Co. v. Howard, 59 Ga. App. 62, 200 S.E. 340 (1938); Mauney v. Collins, 64 Ga. App. 330, 13 S.E.2d 97 (1941); Blakely v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 67 Ga. App. 795, 21 S.E.2d 339 (1942); Macon Dairies, Inc. v. Duhart, 69 Ga. App. 91, 24 S.E.2d 732 (1943); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Stewart, 74 Ga. App. 839, 41 S.E.2d 658 (1947); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Windham, 87 Ga. App. 198, 73 S.E.2d 517 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 Ga. 592, 74 S.E.2d 835 (1953); Federated Mut. Implement & Hdwe. Ins. Co. v. Elliott, 88 Ga. App. 266, 76 S.E.2d 568 (1953); Brewer v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 95 Ga. App. 270, 97 S.E.2d 643 (1957); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moates, 102 Ga. App. 778, 117 S.E.2d 924 (1960); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 104 Ga. App. 617, 122 S.E.2d 308 (1961); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Poole, 112 Ga. App. 527, 145 S.E.2d 615 (1965); Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 176 S.E.2d 925 (1970), for comment, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 497 (1971); Lyons v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268, 193 S.E.2d 244 (1972).

If a contract of employment gives an employer the right to control the manner, means, and methods by which the employee performs the duties required of the employee under the contract, the relationship of master and servant is thereby established between the parties, and when such contract is not afterwards changed by any subsequent agreement, or by any act of one party acquiesced in by the other amounting to a deviation from the terms of the contract, the mere failure of the employer to assert that right under the contract to control the manner, means, and methods by which the employee performs the work, as by not interfering therein, does not change the relationship between the parties. Joiner v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 48 Ga. App. 365, 172 S.E. 754 (1934).

Relationship of master and servant exists whenever the employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in other words, not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. App. 115, 197 S.E. 650 (1938).

True test of whether a person employed is a servant or an independent contractor is whether the employer, under the contract, whether oral or written, has the right to direct the time, manner, methods, and means of execution of the work, as contradistinguished from the right to insist upon the contractor producing results according to the contract, or whether the contractor in the performance of the work is free from any control by the employer of the time, manner, and method of performance. Banks v. Ellijay Lumber Co., 59 Ga. App. 270, 200 S.E. 480 (1938).

Chief test, though not an all-inclusive one, to be applied in determining the relationship of employer and employee or independent contractor is whether the employer has the right to assume control of the manner, means, and time of the work. American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tanner, 97 Ga. App. 122, 101 S.E.2d 875 (1958); Cash v. American Sur. Co., 101 Ga. App. 379, 114 S.E.2d 57 (1960); Barbree v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 186, 123 S.E.2d 905 (1962).

- If the employer has or assumes the right under the contract to control and direct how the work shall be done, i.e., has or assumes the right under the contract to control the manner in which the details of the work are to be executed, as distinguished from the mere right to superintend it so that the desired results are obtained, the relationship is that of master and servant; if, on the other hand, the employer has or assumes only the right under the contract to superintend the work to the end that the desired results so contracted for are obtained, and does not have or assume the right under the contract to control the manner in which it is done, which right is vested in the contractor, the relationship is that of employer and independent contractor. Durham Land Co. v. Kilgore, 56 Ga. App. 785, 194 S.E. 49 (1937); Lokey & Simpson v. Hightower, 57 Ga. App. 577, 196 S.E. 210 (1938).

- If the right of control in the employer is conclusively shown to exist, then evidence to show the actual exercise of control or the absence of it becomes wholly immaterial; it is the right of control, and not the fact of control, which is decisive. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Windham, 87 Ga. App. 198, 73 S.E.2d 517 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 Ga. 592, 74 S.E.2d 835 (1953); American Cas. Co. v. Harris, 96 Ga. App. 720, 101 S.E.2d 618 (1957).

Test for the employer-employee relationship under this section was not whether the employer in fact controlled and directed the employee in the work, but whether the employer had that right under the employment contract. Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 176 S.E.2d 925 (1970), for comment, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 497 (1971); Moon v. Georgia Power Co., 127 Ga. App. 524, 194 S.E.2d 348 (1972).

- When one is employed generally to perform certain services for another, and there is no specific contract to do a certain piece of work according to specifications for a stipulated sum, it is inferable that the employer has retained the right to control the manner, method, and means of the performance of the contract, and that the employee is not an independent contractor. Continental Cas. Co. v. Payne, 56 Ga. App. 873, 194 S.E. 428 (1937); Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moates, 102 Ga. App. 778, 117 S.E.2d 924 (1960); Barbree v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 186, 123 S.E.2d 905 (1962); Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 176 S.E.2d 925 (1970), for comment, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 497 (1971); Moon v. Georgia Power Co., 127 Ga. App. 524, 194 S.E.2d 348 (1972).

Employer's insolvency provides no defense to its liability for workers' compensation. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 173 Ga. App. 95, 325 S.E.2d 408 (1984).

- Existence of the relationship of employer and employee is necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Commission (now Board of Workers' Compensation) to entertain a claim for compensation in any and all cases. Parker v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 174 Ga. 525, 163 S.E. 159 (1932); City Council v. Reynolds, 50 Ga. App. 482, 178 S.E. 485 (1935).

- Trial court did not err in dismissing a sheriff's deputy's widow's claims against the sheriff and the deputy's fellow deputies on the basis that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the widow's exclusive remedy under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a). The sheriff was the deputy's "employer" under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III(a), and O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(3). Teasley v. Freeman, 305 Ga. App. 1, 699 S.E.2d 39 (2010).

2. Independent Contractor

Characteristics of independent contractor contract.

- In order for one to be an independent contractor so as to be outside the protection of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), the contract of employment must itself be one which contemplates a definite beginning, continuance, and ending. Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moates, 102 Ga. App. 778, 117 S.E.2d 924 (1960).

- When there is a relationship of independent contractor and contractee, no coverage is afforded under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Parsley, 113 Ga. App. 830, 149 S.E.2d 848 (1966).

Employer was entitled under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-124(b) to bring an independent contractor under its workers' compensation policy so that the contractor's tort action for injuries was barred by the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 and was also barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because of the administrative law judge's findings in the workers' compensation adjudicative process that the employer's workers' compensation policy applied. Apperson v. S. States Coop., F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 16, 2005).

- Test of whether or not a person is an independent contractor is whether the person employed to perform the work was to be free, under the contract, from the control of the employer as to the manner in which the employee performed the details of the work. Davison-Paxon Co. v. Ferguson, 94 Ga. App. 501, 95 S.E.2d 306 (1956).

- True test in determining whether one is engaged as a servant or occupies the status of an independent contractor ordinarily lies in whether or not the work is to be done according to the workman's own methods without being subject to the employer's control except as to the results to be obtained. Elliott Addressing Mach. Co. v. Howard, 59 Ga. App. 62, 200 S.E. 340 (1938); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 63 Ga. App. 438, 11 S.E.2d 367 (1940); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 104 Ga. App. 617, 122 S.E.2d 308 (1961).

When a doubt exists as to whether a claimant is an employee or an independent contractor, the doubt should be resolved in the employee's favor. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Windham, 87 Ga. App. 198, 73 S.E.2d 517 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 Ga. 592, 74 S.E.2d 835 (1953).

In claims for compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), when the question is whether the injured person or the person under whom the injured person was working occupied the relationship of an employee or of an independent contractor toward the employer, the line of demarcation is often so close that each case must be determined upon its own particular facts. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Windham, 87 Ga. App. 198, 73 S.E.2d 517 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 Ga. 592, 74 S.E.2d 835 (1953); Brewer v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 95 Ga. App. 270, 97 S.E.2d 643 (1957).

Cardinal rule applied in determining who is an independent contractor is whether the employer has the right to control or direct the manner and time in which the work is performed. Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958).

Generally speaking, an independent contractor is one who, in rendering services, exercises an independent employment or occupation, and represents the employer only as to the results of the contractor's work, and not as to the means whereby it is to be accomplished. Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958); Lyons v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268, 193 S.E.2d 244 (1972).

- Employer, simply by designating certain employees as independent contractors, is not permitted to bypass the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), even though the employer may bona fide believe that the end referred to may be accomplished in the matter mentioned. Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958).

- Evidence held sufficient to show that purported subcontractors were employees of home construction contractor when the individuals personally performed the work, were hired and paid weekly on a work unit basis and there were no written contracts; indorsement on contractor's check which, when signed, swore that the indorser was a subcontractor was not controlling. Chandler v. Hancock Bldrs., Inc., 205 Ga. App. 303, 422 S.E.2d 206, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 899, 422 S.E.2d 206 (1992).

- When notwithstanding the express provisions of a contract, there was evidence from which to infer that the actual understanding of the parties was that the employer was to have and indirectly assume the right to control the manner of doing the work, and that the contract was a device or subterfuge to avoid the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), the deceased employee would be held to be a servant and not an independent contractor. Durham Land Co. v. Kilgore, 56 Ga. App. 785, 194 S.E. 49 (1937).

- Fact that employer continuously checks the work of an independent contractor to see that the work is being done according to the specifications of the job is thoroughly consistent with the relationship of employer and independent contractor and with the mere right of the employer to insist on a certain specific result. Lyons v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268, 193 S.E.2d 244 (1972).

- Nothing in federal law contradicts the declaration in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 (2) that an owner-operator shall be deemed an independent contractor; therefore, an owner-operator of a tractor-trailer who leased both the owner-operator's truck and services to a transporter was not entitled to workers' compensation coverage. Upshaw v. Hale Intermodal Transp. Co., 224 Ga. App. 239, 480 S.E.2d 277 (1997).

- Fact that a workman owns and operates the workman's own independent business does not ipso facto preclude the workman from performing services for another in the pursuit of the workman's trade in the status of an employee rather than an independent contractor; this is simply a circumstance to be considered in determining the actual status of the workman at the time the injury was sustained. Barbree v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 186, 123 S.E.2d 905 (1962).

- Employment of one to do piece work is not conclusive of one's status either as an employee or as an independent contractor. Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958).

One of the most significant guides in classing a piece worker as an employee or an independent contractor is whether the person conducts the person's own independent business or merely works in carrying on that of the employer; a contractor is one who, in the pursuit of an independent business, undertakes to do a specific piece of work for other persons, using the contractor's own means and methods, without submitting oneself to their control in respect to all its details. Lyons v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268, 193 S.E.2d 244 (1972).

- Fact that a piece worker uses an employer's equipment, standing as an isolated or independent fact, is indicative of but not conclusive as to whether, as to the worker's employer, the worker occupies the relationship of an employee; fact that the employee uses the employee's own equipment and motive power in performing services for the employee's master does not give the employee the status of an independent contractor. Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958).

- Specialization alone is not an infallible test in determining whether one is a servant or an independent contractor. Federated Mut. Implement & Hdwe. Ins. Co. v. Elliott, 88 Ga. App. 266, 76 S.E.2d 568 (1953).

3. Usual Course of Business

Excluded employees.

- Any person whose employment is not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the person's employer or is not incidental thereto is excluded from the right to compensation under the express provisions of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Continental Cas. Co. v. Haynie, 51 Ga. App. 650, 181 S.E. 126 (1935), aff'd, 182 Ga. 608, 186 S.E. 683 (1936).

The definition of "employee" in former Code 1933, §§ 114-101 and 114-107 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 and34-9-2) that the workers' compensation law shall not apply to employees whose employment was not in the usual course of trade, business, occupation, or profession of the employer or not incidental thereto must be construed together. Wender & Roberts, Inc. v. Jones, 95 Ga. App. 82, 97 S.E.2d 160, cert. dismissed, 213 Ga. 375, 99 S.E.2d 142 (1957).

- Test of employment is whether the employment is in furtherance of an employer's business, and not in the manner or method adopted in the performance of such employment; moreover, the character of the work being done, and not the contract of employment, is determinative of the question. Lee v. Claxton, 70 Ga. App. 226, 28 S.E.2d 87 (1943).

- Test of the relationship of employer and employee is not that the particular work under consideration was done within the period of employment, but whether it was done within the scope of and in the course of the employment. Blakely v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 67 Ga. App. 795, 21 S.E.2d 339 (1942).

- In order to constitute employment under this section, it was sufficient that the service which the employee was performing when injured grew out of and was incidental to employment; it did not matter if the employment was for one of several businesses carried on by the employer. Lee v. Claxton, 70 Ga. App. 226, 28 S.E.2d 87 (1943).

Fact that a particular business is not ordinarily one carried on by a person engaged in the profession of an employer would not result in removing the employment from the usual course of the business of the employer, particularly when such employee was engaged in business clearly related or incidental to the main business of the employer. Lee v. Claxton, 70 Ga. App. 226, 28 S.E.2d 87 (1943).

- A carpenter who is engaged with others to aid in the alteration, repair, and enlargement of the offices of a corporation doing a dairy business, which offices are essential to the successful carrying on of such trade or business in an efficient and modern manner, and who will not be retained after the completion of such carpenter work, is an "employee" in the service of the dairy corporation, whose employment is "incidental" to the usual course of the trade or business of the employer. Continental Cas. Co. v. Haynie, 182 Ga. 608, 186 S.E. 683 (1936).

Employment is incidental to the usual course of the trade or business of the employer when it is being performed upon premises and buildings essential to the successful carrying on of such trade or business in an efficient and modern manner, the test being whether employment is in furtherance of the business of the employer, not in the manner or method adopted in the performance, and whether it is in furtherance of the employer's gain or profit and is related or incidental to such employment. Wender & Roberts, Inc. v. Jones, 95 Ga. App. 82, 97 S.E.2d 160, cert. dismissed, 213 Ga. 375, 99 S.E.2d 142 (1957).

- When the claimant was injured in a motorcycle accident on the way from the claimant's home in Georgia to a motel in Alabama, where the claimant planned to spend the night before beginning work on an employer's job the next morning, the Board of Workers' Compensation did not err in denying the claim for benefits made by the claimant because the claimant's injuries did not arise out of or in the course of the claimant's employment as the claimant was not engaged in the claimant's employment at the time of the accident; and the continuous employment doctrine did not apply as the claimant was not performing work duties or being paid by the employer when the claimant traveled to a motel near a job site. Kendrick v. SRA Track, Inc., 341 Ga. App. 818, 801 S.E.2d 911 (2017).

- One who is engaged with others to aid in the alteration, repair, and enlargement of the offices of a corporation doing a dairy business, which offices are essential to the successful carrying on of trade or business in an efficient and modern manner, and who will not be retained after the completion of such work, comes within the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) as an employee in the usual course of the trade or business of the employer or incidental thereto. Continental Cas. Co. v. Haynie, 51 Ga. App. 650, 181 S.E. 126 (1935), aff'd, 182 Ga. 608, 186 S.E. 683 (1936).

- At the time of an accident which resulted in the death of the claimant's spouse, the deceased was the special employee of others, whom the deceased had undertaken at the deceased's superior's request to drive to Florida with the consent of the defendant, but free from any control or direction of the defendant and not engaged in the furtherance of its business. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. App. 115, 197 S.E. 650 (1938).

4. Termination of Employment

Termination of employment after injury.

- Fact that a claimant quits the claimant's job after receiving an injury which disables the claimant does not prevent the claimant from being entitled to compensation benefits. Continental Ins. Co. v. Lamar, 147 Ga. App. 487, 249 S.E.2d 304 (1978).

Fact that a claimant quits a job after receiving an injury which disables the claimant will not prevent the claimant from being entitled to compensation, nor would the fact that the claimant was discharged for reasons unrelated to injury prohibit the claimant from receiving compensation if the claimant was disabled as a result of injuries the claimant received on the job. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 147 Ga. App. 539, 249 S.E.2d 345 (1978).

- When an employee, with commendable conscientiousness and determination, has endeavored for a period of some months to carry on in the employee's prior employment, but is prevented from doing so by a previous injury which arose out of and in the course of the employee's employment, the employee should not be held to forfeit any rights under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), nor should the employee be penalized for efforts to continue the employee's previous work. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. White, 103 Ga. App. 607, 120 S.E.2d 144 (1961).

When an employee, following a disabling injury, returns to work and then is discharged for a cause unrelated to the injury, the employee is entitled to compensation as a matter of law. Continental Ins. Co. v. Lamar, 147 Ga. App. 487, 249 S.E.2d 304 (1978).

- When a claimant is disabled as the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of employment, the fact that the employee also had some disability resulting from a subsequent noncompensable accident will not deprive the employee of compensation benefits. Royal Indem. Co. v. Manley, 115 Ga. App. 259, 154 S.E.2d 278 (1967).

- Servant continues to occupy the status of servant after the servant finishes the servant's work and is waiting to be paid. AMOCO v. McCluskey, 116 Ga. App. 706, 158 S.E.2d 431 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 224 Ga. 253, 161 S.E.2d 271 (1968).

5. Employees' Substitutes or Helpers

Substitute receiving compensation from employee.

- Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) makes no provision for relief to a mere substitute for an employee, who is receiving compensation from the employee and not from the employer. Howard v. Georgia Power Co., 49 Ga. App. 420, 176 S.E. 69 (1934).

One who merely works for an employee and receives compensation solely from the employee is not an employee of the employer within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Hearing v. Johnson, 105 Ga. App. 408, 124 S.E.2d 655 (1962).

When the deceased was hired and employed as a helper by an employee truck driver, the trial court erred in denying the employer's motion for summary judgment seeking immunity from liability in tort. Capitol Fish Co. v. Tanner, 192 Ga. App. 251, 384 S.E.2d 394 (1989), cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 901, 384 S.E.2d 394 (1989).

- Person who is procured by an employee to act as a substitute or to assist the employee in the employee's duties, when the employer assents to the arrangement, occupies the position of an employee, and it does not make any difference that the substitute or assistant is promised no compensation for services; moreover, authority to employ substitutes or assistants may be implied from the nature of the work to be performed, and also from a general course of conducting the business of the employer by the employee for so long a time that consent thereto may be inferred. Minchew v. Huston, 66 Ga. App. 856, 19 S.E.2d 422 (1942).

If the officers of a company acquiesced in the employment by an employee of a helper, sometimes advanced money to pay for the helper's services, and on one occasion at least issued its check directly to the helper in payment of the helper's wage, it was inferable from the evidence that the helper was essential to the expeditious and proper performance of the duties owed by the employee to the employer and the relationship between the helper and the company constituted employment. Macon Dairies, Inc. v. Duhart, 69 Ga. App. 91, 24 S.E.2d 732 (1943).

- If an employer hires an individual to perform certain work for the employer as an employee, knowing that the employee cannot perform the work without help from someone else, and the terms of the contract are arranged with this fact in view, the helper so employed is entitled to the same protection against injury while engaged in the master's work as is the original employee. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Harris, 61 Ga. App. 319, 6 S.E.2d 168 (1939).

6. Borrowed Servants

Criteria for borrowed employee relationship.

- If an employer furnishes another the service of its employees, the relationship of master and servant does not exist between the servant and such third person, even though the employee is to carry out certain instructions of such person, if there is no contractual relationship between the employee and the third party. Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Middlebrooks, 34 Ga. App. 156, 128 S.E. 777, cert. denied, 34 Ga. App. 836 (1925).

In order for an employee to be a borrowed employee, the evidence must show that the special master had complete control and direction of the servant for the occasion, that the general master had no such control, and that the special master had the exclusive right to discharge the servant. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc. v. Hill, 247 Ga. 375, 276 S.E.2d 572, aff'd, 158 Ga. App. 658, 282 S.E.2d 224 (1981); Shannon v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 239, 372 S.E.2d 818 (1988).

Fact that the plaintiff truck driver was under the direction of the defendant warehouse owner's employees with regard to some aspects of the performance of the task of unloading and reloading a truck did not make the plaintiff the defendant's borrowed servant. There is a distinction between the act of merely following directions while giving assistance to another's servant and the status of being within the complete control of another's servant. Food Giant, Inc. v. Davison, 184 Ga. App. 742, 362 S.E.2d 447 (1987), cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 909, 362 S.E.2d 447 (1988).

- Fact that an employee is the general servant of one employer does not, as a matter of law, prevent the employee from becoming the particular servant of another, who may become liable for the employee's acts; and as a general proposition, when one person lends or hires a servant to another for a particular employment, the servant, as to anything done in such employment, must be dealt with as the servant of the person to whom the servant is lent or hired, although the servant remains the general servant of the person who lent or hired the servant. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neal, 55 Ga. App. 790, 191 S.E. 393 (1937); Adams v. Johnson, 88 Ga. App. 94, 76 S.E.2d 135 (1953).

When one person lends the person's servant to another for a particular employment, the servant, for anything done in that particular employment, must be dealt with as the servant of the borrower, although the servant remains the general servant of the lender. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. 115, 197 S.E. 650 (1938); Blakely v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 67 Ga. App. 795, 21 S.E.2d 339 (1942).

Fact that an employee is the general servant of one employer does not, as a matter of law, prevent the employee from becoming the particular servant of another, who may become liable for the employee's acts. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. App. 115, 197 S.E. 650 (1938); Blakely v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 67 Ga. App. 795, 21 S.E.2d 339 (1942).

Servant directed or permitted by a master to perform services for another may become the servant of such other in performing the services, and may become the other's servant as to some acts and not as to others. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc. v. Hill, 247 Ga. 375, 276 S.E.2d 572 (1981).

- For a borrowed servant to be precluded from suing a special master in tort, the borrowed servant must have notice and give assent to the special relationship; however, it is not necessary that the borrowed servant be on notice of and give assent to the legal consequences of the special relationship. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc. v. Hill, 247 Ga. 375, 276 S.E.2d 572, aff'd, 158 Ga. App. 658, 282 S.E.2d 224 (1981).

- Employee having no notice of a change in employers is entitled to look to the employee's original master and hold the master liable in matters relating to employment; likewise, notice to the employee is necessary before another can claim the employee as that person's servant. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Corbin, 137 Ga. App. 37, 222 S.E.2d 862 (1975).

When one corporation furnished to another corporation a project supervisor who was a regular employee of the first corporation, but whose wages would be paid directly or indirectly by the second corporation, the "borrowed servant" could be considered an employee of both corporations for purposes of this section; however, when the borrowed servant is unaware that the servant is effectively working for a corporation other than the servant's own, lack of knowing assent on the servant's part may destroy the contractual relationship which is the essence of the employee-employer relationship, and hence the relationship itself, precluding application of that section. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Corbin, 137 Ga. App. 37, 222 S.E.2d 862 (1975).

- Recovery from a special employer for the fatal injury of an employee hauling material for construction of a highway while under the special employer's control and direction was authorized. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Stapleton, 37 Ga. App. 707, 141 S.E. 506 (1928), for comment, see 1 Ga. L. Rev. 53 (1927).

Employee at a labor pool, which was in the business of making its employees available to others on a temporary basis, was the borrowed servant of a special master at the time of injury, when the employee was in the exclusive control of the special master, who had the right to discharge the employee from the performance of the employee's duties. Sheets v. J.H. Health Tree Serv., Inc., 193 Ga. App. 278, 387 S.E.2d 155 (1989).

- When a general employee of a general contractor is a "borrowed employee" of a subcontractor at the time of an injury, the relationship of employer-employee exists between the subcontractor and the employee, and on the basis of this relationship the employee is entitled to benefits under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), thus precluding a common-law tort action against the subcontractor. Forrester v. Scott, 125 Ga. App. 245, 187 S.E.2d 323 (1972).

7. Particular Workers

Working minors as employees.

- Minor, though employed and put to work in violation of a child labor law, must be taken to be an employee insofar as necessary to give operation to the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) for and against each of the parties to the employment. Horn v. Planters' Prods. Co., 40 Ga. App. 787, 151 S.E. 552 (1930). See also Porter v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ga. App. 86, 166 S.E. 675 (1932); Rourke v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 636, 1 S.E.2d 728 (1939).

- Since a county is declared to be an "employer" under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) and has constitutional authority to raise the funds therefor, the conclusion is demanded that all county employees in all counties are covered by workers' compensation. Rosser v. Meriwether County, 125 Ga. App. 239, 186 S.E.2d 788 (1971).

County school board employees are covered by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Rosser v. Meriwether County, 125 Ga. App. 239, 186 S.E.2d 788 (1971).

Until a board of education in a county with less than 300,000 population elects to become an insured employer, employees of the board of education are county employees for workers' compensation purposes. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Shuman, 237 Ga. 403, 228 S.E.2d 809 (1976).

Trial court properly determined that a county could not provide workers compensation coverage to Georgia superior court judges, as the judges were not county employees; counties were specifically authorized by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I and O.C.G.A. § 48-5-220 to provide workers compensation to "county officials," such as a sheriff, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1, but judges were deemed state employees. Freeman v. Barnes, 282 Ga. App. 895, 640 S.E.2d 611 (2006).

- School teachers are county employees, being employees of the county governing authority through which the county acts in school matters, i.e., the county board of education. Rosser v. Meriwether County, 125 Ga. App. 239, 186 S.E.2d 788 (1971).

- Municipal corporations and their employees come under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), irrespective of the number of employees in the service of the corporation. City of Brunswick v. Edenfield, 87 Ga. App. 434, 74 S.E.2d 133 (1953), for comment, see 15 Ga. B. J. 499 (1953).

- Acting director of a city housing authority was an employee for purposes of workers' compensation even though the director served without compensation. Housing Auth. v. Jackson, 226 Ga. App. 182, 486 S.E.2d 54 (1997).

- Certain corporate executives are employees while performing some jobs and not while performing others. Denis Aerial Ag-Plicators, Inc. v. Swift, 154 Ga. App. 742, 269 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

Corporate officer is an employee for determination of whether the employer has three or more employees, unless the officer files a written declaration of exemption. Dennison v. G & M Quality Bldrs., Inc., 178 Ga. App. 548, 343 S.E.2d 786 (1986); rev'd on other grounds, 256 Ga. 617, 351 S.E.2d 622 (1987).

- The relationship between a partnership and a member of the partnership is not that of master and servant; and a member of the partnership, when in the performance for the partnership of any of the duties incumbent upon that individual as a member of the partnership, is not a servant of the partnership. Chandler v. Harris, 47 Ga. App. 535, 171 S.E. 174 (1933).

A partner is not an employee of the partnership, within the terms of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1), even though at the time of the injury the partner is performing special services under a contract with the other partner, separate and independent from the articles of partnership, and is being paid compensation therefor in addition to the partner's share in the profits of the enterprise. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Neal, 188 Ga. 105, 3 S.E.2d 80 (1939).

Unlike an independent contractor, a partner is not hired or employed by an employer so as to place the partner into the servant category intended to be protected by law. Scoggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 139 Ga. App. 805, 229 S.E.2d 683 (1976).

A partner who performs services on behalf of and within the scope of a partnership cannot be an employee of the partnership. Denis Aerial Ag-Plicators, Inc. v. Swift, 154 Ga. App. 742, 269 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

- A person who performs a gratuitous service for another, although at the latter's request or suggestion, but for the person's own pleasure and accommodation, does not thereby become the employee or servant of the person for whom the person performs the service, and not being a servant or employee of the other person, is not entitled to compensation from such person for an injury received while in the performance of the service. Jones v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 58 Ga. App. 713, 199 S.E. 832 (1938).

- One who is a laborer or workman, in every sense of the word, is an employee entitled to recover under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), even though the person's duties are governmental. City of Atlanta v. Hatcher, 31 Ga. App. 633, 121 S.E. 864, cert. denied, 31 Ga. App. 811, S.E. (1924).

- An employee of the State Department of Transportation has a right to bring an action directly against the department under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) for compensation for an injury arising out of and during the course of employment. State Hwy. Dep't v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237, 43 S.E.2d 172 (1947).

- The relationship between a baseball player and ball club is that of employee and employer. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S.E. 121, 59 A.L.R. 719 (1928).

- One employed by a city to drive a sanitary cart is an "employee" entitled to compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). City of Atlanta v. Hatcher, 31 Ga. App. 633, 121 S.E. 864, cert. denied, 31 Ga. App. 811, 122 S.E. 260 (1924).

Armed security guard, who was shot during a robbery at a baseball stadium, was acting as the stadium concessionaire's servant, not as an independent contractor, when the guard was controlled by the concessionaire's security coordinator as to when to report to work, when to leave work, and what areas the person was to guard. Braves, Inc. v. Leslie, 190 Ga. App. 49, 378 S.E.2d 133, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 897, 378 S.E.2d 133 (1989).

- A guard of prisoners of a municipality who, in the performance of the guard's duties, wore no uniform, carried no firearms, and had no power or authority to make arrests, and who was designated by the ordinance authorizing appointment as an "employee" was an "employee" under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), and the guard's surviving spouse was entitled to an award for compensation for accidental death occurring in the performance of the guard's duties. City of Atlanta v. Bailey, 70 Ga. App. 711, 29 S.E.2d 514 (1944).

- Claimant model, who was instructed as to where and when claimant would begin work, the amount of luggage claimant would be allowed to carry on the trip, what clothes claimant would wear and how they were to be fitted, the place where the claimant would give the show and the time when it was to be given, and even where the claimant would eat the claimant's meals, was not an independent contractor and was covered by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Davison-Paxon Co. v. Ferguson, 94 Ga. App. 501, 95 S.E.2d 306 (1956).

- A person employed to work as a laborer in laundry at a university hospital erected by the city, who was hired by the laundry superintendent and is subject to discharge by the laundry superintendent and superintendent of the hospital, and who was paid wages out of the common fund which consisted of funds appropriated by the city for the maintenance of the hospital and funds appropriated by the county and the medical college, was an employee of the city. City Council v. Butler, 50 Ga. App. 838, 179 S.E. 149 (1935).

- A boy employed as a helper, with the knowledge and the assent of the employer, by the driver of a milk truck to assist in deliveries and in unloading and cleaning the milk truck was an "employee" under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Minchew v. Huston, 66 Ga. App. 856, 19 S.E.2d 422 (1942).

- Under a contract providing that the claimant would carry out and complete certain construction as and when directed by the city or the pipe line company construction chief, the claimant was an employee and not an independent contractor. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Pruitt, 95 Ga. App. 235, 97 S.E.2d 521 (1957).

- Evidence that the claimant was employed by the day for daily wages as a laborer to paint smokestacks, that paint, brushes, and two helpers were furnished by the employer, and that no directions were to be given by the employer to the helpers, authorized an inference that the claimant was an employee and was entitled, upon a proper case, to compensation. Cleveland-Oconee Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 50 Ga. App. 613, 178 S.E. 753 (1935).

- There was no legal or equitable justification for denying workers' compensation to the claimant on the sole ground that on the trip in question the claimant was driving a rig leased to, instead of owned by, the employer since: 1) in every other particular, the claimant's duties and actions were the same in the claimant's position of supposed "contractor" as they were for the previous five years in the claimant's position of "employee"; and 2) the contract itself specified that claimant could furnish personally as within the "complement of experienced and qualified employees"; hence, it was held that the claimant should be treated as an "employee" under this section. Ratliff v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 211, 253 S.E.2d 799 (1979).

- The evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding that at the time of death, the claimant's spouse, who worked as a caretaker on an estate belonging to the president and majority stockholder of the defendant drug company, which estate was used for business entertainment purposes, was an employee of the drug company. Wender & Roberts, Inc. v. Jones, 95 Ga. App. 82, 97 S.E.2d 160, cert. dismissed, 213 Ga. 375, 99 S.E.2d 142 (1957).

- Evidence and logical inferences therefrom authorized the finding that the route, price, and means of transportation of the decedent "peddler" were controlled by the defendant to a sufficient degree to show a continuation of the peddler's previously existing legal status as an employee. Atlantic Co. v. Moseley, 99 Ga. App. 534, 109 S.E.2d 74, rev'd on other grounds, 215 Ga. 530, 111 S.E.2d 239 (1959).

- The employee of a hospital authority who sustains an accident arising out of and in the course of employment by such employer is not entitled to compensation benefits. Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. McClain, 112 Ga. App. 209, 144 S.E.2d 565 (1965).

- When the only evidence adduced showed that a mason agreed with the general foreperson of a general contractor to provide masonry work for a dwelling at a stipulated piece-work rate for work completed and accepted, and employed others at an hourly rate to assist the mason, over whom the general foreperson did not exercise any control and over whom the general foreperson had no authority, the evidence failed to negate the apparent status of an independent contractor occupied by the person employed by the general foreperson, and would not support a determination of an employee-employer relationship between one employed by such a person and the general contractor. American Cas. Co. v. Smith, 116 Ga. App. 332, 157 S.E.2d 312 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Wright Assocs. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496, 277 S.E.2d 41 (1981).

- A member of a partnership engaged in running two drugstores, who was a manager of the business at one of the stores, "looked after the business," and received from the partnership for the member's services $150.00 a month, was held not to be an "employee" under this section. Chandler v. Harris, 47 Ga. App. 535, 171 S.E. 174 (1933).

- After 1) an individual was employed to saw lumber from timber belonging to the individual's employer; 2) the employer furnished the mill; 3) the person employed hired the person's own help and paid for it out of the person's own money, with the right to direct the help in the performance of the work and at the person's pleasure to discharge them; 4) the employer never gave directions as to the time, manner, and method of the performance of the work, nor did the employer have the right under the contract to do so; and 5) all the other acts performed by the employer and employee in the carrying out of the contract were consistent with the relationship of employer and independent contractor, the relationship between the employer and the employee was not shown to be that of master and servant; hence, an award to the claimant, employed by the independent contractor, against the sawmill owner, was without evidence to support it. Banks v. Ellijay Lumber Co., 59 Ga. App. 270, 200 S.E. 480 (1938).

- General contractor did not come within liability exceptions of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) in action for recovery of personal injuries sustained by a subcontractor, when it was not an employee of the same employer, it was neither an insurer nor a person who provided workers' compensation benefits under a contract with the employer, nor was it a "construction design professional"; the contractor was deemed to be a statutory employer of the subcontractor, pursuant to the definition of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(3), when the subcontractor contracted with a principal, a plumbing company, which was the subcontracting company to the general contractor, for the subcontractor's workers' compensation coverage to be included under the company's workers' compensation coverage and the subcontractor received benefits therefrom. Reynolds v. McKenzie-Perry Homes, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 379, 582 S.E.2d 534 (2003).

- Because the workers' compensation exclusion for owner-operators was clearly stated in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(2), with no mention of the employees of such owner-operators, the employee of the owner-operator could recover benefits from the statutory employer. C. Brown Trucking, Inc. v. Rushing, 265 Ga. App. 676, 595 S.E.2d 346 (2004).

- A convict injured while serving a sentence in a county chain gang is not an employee of the county and is not entitled to compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Lawson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 37 Ga. App. 85, 139 S.E. 96 (1927).

There was no error in finding that a former inmate's participation in a work release program at a bakery was part of the former inmate's punishment and that, as a result, the former inmate was not an "employee" under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(2) at the time of the former inmate's injury while at the bakery. Even when the former inmate was physically at the bakery, the former inmate was still legally confined as an inmate, and the Department of Corrections retained tight control over the inmate. Clarke v. Country Home Bakers, 294 Ga. App. 302, 669 S.E.2d 177 (2008).

- The relationship of employer and employee did not exist between the officer of a corporation and the person engaged to build the officer's residence. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 167 Ga. 897, 147 S.E. 50 (1929).

- A taxi driver, who had an arrangement with a cab company under which the driver paid a fixed daily rate for the use of its cab, bought the gasoline, and retained all of the money collected as fares, while the company maintained and insured the cab, and most of the driver's calls came through the company's dispatcher by radio, was not an employee within the meaning of this section. Cole v. Peachtree Cab Co., 121 Ga. App. 177, 173 S.E.2d 278 (1970).

- Regardless of any purported contracts to the contrary, the evidence was sufficient to support the board's finding that decedent, who was electrocuted while installing cable television wiring for a cable television franchisee, was an employee and not an independent contractor, when the cable company assumed the right to control the time, manner and method of executing the work. OCB Co./National Cable Sys. v. Wiley, 178 Ga. App. 101, 341 S.E.2d 870 (1986), overruled on other grounds, American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Flowery Branch Nursing Center, 258 Ga. 222, 367 S.E.2d 788 (1988).

- An employee of a nonprofit corporation which trained handicapped persons participating in a Job Training Partnership Act (29 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.) program is an "employee" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1, when in addition to receiving classroom instruction, the participant performed work for the corporation under its supervision and control and was paid as long as the participant participated in the program. Tommy Nobis Ctr. v. Barfield, 187 Ga. App. 394, 370 S.E.2d 517 (1988).

- Award of workers' compensation benefits was upheld as there was evidence that the workers' compensation claimant was a direct employee of the employer when the claimant was a partner in a vinyl siding installation partnership that was employed as a subcontractor by the employer, the partnership received directions from the employer on how to perform the work, a representative of the employer established the time during which the work was to be performed, another partner sometimes acted on behalf of the employer during meetings on the jobsite and for the delivery of supplies to the employer, and when the other partner, after the accident, was transferred by the employer to another location. Atlas Constr. Co. v. Pena, 268 Ga. App. 566, 602 S.E.2d 151 (2004).

8. Employers

Corporations engaged in any business.

- The definition of "employer" does not include all corporations, but specifies corporations "engaged in any business." Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978).

The phrase "corporations engaged in any business" includes only corporations governed by the Georgia Business Corporation Code (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 2, T. 14). Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978).

- When a contractor withheld monies from subcontractors ostensibly to pay for workers' compensation insurance, but instead used the money for general operations, including payment of salary and commissions to the sole shareholder and officer of the corporation, there was no evidence that the sole shareholder was the corporation's alter ego so as to deem the shareholder an employer. Morgan v. Palace Indus., Inc., 195 Ga. App. 80, 392 S.E.2d 315 (1990).

- Material issues of fact barring summary judgment existed as to whether the defendant, in the defendant's status as owner and landlord of the building in which the plaintiff was injured, was a separate legal persona from the defendant in the defendant's status as president and therefore representative of the plaintiff's corporate employer. Doggett v. Patrick, 197 Ga. App. 420, 398 S.E.2d 770 (1990).

- When the agent of an undisclosed principal, while acting within the agent's authority, employs another, either the principal or the agent may be held liable to the employee for injuries in the course of employment, but not both jointly; but if such agent acts beyond the authority of the agent's principal, the agent alone is liable. Davis v. Menefee, 34 Ga. App. 813, 131 S.E. 527 (1926).

When an employee of an agent for an undisclosed principal is injured, the injured employee may at the employee's election proceed in a workers' compensation action against either the principal or the agent, but having elected to proceed against one, the employee may not thereafter proceed against the other. Roberts v. Burnette, 72 Ga. App. 775, 35 S.E.2d 201 (1945).

- Third party who conducted an inspection of an employer's facilities for the employer's workers' compensation carrier was not the employer's alter ego under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(3) for purposes of exclusivity under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a). Coker v. Deep S. Surplus of Ga., 258 Ga. App. 755, 574 S.E.2d 815 (2002).

- The 1975 amendment to this section eliminated the exempted status for nonprofit business corporations and made the worker's compensation law apply to them as it does to profit-making corporations. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978).

- A hospital authority is not a political subdivision of this state, nor is it otherwise an "employer" as that term is defined for purposes of workers' compensation. Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. McClain, 112 Ga. App. 209, 144 S.E.2d 565 (1965).

A local hospital authority is not covered under workers' compensation law. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978).

A local hospital authority which, under the Constitution and its contract, was an instrumentality of the county, not of the state, was not covered by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) under its definition of "employer" as a state instrumentality. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978).

- A municipal corporation is not given the right to accept or reject the provisions of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), but is automatically placed in the category of an "employer" under the law. City Council v. Young, 218 Ga. 346, 127 S.E.2d 904 (1962).

- The term "employer" is applicable to a receiver or trustee of an individual, firm, association, or corporation engaged in any business operated for gain or profit, or to legal representatives of a deceased employer, not only when the injuries to the employee took place before their becoming such representatives, but as well as to injuries arising during the tenure of their status as such representatives. Minchew v. Huston, 193 Ga. 272, 18 S.E.2d 487 (1942); Minchew v. Huston, 66 Ga. App. 856, 19 S.E.2d 422 (1942).

- When under a lease a contract lumber company had the right not only to select and discharge truck drivers but also the right to control the time, manner, methods, and means of performance of their employment duties, and the lessor of the trucks had no control whatsoever over the truck drivers, the deceased truck driver, at the time of the driver's death, was an employee of the lumber company, despite the fact that the parties never operated under the terms of the lease agreement. American Cas. Co. v. Harris, 96 Ga. App. 720, 101 S.E.2d 618 (1957).

- A cab company with a permit to operate taxicabs upon a city's streets was bound to operate taxicabs in compliance with the city's regulatory ordinances, including an ordinance that no taxicabs could be operated by any person other than the owner or the owner's duly licensed employee, and could not delegate its duties as an operating company to its drivers, by an arrangement of leasing its taxicabs to drivers as independent contractors rather than as employees, in order to avoid liability under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) for death or injury to its drivers. Diamond Cab Co. v. Adams, 91 Ga. App. 220, 85 S.E.2d 451 (1954).

A taxicab company which obtained its permit pursuant to a regulatory ordinance could not delegate its duties as an operating company to its drivers by leasing its cars to its drivers, rather than paying wages, in order to avoid workers' compensation liability. Yellow Cab Co. v. Worrell, 155 Ga. App. 41, 273 S.E.2d 410 (1980).

- When a taxicab driver employed by a cab company was struck and injured by a taxi operated by an agent of another taxi company and the State Board of Workers' Compensation approved a stipulated settlement in which the second taxi company, on behalf of the employer, agreed to pay compensation to the driver to satisfy and extinguish all workers' compensation benefits, the second taxicab company fell within the definition of "employer" found in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 (3). Rapid Cab Co. v. Colbert, 166 Ga. App. 881, 305 S.E.2d 668 (1983).

- A municipality is an employer for the purposes of workers' compensation and thus liable for benefits to which city employees are entitled. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 173 Ga. App. 95, 325 S.E.2d 408 (1984).

- The Supreme Court's decision in Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Gaither, 241 Ga. 572, 247 S.E.2d 89 (1978) that the Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority is not an employer for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act is no longer controlling. Nunnally v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 171 Ga. App. 12, 318 S.E.2d 759 (1984) (decided prior to the 1980 amendment to subdivision (3)).

- A service agency which is responsible for the administration of a self-insured employer's workers' compensation program is included under the umbrella of immunity provided by O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 34, since by contract the service agency administers and facilitates the payment of benefits by the self-insurer, and anyone who "undertakes to perform or assist in the performance" of an employer's statutory duties under that chapter should be immune from an action as a third party tortfeasor. Fred S. James & Co. v. King, 160 Ga. App. 697, 288 S.E.2d 52 (1981).

- State Board of Workers' Compensation did not err in ruling that the motor common carrier was the employee's statutory employer because common carriers were not explicitly exempted from providing coverage to leased-operators. C. Brown Trucking, Inc. v. Rushing, 265 Ga. App. 676, 595 S.E.2d 346 (2004).

9. Insurance

Notice to insurer as notice to employer.

- The deposition of a physician was taken with notice, when a nonattorney representative of the employer was present at the taking, since notice to the employer would serve as notice to the insurer. Royal Globe Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 123 Ga. App. 268, 180 S.E.2d 576 (1971).

When an employer was a nonresident employer, providing it with notice of a hearing on a workers' compensation claim by first class mail did not violate former O.C.G.A. § 34-9-102(j)(3), requiring service by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery, because its workers' compensation insurer was a Georgia resident, which was also provided with notice by first class mail, and, under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(3), the definition of employer included the insurer, so notice to one of them was notice to the other. Am. Mobile Imaging, Inc. v. Miles, 260 Ga. App. 877, 581 S.E.2d 396 (2003).

- The legislature, in employing the phrase "as far as applicable", must be presumed to have intended exceptions to the identity of insurer and employer. Mull v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 226 Ga. 462, 175 S.E.2d 552 (1970).

- A standard form agreement dealing with workers' compensation, bearing the board's approval, is valid when signed only by the employee and by the employer's insurance carrier, since the insurer is considered to be the alter ego of the insured employer. Tuck v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 807, 207 S.E.2d 210 (1974).

Injury by Accident Arising Out of and in Course of Employment

1. In General

- Injury means injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Blue Bell Globe Mfg. Co. v. Baird, 61 Ga. App. 298, 6 S.E.2d 83 (1939).

If employment contributes to an injury, the injury is an accident and is compensable. Fox v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 125 Ga. App. 285, 187 S.E.2d 305 (1972).

The word "injury" means any injury arising from employment with the party from whom compensation is sought. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 132 Ga. App. 708, 209 S.E.2d 76 (1974).

- The workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) cannot be applied except in the case of an injury "by accident." Covington v. Berkeley Granite Corp., 182 Ga. 235, 184 S.E. 871, answer conformed to, 53 Ga. App. 269, 185 S.E. 386 (1936), aff'd, 183 Ga. 801, 190 S.E. 8 (1937).

- The word "accident" means an unlooked-for mishap or untoward event, not expected or designed. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934); Shipman v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 487, 125 S.E.2d 72 (1962).

The legislature, at the time it enacted this section, knew the broad meaning of the word "accident," and had it desired that this word be limited in its scope and confined to any particular types of accidents, it would, as it had the power and right to do, have so defined and restricted it; not having done so, the unambiguous language of the law should not be changed by judicial interpretation. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

The word "accident", as used in this section, included an injury resulting from the negligence of an employer which afforded a right of action at common law. Bartram v. City of Atlanta, 71 Ga. App. 313, 30 S.E.2d 780 (1944).

The word "accident", as used in the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), includes negligence. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Bolen, 106 Ga. App. 684, 127 S.E.2d 832 (1962).

The word "accident" contemplates intentional torts. Burbank v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 484 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 616 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1980).

The word "accident" in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 was not intended to mean anything except a physical occurrence. Hanson Buick, Inc. v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127, 292 S.E.2d 428 (1982).

- Intentional tortious conduct related to a disruption of the payment of workers' compensation benefits neither "arises out of" nor "arises in the course of" the employee's employment within the meaning of those phrases in the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Brazier v. Travelers Ins. Co., 602 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ga. 1984).

- Under the broad definition of the term "accident", as used in this section, if the employee continued to perform duties of employment and thereby aggravated the initial injury, this would amount to a new "injury by accident." Mallory v. American Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 641, 152 S.E.2d 592 (1966).

Even if the wear and tear of ordinary life or ordinary work to some extent aggravates a preexisting infirmity, when that infirmity itself, stemming from the original trauma, continues to worsen, to the point at which the employee is no longer able to continue work, this is not a new accident but a change of physical and economic condition, entitling claimant to compensation under the original award. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 125 Ga. App. 328, 187 S.E.2d 551 (1972).

An accident arises "in the course of employment" if it is an aggravation of an injury which took place in the course of employment, or if it is the end product of a force or cause set in motion in the course of employment. United States Asbestos v. Hammock, 140 Ga. App. 378, 231 S.E.2d 792 (1976).

- An occurrence which is sudden, unexpected, and undesigned by the workman comes within the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

An injury which arises suddenly and unexpectedly, undesigned by the employee personally, although in the course of the performance of the usual duties of employment, and without any slipping, falling, or outside interference, is an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Savage, 49 Ga. App. 106, 174 S.E. 363 (1934).

A sudden and violent rupture or break in the physical structure of the body of an employee, caused by some strain or exertion in employment, is an "accidental injury" within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), even though no external unforeseen event, such as slipping, falling, or being struck contributes thereto. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

- To constitute an injury by accident it is not necessary that there should be an extraordinary occurrence in or about the performance of the work engaged in, such as falling, slipping, or being struck, nor is an employee barred from compensation merely because at the time of injury the employee was performing a duty for the employer in the usual and ordinary manner. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sprayberry, 69 Ga. App. 196, 25 S.E.2d 74 (1943).

- Word "accident", as used in the workers' compensation law (see O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), includes every injury except diseases not naturally growing out of injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, injuries caused by the willful act of a third person directed against such employee for reasons personal to that person, and willful misconduct on the part of the employee. Reid v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 58 Ga. App. 184, 197 S.E. 904 (1938); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sprayberry, 195 Ga. 393, 24 S.E.2d 315 (1943); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sprayberry, 69 Ga. App. 196, 25 S.E.2d 74 (1943); Southern Wire & Iron, Inc. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962); Helton v. Interstate Brands Corp., 155 Ga. App. 607, 271 S.E.2d 739 (1980); Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hosp., 162 Ga. App. 82, 290 S.E.2d 192 (1982); Swanson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 181 Ga. App. 876, 354 S.E.2d 204 (1987).

- Fraud is not an "accident" and the damages resulting therefrom do not arise "out of or in the course of the employment" but, rather, result from the intentional misconduct of the defendants subsequent to the physical injuries which gave rise to the original workers' compensation claim. Exemplary damages for fraud are not within the power of the Workers' Compensation Board to award. Griggs v. All-Steel Bldgs., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 253, 433 S.E.2d 89 (1993).

- A felonious assault does not prevent the resulting injury from being treated as an "accident" under the workers' compensation law (see O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) if the willful act is not directed against the employee for reasons personal to the employee. Helton v. Interstate Brands Corp., 155 Ga. App. 607, 271 S.E.2d 739 (1980).

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court erred in denying an employer's motion for summary judgment against the claims filed by the decedent's parents as those claims were limited by the exclusivity provisions of the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., given evidence that the decedent's death arose out of and in the course of employment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4). Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. Corp. v. Johnson, 284 Ga. App. 289, 643 S.E.2d 800 (2007).

- Assault and rape of an employee by another employee was an "accident" within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Helton v. Interstate Brands Corp., 155 Ga. App. 607, 271 S.E.2d 739 (1980).

- When an injury results from an attack by a co-employee on a claimant, the attack must be work-related rather than for personal reasons in order to be compensable. Walsh Constr. Co. v. Hamilton, 185 Ga. App. 105, 363 S.E.2d 301 (1987).

- The word "accident" in the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) did not have the same meaning as the phrase "accidental means" often found in policies which insure against bodily injury effected solely and exclusively of all other causes from violent and external injury by accidental means. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sprayberry, 69 Ga. App. 196, 25 S.E.2d 74 (1943).

- The workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), in providing compensation for injuries resulting from "accident", did not intend to exclude injuries chargeable to negligence on the part of either the employer or employee. Teems v. Enterprise Mfg. Co., 41 Ga. App. 708, 154 S.E. 466 (1930).

A question of negligence would not affect the question of recovery by an employee under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Continental Cas. Co. v. Weems, 60 Ga. App. 410, 3 S.E.2d 846 (1939).

The negligence of an employee, no matter how gross, will not bar compensation when the injury is otherwise compensable. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lynch, 63 Ga. App. 530, 11 S.E.2d 699 (1940).

Wrestler's acceptance of workers' compensation benefits foreclosed any tort claims against the employer because the employment contract was unambiguous and set out what happened if the wrestler became injured. Eudy v. Universal Wrestling Corp., 272 Ga. App. 142, 611 S.E.2d 770 (2005).

- If a worker, in the reasonable performance of the worker's duties, sustains a physiological injury as the result of the work the worker was engaged in, this was an accidental injury in the sense of this section. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

When a disability results which is objectively physiologically ascertainable, it is compensable, even though the onset of disability is imperceptible from day to day, and there is no one "accident" at a specifiable time and place to which the result may be attributable. Thomas v. Ford Motor Co., 123 Ga. App. 512, 181 S.E.2d 874 (1971); Home Indem. Co. v. Brown, 141 Ga. App. 563, 234 S.E.2d 97 (1977).

- The legislative intent of the 1973 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) was to extend the absolute prohibition against a finding of compensability as an "injury" or "personal injury" to cases of alcoholism and to extend the conditional prohibition against such a finding to certain cases of drug addiction. Dan River, Inc. v. Shinall, 186 Ga. App. 572, 367 S.E.2d 846, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917, 367 S.E.2d 846 (1988).

The legislative intent of the 1973 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) was to address the compensability of claims involving addiction and to preclude a recovery for any and all claims for compensation based upon alcoholism, including a claim for alcohol detoxification expense asserted for alcohol dependency directly resulting from a compensable injury, and to authorize the recovery of claims for compensation based upon drug addiction under limited circumstances. Dan River, Inc. v. Shinall, 186 Ga. App. 572, 367 S.E.2d 846, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 917, 367 S.E.2d 846 (1988).

- Claimant's drug addiction was not a pre-existing condition, as it was not "caused by" the medications prescribed for the claimant's initial back injury, such medications having merely "worsened" an already existing addiction, which was further worsened by medication prescribed for a subsequent back injury. Fulmer Bros. v. Kersey, 190 Ga. App. 573, 379 S.E.2d 607 (1989).

When there was no finding that claimant's drug addiction was caused by the use of drugs or medicines prescribed for the treatment of claimant's initial compensable injury, the trial court erred in affirming that portion of the award which directed the employer to provide the claimant with workers' compensation benefits in the form of detoxification care. Waffle House, Inc. v. Bozeman, 194 Ga. App. 860, 392 S.E.2d 48 (1990).

- Non-physical injuries, such as claims for slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress, are not compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 Ga. App. 703, 434 S.E.2d 500 (1993).

- Mental disability caused by post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff suffered a physical injury is also a compensable injury. George v. Southwire Co., 217 Ga. App. 586, 458 S.E.2d 362 (1995), aff'd, 266 Ga. 739, 470 S.E.2d 865 (1996).

Claimant who suffered psychic trauma and disability which was not preceded or accompanied by a physical injury was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Abernathy v. City of Albany, 269 Ga. 88, 495 S.E.2d 13 (1998).

- An injury which arises out of and in the course of employment, and which is not the result of a claimant's willful misconduct or some other stated exception, is an injury "by accident" under the terms of this section, even though its immediate cause may be unknown. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ray, 92 Ga. App. 273, 88 S.E.2d 428 (1955).

When an accidental injury which is not explained occurs to an employee, it constitutes an accidental compensable injury. Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 99 Ga. App. 489, 109 S.E.2d 325 (1959).

- An injury alleged to have been due to a failure to furnish an employee a safe place to work and safe appliances with which to work, not being a disease, and not coming within any exception named in the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), is such an accident as is contemplated thereby. Reid v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 58 Ga. App. 184, 197 S.E. 904 (1938).

- Pain suffered by an employee because the employee engages in an occupation which the employee is physically unable to perform is not an accidental injury. Johnston v. Boston-Old Colony Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 410, 126 S.E.2d 919 (1962).

- One accident may cause two injuries. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am. v. Rucker, 87 Ga. App. 375, 73 S.E.2d 609 (1952).

- In order for an injury to be compensable, it must have been caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, neither alone being sufficient. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786 (1923); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 48 Ga. App. 822, 173 S.E. 925 (1934); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Lemming, 187 Ga. 378, 200 S.E. 141 (1938); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Babb, 67 Ga. App. 161, 19 S.E.2d 550 (1942); McClain v. Travelers Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 659, 31 S.E.2d 830 (1944); Wilcox v. Shepherd Lumber Corp., 80 Ga. App. 71, 55 S.E.2d 382 (1949); Hanson v. Globe Indem. Co., 85 Ga. App. 179, 68 S.E.2d 179 (1951), for comment, see 14 Ga. B. J. 4845 (1952); Smith v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Ga. App. 507, 95 S.E.2d 35 (1956); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 98 Ga. App. 265, 105 S.E.2d 370 (1958); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hamlin, 98 Ga. App. 167, 105 S.E.2d 481 (1958); Samples v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 41, 107 S.E.2d 574 (1959); Corbin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 823, 162 S.E.2d 226 (1968).

The words "by accident arising out of and in the course of employment", as used in the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), should be liberally construed in harmony with the humane purposes of the law. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

"Arising out of" does not mean the same thing as "in the course of," but the expressions in the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) impose a double condition. Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936).

An injury may occur in the course of employment but yet not arise out of it. Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936).

The terms "arising out of" and "in the course of" are not synonymous; the latter term refers to time, place, and circumstances under which the accident took place, while an accident "arises out of employment" when it is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960); Wood v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 116 Ga. App. 284, 157 S.E.2d 60 (1967); State Dep't of Labor v. Yates, 131 Ga. App. 71, 205 S.E.2d 36 (1974).

The terms "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment are not synonymous; one phrase refers to when the accident occurs within the period of employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of the employee's work, while the other phrase refers to a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury from the accident. American Hdwe. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burt, 103 Ga. App. 811, 120 S.E.2d 797 (1961).

When the first requirement of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 (4) is not met, in that the injury did not "arise out of" the employment, the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., is not applicable regardless of whether the injury met the second requirement and occurred "in the course of" the employment. Garrett v. K-Mart Corp., 197 Ga. App. 374, 398 S.E.2d 302 (1990).

- The terms "in the course of " and "out of " are not synonymous; both must concur to render a case compensable. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E.2d 189 (1939), overruled on other grounds, National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 152 Ga. App. 566, 263 S.E.2d 455 (1979); Francis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ga. App. 225, 97 S.E.2d 553 (1957), overruled on other grounds, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960); Samples v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 41, 107 S.E.2d 574 (1959); Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 99 Ga. App. 489, 109 S.E.2d 325 (1959); Crawford W. Long Hosp. v. Mitchell, 100 Ga. App. 276, 111 S.E.2d 120 (1959); Davis v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 385, 233 S.E.2d 479 (1977).

- The claimant's testimony that it was "hard for me to get a job right now with my knee bad" would support a finding of proximate cause of the claimant's inability to secure employment elsewhere under the "any evidence" rule. Brown v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. App. 500, 352 S.E.2d 818 (1987).

- When an employee returns to work following a disabling injury and is then discharged for a cause unrelated to the injury, the employee is entitled to receive benefits for a loss of earning capacity if the employee is unable to find other employment because of the disability. Brown v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. App. 500, 352 S.E.2d 818 (1987).

- Ordinarily, whether or not an accident arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of fact, and the award of the board, if supported by any evidence, is conclusive. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Carlan, 104 Ga. App. 170, 121 S.E.2d 316 (1961).

- The issue of whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment and hence is compensable under the workers' compensation law is a mixed question of fact and law. The finder of fact must first hear all the relevant evidence concerning the injury and, after finding the facts with regard thereto, render a conclusion of law on whether it was job-related. Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888, 288 S.E.2d 601 (1982).

The issue of whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment is a mixed question of fact and law. Knight v. Gonzalez, 181 Ga. App. 468, 352 S.E.2d 646 (1987).

- If there is any evidence to support a finding of the Workers' Compensation Board of injury, the superior court is without authority to reverse it. Parker v. American Carpet Mills, 168 Ga. App. 171, 308 S.E.2d 409 (1983).

- The burden is on the claimant to show that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Haynie, 43 Ga. App. 579, 159 S.E. 781 (1931); Gay v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 72 Ga. App. 122, 33 S.E.2d 109 (1945), disapproved on other grounds, Federal Ins. Co. v. Coram, 95 Ga. App. 622, 98 S.E.2d 214 (1957); Harper v. National Traffic Guard Co., 73 Ga. App. 385, 36 S.E.2d 842 (1946); Hughes v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 76 Ga. App. 785, 47 S.E.2d 143 (1948); Wilcox v. Shepherd Lumber Corp., 80 Ga. App. 71, 55 S.E.2d 382 (1949); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fulmer, 81 Ga. App. 97, 57 S.E.2d 865 (1950), later appeal, 85 Ga. App. 102, 68 S.E.2d 180 (1951); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Watson, 91 Ga. App. 657, 86 S.E.2d 656 (1955); Roberts v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 93 Ga. App. 440, 92 S.E.2d 51 (1956); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Wilson, 215 Ga. 746, 113 S.E.2d 611 (1960); Sanford v. University of Ga. Bd. of Regents, 131 Ga. App. 858, 207 S.E.2d 255 (1974); Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hosp., 162 Ga. App. 82, 290 S.E.2d 192 (1982).

The burden is upon the claimant to establish that the employee sustained an accidental injury such as is contemplated by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Shelby Mut. Cas. Co. v. Huff, 87 Ga. App. 463, 74 S.E.2d 251 (1953); Rivers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 Ga. App. 779, 92 S.E.2d 818 (1956).

The burden of proof is on the claimant to show that an employee's death resulted instantly from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, or later resulted proximately therefrom. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Marks, 88 Ga. App. 167, 76 S.E.2d 507 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Fowler v. City of Atlanta, 116 Ga. App. 352, 157 S.E.2d 306 (1967).

The burden is on the claimant to show that an injury to the employee was the direct result of an injury caused by an accident, or that the injury to such employee arose both out of and in the course of the claimant's employment. Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 99 Ga. App. 489, 109 S.E.2d 325 (1959).

The burden was on the claimant to show that the death of an employee occurred at a place where the employee might reasonably have been expected to be in the performance of duties, and while the employee was fulfilling duties or was engaged in doing something incidental thereto, and that the employee's employment was the contributing proximate cause thereof. Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 99 Ga. App. 489, 109 S.E.2d 325 (1959).

The burden of proof is on the claimant to show that the employee suffered an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of employment. City of Pembroke v. Jones, 109 Ga. App. 296, 136 S.E.2d 139, aff'd, 220 Ga. 213, 138 S.E.2d 276 (1964); International Paper Co. v. Gilbourn, 144 Ga. App. 175, 240 S.E.2d 722 (1977).

- A claimant in a workers' compensation case having proved the injury and subsequent pain, disability, and death, and that the deceased's pain began the day the deceased was injured and lasted until the deceased died, the burden was upon the employer and the insurance carrier to prove, as a matter of affirmative defense, that some intervening or pre-existing agency was the cause of death, rather than the injury proved by the plaintiff. Royal Indem. Co. v. Land, 45 Ga. App. 293, 164 S.E. 492 (1932); United States Cas. Co. v. Kelly, 78 Ga. App. 112, 50 S.E.2d 238 (1948); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Brown, 91 Ga. App. 12, 84 S.E.2d 594 (1954).

- An essential element of proof as to the time when the accident happened was that it was within the statutory period prescribed by former Code 1933, § 114-305 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82); however, when the claimant testified that the claimant was injured on a particular day, and described in detail the manner in which the accident happened, proof that on the date claimant testified claimant was injured claimant was not in the employer's service or was not performing the duties of the claimant's employment was evidence that could be considered in deciding whether the claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of employment. Skinner Poultry Co. v. Mapp, 98 Ga. App. 772, 106 S.E.2d 825 (1958).

- Trial court properly denied summary judgment to an employer in a wrongful death action because questions of fact existed as to whether the deceased employee had left work for the day or was merely on a break and whether workers' compensation was applicable following the employee being shot and killed at a convenience store associated with the employer. Dixie Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Sallet, 318 Ga. App. 228, 733 S.E.2d 511 (2012).

- Fact that a disability or death stemmed from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment must be proved by some competent evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence. City Council v. Williams, 137 Ga. App. 177, 223 S.E.2d 227 (1976).

- When an injury is sustained and thereafter a continued disability ensues, such injury is the proximate cause of the disability, in the absence of some intervening cause; and the burden of showing such intervening cause is upon the employer. Davis v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 75 Ga. App. 515, 43 S.E.2d 780 (1947).

- When an employee is found dead in a place where the employee might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of the employee's duties, a natural presumption arises that the employee's death occurred out of and in the course of the employee's employment. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fulmer, 81 Ga. App. 97, 57 S.E.2d 865 (1950), later appeal, 85 Ga. App. 102, 68 S.E.2d 180 (1951); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 120 Ga. App. 625, 171 S.E.2d 909 (1969); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Jenkins, 143 Ga. App. 192, 237 S.E.2d 664 (1977).

Though a presumption may arise that an employee's death arose out of and in the course of employment when such employee dies on account of injuries received in a place when the employee may reasonably be expected to be in the performance of the employee's duties, such presumption disappears upon introduction of evidence to the contrary. Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275, 92 S.E.2d 103 (1956), for comment, see 19 Ga. B. J. 237 (1956); Weathers v. Jones, 94 Ga. App. 50, 93 S.E.2d 390 (1956).

If a person is found dead or dying in a place where the person could reasonably be expected to be in the performance of the person's duties, a natural presumption arises that the death arose out of and in the course of the employment, but only when the death is unexplained. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Trigg, 144 Ga. App. 74, 240 S.E.2d 725 (1977); Odom v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 148 Ga. App. 156, 251 S.E.2d 48 (1978); Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hosp., 162 Ga. App. 82, 290 S.E.2d 192 (1982).

- When an employee, after sustaining an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment, is disabled continuously until the time of the employee's death shortly thereafter, or when expert opinion is submitted to the effect that the injury sustained had some connection with the subsequent death of the employee, there is ordinarily a natural and reasonable inference, sufficient to support a finding, that the accidental injury was the proximate cause of the employee's death, in the absence of other than conjectural evidence to the contrary. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. King, 88 Ga. App. 176, 76 S.E.2d 81 (1953).

When the evidence showing an injury, continued disability, and almost immediate death, was sufficient to raise an inference that the employee's death was the result of an accidental injury sustained by the employee while on the job, the burden fell upon the employer to prove as a matter of affirmative defense that some intervening or preexisting agency was the cause of the employee's death, and that neither the exertion engaged in by the employee in performing the employee's work nor the injury sustained in the fall into the ditch was the cause of the employee's death. Mayor of Athens v. Cook, 102 Ga. App. 188, 115 S.E.2d 571 (1960).

When an accident occurs during the course of employment, and an employee receives an injury at a place where the employee may reasonably be expected to be in the course of the employee's duties, a finding that the injury arose out of the employment is justified, but this presumption does not benefit an employee upon the introduction of uncontradicted evidence showing that the employee was not in such a place. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. King, 127 Ga. App. 566, 194 S.E.2d 282 (1972).

When an employee is found dead in a place where the employee might reasonably have been expected to be in the performance of the employee's duties, it is presumed that the death arose out of the employee's employment; and evidence which merely tends to negate what is the suspected cause of an unexplained death, but which does not affirmatively establish an alternate noncompensable explanation for the injury, does not rebut the general presumption. International Paper Co. v. Gilbourn, 144 Ga. App. 175, 240 S.E.2d 722 (1977); Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hosp., 162 Ga. App. 82, 290 S.E.2d 192 (1982).

- When an employee dies while entitled to workers' compensation, no presumption arises that the employee's death resulted from the accident and injury for which the employee was being paid at the time of the employee's death. Fowler v. City of Atlanta, 116 Ga. App. 352, 157 S.E.2d 306 (1967).

- The workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) does not restrict the making of an award to accidents arising out of employment and solely by reason of the employment, but it covers injuries by an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment," which is broader. Globe Indem. Co. v. Legien, 47 Ga. App. 539, 171 S.E. 185 (1933).

An injury received while in the course of employment and in the performance of an act connected with the employment, which injury is unexpected and which may proceed from an unknown cause, or is the unusual effect of a known cause, is an injury caused by an accident, which is compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934); Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 649, 21 S.E.2d 478 (1942).

In order for an injury to be compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), it must have been occasioned by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 44 S.E.2d 160 (1947).

In order for a death to be compensable to a dependent under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), it must result instantly from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, or later result proximately therefrom. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Marks, 88 Ga. App. 167, 76 S.E.2d 507 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Fowler v. City of Atlanta, 116 Ga. App. 352, 157 S.E.2d 306 (1967), for comment, see 16 Ga. B. J. 215 (1953).

- When an accident occurs in the course of employment otherwise unexplained, a presumption arises that it is compensable. Lockhart v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 476, 233 S.E.2d 810 (1977).

2. Arising Out of Employment

"Arising out of employment" defined.

- The words "arising out of employment" refer to a causal connection between the employment and the injury. Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936); Helton v. Interstate Brands Corp., 155 Ga. App. 607, 271 S.E.2d 739 (1980).

The words "arising out of employment" mean that there must be some causal connection between the conditions under which the employee worked and the injury which the employee received; the causative danger must be incidental to the character of the employment, and not independent of the relationship of master and servant. Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945); Francis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ga. App. 225, 97 S.E.2d 553 (1957), overruled on other grounds, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960); Sands v. Union Camp Corp., 559 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1977).

The words "arising out of employment" mean that there must be some causal connection between the conditions under which the employee worked and the injury which the employee received. Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 99 Ga. App. 489, 109 S.E.2d 325 (1959); Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), for comment, see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964); Davis v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 385, 233 S.E.2d 479 (1977); Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hosp., 162 Ga. App. 82, 290 S.E.2d 192 (1982).

The word "arising" connotes origin, not completion or manifestation. United States Asbestos v. Hammock, 140 Ga. App. 378, 231 S.E.2d 792 (1976).

- In a workers' compensation case, an essential element of a valid claim is that the claimant sustains an accidental injury arising out of the claimant's employment. De Howitt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 147, 108 S.E.2d 280 (1959).

- An accident arises out of employment when it arises because of it, as when the employment is a contributing proximate cause. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786 (1923); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Waymick, 42 Ga. App. 177, 155 S.E. 366 (1930), aff'd, 173 Ga. 67, 159 S.E. 564 (1931); Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Montgomery, 45 Ga. App. 634, 165 S.E. 903 (1932); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 48 Ga. App. 822, 173 S.E. 925 (1934); Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Alford, 51 Ga. App. 237, 179 S.E. 912 (1935); Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Woodward, 53 Ga. App. 778, 187 S.E. 142 (1936); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mangham, 56 Ga. App. 498, 193 S.E. 87 (1937); Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Sockwell, 58 Ga. App. 111, 197 S.E. 647 (1938); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. App. 115, 197 S.E. 650 (1938); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E.2d 189 (1939); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Babb, 67 Ga. App. 161, 19 S.E.2d 550 (1942); Macon Dairies, Inc. v. Duhart, 69 Ga. App. 91, 24 S.E.2d 732 (1943); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sprayberry, 69 Ga. App. 196, 25 S.E.2d 74 (1943); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Honea, 71 Ga. App. 569, 31 S.E.2d 421 (1944); Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945); Harper v. National Traffic Guard Co., 73 Ga. App. 385, 36 S.E.2d 842 (1946); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 44 S.E.2d 160 (1947); Wilcox v. Shepherd Lumber Corp., 80 Ga. App. 71, 55 S.E.2d 382 (1949); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Prescott, 80 Ga. App. 421, 56 S.E.2d 137 (1949); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fulmer, 81 Ga. App. 97, 57 S.E.2d 865 (1959), later appeal, 85 Ga. App. 102, 68 S.E.2d 180 (1951); Redd v. United States Cas. Co., 83 Ga. App. 838, 65 S.E.2d 255 (1951); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Roberts, 86 Ga. App. 472, 71 S.E.2d 718 (1952); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Humphries, 91 Ga. App. 271, 85 S.E.2d 456 (1954); Smith v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Ga. App. 507, 95 S.E.2d 35 (1956); Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 99 Ga. App. 489, 109 S.E.2d 325 (1959); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 120 Ga. App. 625, 171 S.E.2d 909 (1969); Ferguson v. City of Macon, 121 Ga. App. 128, 173 S.E.2d 227 (1970).

An injury "arises out of" employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Clore, 34 Ga. App. 409, 129 S.E. 799 (1925); Globe Indem. Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46 (1928), aff'd, 169 Ga. 510, 150 S.E. 849 (1929); Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Shuttleworth, 61 Ga. App. 644, 7 S.E.2d 195 (1940); Fried v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 192 Ga. 492, 15 S.E.2d 704 (1941); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Zachery, 60 Ga. App. 250, 25 S.E.2d 135 (1943); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Phillips, 97 Ga. App. 729, 104 S.E.2d 542 (1958); Francis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ga. App. 225, 97 S.E.2d 553 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960); Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), for comment, see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964); Borden Foods Co. v. Dorsey, 112 Ga. App. 838, 146 S.E.2d 532 (1965); Davis v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 385, 233 S.E.2d 479 (1977); Maxwell v. Hospital Auth., 202 Ga. App. 92, 413 S.E.2d 205 (1992).

Causative danger must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relationship of master and servant; it need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Clore, 34 Ga. App. 409, 129 S.E. 799 (1925); Globe Indem. Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46 (1928), aff'd, 169 Ga. 510, 150 S.E. 849 (1929); Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hamlin, 98 Ga. App. 167, 105 S.E.2d 481 (1958).

If the employee is engaged in some act incidental to the employee's employment and is injured, the injury is compensable. Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Sockwell, 58 Ga. App. 111, 197 S.E. 647 (1938).

There must be a causal connection between the employment and the injury, and the injury must be the rational consequence of some hazard connected with the employment. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E.2d 189 (1939), overruled on other grounds, National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 152 Ga. App. 566, 263 S.E.2d 455 (1979); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Shuttleworth, 61 Ga. App. 644, 7 S.E.2d 195 (1940); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Thornton, 71 Ga. App. 486, 31 S.E.2d 115 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945).

A causative danger must be incidental to the character of the employment, and not independent of the relationship of master and servant. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Zachery, 69 Ga. App. 250, 25 S.E.2d 135 (1943); Davis v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 385, 233 S.E.2d 479 (1977).

For an injury or death to be compensable, the employment must be a contributing proximate cause. Francis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ga. App. 225, 97 S.E.2d 553 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960).

A disabling injury must flow from the employment, just as effect from cause; the mere fact that an injury is contemporaneous or coincidental with employment is not enough. United States Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 106 Ga. App. 441, 127 S.E.2d 169, rev'd on other grounds, 218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749 (1962).

When the activity in which an employee was engaged at the time of the employee's death was in the interest of the employee's employer, and was reasonably incident to the employee's regular work, the employee's employment was a contributory cause of death. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Rosenfeld, 130 Ga. App. 251, 202 S.E.2d 678 (1973).

Evidence when construed in an employee's favor authorized the State Board of Workers' Compensation to find that the employee's knee dislocation arose out of the employee's employment, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4), and the trial court erred in reversing a benefit award. Bending over to remove an object from the floor, even when the object was the employee's own diuretic pill, was incidental to the character of the employee's employment as a custodian. Harris v. Peach County Bd. of Comm'rs, 296 Ga. App. 225, 674 S.E.2d 36 (2009).

- An injury which arises out of the conditions under which it is necessary for an employee to work, in the performance of the duties of the contract of employment, is an injury which arises out of the employment. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sanders, 49 Ga. App. 600, 176 S.E. 104 (1934), rev'd on other grounds, 182 Ga. 594, 186 S.E. 693 (1936).

If, in the performance of an act which a person was directly employed to do, or an act reasonably necessary to be done in order to perform the act the person was employed to do, an employee receives an accidental injury, such injury is compensable; if the person's act does not come within either of these classifications, the injury is not compensable. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Skinner, 188 Ga. 823, 5 S.E.2d 9 (1939); Ayers v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 89 Ga. App. 808, 81 S.E.2d 234 (1954); Sanford v. University of Ga. Bd. of Regents, 131 Ga. App. 858, 207 S.E.2d 255 (1974).

A claimant's right to compensation depends upon whether there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to show that the deceased, when fatally injured, was engaged in work necessary or reasonably incident to the purpose of the deceased's employment. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hamlin, 98 Ga. App. 167, 105 S.E.2d 481 (1958).

- If an injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work, and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises "out of" the employment. Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency v. Walker, 30 Ga. App. 91, 117 S.E. 281 (1923); Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Shuttleworth, 61 Ga. App. 644, 7 S.E.2d 195 (1940); Fried v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 192 Ga. 492, 15 S.E.2d 704 (1941); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Zachery, 69 Ga. App. 250, 25 S.E.2d 135 (1943); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fulmer, 81 Ga. App. 97, 57 S.E.2d 865 (1950), later appeal, 85 Ga. App. 102, 68 S.E.2d 180 (1951); Francis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ga. App. 225, 97 S.E.2d 553 (1957), overruled on other grounds, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960); Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), for comment, see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964); Wood v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 116 Ga. App. 284, 157 S.E.2d 60 (1967); Davis v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 385, 233 S.E.2d 479 (1977).

Under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), an employee is entitled to compensation for injuries from accidents arising out of and in the course of employment, that is, for such occurrences as might have been reasonably contemplated by the employer as a risk naturally incident to the nature of the employment, or such as, after the event, might be seen to have had their origin in a risk connected with the business of the employment, and to have arisen out of and flowed from that source as a natural consequence. Keen v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 34 Ga. App. 257, 129 S.E. 174, cert. denied, 34 Ga. App. 836 (1925); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Green, 38 Ga. App. 50, 142 S.E. 464, cert. denied, 38 Ga. App. 817 (1928), overruled on other grounds, American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Benford, 77 Ga. App. 93, 47 S.E.2d 673 (1948); Maddox v. Travelers Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 690, 148 S.E. 307 (1929); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sprayberry, 69 Ga. App. 196, 25 S.E.2d 74 (1943); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Benford, 77 Ga. App. 93, 47 S.E.2d 673 (1948); United States Cas. Co. v. Russell, 98 Ga. App. 181, 105 S.E.2d 378 (1958); Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 99 Ga. App. 489, 109 S.E.2d 325 (1959); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Rosenfeld, 130 Ga. App. 251, 202 S.E.2d 678 (1973).

An injury arises "out of" employment when the risk thereof might have been contemplated by a reasonable person, when entering the employment, as incidental to it. Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934).

A risk is incident to employment when it belongs to or is connected with what a workman has to do in fulfilling a workman's contract of service. Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945); Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), for comment, see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964).

A compensable accident must be one resulting from a risk reasonably incident to the employment. Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), for comment, see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964); Davis v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 385, 233 S.E.2d 479 (1977).

It is only necessary that the claimant prove that the claimant's work brought the claimant within range of the danger by requiring the claimant's presence in the locale when the peril struck, even though any other person present would have also been injured irrespective of the person's employment. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 152 Ga. App. 566, 263 S.E.2d 455 (1979).

- Risk may be incidental to employment when it is either an ordinary risk directly connected with the employment or an extraordinary risk which is only indirectly connected with the employment owing to the special nature of the employment. Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934); Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), for comment, see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964).

- When the duties of an employee entail the employee's presence at a place and time, a claim for injury there occurring is not barred because it results from a risk common to all others, unless it is common to the general public without regard to such conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 152 Ga. App. 566, 263 S.E.2d 455 (1979).

- An employee's exclusive remedies for physical illness caused by pipe smoke of employer's vice president were under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., because the injuries arose in the course of and out of the employee's employment. Hennly v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 355, 444 S.E.2d 317 (1994).

- The determination of whether injuries occurred due to "reasons personal to" an employee is decided on the basis of whether the alleged injuries arose out of and in the course of employment. Murphy v. ARA Servs., Inc., 164 Ga. App. 859, 298 S.E.2d 528 (1982).

Injuries caused to an employee by the willful act of a third person for reasons entirely personal to the employee were excluded from coverage. Johnson v. Holiday Food Stores, Inc., 238 Ga. App. 822, 520 S.E.2d 502 (1999).

- A particular injury complained of need not have been foreseen or expected; it is sufficient if, after the injury, it can be traced to the employment as a contributing cause. Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934).

- An injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment is excluded. Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Zachery, 69 Ga. App. 250, 25 S.E.2d 135 (1943).

- An employee whose occupation requires personal service to the public is exposed to the risk of physical danger as the result of having to come in contact and associate with people, and if such hazard becomes an actuality, it may, according to the circumstances and conditions present, constitute a reasonable incident of the employment, entitling the employee to workers' compensation benefits for injuries resulting therefrom. Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), for comment, see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964).

- It is not a condition precedent to the allowance of compensation for an injury or death to have been the result of a hazard peculiar to the particular employment. McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 54 S.E.2d 471 (1949), for comment, see 12 Ga. B. J. 208 (1949).

Injuries are not required to arise from something peculiar to the employment; an injury is compensable if after the event it is apparent to the rational mind that there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the employment was performed and the resulting injury. Wood v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 116 Ga. App. 284, 157 S.E.2d 60 (1967).

To be compensable, an injury need not arise from something peculiar to the employment. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 152 Ga. App. 566, 263 S.E.2d 455 (1979).

Case law holding that danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for an injury to arise out of and in the course of employment has been overruled. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 152 Ga. App. 566, 263 S.E.2d 455 (1979).

- If an employee is injured while doing something in the interest of an employer, which is reasonably necessary or incident to the employee's regular work, the injury arises out of the employee's employment; this is true even though the employee has no special permission from the employer to do the particular act, which is beyond the scope of the employee's specific duties, and it applies especially when the employee has no instruction from the employer prohibiting the act, and has some discretionary authority. Pike v. Maryland Cas. Co., 107 Ga. App. 49, 129 S.E.2d 78 (1962), for comment, see 26 Ga. B. J. 131 (1963); McElreath v. McElreath, 155 Ga. App. 826, 273 S.E.2d 205 (1980).

- If the employee is free to use time for the employee's own individual affairs and an injury occurs during this time, the injury is not compensable as it does not arise out of employment. Street v. Douglas County Rd. Dep't, 160 Ga. App. 559, 287 S.E.2d 586 (1981).

- When other employment intervenes between an original award of compensation and a claimant's subsequent disability, an award against the original employer based upon a "change of condition" is not, as a matter of law, barred unless the subsequent employment, in which the gradual worsening condition occurred, evidences a work environment and work circumstances which are "new" and "different" from those existing in the claimant's previous "ordinary work." Then it can be said that the claimant has suffered a compensable "accident" arising out of the claimant's subsequent employment rather than a mere economic "change of condition" proximately resulting from the claimant's original "accident." Slattery Assocs. v. Jones, Batson-Cook & Russell, 161 Ga. App. 389, 288 S.E.2d 654 (1982).

- The decisive issue in determining ultimately whether the claimant has suffered proximately a "change of condition" or a separately compensable "accident" during the claimant's subsequent employment is, assuming there is no subsequent specific job-related incident, whether the environment and circumstances of the new employment are "new" and "different" from those which would have existed in the "ordinary work" encompassed by the claimant's previous employment. If the environment and circumstances surrounding the new employment differ from the claimant's previous "ordinary work," the claimant's gradually worsening condition is, as a matter of law, causally connected with the "ordinary work" associated with those new and different circumstances which exist in the subsequent employment. Slattery Assocs. v. Jones, Batson-Cook & Russell, 161 Ga. App. 389, 288 S.E.2d 654 (1982).

- When the initial claim is based upon the "new accident" theory, it must be asserted against that employer in whose employment the proximate cause of the "new accident" - the aggravation of the original uncompensated injury - occurred. Slattery Assocs. v. Jones, Batson-Cook & Russell, 161 Ga. App. 389, 288 S.E.2d 654 (1982).

Claim for "change of condition" is claim for additional compensation under the original award. A "change of condition" claim for additional compensation is predicated upon the claimant's gradually worsening condition, from the wear and tear of performing the claimant's usual employment duties and of ordinary life, to the point that the claimant can no longer continue to perform the claimant's ordinary work. Slattery Assocs. v. Jones, Batson-Cook & Russell, 161 Ga. App. 389, 288 S.E.2d 654 (1982).

3. Arising in Course of Employment

"In course of employment" defined.

- An injury arises "in the course of employment" within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) when it occurs within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of the employee's duties, and while the employee is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786 (1923); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Waymick, 42 Ga. App. 177, 155 S.E. 366 (1930), aff'd, 173 Ga. 67, 159 S.E. 564 (1931); Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Montgomery, 45 Ga. App. 634, 165 S.E. 903 (1932); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 48 Ga. App. 822, 173 S.E. 925 (1934); Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Alford, 51 Ga. App. 237, 179 S.E. 912 (1935); Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Woodward, 53 Ga. App. 778, 187 S.E. 142 (1936); Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mangham, 56 Ga. App. 498, 193 S.E. 87 (1937); Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Sockwell, 58 Ga. App. 111, 197 S.E. 647 (1938); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. App. 115, 197 S.E. 650 (1938); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E.2d 189 (1939); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Babb, 67 Ga. App. 161, 19 S.E.2d 550 (1942); Macon Dairies, Inc. v. Duhart, 69 Ga. App. 91, 24 S.E.2d 732 (1943); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sprayberry, 69 Ga. App. 196, 25 S.E.2d 74 (1943); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Honea, 71 Ga. App. 569, 31 S.E.2d 421 (1944); Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945); Harper v. National Traffic Guard Co., 73 Ga. App. 385, 36 S.E.2d 842 (1946); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 44 S.E.2d 160 (1947); Free v. McEver, 79 Ga. App. 831, 54 S.E.2d 372 (1949); Wilcox v. Shepherd Lumber Corp., 80 Ga. App. 71, 55 S.E.2d 382 (1949); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fulmer, 81 Ga. App. 97, 57 S.E.2d 865 (1950), later appeal, 85 Ga. App. 102, 68 S.E.2d 180 (1951); Employers Ins. Co. v. Bass, 81 Ga. App. 306, 58 S.E.2d 516 (1950); Redd v. United States Cas. Co., 83 Ga. App. 838, 65 S.E.2d 255 (1951); Smith v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Ga. App. 507, 95 S.E.2d 35 (1956); Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 99 Ga. App. 489, 109 S.E.2d 325 (1959); Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), for comment, see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 120 Ga. App. 625, 171 S.E.2d 909 (1969); Ferguson v. City of Macon, 121 Ga. App. 128, 173 S.E.2d 227 (1970); McDonald v. State Hwy. Dep't, 127 Ga. App. 171, 192 S.E.2d 919 (1972); Barge v. City of College Park, 148 Ga. App. 480, 251 S.E.2d 580 (1978); International Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Bozardt, 156 Ga. App. 794, 275 S.E.2d 376 (1980).

An injury is received "in course of" employment when it occurs while a workman is doing duty which the workman is employed to perform. Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Clore, 34 Ga. App. 409, 129 S.E. 799 (1925); Globe Indem. Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46 (1928), aff'd, 169 Ga. 510, 150 S.E. 849 (1929).

The phrase "in course of employment" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident took place. Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936); Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945); Maddox v. Buice Transf. & Storage Co., 81 Ga. App. 503, 59 S.E.2d 329 (1950); Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), for comment, see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964); McDonald v. State Hwy. Dep't, 127 Ga. App. 171, 192 S.E.2d 919 (1972); Sands v. Union Camp Corp., 559 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1977); International Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Bozardt, 156 Ga. App. 794, 275 S.E.2d 376 (1980).

An injury arising from the performance of anything incidental to a claimant's duties arises out of and in the course of employment and is compensable. Thompson-Weinman Co. v. Yancey, 90 Ga. App. 213, 82 S.E.2d 725 (1954).

If at the moment an employee is accidentally injured the employee is engaged in the regular duties of employment, the accident occurs in the course of and within the scope of the employee's employment. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hamlin, 98 Ga. App. 167, 105 S.E.2d 481 (1958).

4. Accidents Held to Arise Out of and in Course of Employment

Death from tree falling on highway.

- When an employee, while traveling in an automobile upon a public highway in the regular course of the employee's employment, was killed in a section of woodland through which the road passed, by a tree which stood near the road and which was blown upon the employee and the employee's automobile by a sudden and violent storm, the employee's death arose out of the employee's employment, within the meaning of Ga. L. 1922, p. 185, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1). Globe Indem. Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46 (1928), aff'd, 169 Ga. 510, 150 S.E. 849 (1929).

- An injury to the claimant insurance salesperson, whose car was hit by a train on a Saturday afternoon while the claimant was traveling to the store of a customer to collect an insurance premium, arose out of and in the course of the claimant's employment. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Babb, 67 Ga. App. 161, 19 S.E.2d 550 (1942).

- Award of compensation to a salesperson injured on the highway was authorized by the evidence. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 33 Ga. App. 299, 126 S.E. 271 (1924), cert. denied, 33 Ga. App. 829 (1925).

- When employee, in the course of employment, was walking on a street at night returning from a meal, in an area where the employee was placed on account of the employee's employment, which was particularly susceptible to crimes against the person, the injury sustained from an assault made for reasons not personal to the employee "arose out of" the employment. General Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bellflower, 123 Ga. App. 864, 182 S.E.2d 678 (1971), for comment, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 449 (1972).

Evidence that a bus driver worked an irregular schedule requiring the driver to be away from home, and that at the time of the driver's fatal injury the driver was "off duty" but "on call," occupying lodging furnished by the employer, and was returning on a direct route to the driver's lodging after having visited a convenient place in the area to eat, supported a determination that the driver was injured in the course of employment. General Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bellflower, 123 Ga. App. 864, 182 S.E.2d 678 (1971), for comment, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 449 (1972).

- It could not realistically be said as a matter of law that a deceased employee, when using a prohibited alternate route for delivering cargo, was not pursuing the employer's business at the time of a fatal accident, as the employee was doing the very job for which the employee was employed, namely, driving a tractor-trailer for the purpose of delivering cargo to an intended destination. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 111 Ga. App. 616, 142 S.E.2d 459 (1965).

- The death of one who is employed to drive an ice wagon and deliver ice to various points in a city, and who in the discharge of such duties must travel along a certain route which crosses a railroad track, when caused by a collision at such crossing between the wagon driven by that person and a railroad train, while the driver was in the discharge of the driver's duty in attempting to drive across the railroad crossing, arose out of the employment. Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp. v. Wishard, 30 Ga. App. 730, 119 S.E. 429 (1923).

- An injury to an express messenger who slipped and fell under a train, which was coming into a station, while speaking to another express messenger who was on the ground, was from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Southeastern Express Co. v. Edmondson, 30 Ga. App. 697, 119 S.E. 39 (1923).

- Laborer who is employed to assist in hauling logs from a swamp to an employer's sawmill, and who is permitted by an employer to ride upon the truck when going to the mill from the swamp for the purpose of bringing back logs, is in the discharge of duties when so riding upon the truck; and when injured by falling from the truck, the laborer's injury arises out of and in the course of the laborer's employment. Integrity Mut. Cas. Co. v. Jones, 33 Ga. App. 489, 126 S.E. 876 (1925).

- Employee, who indisputably was injured after slipping and falling on the wet floor of the break room on the employer's premises in the middle of the workday, while preparing to eat lunch, was injured during the course of employment as it logically followed that the employee's injury was causally connected to the conditions under which the employee worked, and the injury, therefore, arose out of employment. Frett v. State Farm Emple. Workers' Comp., Ga. , 844 S.E.2d 749 (2020).

- State Board of Workers' Compensation erred in finding that an employee's accident did not arise out of employment under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4), because the decision was based upon an erroneous theory regarding what conduct constituted a deviation from employment that would bar compensation under the Act; the decision contravened the humanitarian purpose of the Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-23, and distorted the definition of a deviation from employment to say that the employee's attempt to stop a rolling car was a purely personal mission because at the instant the employee's car began to roll, the employee was on duty. Stokes v. Coweta County Bd. of Educ., 313 Ga. App. 505, 722 S.E.2d 118 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0880, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 473 (Ga. 2012).

- When a proper evening meal was by contract made necessary and incidental to a minor claimant's employment, in that the employer furnished the transportation, controlled the time and duration, and retained the right to have certain duties performed during the trip, a finding that an injury arose not only in the course of but also out of the employment, within the requirements of this section, was authorized. American Hdwe. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burt, 103 Ga. App. 811, 120 S.E.2d 797 (1961).

- When a mission may have had two objectives, business as intended by the contract of employment and also the personal pleasure of the employee, and there was no deviation from the course which the employee would have followed had the trip been entirely upon the business of the employer and no real deviation therefrom was intended before the full duty to the employer was to have been performed, an injury sustained by an employee while en route to the place where the employee was to perform the duties of employment was an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment and compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 44 S.E.2d 160 (1947).

There is no requirement in Georgia's workers' compensation law that an employee at the time of their injury must have no objective other than the business of their employer. Amedisys Home Health, Inc. v. Howard, 269 Ga. App. 656, 605 S.E.2d 60 (2004).

- When a nurse, who was required to be on 24-hour call, and to complete reports of the nurse's visits to patients by the morning following the visit, was injured while carrying such reports, a pager, a cellular telephone, and a pizza for the nurse's family's dinner into the nurse's home, the nurse was injured in the course and scope of employment because, in addition to delivering the family's dinner, the nurse was also carrying time sensitive job-related paperwork and job-related equipment into the nurse's home, and, given the 24-hour nature of the employment, the rule of continuous employment applied. Amedisys Home Health, Inc. v. Howard, 269 Ga. App. 656, 605 S.E.2d 60 (2004).

- When a driver was killed by being run over by an automobile while the driver was standing by the driver's truck engaged in making deliveries of the products which the driver was employed to deliver, a finding that the injury arose out of and in the course of the driver's employment as an agent for the oil company whose products the driver was delivering, and, as such, was entitled to compensation, was authorized. Roberts v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 42 Ga. App. 668, 157 S.E. 537 (1931).

- When an employment contract contemplated that an employee, while on duty, would procure wood to heat the house where the employee stayed awaiting the occasion to do the work which an employer engaged the employee to do, the procuring of this wood was incidental to the employment. Free v. McEver, 79 Ga. App. 831, 54 S.E.2d 372 (1949).

- When a still catches fire from a bolt of lightning, and the person who is working at the still is burned in the performance of the duties for which the person is employed, i.e., "sounding" the still, the burns thus received constitute an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. Moody v. Tillman, 45 Ga. App. 84, 163 S.E. 521 (1932).

- When the attending physician testified, in effect, that the physician did not know what caused the employee's death, that it was not caused by the operation for compensable accidental injury as such but that the employee would still be alive if the operation had not been performed, and that the operation was necessary in order to permit the employee to return to work, a finding that the employee died as a result of the injury which arose out of and in the course of the employee's employment was authorized. Armour & Co. v. Cox, 96 Ga. App. 829, 101 S.E.2d 733 (1958).

- When the claimant fell or was thrown to the ground when the claimant's body came in contact with a charge of electricity while the claimant was working in the vicinity of high voltage electrical equipment during a thunderstorm, a finding was authorized that the claimant received injuries as a result of this occurrence, and compensation was justified. Stockbridge Stone Div. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Rolley, 111 Ga. App. 447, 142 S.E.2d 86 (1965).

- A police officer may be in the discharge of the officer's duty while wiping a gun furnished to the officer by the city while at home for supper. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Henderson, 37 Ga. App. 238, 139 S.E. 688 (1927), cert. denied, 37 Ga. App. 833 (1928).

- When the evidence authorized a finding that the deceased police officer was engaged in instructing junior members of a police force in the practice of quick drawing and shooting, as the deceased had been instructed to do, when the deceased was accidentally shot by another police officer, the fatal accident arose out of and in the course of the deceased's employment for purposes of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Phillips, 97 Ga. App. 729, 104 S.E.2d 542 (1958).

- In a wrongful death action, the trial court properly granted the employer summary judgment and correctly ruled that the worker's injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment for purposes of the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., because it was undisputed that the employment placed the worker in a locale that unfortunately exposed the worker to being shot and it was only because of the employment that there was any contact with the shooter. Sturgess v. OA Logistics Servs., 336 Ga. App. 134, 784 S.E.2d 432 (2016).

- Injury received in replacing belts at a ginnery arose "out of and in the course of" an injured person's employment with company. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ellington, 34 Ga. App. 490, 130 S.E. 220 (1925).

- When the claimant operated a grinding machine and was injured when the claimant attempted to replace a belt on a drill press which had been used by a co-employee, the attempted repair was an incident of the claimant's regular work, even though the claimant had not been authorized to use the drill press and the co-employee was not on the premises at the time of the accident. Graves v. Builders Steel Supply, 186 Ga. App. 736, 368 S.E.2d 188 (1988).

- The evidence was sufficient to support an award on the basis that lending assistance to fellow travelers upon the highway was within the scope and course of deceased's employment for a tractor repair service. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hamlin, 98 Ga. App. 167, 105 S.E.2d 481 (1958).

- An employee summoned by an employer to assist in extinguishing a fire by cutting fire lanes with a bulldozer, traveling to the place where the bulldozer was to be obtained by the employee was incidental to and in the course of employment, and the injury that the employee received while thus employed was by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Humphries, 91 Ga. App. 271, 85 S.E.2d 456 (1954).

- An act done in violation of the rule against use of an elevator by employees is not necessarily one outside the scope of employment to the extent of excluding the master and servant relationship and when there was nothing to show that the rule had been approved by the commission (now board), its violation would not bar compensation. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 137 S.E. 113 (1927).

- If an employee, while in the performance of the employee's work cutting timber, was injured by a tree falling on the employee and breaking the employee's leg, the injury sustained arose out of and in the course of employment. Love Lumber Co. v. Thigpen, 42 Ga. App. 83, 155 S.E. 77 (1930).

- When an employee was where the employee's duties required the employee to be, in a large lumberyard among stacks of wet or damp lumber, when struck by lightning, the employee's death was from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 54 S.E.2d 471 (1949), for comment, see 12 Ga. B. J. 208 (1949).

- An injury to an ear causing diminution in earning capacity is compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) when such an injury arises out of and during the course of employment. Blue Bell Globe Mfg. Co. v. Baird, 61 Ga. App. 298, 6 S.E.2d 83 (1939).

- When a room in which the employee works in the discharge of the duties of the contract of employment is heated by an open fire, an injury to the employee which is caused while the employee is in the performance of the employee's duties, from burns received by the employee's clothes accidentally becoming ignited, is an injury which arises out of and in the course of the employment. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sanders, 49 Ga. App. 600, 176 S.E. 104 (1934), rev'd on other grounds, 182 Ga. 594, 186 S.E. 693 (1936).

- When the evidence demanded a finding that the claimant's fall at least contributed to a herniated disc for which the claimant was operated on, the court did not err in reversing a denial of compensation. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Craig, 96 Ga. App. 791, 101 S.E.2d 740 (1957).

- If an employee, in the line of the employee's duty in the place of business of the employer, entered a freight elevator to carry an article from one floor to another on a continuous nonstop trip to the second floor, but, before reaching the second floor, threw a cigarette out of the door to a fellow employee, and the employee's arm was caught and crushed while throwing the cigarette, that act was not a deviation by claimant from the course of employment such as would defeat a recovery for compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Columbia Cas. Co. v. Parham, 69 Ga. App. 258, 25 S.E.2d 147 (1943).

- If an employer knew that the claimant used slack time to work on personal projects and condoned or permitted such activity, the employee was required to remain on the premises during such slack periods, and the injury occurred during a slack or enforced lull period while engaged in an authorized activity, in an authorized place, and during an authorized time, the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Parker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 142 Ga. App. 711, 236 S.E.2d 915 (1977).

- An employee afflicted with an epileptoid condition suffered an injury which arose out of and in the course of employment when while in the course of employment, the employee was seized with an epileptic attack which caused the employee to fall against the sharp edge of a table producing an injury. United States Cas. Co. v. Richardson, 75 Ga. App. 496, 43 S.E.2d 793 (1947).

- The rule that if there is evidence which points to a theory of causation indicating a logical sequence of cause and effect, then there is a juridical basis for a determination as to how the event happened, authorized a finding that the injury to the employee's finger was the proximate cause of the employee's death from blood poisoning. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Nuckolls, 69 Ga. App. 649, 26 S.E.2d 473 (1943).

- When a deceased employee was discovered in a fatally injured condition beside a swimming pool on the premises of the employer motel, and it did not appear that in being at such location on the premises of the employer the employee was not in the line of the employee's duty and in the performance thereof, the night clerk having sent the employee on an errand, a finding that as a matter of law the deceased employee did not meet death by reason of an injury or accident occurring in the course of the employee's employment or arising out of the employee's employment was error. Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 99 Ga. App. 489, 109 S.E.2d 325 (1959).

When an employee is found dead in a place where the employee might reasonably have been expected to be in the performance of the employee's duties, it is presumed that the death arose out of the employee's employment, but this inference applies only to cases in which the death is unexplained, that is, when the employee literally is "found dead" and the cause of death is not known. If the death is found to be explained as heart-related, the case is expressly governed by the specific standard of proof in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 (4). Lavista Equip. Supply, Inc. v. Elliott, 186 Ga. App. 585, 367 S.E.2d 811, , 186 Ga. App. 918, 367 S.E.2d 811 (1988).

- A finding that an employee's disability was caused by a kidney ailment rather than by a fractured vertebra was unauthorized by the evidence when while the record showed that the employee was unable to work full-time on account of the employee's kidney ailment, the employee's total inability to work stemmed from the very moment that the employee fell while attempting to lift a tire in the course of the employee's employment, as it is inconceivable that kidney trouble can cause the fracture of a vertebra. Whitener v. Baly Tire Co., 98 Ga. App. 257, 105 S.E.2d 775 (1958).

- Since the evidence shows that the deceased spouse of a claimant never recovered from the effect of a snakebite arising out of and in the course of the deceased's employment, but died after a lingering illness, a finding of fact that the effects of the compensable snakebite contributed proximately to the deceased's death eleven weeks after was proper. Phoenix Ins. v. Weaver, 124 Ga. App. 423, 183 S.E.2d 920 (1971).

- The conditions of the victim's employment, including the early morning hour at which the victim was required to report to work and the location of the company parking lot in an area of known criminal activity, not only provided the time and place for the assault upon the victim, but actually contributed to an increase in the risk of attack, and provided causal connection with the victim's employment. Helton v. Interstate Brands Corp., 155 Ga. App. 607, 271 S.E.2d 739 (1980).

- Since an employee was murdered by another employee during an armed robbery while making a night deposit at a local bank for their employer, the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., provided immunity for the employer in a tort action because the employee's death arose out of and in the course of employment. Hadsock v. J.H. Harvey Co., 212 Ga. App. 782, 442 S.E.2d 892 (1994).

- Because sufficient evidence supported a finding that the decedent's tinnitis resulted from an automobile accident which occurred in the course of employment, and that such deprived the decedent of normal judgment, the trial court did not err in awarding the surviving spouse both outstanding TTD and statutory death benefits based on the decedent's suicide. Moreover: (1) the question of whether the decedent's suicide was a reasonably foreseeable result of the automobile accident was irrelevant; and (2) any finding that the decedent's suicide constituted an unforeseeable intervening cause would serve only to relieve the tortfeasor of liability, but would not bear on the question of whether the death was compensable. Bayer Corp. v. Lassiter, 282 Ga. App. 346, 638 S.E.2d 812 (2006).

- Injuries sustained by the claimant while enroute to see a doctor arose out of and in the course of employment, when the claimant was required by the employer to consult with the claimant's personal physician as a precondition to the claimant's return to work and transportation was furnished by the employer. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crawford, 177 Ga. App. 242, 339 S.E.2d 292 (1985).

- If the work of an employee or the performance of an incidental duty involves exposure to the perils of handling a firearm, the protection of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) extends to the employee while the employee is handling the firearm in the performance of the employee's duties. Ferguson v. City of Macon, 121 Ga. App. 128, 173 S.E.2d 227 (1970).

5. Accidents Held Not to Arise Out of and in Course of Employment

Feigning brain damage from exposure to wallpaper glue fumes.

- Superior court erred in reversing a decision of an ALJ denying workers' compensation to an employee who claimed permanent brain injury from exposure to wallpaper glue at work; the ALJ was authorized to conclude from observing the employee's testimony and from the medical evidence that the employee's symptoms were feigned or psychological. Hughston Orthopedic Hosp. v. Wilson, 306 Ga. App. 893, 703 S.E.2d 17 (2010).

- A decree denying compensation on the grounds that death was not from an injury arising out of the course of employment was authorized by evidence showing that a deceased employee did not show symptoms of alleged poisons from gases of exploding dynamite until three or four days after exposure thereto, that the mine was well ventilated, and that a person inhaling quantity of such gas sufficient to cause death is affected within 24 hours. Maryland Cas. Co. v. England, 34 Ga. App. 354, 129 S.E. 446 (1925).

- The deceased, in catching hold of a live, smoking, and disconnected wire lying in a yard, in spite of the repeated warnings of a fellow employee, was held not to have acted in any such emergency, so as to bring oneself within the scope and operation of the rule as to acting within the scope of employment when confronted by a sudden emergency. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dallas, 39 Ga. App. 38, 146 S.E. 37 (1928).

- The character and nature of the deceased's employment as an assistant grocery store manager, a public service occupation exposing the manager to certain "causative danger", is insufficient standing alone to show that the manager's homicide arose out of the course of the manager's employment. Wood v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 116 Ga. App. 284, 157 S.E.2d 60 (1967).

- When the cause which brings about a nervous state, with resultant injury to the claimant, is removed, and such claimant is restored to a normal condition, and thereafter claimant reverts to the same nervous state, resulting in hysterical paralysis, the cause of such hysterical paralysis not being the result of an injury sustained out of and in the course of claimant's employment, it is not compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Swift & Co. v. Ware, 53 Ga. App. 500, 186 S.E. 452 (1936).

- When an employee held a discussion with the employer relative to whether an absence was to be charged against the employee unexcused because of a failure to notify the office that the employee would not come in, and the employee became emotionally upset and developed a conversion reaction from which the employee supposed the employee's arm to be paralyzed, but the doctors could find no physical reason for it, a finding that the employee did not suffer an accidental injury arising out of employment was authorized. Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312, 160 S.E.2d 424 (1968), for comment, see 20 Mercer L. Rev. 473 (1969).

- When the evidence authorized a finding that the deceased truck driver, when killed, was driving the truck of the deceased's employer on a mission purely personal, that of returning from the deceased's boarding house where the deceased had been to lunch and where the deceased had taken the truck of the employer without authority, an award against the claimant was authorized. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Westmoreland, 93 Ga. App. 888, 93 S.E.2d 193 (1956).

- Evidence of the employer to the effect that the employee was specifically instructed not to go over into the area where the employee met death was sufficient to rebut the presumption that the employee was engaged in the employer's duties, and a denial of compensation was sustainable on the theory that the employee was engaged on a mission personal to the employee. Weathers v. Jones, 94 Ga. App. 50, 93 S.E.2d 390 (1956).

- Evidence that the claimant fell while walking along an aisle marked off on the concrete floor of the employer's plant while proceeding to the employee's place of work in another part of the plant, that it appeared to an eyewitness as though the employee might have fainted or a muscle might have given way or something like that, that there was nothing at the place where the employee fell for the employee to fall over, and that there was nothing but the floor that the employee could have hit as the employee fell was sufficient to authorize a finding that there was no causal connection between the injury which the employee sustained when the employee fell and the employee's employment. Borden Foods Co. v. Dorsey, 112 Ga. App. 838, 146 S.E.2d 532 (1965).

- When the employee of a corporation was injured while performing a service for the president of the corporation, who had directed the employee to secure poles with which to build a turkey pen in the woods adjacent to the corporation's mill property (raising turkeys not being the business of the corporation), it could not be held that the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employer's business, notwithstanding the fact that the officers and directors of the corporation called upon the employee to do odd jobs for them, which odd jobs were not separated from the employee's regular job of keeping the mill and houses in repair. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Lemming, 187 Ga. 378, 200 S.E. 141 (1938).

- When the claimant's spouse was killed in an airplane accident while piloting an airplane of the deceased's employer which the deceased had authority to use at the time but which was being used solely for the deceased's own personal pleasure and that of the deceased's companions, the deceased's death did not arise out of and in the course of employment so as to be compensable. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fulmer, 81 Ga. App. 97, 57 S.E.2d 865 (1950), later appeal, 85 Ga. App. 102, 68 S.E.2d 180 (1951).

- A traveling salesperson and collector who had been called to the employer's office for a conference, the whole trip, including lodging and meals, at the expense of the company, in an automobile furnished by the company, who was injured in an accident after the conference while the salesperson and a superior coemployee were going from the office a distance of 18 miles for the sole purpose of getting a seafood dinner and seeing the ocean, was not acting in the course of the salesperson's employment at the time of the accident. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Skinner, 188 Ga. 823, 5 S.E.2d 9 (1939).

- When the claimant failed to show that the duties of claimant's employment specifically included a weekend trip to watch an all-day exhibition of gamecock fighting with a prospective customer, or that the trip was reasonably necessary to sell insurance, the claimant's injury while returning from the trip did not have its origin in a risk connected with the employment. Ayers v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 89 Ga. App. 808, 81 S.E.2d 234 (1954).

- The action of the employee, a workman on a barge removing sand from the bottom of a pond, in removing the employee's upper clothing and diving from the barge into the water, where the employee drowned, was an act not arising "out of" the employee's employment, although performed "in the course of" it. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. King, 127 Ga. App. 566, 194 S.E.2d 282 (1972).

- When a deputy clerk in a recorder's court, whose duties consisted, among other things, of taking guns to or from court, as required, while on duty, undertook to examine a pistol shown the clerk by a police officer, accidentally injuring the clerk's left hand in the process, such injury did not arise out of the claimant's employment, for the reason that the examination of the pistol was not incidental to any of the clerk's duties, nor was there a causal connection between the conditions under which the clerk's employment was performed and the resulting injury, but the examination of the pistol was solely for the gratification of the clerk's own curiosity. Ferguson v. City of Macon, 121 Ga. App. 128, 173 S.E.2d 227 (1970).

- The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for a recreation club against the parents of a lifeguard who was electrocuted on club property when genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the club was a charitable institution entitled to the charitable immunity, whether the club employed the requisite number of employees to qualify for workers' compensation, and whether the electrocution arose out of and was within the lifeguard's course of employment. Molton v. Lizella Recreation Club, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 154, 322 S.E.2d 354 (1984).

- The risk of verbal and physical abuse of a sexual nature by a supervisor was not causally connected with the appellant's employment by the defendant cafeteria merely because the discharge of the appellant was performed under authority properly exercised by such supervisor. Murphy v. ARA Servs., Inc., 164 Ga. App. 859, 298 S.E.2d 528 (1982).

The plaintiff's claims were not barred by the exclusivity provision of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 when the injury, although arising in the course of employment, did not arise out of employment; the plaintiff charged the defendants with rape and sexual harassment, which could, under the circumstances, only be classified as willful acts conducted for personal reasons. Simon v. Morehouse Sch. of Medicine, 908 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1995).

Mental disability without prior physical injury is not compensable as an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Hanson Buick, Inc. v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127, 292 S.E.2d 428 (1982).

- Administrative law judge correctly concluded that appellee failed to carry appellee's burden of proof that the trauma did in fact occur at work because the evidence otherwise indicated that appellee did not consider a date and time of the incident until over 26 weeks after the alleged event. Fitzgerald Railcar Servs. v. Stevens, 212 Ga. App. 92, 441 S.E.2d 91 (1994).

6. Entering and Leaving Premises and Preparing for Work

In general.

- Generally, an injury on an employer's premises in going to or from work is within the course of employment and is entitled to compensation. United States Cas. Co. v. Russell, 98 Ga. App. 181, 105 S.E.2d 378 (1958).

- A reasonable time must ensue after an employee reaches the employer's premises prior to the time when work should begin, and a reasonable time after work ends before leaving the premises, during which time an accident occurring should be construed as arising out of and in the course of the employment. Jackson v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 33 Ga. App. 35, 125 S.E. 515 (1924).

When an employee is on the employer's premises in anticipation of work, at a reasonable time before the employee is required to begin work, and in a place which the employer permits employees to use in going to and from a restroom used by employees, the relationship of master and servant exists. Mobley v. Durham Iron Co., 83 Ga. App. 690, 64 S.E.2d 469 (1951).

No more than a reasonable time must ensue after an employee reaches an employer's premises prior to the time for beginning work, during which time an accident occurring shall be construed as arising out of and in the course of the employment. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Worley, 86 Ga. App. 794, 72 S.E.2d 560 (1952); De Howitt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 147, 108 S.E.2d 280 (1959).

A period of employment generally includes a reasonable time for ingress and egress from the place of work while on the employer's premises. United States Cas. Co. v. Russell, 98 Ga. App. 181, 105 S.E.2d 378 (1958).

The words "in the course of", applied in accordance with the liberal interpretation of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), refer not only to that time for which the employee is drawing an hourly wage, but to that reasonable time which, after reaching the premises, is necessary in order to get into position to commence remunerative activities at the proper time. United States Cas. Co. v. Russell, 98 Ga. App. 181, 105 S.E.2d 378 (1958).

A servant's relationship with a master does not end the moment the servant finishes the task allotted to the servant or the period of the servant's employment expires, but the servant must be given reasonable time to depart the master's premises before the relationship of master and servant ceases. AMOCO v. McCluskey, 116 Ga. App. 706, 158 S.E.2d 431 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 224 Ga. 253, 161 S.E.2d 271 (1968).

An employee is allowed a reasonable time for egress from the immediate place of work, during which time the employee remains in the course of the employee's employment. West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. McEntire, 150 Ga. App. 728, 258 S.E.2d 530 (1979).

- An injury received by an employee in entering or leaving a place of employment, in a building in which the employer leases or uses only a part, has generally been held to arise out of and in the course of employment when the means used by the employee to enter or leave the building are the only means of ingress or egress; the term "only means of ingress and egress" means no other way of entering or leaving the place of employment except through the building where the place of employment is located, and is not intended to restrict the area of an employer's premises to one of two or more ways through the building to an employer's place of business. De Howitt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 147, 108 S.E.2d 280 (1959).

When the employer's place of business is located in a building of which it occupies only a part, and two ways through the building are the only means of ingress and egress, both ways are parts of the employer's premises within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), so that an accident occurring there shall be construed as arising out of and in the course of employment. De Howitt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 147, 108 S.E.2d 280 (1959).

Ingress/egress rule applied and an employee's death from being struck by a train was compensable because the employee had no alternative route to the building but to cross the tracks, the entrance road crossing the railroad track was part of the leased business premises, the employee arrived just before the employee's shift started, and the employer had control over the entrance road pursuant to the lease. Bonner-Hill v. Southland Waste Sys. of Ga., Inc., 330 Ga. App. 151, 767 S.E.2d 803 (2014).

- Preparations made by the employee at the place of employment, to begin the work for which the employee is employed, are a part of the duties of the employment. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sanders, 49 Ga. App. 600, 176 S.E. 104 (1934), rev'd on other grounds, 182 Ga. 594, 186 S.E. 693 (1936); Employers Ins. Co. v. Bass, 81 Ga. App. 306, 58 S.E.2d 516 (1950).

When injuries are sustained by employees who are not at the moment actually engaged in doing the work they have been hired to do, during the time for which compensation is paid them, but who are performing acts preparatory to entering or leaving their employment, or other incidental acts within the period of their employment but not strictly in furtherance of it, it becomes ordinarily a question of fact as to whether the requirements of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) have been met, and the burden is upon claimant to meet these requirements. Fulton County Civil Court v. Elzey, 101 Ga. App. 520, 114 S.E.2d 314 (1960).

- When the claimant was injured in proceeding from the immediate work area on an employer's premises to another part of an employer's premises where the claimant was furnished parking facilities, a finding that the accident arose out of and in the course of the claimant's employment was authorized. Federal Ins. Co. v. Coram, 95 Ga. App. 622, 98 S.E.2d 214 (1957).

When it was necessary for an employee, after entering the premises of an employer, to park the employee's automobile in a lot supervised by plant guards for that purpose, and then walk approximately one-half mile to the place where the employee received an identification badge, and thence to an adjacent building to actually commence work, an allowance of 30 minutes between leaving the car and commencing work was not an unreasonable time under all the circumstances. United States Cas. Co. v. Russell, 98 Ga. App. 181, 105 S.E.2d 378 (1958).

When a state employee was injured in the parking lot of a state office building and such lot was provided by the state for its own convenience as well as that of the employees, such injury occurred within the course of employment. Department of Human Resources v. Jankowski, 147 Ga. App. 441, 249 S.E.2d 124 (1978).

Employee was precluded by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 from further recovery from a fellow employee whose car collided with the employee's vehicle in a parking lot when, although the employee was finished with the employee's daily work shift, the employee was in a parking lot on the employee's employer's premises and the accident occurred within a reasonable time for the employee's egress from the employee's workplace. Crawford v. Meyer, 195 Ga. App. 867, 395 S.E.2d 327 (1990).

Employer was properly granted summary judgment, in an employee's personal injury and loss of consortium suit filed against it, because the employee's accidental injury, which occurred as the employee was walking to work from an employer-owned parking facility to the employee work building and was struck by an employer-operated vehicle, was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., under the parking lot exception. Longuepee v. Ga. Inst. of Tech., 269 Ga. App. 884, 605 S.E.2d 455 (2004).

- Parking lot exception did not apply because a workers' compensation claimant was injured in a crosswalk on a public street leading to the place of employment as neither the parking lot nor the crosswalk was owned, controlled, or maintained by the employer. Collie Concessions, Inc. v. Bruce, 272 Ga. App. 578, 612 S.E.2d 900 (2005).

- When an employee is injured in, or going to and from, a parking lot which is owned or maintained by the employer, the incident is compensable under workers' compensation, since the injury arose during the employee's ingress or egress from employment. Tate v. Bruno's Inc./Food Max, 200 Ga. App. 395, 408 S.E.2d 456, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 897, 408 S.E.2d 456 (1991).

When a parking lot is neither owned, controlled, nor maintained by the employer, the lot is not part of the employer's premises and the rationale which allows recovery of workers' compensation benefits does not apply. City of Atlanta v. Spearman, 209 Ga. App. 644, 434 S.E.2d 87 (1993).

- The provisions of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 were not intended to afford compensation to injuries of employees in public parking lots. Tate v. Bruno's Inc./Food Max, 200 Ga. App. 395, 408 S.E.2d 456, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 897, 408 S.E.2d 456 (1991).

- Judgment denying the employee workers' compensation benefits was affirmed because the employee's injury on a public sidewalk occurred while the employee was egressing the employer's property during a regularly scheduled lunch break; thus, the injury was not compensable under the Workers Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Daniel v. Bremen-Bowdon Inv. Co., 348 Ga. App. 803, 824 S.E.2d 698 (2019).

When the decedent was shot and killed in the parking lot outside a grocery store where the decedent was employed, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the store and several persons who owned or managed the store because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the death of the decedent was a compensable injury under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., and fell within the exclusive remedy provision of the Act because a fact question existed as to whether the "in the course of" requirement was met because there was evidence showing that the decedent was shot while off duty in a parking lot that was not owned, maintained, or controlled by the employer. Smith v. Camarena, 352 Ga. App. 797, 835 S.E.2d 712 (2019).

- City's control over the allocation of parking spaces was not equal to control and direction over the parking lot itself. Thus, an accident in the parking lot did not arise out of and in the course of employment. City of Atlanta v. Spearman, 209 Ga. App. 644, 434 S.E.2d 87 (1993).

- For purposes of the ingress and egress rule, an employer's premises is real property owned, maintained or controlled by the employer; when a janitor at a law school crashed the janitor's bicycle after the janitor passed the law school building en route to another building where the janitor had to sign in and obtain keys to the law school, the janitor was involved in conduct arising out of and in the course of the janitor's job and was entitled to compensation. Peoples v. Emory Univ., 206 Ga. App. 213, 424 S.E.2d 874 (1992).

- An assault and kidnapping which took place on the employer's premises while the employee was in the process of going to work occurred "in the course of" the victim's employment. Helton v. Interstate Brands Corp., 155 Ga. App. 607, 271 S.E.2d 739 (1980).

- When an employer made provisions for employees to enter a work building ahead of time in order to change into working clothes, and in view of the fact that 20 minutes cannot be held an unreasonable length of time to proceed to a dressing room, change clothes, and proceed to the work station, an award to the claimant for an injury on the way to the dressing room prior to starting the claimant's shift was not without evidence to support it. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Worley, 86 Ga. App. 794, 72 S.E.2d 560 (1952).

- When an employee on a ship, while the ship was docked, obtained leave for a few hours to go into an adjacent city, the employee was in the course of employment when the employee attempted, on the employee's way back to the ship, to enter a gate maintained by the employee's master between its private docks and terminals and a public street, the entrance and exit of the master's employees; the relationship of master and servant was not suspended, but was merely dormant. Holliday v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 32 Ga. App. 567, 124 S.E. 89 (1924).

When a member of a crew on a vessel lying at the docks, part of the terminal of the defendant, obtained shore leave and, after two hours spent ashore, returned to the terminals and demanded entrance at a gate, even if the relationship of master and servant existing between the crew member and the transportation company had been suspended, that relationship came immediately into existence again as soon as the servant returned to the gate and demanded admittance. Holliday v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 161 Ga. 949, 132 S.E. 210 (1926).

- An employee leaving work after working hours is not "on the job" while so leaving, even when the employee is subject to call at all hours of the day and the employee's work just before the employee left the premises on the occasion in question might be said to have been equivalent to a special call. Welsh v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 61 Ga. App. 635, 7 S.E.2d 85 (1940), disapproved, Lewis Wood Preserving Co. v. Jones, 110 Ga. App. 689, 140 S.E.2d 113 (1964).

7. Lunch and Rest Breaks

Injury during free time.

- A hotel employee who during a 15-minute rest period, desiring to obtain some cold water to drink, went to the hotel basement, and, in attempting to obtain some ice out of a machine used to crush ice, severely injured the employee's hand, was properly denied compensation, as the employee's injury did not arise out of the employee's employment. Austin v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 56 Ga. App. 481, 193 S.E. 86 (1937).

When an employee is free to use time for the employee's own individual affairs and an injury occurs during this time, the injury is not compensable as not arising out of employment. Teems v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 131 Ga. App. 685, 206 S.E.2d 721 (1974).

Children's home employee who resided on premises, and was "subject to call" when the employee perished in a fire on the premises, was fulfilling a part of the employee's duties when the employee was involved in the fire, and the employee's death was therefore compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Blair v. Georgia Baptist Children's Home & Family Ministries, Inc., 189 Ga. App. 579, 377 S.E.2d 21 (1988), cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 911, 377 S.E.2d 21 (1989).

When the worker fell at a restaurant on a scheduled lunch break and the worker's employer corporation had no control over the worker during that period, the worker's injury did not arise out of employment and a workers' compensation award was reversed. ATC Healthcare Serv. v. Adams, 263 Ga. App. 792, 589 S.E.2d 346 (2003).

- When the claimant was injured in a fall while on the way to the restroom on the employer's premises during a ten-minute rest break, being free to use the time as the claimant chose, an injury occurring during this time arose out of the claimant's individual pursuit and not out of the claimant's employment. Wilkie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 714, 185 S.E.2d 783 (1971), for comment, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 703 (1972).

- In a claim for compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), when the evidence showed that the claimant, who was employed to pick up waste around a cotton mill, was injured by reason of a fire which occurred in the "hopper room" where the claimant had gone during the lunch hour and while off duty for the purpose of sleeping and that the claimant's duty did not require the claimant to go into the hopper room, and when the overseer of the employer testified that during the lunch hour the employees were permitted to lounge anywhere except the hopper room, a finding that the injury to the claimant did not arise out of and in the course of employment was authorized. Drummond v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 43 Ga. App. 595, 159 S.E. 740 (1931).

- Injuries occurring during a scheduled lunch break or rest break, while the claimant is free to do as the claimant chooses, are generally not compensable. Rampley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 612, 239 S.E.2d 183 (1977).

Even if the employee is on a scheduled break and even if the employee is free to use the break time as the employee pleases, if the employee is in fact engaged in employment-related activities, the injury is compensable under the workers' compensation law, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Swanson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 181 Ga. App. 876, 354 S.E.2d 204 (1987).

- An injury while an employee is conducting the employer's business or following job-related instructions during a "break" is compensable. Wilkie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 714, 185 S.E.2d 783 (1971), for comment, see 23 Mercer L. Rev. 703 (1972).

- Once a claimant has introduced evidence establishing that an accident or injury occurred on the employer's premises during the regularly scheduled workday, even though the claimant was on break when it happened, it falls on the employer's shoulders to introduce evidence to show that the break was a scheduled one during which the claimant was not subject to the employer's demands or control. Rampley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 612, 239 S.E.2d 183 (1977).

- The preparation for and the eating of lunch by an employee during a 30-minute lunch period was the employee's individual affair and was not a part of the employer's work, as the employee was not required to eat lunch on the premises; thus, the injury suffered during the lunch period was not compensable. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Honea, 71 Ga. App. 569, 31 S.E.2d 421 (1944).

In a workers' compensation case in which the employee was injured while in the break room in the process of taking the employee's lunch outside, the scheduled lunch break exception barred recovery and the ingress and egress rule did not apply. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 91 Ga. App. 305, 309, 85 S.E.2d 484 (1954), Chandler v. Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 101 Ga. App. 597, 114 S.E.2d 438 (1960), and Rockwell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 248 Ga. App. 73, 545 S.E.2d 121 (2001), were disapproved. Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers' Comp., 348 Ga. App. 30, 821 S.E.2d 132 (2018).

Because the employee's injury occurred while the employee was egressing the employer's property during a regularly scheduled lunch break, the employee's injury was not compensable under the Workers Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Daniel v. Bremen-Bowdon Inv. Co., 348 Ga. App. 803, 824 S.E.2d 698 (2019).

- An employee obtaining lunch for an employer is not a task of a personal nature but one of benefit to the employer entitling the employee to workers' compensation benefits in the event the employee is injured in a restaurant while obtaining the lunch. Edwards v. State, 173 Ga. App. 87, 325 S.E.2d 437 (1984).

- An employee, who was injured in an automobile accident while being driven back to the employee's office by a co-employee after lunch, was barred from pursuing a common-law negligence action against the co-employee because workers' compensation covered the incident, when the trial court found that the lunch was a business lunch at which recruitment needs, sources of recruitment, and recruiting strategy were discussed. Mann v. Workman, 257 Ga. 70, 354 S.E.2d 831 (1987).

Recreational or social activities are within the course of employment, and thus subject to the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., if: (1) they occur on work premises during a lunch or recreation period as a regular incident of employment; or (2) employee participation is required, either expressly or by implication; or (3) the employer derives a substantial benefit from the event beyond the improvement in employee health and morale that is common to all kinds of recreational or social activities. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. Hood, 198 Ga. App. 112, 400 S.E.2d 657 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 400 S.E.2d 657 (1991).

Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., did not provide the exclusive remedy for the drowning of an employee during a company picnic, when the picnic did not occur on work premises and employee attendance was not required, notwithstanding the company's contention that the picnic had the purpose of promoting its new product of traditional hand-tossed pizza and recruiting and maintaining employees. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. Hood, 198 Ga. App. 112, 400 S.E.2d 657 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 400 S.E.2d 657 (1991).

8. Traveling to and from Work

In general.

- Death or injury to an employee on the employee's way to work while pursuing a course of the employee's own selection does not arise out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Clore, 34 Ga. App. 409, 129 S.E. 799 (1925).

It is the general rule that a worker injured while going to or from the worker's place of work is not in the course of the worker's employment. Wilcox v. Shepherd Lumber Corp., 80 Ga. App. 71, 55 S.E.2d 382 (1949).

Hazards encountered by employees while going to or returning from their regular place of work, before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises, are not ordinarily incident to the employment, and for this reason injuries resulting from such hazards are in most instances held not to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment. Wilcox v. Shepherd Lumber Corp., 80 Ga. App. 71, 55 S.E.2d 382 (1949).

The general rule is that when an employee's duties begin and end at the employee's place of employment and the employer does not furnish the employee transportation to and from that place, accidents occurring while the employee is en route to or coming from such place do not arise out of the employee's employment. Lewis Wood Preserving Co. v. Jones, 110 Ga. App. 689, 140 S.E.2d 113 (1964).

Trial court properly upheld the denial of two employees' claims for workers' compensation coverage because the motor vehicle accident in which the employees were involved in on the way to work was not compensable as there was no causal connection between the employees' employment and the accident; thus, the employees' injuries did not arise out of employment. Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Hernandez, 319 Ga. App. 335, 734 S.E.2d 557 (2012).

- Because the employee was struck in a crosswalk on the way to work as a cashier at a golf tournament, the general rule applied and the injury was not compensable; the court declined to extend the positional risk doctrine to the crosswalk which was not a part of the employer's premises. Collie Concessions, Inc. v. Bruce, 272 Ga. App. 578, 612 S.E.2d 900 (2005).

- While the hazards encountered by employees while going to or returning from the regular place of work are in most instances held not to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of employment, that rule is ordinarily applied only in those cases involving employees whose hours and place of employment are fixed and who show that travel is not an incident of their employment, that is, in those cases with a sharp division between the personal requirements of the employee and the requirements of the employer. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Casey, 91 Ga. App. 694, 86 S.E.2d 697 (1955).

- Generally, injuries sustained by an employee while going to or coming from the employee's employment are not compensable, except in certain instances, such as: 1) when the employer furnishes transportation; 2) doing some act permitted or required by the employer and beneficial to the employer while en route to and from work; 3) going to and from parking facilities provided by the employer; and 4) when an employee is on call and furnishes or is reimbursed for the employee's transportation costs. Corbin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 823, 162 S.E.2d 226 (1968); Street v. Douglas County Rd. Dep't, 160 Ga. App. 559, 287 S.E.2d 586 (1981).

Exceptions to the general rule that an injury suffered by an employee while driving home at the end of the employee's day of work is not one arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment include situations in which the employer furnishes the vehicle or transportation, or in which the employee, while using the employee's own vehicle, is doing some act permitted, required, or beneficial to the employer while en route to or from work, or in which the employee is on call. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 120 Ga. App. 51, 169 S.E.2d 665 (1969), later appeal, 124 Ga. App. 7, 183 S.E.2d 13 (1971).

- It is the general rule that a worker injured going to or coming from the place of work is not in the course of the worker's employment; however, when a worker is injured while being transported in a vehicle furnished by the worker's employer as an incident of employment, the worker is within the course of the worker's employment, as contemplated by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Curry, 187 Ga. 342, 200 S.E. 150 (1938); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Bolen, 106 Ga. App. 684, 127 S.E.2d 832 (1962); Board of Trustees v. Christy, 154 Ga. App. 488, 269 S.E.2d 33 (1980); Jose Andrade Painting v. Jaimes, 207 Ga. App. 596, 428 S.E.2d 640 (1993).

When a vehicle is supplied by an employer for the mutual benefit of the employer and a worker to facilitate the progress of the work, employment begins when the worker enters the vehicle and ends when the worker leaves it on the termination of the worker's labor; this exception to the general rule may arise either as the result of custom or contract, express or implied, and may be implied from the nature and circumstances of the employment and the custom of the employer to furnish transportation. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Curry, 187 Ga. 342, 200 S.E. 150 (1938); Jose Andrade Painting v. Jaimes, 207 Ga. App. 596, 428 S.E.2d 640 (1993).

While going to or returning from the place of work, a worker is not "in the course of his employment", unless the means of transportation used by the worker has been furnished by the worker's employer as incident to or as part of the contract of the worker's employment. Wilcox v. Shepherd Lumber Corp., 80 Ga. App. 71, 55 S.E.2d 382 (1949).

When an employee was killed in an automobile accident while driving a truck provided by the employer, an award of compensation based on a finding that the employee was injured on the way to the job site was supported by the doctrine providing coverage to an employee injured on the way to or from work while in a vehicle furnished by the employer as an incident of the employment. Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. King, 281 Ga. 853, 642 S.E.2d 841 (2007).

- When an employee is subject to call and sustains an injury while going to or from work, and at the time of the injury is actually engaged in furthering the employer's business, the injury arises out of and in the course of the employment and is compensable. Lewis Wood Preserving Co. v. Jones, 110 Ga. App. 689, 140 S.E.2d 113 (1964).

An exception to the general rule that an injury must arise out of and in the course of employment is when an employee is on call and is reimbursed for the employee's transportation costs; however, there is no difference between an employee on call and one off call when the employee provides the employee's own lodging and transportation. Foster v. Brown Transp. Corp., 143 Ga. App. 371, 238 S.E.2d 738 (1977).

Police officer who was injured in a car accident one block away from the officer's precinct while driving to work, in uniform, armed, and with the officer's radio on, was entitled to workers' compensation benefits because the officer was subject to duty 24 hours per day. Mayor v. Stevens, 261 Ga. App. 694, 583 S.E.2d 553 (2003).

Although, for purposes of workers' compensation, a police officer's injuries from a traffic accident while the officer was driving to work arose in the course of employment under the continuous employment doctrine, the accident was not related to the employee's work as a police officer and thus the injuries did not arise out of employment. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Stevens, 278 Ga. 166, 598 S.E.2d 456 (2004).

- Workers' compensation claimant was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., for injuries the claimant sustained in a fall in a mall, 100 to 200 yards from the escalator leading to the claimant's employer's hotel that was adjacent to the mall and which the claimant's employer did not own, control, or maintain. Hill v. Omni Hotel at CNN Ctr., 268 Ga. App. 144, 601 S.E.2d 472 (2004).

- When an employee is permitted or required by the employee's master to perform a part of the work contemplated by the contract of employment, or some act incidental thereto and beneficial to the employer, while en route to work, and is accidentally injured at such time, the injury arises in the course of employment. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moore, 115 Ga. App. 295, 154 S.E.2d 385 (1967).

- If transportation was furnished by a subcontractor to the claimant and other employees of the principal contractor free of charge and in the interest of assisting the principal contractor in performing the work, with the full knowledge and consent of the employer, and was relied on by the employees as the means of transportation to and from their work, the claimant, while being thus transported, was engaged in doing something incidental to the performance of the claimant's duties, and the evidence was sufficient to support an award in the claimant's favor for injuries suffered while being transported. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mangham, 56 Ga. App. 498, 193 S.E. 87 (1937).

- When employees were members of a car pool financed by their employer, they were within the scope of employment when they were involved in an accident on the way home, even though they had deviated from their usual route prior to the accident by stopping at a whiskey store. Adams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 125 Ga. App. 232, 186 S.E.2d 784 (1971).

- Injury was not sustained in the course of employment, when employer met the employees every morning at an apartment complex to give out work assignments, the apartment complex having been chosen as a meeting point because many of the employees lived in or around the complex; after receiving their work assignment, the employees would form car pools to travel to the various job sites, using their own vehicles, the employer's vehicle and another vehicle furnished by the employer; on occasion, the employer would give employees money for gas; at the end of the work day, some employees would return to the complex to drop off co-workers from the complex; the workers were only paid for time at the job site; employee was injured returning to the apartment complex at the end of a work day in a co-worker's car; and on the day of the accident the co-worker was not given any money for gas. Jose Andrade Painting v. Jaimes, 207 Ga. App. 596, 428 S.E.2d 640 (1993).

- While the deceased was paid from the time the deceased started work at a mill, and the time the deceased spent riding on a company truck going to and from the deceased's work was not counted, a finding that the deceased was actually in the service of the deceased's employer while the deceased was riding to and from work, and that the real beginning of the deceased's work was when the deceased boarded the truck, was authorized. Hamner v. White, 80 Ga. App. 648, 56 S.E.2d 653 (1949).

- The rule that an employee is injured in the course of employment, within the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), when, at the time of the accident, the employee is being transported to or from work by the employer as a part of the contract of employment, is not applicable when the means of transportation or the way is provided by the employer, but the employee does not choose to avail oneself of such means of transportation, and sustains harm by being, or attempting to be, transported by a conveyance furnished by another employee and selected by the claimant employee personally; in such a case the injury is not compensable. Martin v. State Hwy. Bd., 54 Ga. App. 856, 189 S.E. 614 (1936).

- Gratuitous and permissive riding on an employer's vehicle by an employee in going forth and back between the employee's home and the employee's place of work, not in furtherance of the employer's business, did not justify the conclusion that a right to do so became by implication a part of the contract, and a fatal injury suffered by the employee during the ride home did not arise out of and in the course of employment. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Curry, 187 Ga. 342, 200 S.E. 150 (1938).

- When the actual work of the employee was in a woods 20 miles from the employee's residence, the employee's residence being near the mill of the employee's employer, and each morning the employee caught a ride on the truck of a third person from the mill to the employee's place of work, with the knowledge, consent, and expectation of the employer but without any express agreement between the parties, a finding that the injury and death of such employee when the employee was thrown from the truck arose out of and in the course of employment was authorized. Cooper v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 179 Ga. 256, 175 S.E. 577 (1934).

- When bartender who frequently worked until 4 A.M. was voluntarily taken home by another employee, without additional remuneration, and the employer, who was aware of this practice, did not consider such transportation as additional remuneration, a finding that the death of the bartender one morning on the bartender's way home from work did not arise out of and in the course of the bartender's employment was authorized. Thane v. Maryland Cas. Co., 99 Ga. App. 753, 109 S.E.2d 829 (1959).

- The deceased's death in a traffic accident which occurred as the deceased was returning from a job site, to which the deceased had gone to secure tools, to the deceased's home, at which the deceased was to make repairs to the employer's tractor, was occasioned by the engagement in the deceased's employment. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mansfield, 78 Ga. App. 248, 50 S.E.2d 370 (1948).

- When an employee was killed in an automobile accident while returning home from a convention and banquet relating to the electrical supply business in which the employer was engaged, the evidence demanded a finding that the employee's death was not the result of an accident arising out of or in the course of employment, despite the fact that the automobile in which the deceased was traveling belonged to the employer and was furnished to the employer for use in employment, since the employer permitted the deceased to use the automobile for the deceased's own personal use. Roper v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 69 Ga. App. 726, 26 S.E.2d 488 (1943).

- When newspaper delivery employee had gone to the office of the employer to turn in money collected and was injured while riding a bicycle home, employee was on employee's own time, and a finding that such injury was not compensable because it did not arise out of and during the course of employee's employment was supported by the evidence. United States Cas. Co. v. Scott, 51 Ga. App. 115, 179 S.E. 640 (1935).

- When an employer was negligent in refusing to permit an employee to leave employment at a time when the employee could have avoided a snowstorm and effected a safe return home, a cause of action for negligence on the part of the employer was related to the employment of the employee and had to be sought under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) rather than by an action for negligence. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Peacock, 151 Ga. App. 278, 259 S.E.2d 681 (1979).

9. Deviation from Employment

In general.

- An injury may be compensable when an employee is on a mission with two objectives, one personal and the other connected with employment, but this rule is qualified by the requirement that the trip must have a direct, immediate, and substantial business objective. Ayers v. Gulf Ins. Co., 89 Ga. App. 808, 81 S.E.2d 234 (1954).

- Employee was engaged in an activity that arose out of and in the course of employment at the time the employee was fatally injured as the employee's company-supplied vehicle was struck by another vehicle after the employee had completed a personal errand and was returning to either the company-supplied housing or the company's job site. Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. King, 277 Ga. App. 144, 625 S.E.2d 541 (2006).

- There is no requirement that the employee, at the time of an injury, must have no objective other than the business of the employer; it is sufficient if the injury is occasioned by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Welker, 75 Ga. App. 594, 44 S.E.2d 160 (1947).

- If a servant steps aside from the master's business for however short a time to do an act entirely disconnected from it, and an injury results to another from such an independent voluntary act, the servant may be liable, but the master is not liable. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. App. 115, 197 S.E. 650 (1938).

When the employee steps aside from the employer's business to do some act of the employee's own, not connected with the employer's business, the relationship of employer and employee, or master and servant, is, as to that act, completely suspended, and an accident occurring at that time, resulting in injury to the employee, does not arise out of the employment within the meaning of this section; however, the incident necessary to constitute a break in the employer must be of a pronounced character. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Souther, 110 Ga. App. 84, 137 S.E.2d 705 (1964).

- The fatal injury of a laundry truck driver who deviated from the driver's employment in going to the aid of some fellow travelers on the highway, but was at a place where the driver had a right to be in pursuance of the driver's duties, had indicated that the driver's mission of helpfulness was at an end, and had put one foot on the running board, one hand on the door and one hand on the steering wheel of the driver's truck as incidental to entering the truck to resume the driver's duties for the master at the time the driver was fatally struck by an automobile was in the course of and arose out of employment. Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Sockwell, 58 Ga. App. 111, 197 S.E. 647 (1938).

When an employee breaks the continuity of employment for purposes of the employee's own, and is injured before the employee returns back into the line of employment, the injury does not arise out of and in the course of employment; but when the personal mission has been accomplished and the employee is once more engaged in the duties of employment when injured, the injury arises out of and in the course of the employment. Parks v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 Ga. App. 720, 26 S.E.2d 562 (1943); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Prescott, 80 Ga. App. 421, 56 S.E.2d 137 (1949).

Although a servant may have made a temporary departure from the service of the master, and in so doing may for the time have severed the relationship of master and servant, yet, when the object of the servant's departure has been accomplished and the servant has resumed the discharge of the servant's duties to the master, the responsibility of the master for the acts of the servant reattaches. Parks v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 Ga. App. 720, 26 S.E.2d 562 (1943).

The fact that an employee, after making deliveries pursuant to the employee's duties as an employee, went outside of the employee's duties and visited among the employee's friends did not deprive the employee of the status of an employee in and about the employer's business when afterwards, in the discharge of the duties of employment, the employee proceeded with a delivery to the employer. Parks v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 Ga. App. 720, 26 S.E.2d 562 (1943).

- When an activity in which an employee was engaged when the employee died was in the interest of the employer and was reasonably incident to the employee's regular work, the employment was a contributing cause of death, and the concurrence of personal gratification in the activity will not defeat compensability under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Cabin Crafts, Inc. v. Pelfrey, 119 Ga. App. 809, 168 S.E.2d 660 (1969).

- The drowning of a watchman while seeking to save the watchman's dog was held not to have occurred in the performance of the watchman's duties to the master. Montgomery v. Maryland Cas. Co., 39 Ga. App. 210, 146 S.E. 504 (1929), aff'd, 169 Ga. 746, 151 S.E. 363 (1930).

- When the deceased delivery person was located five miles in the opposite direction from an employer's plant and at places at which deliveries were made, having run a delivery truck into a large tree and sustained fatal injuries, and another person who was not an employee, was found in the truck with the deceased, along with a whiskey bottle, and the odor of whiskey was strong on the breath of the deceased, a finding that the fatal injury did not arise out of and in the course of the deceased's employment and that there had been such a departure from the scope of the employment as would bar recovery of compensation by the widow of the deceased was authorized. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Curry, 76 Ga. App. 312, 45 S.E.2d 453 (1947).

10. Horseplay

Injury resulting from employee's own "horseplay."

- When an injury was the result of "horseplay" or "fooling" by the injured employee, who instigated the occurrence, the employer was not liable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) for the injuries so sustained, as even though the accident occurred in the course of the employment, it did not arise out of the employment. Givens v. Travelers Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 50, 30 S.E.2d 115 (1944).

When employees step aside from their employment and engage in horseplay or practical joking, or so engage while continuing their work, and accidental injury results, the injury is not one arising out of the employment within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Cowan, 85 Ga. App. 816, 70 S.E.2d 386 (1952), for comment, see 4 Mercer L. Rev. 216 (1952).

Injury to a covered employee resulting from "horseplay" in which the claimant was the instigator or a participant does not "arise out of" the employment. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Georgia Auto. Dealers' Ass'n Group Self-Insurers' Fund, 182 Ga. App. 595, 356 S.E.2d 686 (1987).

- The injury of an innocent employee in the course of employment by the horseplay of a fellow employee, in which the injured employee did not participate, arises out of the employee's employment, and nothing more appearing, is compensable. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Benford, 77 Ga. App. 93, 47 S.E.2d 673 (1948), for comment, see 11 Ga. B. J. 79 (1948).

An employee who is not participating in practical joking or horseplay but is discharging the duties of employment at the time the employee is injured by the playful prank of a fellow employee sustains an accidental injury arising out of employment within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Baird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 98 Ga. App. 882, 107 S.E.2d 579 (1959).

- The fact that an employer has permitted the practice of practical joking and should anticipate that it may result in an employee being injured must be considered in determining whether the risk of injury from practical joking or prank playing has become a risk of the employment so that a resulting injury arose out of the employment. Baird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 98 Ga. App. 882, 107 S.E.2d 579 (1959).

- The death of an employee caused by falling on a knife when engaged in horseplay with another employee did not arise out of employment. Maddox v. Travelers Ins. Co., 39 Ga. App. 690, 148 S.E. 307 (1929).

- When convict guards were leisurely gathered in camp, one of whom took from the pocket of another a gun in a joking fashion, snapped it, unbreached it, and then in this condition delivered it to its owner, who, in attempting to breach it preparatory to returning it to one's pocket, accidentally fired the gun, killing the deceased, the commission (now board) properly found that while this accident arose in the course of employment it did not arise out of the employment, there being nothing to indicate that such handling of the gun was an incident to the employment. Georgia Cas. Co. v. Martin, 157 Ga. 909, 122 S.E. 881 (1924).

When an employee, in sport or horseplay, tampers with a pistol belonging to another, such act not being properly within the course of the scope of employment, and thus creates a situation as a result of which the employee is accidentally shot by the owner of the pistol, the employee's death is not compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Phillips, 97 Ga. App. 729, 104 S.E.2d 542 (1958).

11. Traveling Salespeople and Employees

Injury arising from travel.

- When the duties of an employee are such that the employee is required to travel away from home to perform the duties of employment, and sustains an accidental injury on account of such hazards as may arise from the fact of traveling, such injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 82 Ga. App. 422, 61 S.E.2d 293 (1950).

- The scope and range of a traveling employee's territorial activity necessarily broadens the field of employment, but in no other way is the traveling employee distinguished from ordinary employees who do not have to travel in the performance of their work. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Thornton, 71 Ga. App. 486, 31 S.E.2d 115 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945).

The scope of employment of a traveling employee is wider than that of an ordinary employee, and is not broken by mere intervals of leisure such as those taken for a meal, unless the employee is doing something wholly foreign to the employee's employment. Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945).

- If an employee is required to be away from home at night by the duties of employment, and the employee's compensation covers the expense necessary and incident to spending the night away from home, the protection of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) extends to such employee while so engaged in the service of the employer. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Shuttleworth, 61 Ga. App. 644, 7 S.E.2d 195 (1940).

While a servant, such as a traveling salesperson, is traveling for the benefit of an employer and performing acts incident to employment, including lodging or eating, the servant is considered to be within the course and scope of employment continuously. Johnston v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ga. 1969).

When an employee who lived in an employer-provided apartment was killed in an accident after delivering some family furniture to a storage shed, the employee's child was entitled to workers' compensation dependency benefits under the continuous employment doctrine; when the employee returned from the personal mission to the general proximity of the area where the employee worked, coverage resumed whether the employee was resuming the employee's trip to the job site or was returning to the employer-provided housing. Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. King, 281 Ga. 853, 642 S.E.2d 841 (2007).

- The proper test to be applied to determine whether an injury arises out of the course of employment is whether an employee, while working away from home, is required by employment to lodge and work within an area geographically limited by the necessity of being available for work on the employer's job site, so that the employee is, in effect, in continuous employment. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Navarre, 147 Ga. App. 302, 248 S.E.2d 562 (1978).

- A traveling salesperson is in continuous employment, day and night, but this does not mean that the salesperson cannot step aside from employment for personal reasons, or reasons in no way connected with the salesperson's employment, just as might an ordinary employee working on a schedule of hours at a fixed location. International Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Bozardt, 156 Ga. App. 794, 275 S.E.2d 376 (1980).

- If the motivating purpose of a trip was personal interest and the journey would have been made just the same without the interest or task to be done for the employer, an injury in the course of travel would be not in the course of employment; however, if the journey would still have been made for the work or business of the employer had the element of personal interest been lacking, the injury would be in the course of employment and compensable. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Babb, 67 Ga. App. 161, 19 S.E.2d 550 (1942).

When an employee sustains an accidental injury because of hazards arising solely on account of being engaged in a matter purely personal to the employee amounting to a deviation from acts reasonably necessary in traveling away from home in order to perform duties of employment, such accidental injury is not one arising out of and in the course of employment. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 82 Ga. App. 422, 61 S.E.2d 293 (1950).

- Acts of ministration by a servant to the servant, such as quenching the servant's thirst or relieving the servant's hunger, are incidents of the servant's employment, and consequently no break in the employment is caused by the mere fact that the worker is ministering to the worker's personal comforts to procure drink and food. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Shuttleworth, 61 Ga. App. 644, 7 S.E.2d 195 (1940).

When the duties of a traveling salesperson take the salesperson away from home, the salesperson's acts of ministration to the salesperson do not take the salesperson outside the scope of employment, so long as the salesperson performs these acts in a normal and prudent manner. Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945); McDonald v. State Hwy. Dep't, 127 Ga. App. 171, 192 S.E.2d 919 (1972); International Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Bozardt, 156 Ga. App. 794, 275 S.E.2d 376 (1980).

A traveling salesperson, while lodging in a hotel or preparing to eat, or while going to or returning from a meal, is performing an act incident to the salesperson's employment, unless the salesperson steps aside from the salesperson's employment for personal reasons. Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945); International Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Bozardt, 156 Ga. App. 794, 275 S.E.2d 376 (1980).

An employee who is required to be away from home about the business of an employer will be allowed compensation for an injury which occurs by reason of the fact that the employee has to eat or sleep during that time, as proper food and proper rest are necessary and incidental to the performance of the labor required. International Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Bozardt, 156 Ga. App. 794, 275 S.E.2d 376 (1980).

- Injuries sustained by a traveling salesperson while traveling by automobile from one town to another on business for an employer are compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Skinner, 188 Ga. 823, 5 S.E.2d 9 (1939).

- When the work of an employee or the performance of an incidental duty involves exposure to the perils of the highway, the protection of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) extends to the employee while the employee is passing along the highway in the performance of the employee's duties. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786 (1923); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Waymick, 42 Ga. App. 177, 155 S.E. 366 (1930), aff'd, 173 Ga. 67, 159 S.E. 564 (1931); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Shuttleworth, 61 Ga. App. 644, 7 S.E.2d 195 (1940).

An employee whose work requires that the employee travel and spend nights away from home, at hotels or lodging places, is protected by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) from exposure to the perils of the highway and the hazards of hotels which occur in the normal, usual, and accustomed manner, and which are incident to such exposure. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Thornton, 71 Ga. App. 486, 31 S.E.2d 115 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 198 Ga. 786, 32 S.E.2d 816 (1945).

- When the duties of an employee entail the employee's presence or travel upon a highway, a claim for an injury occurring there is not to be barred because it results from a risk common to all others upon the highway under like conditions, unless it is also common to the general public without regard to such conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit. Globe Indem. Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46 (1928), aff'd, 169 Ga. 510, 150 S.E. 849 (1929).

- Status of a bus driver who is required to be away from home overnight is substantially analogous to that of a traveling salesperson required to remain away from home. International Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Bozardt, 156 Ga. App. 794, 275 S.E.2d 376 (1980).

12. Disease Resulting from Accident

Editor's notes.

- Cases relating to disease resulting from employment should be read in light of Art. 8 of this chapter, relating to occupational diseases.

- In order to be compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), a disease must arise out of or result from an accident or injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lynch, 63 Ga. App. 530, 11 S.E.2d 699 (1940).

- A traumatic disease, as distinguished from an idiopathic disease, is one which is caused by physical injury, and is compensable. Griggs v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 61 Ga. App. 448, 6 S.E.2d 180 (1939), aff'd, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

- Injury means an injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and does not include a disease in any form, except a disease resulting naturally and unavoidably from the accident or injury received. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maddox, 52 Ga. App. 416, 183 S.E. 570 (1935).

- The word "naturally", as employed in this section, means according to the laws of nature of the usual course of things. United States Cas. Co. v. Smith, 34 Ga. App. 363, 129 S.E. 880 (1925), aff'd, 162 Ga. 130, 133 S.E. 851 (1926).

- The word "unavoidably" is to be given a reasonable interpretation according to its general acceptance, keeping in mind the general requirements of the law as to the care and diligence which a person ordinarily exercises for that person's own safety and protection; it is not employed in the absolute sense, and does not imply that the disease must follow certainly. A thing is generally considered unavoidable when common prudence and foresight cannot prevent it. United States Cas. Co. v. Smith, 34 Ga. App. 363, 129 S.E. 880 (1925), aff'd, 162 Ga. 130, 133 S.E. 851 (1926).

A disease results naturally and unavoidably from injury when it is contracted in a way that is natural to the disease and when it could not have been avoided by the victim through the exercise of reasonable care and caution. United States Cas. Co. v. Smith, 34 Ga. App. 363, 129 S.E. 880 (1925), aff'd, 162 Ga. 130, 133 S.E. 851 (1926); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 48 Ga. App. 822, 173 S.E. 925 (1934).

- Physical sickness and disease "result from" injury when there is a causal connection between them. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lynch, 63 Ga. App. 530, 11 S.E.2d 699 (1940).

- This section did not contemplate any disease, except when it resulted naturally and unavoidably from the accident; however, an injury which aggravated a preexisting disease was compensable, when such increased result would not have occurred except for the injury. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Chandler, 61 Ga. App. 311, 6 S.E.2d 142 (1939).

- A disability to an employee caused by a disease which results from unusual, sudden, and unexpected inhalation of gas or fumes while performing the duties of employment, when the disease causing the injury is not the natural result of the existence of conditions necessary incident to the work being performed, is the result of an injury by accident and is compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), and the employee's negligence in continuing to work after knowingly inhaling such fumes would not constitute a bar to compensation. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lynch, 63 Ga. App. 530, 11 S.E.2d 699 (1940).

- Worker was properly denied workers' compensation benefits and terminated from employment for failing to return from a leave of absence because evidence supported the findings that the worker recovered from the chemical fume exposure incident based on a family doctor releasing the worker to return to work with no restrictions and that the pneumonia the worker suffered was unrelated to the exposure incident. Royal v. Pulaski State Prison, 324 Ga. App. 275, 750 S.E.2d 179 (2013).

- When evidence showed that an employee consulted a physician promptly and was constantly under treatment, it was sufficient to establish that the employee could not have avoided the disease by ordinary care. United States Cas. Co. v. Smith, 34 Ga. App. 363, 129 S.E. 880 (1925), aff'd, 162 Ga. 130, 133 S.E. 851 (1926).

- When an employee skinned the employee's hands as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such abrasions came in contact with a cleaning agent used on the job, resulting in dermatitis so that the employee suffered a "loss of use" of the employee's hands, such employee was entitled to compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Shore v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 102 Ga. App. 431, 116 S.E.2d 526 (1960).

13. Willful Acts of Third Persons

Chapter inapplicable when employee attacked by co-employee.

- When the evidence of record did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff's performance of the plaintiff's duties at the supermarket and the incident which gave rise to the action, but instead it was inferred from the evidence that a co-employee attacked the plaintiff for reasons which were purely personal, within the contemplation of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 (4), it followed that the employee was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11. Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 186 Ga. App. 867, 368 S.E.2d 813 (1988).

- The legislature did not intend to except all injuries caused by the willful act of third persons from the operation of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), as had that been its intention, the phrase "for reasons personal to such employee", would not have been used; rather, it was intended that certain injuries, though inflicted by the willful act of a third person, should come, for purposes of compensation, within the scope of that law. Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency v. Walker, 30 Ga. App. 91, 117 S.E. 281 (1923).

- An injury is not compensable when it was caused by the willful act of a third party directed against the claimant employee for reasons personal to such employee. Jackson v. Wilson, 84 Ga. App. 684, 67 S.E.2d 161 (1951).

For a claimant to be entitled to compensation under this section, the claimant must show that the employee's death resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of the claimant's employment; however, the accident cannot be a willful act of a third person directed against the employee for reasons personal to such employee. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960).

When an injury results from an attack by a coemployee on a claimant, the attack must be work-related rather than for personal reasons for the injury to be compensable. State v. Purmort, 143 Ga. App. 269, 238 S.E.2d 268 (1977).

Although workers' compensation may provide the exclusive remedy when the injured party is a nonparticipating victim of "horseplay" or the subject of wilful actions taken by fellow employees, workers' compensation is not the exclusive remedy, and thus does not bar a common-law tort claim, when the wilful actions are directed against the nonparticipating victim by fellow employees for purely nonwork-related personal reasons. Brown v. Trefz & Trefz, 173 Ga. App. 586, 327 S.E.2d 556 (1985).

When an employee is injured in a physical altercation with a co-employee occurring on the job but stemming from personal animosity, the employee's injuries will nevertheless be considered compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., if it is shown that the animosity arose from reasons related to the employee's performance of the employee's work-related duties. Western Waterproofing Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ga. App. 779, 420 S.E.2d 606, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 922, 420 S.E.2d 606 (1992).

- The fact that an injury is the result of the willful or criminal assault of a third person does not necessarily prevent it from being accidental within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 56 Ga. App. 68, 192 S.E. 325 (1937); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960); Sands v. Union Camp Corp., 559 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1977); Zamora v. Coffee Gen. Hosp., 162 Ga. App. 82, 290 S.E.2d 192 (1982).

An injury caused by the attack of a third person may be accidental so far as the injured person is concerned. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 56 Ga. App. 68, 192 S.E. 325 (1937).

When injury is the result of the willful or criminal assault of a third person, and an employee is guilty of no misconduct, the injury may be "accidental" within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Coney, 102 Ga. App. 155, 115 S.E.2d 633 (1960).

- When a servant is injured by a fellow servant or superior employee in a dispute, not provoked by the injured servant, arising over the conduct of the master's business, the injury may be the result of an accident, insofar as the injured employee is concerned. McLaughlin v. Thompson, Boland & Lee, Inc., 72 Ga. App. 564, 34 S.E.2d 562 (1945); Echols v. Chattooga Mercantile Co., 74 Ga. App. 18, 38 S.E.2d 675 (1946); Southern Wire & Iron, Inc. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962).

The fact that an injury sustained by an employee is the result of a willful criminal assault does not prevent the injury from being an accidental injury within the purview of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) if there is no misconduct on the part of the claimant and no question of prior personal motivation or ill will between the claimant and the assailant. Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39 (1963), for comment, see 1 Ga. St. B. J. 123 (1964).

The fact that the injury resulted from a willful or criminal assault by a third person, while the employee was engaged in the work of an employer, does not necessarily prevent the injury from being accidental within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Woodward v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 160 Ga. App. 676, 288 S.E.2d 10 (1981).

- Language "nor shall 'injury' and 'personal injury' include injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee for reasons personal to such employee" was not intended to exclude compensation when the animosity of an assailant, which results in injury to an employee, begins while the employee is on the job for the employer, under circumstances in which the employee does nothing to justify the animosity at the time and does nothing subsequently to provoke its continuance or aggravate it. Commercial Constr. Co. v. Caldwell, 111 Ga. App. 1, 140 S.E.2d 298 (1965), for comment, see 2 Ga. St. B. J. 135 (1965).

- Under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), a claimant is not entitled to compensation in which the injury to a deceased employee was the result of a fight between the claimant and a fellow employee in which the deceased employee was the aggressor; in such a case the injury was not an accident arising out of the employment. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Haynie, 43 Ga. App. 579, 159 S.E. 781 (1931); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 56 Ga. App. 68, 192 S.E. 325 (1937).

In some cases, active participation by an employee in a fight with another employee would constitute an assault and would label such employee the aggressor, and in such a case, any resulting injury would not be an accident arising out of the employment within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934).

- In some cases, active intervention on the part of an employee may be for the protection of the master's property, and in such cases the employee would not be guilty of an assault so as to label the employee an "aggressor." Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934).

- If the chain of events culminating in assault and injury leads back to an employee's employment and the state of mind of the assailant, the fact that the assault happens at a different time, not too remote and in a different place, is immaterial since the other necessary factors are present. Commercial Constr. Co. v. Caldwell, 111 Ga. App. 1, 140 S.E.2d 298 (1965), for comment, see 2 Ga. St. B. J. 135 (1965).

- Injury received by the claimant as a result of and during a fight with a fellow employee, arising over the manner in which the claimant performed the duties of employment, which fight was precipitated by the claimant's using strong language towards the co-employee, is not compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Kimbro v. Black & White Cab Co., 50 Ga. App. 143, 177 S.E. 274 (1934).

- When a truck driver was called aside by the driver's employer, and while engaged with the latter in conversation, became involved in a personal quarrel with a co-employee over a matter (a quarrel between their respective wives) entirely disassociated with the employment of either of the employees and the co-employee went away and came back with a gun, with which the co-employee shot the employee with whom that person had been quarreling, the injury thus sustained was caused by the "willful act" of the person doing the shooting, for reasons personal to such employee, and was not compensable. Lanier v. Brown Bros., 44 Ga. App. 831, 163 S.E. 263 (1932).

- The death of a cabdriver who was shot and killed during the operation of a taxicab arose out of and in the course of the driver's employment. Atlanta Checker Cab Co. v. Padgett, 154 Ga. App. 43, 267 S.E.2d 464 (1980).

- When the claimant was shot and injured while performing regular duties as a night watchman at the manufacturing plant of an employer, by a person or persons who intended to commit a robbery upon the claimant, and owing to the nature of claimant's employment the claimant was subjected to special danger from persons inclined to such violence, the assault was not directed against claimant for reasons personal to claimant, but was one arising out of claimant's employment within the purview of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Herring, 43 Ga. App. 249, 158 S.E. 448 (1931).

- An exception in Ga. L. 1922, p. 185, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1), excluding injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee for reasons personal to such employee, did not apply to the homicide of a detective who was assigned by an employer detective agency to a jewelry store for the purpose of protecting it from thefts, and who was in the front of the store for this purpose, without anything on the detective's person to indicate the nature of the detective's employment, when shot and killed by a thief fleeing with a diamond ring taken from the store, whom the detective had just grabbed to prevent the thief from escaping. Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency v. Walker, 30 Ga. App. 91, 117 S.E. 281 (1923).

- If an employee, while attempting to eject a trespasser from the employer's premises, using only the amount of force necessary, was struck by the trespasser with a stick and wounded, the employee should not then be penalized because the employee was the aggressor. Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934).

- Employee's claims against bank, alleging that a member of the bank's board of directors sexually assaulted the employee, was not covered under workers' compensation because the employee was equally exposed to the hazard of sexual assault apart from employment, and the risk of physical sexual abuse was unconnected to the employee's responsibilities of employment. Kennedy v. Pineland State Bank, 211 Ga. App. 375, 439 S.E.2d 106 (1993).

- After a dispute arose between an employee, superintendent, and a customer about a wheel which had been left for repair, and the employee did some act of violence to the customer, the death of the employee when the customer returned with a gun and killed the employee without further altercation was not within the scope of employment under former Ga. L. 1920, p. 167 §§ 2, 45 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1), but fell within the exception as to willful acts for reasons personal to the employee. Hightower v. United States Cas. Co., 30 Ga. App. 123, 117 S.E. 98 (1923).

When a garage employee, while asking instructions from an employer, was shot by a customer who was irritated at the employer's refusal to do additional work on the car without further charge, the injury occurred not only while the employee was engaged in the work of employment but also in the performance of ordinary duties, arising out of and in the course of employment within the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), the assault not being directed against the employee for reasons personal to the employee. Keen v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 34 Ga. App. 257, 129 S.E. 174, cert. denied, 34 Ga. App. 836 (1925).

- When a supervisor strikes an employee immediately upon firing the employee, the employee may not institute a tort action since the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., is still applicable as the aggressive acts of the supervisor are part of the res gestae of the discharge which creates an employment-related situation and constitutes an injury out of and in the course of employment. Woodward v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 160 Ga. App. 676, 288 S.E.2d 10 (1981).

Workers' compensation is not the exclusive remedy, and thus does not bar a common law tort claim, when the willful actions are directed against the employee by fellow employees for purely non-work-related personal reasons. Knight v. Gonzalez, 181 Ga. App. 468, 352 S.E.2d 646 (1987).

- A workers' compensation award is authorized when an employee was murdered because the employee's partner desired to gain complete control of the business. Handcrafted Furn., Inc. v. Black, 182 Ga. App. 115, 354 S.E.2d 696 (1987).

Even if the employee is on a scheduled break and even if the employee is free to use the break time as the employee pleases, if the employee is in fact engaged in employment-related activities, the injury is compensable under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Swanson v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 181 Ga. App. 876, 354 S.E.2d 204 (1987).

14. Injury Due to Exertion or Aggravation of Condition

A. In General

- For provisions concerning the aggravation of a preexisting condition as "injury" or "personal injury", see the second sentence of paragraph (4), added in 1994.

- The 1963 amendment to this section, excepting heart disease, heart attack, the failure or occlusion of coronary blood vessels, or thrombosis as compensable "injuries" unless it is "shown by a preponderance of competent and creditable evidence" that they were attributable to the usual work of employment, only made explicit the law contained in judicial decisions. Burson v. Howell, 112 Ga. App. 675, 145 S.E.2d 718 (1965).

- When a previously diseased condition of the claimant is aggravated by an injury or accident arising out of and in the course of employment, resulting in disability to the claimant, there is a compensable injury. Griggs v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 61 Ga. App. 448, 6 S.E.2d 180 (1939), aff'd, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

An accident arises out of employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the person undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of the person's health. Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 649, 21 S.E.2d 478 (1942); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Kitchens, 81 Ga. App. 470, 59 S.E.2d 270 (1950); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272 (1951); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Clements, 88 Ga. App. 648, 76 S.E.2d 830 (1953); Globe Indem. Co. v. Simonton, 88 Ga. App. 694, 76 S.E.2d 837 (1953); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wright, 92 Ga. App. 224, 88 S.E.2d 205 (1955).

If the employment of the employee contributes to the injury it is an accident under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) and is compensable, regardless of what combined with the employment to produce it. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Adams, 70 Ga. App. 297, 28 S.E.2d 79 (1943); Davis v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 72 Ga. App. 783, 35 S.E.2d 203 (1945); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 81 Ga. App. 800, 60 S.E.2d 258 (1950); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272 (1951); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Clements, 88 Ga. App. 648, 76 S.E.2d 830 (1953).

When the work of an employee contributes to an injury it is accidental, even if the work done is usual and is done in the customary manner, or is too great for the person undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of the person's health. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Adams, 70 Ga. App. 297, 28 S.E.2d 79 (1943).

Disability or death resulting from aggravation, by accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment, of a preexisting bodily infirmity is compensable. United States Cas. Co. v. Kelly, 78 Ga. App. 112, 50 S.E.2d 238 (1948).

In order for an injury to be compensable when disease or a physical disability exists, exertion on the part of the employee in the performance of the employee's duties must combine with the disease and its effects and contribute to the resulting condition of the employee. Finch v. Evins Amusement Co., 80 Ga. App. 457, 56 S.E.2d 489 (1949).

An injury which aggravates a preexisting disease is compensable when such increased result would not have occurred except for the injury. McDaniel v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 104 Ga. App. 340, 121 S.E.2d 801 (1961).

The aggravation of a preexisting infirmity, whether congenital or otherwise, is compensable. Thomas v. Ford Motor Co., 123 Ga. App. 512, 181 S.E.2d 874 (1971).

If an accident is a precipitating cause of a disability, it matters not what preexisting factor it combined with. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 125 Ga. App. 328, 187 S.E.2d 551 (1972).

If an employee's disability results as the immediate consequence of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, it matters not that it combines with a preexisting injury or disease, or that the accident would not have resulted in disablement except for the prior condition, or even that if the accident had not occurred at the time and place it did, it might have subsequently occurred in some manner unrelated to the employment or might eventually have occurred in any event. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 132 Ga. App. 708, 209 S.E.2d 76 (1974).

The aggravation of a preexisting condition may be sufficient of itself to constitute a compensable injury. Thornton Chevrolet, Inc. v. Morgan, 148 Ga. App. 711, 252 S.E.2d 178 (1979).

If a work-related accident combines with a preexisting injury or disease to cause a disability which would not otherwise have occurred, it is compensable, whether or not the latter is related to the employment. Rachel v. Simmons Co., 151 Ga. App. 735, 261 S.E.2d 467 (1979).

- While susceptibility to injury will not prevent a recovery for disability or death proximately caused by an injury arising out of the employment, no compensation is payable when a preexisting condition causes the death or disability independent of any subsequent mishap; hence, if death comes during the course of the employment, in an ordinary way natural to the progress of the disease with which the employee is afflicted and with which the employee was smitten before the accident, there can be no recovery. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Chandler, 61 Ga. App. 311, 6 S.E.2d 142 (1939).

- In determining whether or not a physical seizure was in fact induced by employment, consideration should be given to any previous weakened condition of the employee, since it could be true that the work of any employment, under such circumstances, might induce the seizure when otherwise it would have no such deleterious effect, especially if it appears that the prior existing illness had been brought to the attention of the employer by the employee, and the employee was induced to continue at the employee's post by the solicitation of the employer. Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Alford, 51 Ga. App. 237, 179 S.E. 912 (1935).

- If, in a workers' compensation case, the immediate precipitating cause of the injury to the employee is over-exertion within the necessary and regular course of employment, the injury is compensable, even though the attack from which the employee died may not actually have incapacitated the employee until after the day's employment was ended. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 81 Ga. App. 800, 60 S.E.2d 258 (1950).

If the exertion of employment was the immediate precipitating cause of an employee's death or disability, the mere fact that the attack itself was delayed somewhat, and occurred after the employee left the premises of the employer, is not in itself a sufficient reason for denying compensation. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272 (1951).

- Employee's claim against an employer that, following a vehicle accident, the employer exacerbated the employee's injuries by denying the employee access to needed health care was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11, because the injury occurred in the course of employment and arose out of the employment. Savannah Hospitality Services, LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 828 S.E.2d 423 (2019).

- When the duties of employment call for a quantity and quality of exertion which actually contributes as an immediate precipitating factor to an injury to the physical condition of an employee's health, the injury is compensable, regardless of whether or not it occurred on or off the actual physical premises of the employer. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272 (1951).

- There is no standard of health set up or provided in this section. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

- It is not necessary, in order for an employee to recover compensation as an injured worker, that the worker must have been in perfect health or free from disease at the time the worker received the injury; every worker brings with them to employment certain infirmities, and the employer takes the worker as the employer finds the worker and assumes the risk of a diseased condition aggravated by injury. Griggs v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 61 Ga. App. 448, 6 S.E.2d 180 (1939), aff'd, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

Compensation is not made to depend upon the health of the employee, nor upon the employee's freedom from liability to injury through a constitutional weakness or a latent tendency; compensation is awarded for an injury which is a hazard of the employment, and it is the hazard of the employment acting upon the particular employee in the employee's condition of health, not what that hazard would be if acting upon a healthy employee or upon the average employee. Griggs v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 61 Ga. App. 448, 6 S.E.2d 180 (1939), aff'd, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

Perfect health is not a prerequisite to enjoying the benefits of this section. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

- If employment contributes to the aggravation of a preexisting injury, there is an accident which is compensable; and it is not necessary that there be a specific job-connected incident which aggravates the previous injury. Home Indem. Co. v. Brown, 141 Ga. App. 563, 234 S.E.2d 97 (1977).

- To construe the plain language of this section to embrace only those accidents that were external, and to exclude those that are internal was to quibble with distinctions when there were no differences. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

An accident, to be compensable, need not be one caused by external factors alone, such as a blow or other external violence; a stroke, a ruptured blood vessel, or a heart attack may, under proper circumstances, be the subject matter of compensation. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272 (1951).

- A physical impact is not a necessary prerequisite to an "injury". Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 649, 21 S.E.2d 478 (1942); Georgia Power Co. v. Reid, 87 Ga. App. 621, 74 S.E.2d 672 (1953); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wright, 92 Ga. App. 224, 88 S.E.2d 205 (1955); Shipman v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 487, 125 S.E.2d 72 (1962).

- It is immaterial that the physical exertion engaged in by an employee is not unusual or excessive. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Clements, 88 Ga. App. 648, 76 S.E.2d 830 (1953).

- Employee's skin condition was a compensable injury caused and aggravated by the numerous surgical pre-scrubbings and in-office cleansings required by the employee's profession; further, such condition was an injury caused by cumulative trauma, which fell within the definition of injury found in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4). D.W. Adcock, M.D., P.C. v. Adcock, 257 Ga. App. 700, 572 S.E.2d 45 (2002).

- If the evidence showed excessive exertion, peculiar to the employment and peculiar to the employee, which brought about an arteriosclerotic attack resulting in injury to the employee, an award would be considered to be founded on sufficient competent testimony. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Handspike, 76 Ga. App. 67, 44 S.E.2d 704 (1947).

When an injury is claimed to have been precipitated by job exertion, the evidence must show that the exertion was such that, when considering all other facts of the case, a natural inference through human experience would be raised to indicate that the exertion contributed to the injury, or medical testimony must be that the exertion was sufficient to precipitate the injury. McDaniel v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 104 Ga. App. 340, 121 S.E.2d 801 (1961).

The requirement of competent and credible evidence in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 (4) does not go to the form of evidence required to support a claim for compensation in heart injury cases. Southwire Co. v. Eason, 181 Ga. App. 708, 353 S.E.2d 567 (1987).

- When the facts are sufficient to raise the presumption that the death of an employee arose out of and in the course of employment, such presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the injury resulted from willful conduct or was not otherwise within the provisions of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960).

- When there is no evidence, opinion or otherwise, as to the cause of death, an inference cannot legitimately be raised that the normal exertion of the employee in the course of daily employment, not shown to be unusual or severe, contributed to aggravate another and unspecified disease so as to contribute to the employee's death. Shelby Mut. Cas. Co. v. Huff, 87 Ga. App. 463, 74 S.E.2d 251 (1953).

In cases involving heart disease, heart attack, heart failure, occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels, or thrombosis, a natural inference from the human experience constituted competent creditable evidence as to causation sufficient to be found to satisfy the preponderance of the evidence requirement of this section, when there was no medical testimony to the contrary. Guye v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Ga. 213, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978).

- An injury arising from a physical seizure not induced by or related to the employment is not such an accident as would afford compensation even though it might appear that the particular consequences of the seizure were such as would not have resulted elsewhere than at the place of employment. Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Alford, 51 Ga. App. 237, 179 S.E. 912 (1935).

- When there was evidence showing the worker's later employment aggravated a pre-existing problem, it was proper to find that aggravation of a pre-existing condition was a new injury and the worker's prior employer had no duty to pay for surgery. Haralson County v. Lee, 264 Ga. App. 68, 589 S.E.2d 872 (2003).

B. Heart Attacks

Second accident.

- If the claimant sustains a second accident as the result of a specific job-related incident which aggravates a pre-existing condition which resulted from a prior accident, the second accident which aggravated the pre-existing condition is a new injury, if the second accident at least partially precipitated the claimant's disability. Mutual Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Pruitt, 178 Ga. App. 476, 343 S.E.2d 495 (1986).

- The mere fact that an employee suffered a fatal heart attack while working for an employer does not, in and of itself, require a finding that the attack was caused by exertion on the part of the employee in the course of employment. Hansard v. Georgia Power Co., 105 Ga. App. 486, 124 S.E.2d 926 (1962).

A heart attack caused by exertion on the job was an accident arising out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of this section. Home Indem. Co. v. Floyd, 122 Ga. App. 87, 176 S.E.2d 269 (1970).

- When an employee has a heart attack, it matters not how predisposed the employee is to the attack, if the employee is in the course of employment and if the exertion of that employment, no matter how slight, contributes, no matter in what degree, to the accident. Brown Transp. Corp. v. Jenkins, 129 Ga. App. 457, 199 S.E.2d 910 (1973).

- The fact that an attack is made more likely or probable by a pre-existing weakened physical condition is not a ground for denying compensation, if there is sufficient competent evidence that it was traumatic rather than idiopathic in origin. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272 (1951).

- Prima facie presumption, which usually arises when an employee is found dead at a place where the employee is reasonably expected to be in the performance of the employee's duties, that the death arose out of and in the course of employment, must be bolstered in heart cases by evidence of a causal connection between the work and the heart attack. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Shaddrick, 114 Ga. App. 58, 150 S.E.2d 314 (1966).

Decision granting a widow workers' compensation death benefits was upheld as the unexplained death presumption applied in that the employee's heart failure at work was unexplained and, once the unexplained death presumption arose, no further proof was required to satisfy O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 to establish the injury. Keystone Auto. v. Hall, 292 Ga. App. 645, 665 S.E.2d 392 (2008).

- The burden is on the one seeking compensation for death due to a heart attack to show a causal connection between employment and death. United States Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 106 Ga. App. 441, 127 S.E.2d 169, rev'd on other grounds, 218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749 (1962).

- A heart attack or other sudden seizure experienced by an employee while physically exerting oneself in the course of employment, and caused by such exertion, was an accident arising out of and within the course of employment within the meaning of this section, and the fact of such accident, when proved by competent evidence, shifted the burden of evidence to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the disability or death of the employee was not the result of that accident. Thomas v. United States Cas. Co., 218 Ga. 493, 128 S.E.2d 749 (1962);for comment, see 26 Ga. B. J. 126 (1963).

- The mere fact that a heart attack from which the claimant's spouse died occurred at a moment when the spouse was attending to personal business, rather than a few minutes earlier when the spouse was engaged in the course of the spouse's employment, was not in and of itself sufficient to predicate a denial of compensation. Maddox v. Buice Transf. & Storage Co., 81 Ga. App. 503, 59 S.E.2d 329 (1950).

When the evidence is sufficient to authorize a finding that during an automobile chase of a hit-and-run driver participated in by the chief of police two days before death, the police chief suffered a heart attack, and that this attack was a contributing concurrent proximate cause of death, a finding that this attack was an accident within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) was authorized. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172, 63 S.E.2d 272 (1951).

An employee's heart attack, which resulted in death and was contributed to by an automobile accident arising out of and in the course of employment, was sufficient to authorize an award of compensation even though the heart attack occurred 17 hours after the accident and the cause of the heart attack was contradicted by other medical testimony. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Williams, 117 Ga. App. 713, 161 S.E.2d 396 (1968).

The "natural inference" that a strenuous job contributes to the precipitation of heart attacks is not available when the symptoms of the heart attack did not occur until the claimant had been home several hours. Southwire Co. v. Cato, 250 Ga. 895, 302 S.E.2d 91 (1983).

- It cannot be questioned that physical exertion contributes to a heart stroke or exhaustion suffered while one is engaged in physical effort or immediately following; but, to carry a claimant's burden, the claimant should have some evidence in the record as to the exertion which actually existed at the time of the heat stroke, and some testimony, opinion or otherwise, that the quantum of physical exertion present would contribute to the seizure. Globe Indem. Co. v. Simonton, 88 Ga. App. 694, 76 S.E.2d 837 (1953).

When compensation is sought under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), based on an accident growing out of the death of the employee due to a heart attack alleged to have been precipitated by exertion on the part of such employee while in the course of employment, in order for there to be a recovery either the evidence must show that the work engaged in by the employee was sufficiently strenuous or of such a nature that, combined with the other facts of the case, it raises a natural inference through human experience that the exertion contributed toward the precipitation of the attack, or there must be medical testimony that the exertion, however slight, would have been sufficient to precipitate such an attack. Hoffman v. National Sur. Corp., 91 Ga. App. 414, 85 S.E.2d 784 (1955); Milledgeville State Hosp. v. Norris, 101 Ga. App. 502, 114 S.E.2d 298 (1960).

The mere fact that an employee suffered a fatal attack while at work does not require a finding that the attack was caused by exertion in the course of employment, but medical testimony that there is a reasonable probability that such an exertion contributed to the attack is sufficient to support a finding that it did. Cabin Crafts, Inc. v. Pelfrey, 119 Ga. App. 809, 168 S.E.2d 660 (1969).

When an employee has a sudden fatal attack while exerting oneself at work, and there is no medical evidence that exertion at work did or did not contribute to the attack, an award of compensation is demanded. Cabin Crafts, Inc. v. Pelfrey, 119 Ga. App. 809, 168 S.E.2d 660 (1969).

When an employee in the course of employment dies of a heart attack, the evidence must be weighed to determine whether or not the employment was a contributing proximate cause of the attack. Brown Transp. Corp. v. Jenkins, 129 Ga. App. 457, 199 S.E.2d 910 (1973).

In determining whether a heart attack arose out of and in the course of employment, a fact-finding body may rely on several different forms of evidence to establish whether there is a causal connection between the employment activities and the heart attack, including medical opinion, lay observations and opinion, and a natural inference through human experience. Employees Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 148 Ga. App. 129, 251 S.E.2d 96 (1978).

- The "any evidence" rule precluded the superior court's reversal of the board's award, when there was ample evidence to support a finding that the deceased employee died of a heart attack and that the evidence did not show the work the deceased did on the date of death was a precipitating or aggravating cause. G & H Loggins, Inc. v. Burch, 178 Ga. App. 28, 341 S.E.2d 868 (1986).

- When an employee suffered a coronary occlusion while engaged in the regular course of employment, and the evidence authorized the finding that the immediate precipitating cause of the injury was overexertion within the regular course of employment, which exertion was too great for the person undertaking the activity in the employee's existing physical condition, the injury was an accident and was compensable; the fact that total incapacity did not result until after the day's work was over would not alter the situation. Federated Mut. Implement & Hdwe. Ins. Co. v. Elliott, 88 Ga. App. 266, 76 S.E.2d 568 (1953).

When a deceased employee, who died of coronary occlusion, complained of pain in the stomach or chest while performing the normal duties of employment, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the employee had an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and it was immaterial that the physical exertion the employee engaged in was not unusual or excessive. Delta C. & S. Airlines v. Perry, 94 Ga. App. 107, 93 S.E.2d 771 (1956), for comment, see 19 Ga. B. J. 235 (1956).

There was sufficient evidence to support an award of compensation when an employee suffered a heart attack when attempting to repair the motor of a loading crane which necessitated the employee pulling oneself up onto the crane approximately at head height, during which activity the employee felt sharp chest pains radiating down the employee's left arm. Howell v. Federated Mut. Implement & Hdwe. Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App. 321, 151 S.E.2d 195 (1966).

Medical opinion that exertion in working abnormally long hours over a long period contributed to an attack and death authorized a finding that the work was a contributing cause of death. J.D. Jewell, Inc. v. Peck, 116 Ga. App. 405, 157 S.E.2d 806 (1967).

When the deceased died of a heart attack after driving an empty truck some 65 miles, the evidence was sufficient to find that the heart attack did not arise out of the course of employment. Brown Transp. Corp. v. Blanchard, 126 Ga. App. 333, 190 S.E.2d 625 (1972).

When there was medical evidence in the record that prior exertion could have caused a coronary occlusion, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding that the exertion produced an employee's death and that the employee died as a result of an accident and injury which arose out of and in the course of employment. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Stephen, 125 Ga. App. 277, 187 S.E.2d 534 (1972).

A claimant suffered a compensable heart injury, when the record showed that claimant experienced severe chest pain while at work and experienced incapacitating pain within one to one and a half hours after claimant arrived at home following claimant's shift, when there was medical testimony that emotional or physical stress could have been the precipitating factor in heart pain up to one hour after the stressful event occurred, and when there was medical testimony that the claimant's heart condition was significantly aggravated by claimant's employment. Southwire Co. v. Eason, 181 Ga. App. 708, 353 S.E.2d 567 (1987).

When the nature of claimant's employment as a long-haul truck driver required long periods of stress without physical exercise, and without the availability of a healthy diet, all exacerbated by time constraints, these "conditions" of the work were causally connected to the heart attack which had its onset when claimant was driving and which fully matured after claimant got the truck to someone who could complete the delivery on time. A & P Transp. v. Warren, 213 Ga. App. 60, 443 S.E.2d 857 (1994).

The state board of workers' compensation properly awarded benefits to the widow of a prison guard who died of a cardiac dysrhythmia while on the job since a physician testified that "but for the physical and mental stress experienced at work on that day, he should not have died at that time." Phillips Corr. Inst. v. Yarbrough, 248 Ga. App. 693, 548 S.E.2d 424 (2001).

- The board was authorized to find that the employee had not entered upon the employee's duties at the time of the heart attack and that at that time the employee was not expending any physical energy in the performance of duties for the employer. Finch v. Evins Amusement Co., 80 Ga. App. 457, 56 S.E.2d 489 (1949).

When the claimant's deceased spouse was not authorized to ring in on a time-clock before 7:55 A.M., and was found between 7:35 A.M. and 7:40 A.M. in street clothes in a portion of the employer's premises not connected with the spouse's employment, in a dying condition due to a coronary occlusion, and at the time of the heart attack was not engaged in any activities either required by or necessary to the employment, a finding was demanded that the deceased's death did not arise out of and in the course of employment. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Johnson, 83 Ga. App. 227, 63 S.E.2d 296 (1951).

When there was no direct proof that death from a heart attack was caused by an accidental injury which arose out of the deceased's employment, that is, that there was a causal connection between the conditions under which the work was required to be performed and the resulting injury, and no direct evidence that the deceased was upset or engaging in unusual physical exertion in performing the duties of the deceased's employment, but on the contrary there was evidence that the death could have occurred without any such causal connection, the presumption that the deceased's death arose out of and during the course of employment was rebutted. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 120 Ga. App. 625, 171 S.E.2d 909 (1969).

When a heart attack was the result of an on-going progressive coronary disease, the disease, even though painful on the job, is not a compensable injury under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Carter v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 138 Ga. App. 601, 226 S.E.2d 755 (1976).

Even assuming that there was sufficient evidence of exertion to warrant application of the "natural inference" rule in the case of a heart attack, an award was nevertheless not demanded by the evidence, when there was competent, credible evidence that the deceased's heart attack was not related to employment. Gallman v. Coronet Indus., Inc., 182 Ga. App. 649, 356 S.E.2d 654 (1987).

A finding that claimant's congestive heart failure was not attributable to claimant's employment was warranted when the medical evidence showed that claimant had multiple risk factors for coronary disease, including hypertension, cigarette abuse, and obesity with adult onset glucose intolerance, and the board was not precluded from considering such preexisting risk factors. Sutton v. B & L Express, 215 Ga. App. 394, 450 S.E.2d 859 (1994).

When facts not supplied to the expert witnesses concerning deceased worker's family history of cardiovascular problems resulted in hypothetical questions that were not just insufficient but misleading, the testimony provided in the expert depositions was not competent and credible evidence, and must be disregarded. Kines v. City of Rome, 220 Ga. App. 732, 470 S.E.2d 311 (1996).

C. Cerebral Hemorrhages

Time lapse.

- Cases involving cerebral hemorrhage have frequently been held compensable in spite of the fact that there has been a lapse of time, extending from a few minutes to several days, between the exertion which precipitated the cerebral accident and the ultimate death or disability. Springfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 106 Ga. App. 422, 126 S.E.2d 920 (1962).

- While there was no expert opinion to the effect that the deceased's exertion contributed to a cerebral hemorrhage, unless and until some method is developed to ascertain with some degree of certainty that such an attack is not contributed to by exertion, knowledge from human experience, including medical caution against exertion in such cases and the admitted opinion of experts that exertion might contribute to such an attack, authorized a finding, on the weight of reasonable probabilities, that the amount of exertion contributed to the cerebral hemorrhage which caused the deceased's death. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Waters, 87 Ga. App. 117, 73 S.E.2d 70 (1952).

When an injury to an employee's head was found to have a causal relationship to the employee's death by subarachnoid hemorrhage, it did not matter whether the employee's fall was strictly accidental or was the result of the employee's own condition, provided the employee's injury was not the result of the employee's willful misconduct, intoxication, or an assault by another employee for personal reasons; if the fall that occurred before the stroke from which the employee died was accidental, aggravated the employee's previous condition, and precipitated the employee's fatal hemorrhage, then the employee's death would be considered to have been the result of an accidental injury and would be compensable. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. King, 88 Ga. App. 176, 76 S.E.2d 81 (1953).

When there is some medical opinion evidence, although disputed, that the exertion of an employee is a contributing precipitating factor in the onset of a cerebral thrombosis or hemorrhage (stroke), an award in favor of claimant will not be disturbed by the court. Springfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 106 Ga. App. 422, 126 S.E.2d 920 (1962).

- Because the decision of the Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation did not apply the wrong standard of proof, and because there was evidence in the record to support the appellate division's ruling that the claimant did not suffer a compensable, work-related injury as the claimant did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant suffered a stroke, and that, even if the claimant had, the stroke was not caused by work stress, the superior court was required to accept the appellate division's findings and the court's decision affirming the administrative law judge's denial of benefits. Save-A-Lot Food Stores v. Amos, 331 Ga. App. 517, 771 S.E.2d 192 (2015).

- Trial court erred by vacating the decision of the State Board of Workers' Compensation reversing the award of benefits to an employee because the Board applied the proper legal framework in analyzing whether the employee's exposure on the bus contributed to or aggravated the employee's stroke and the trial court had no authority to substitute itself as a fact finding body in lieu of the Board. Henry County Bd. of Educ. v. Rutledge, 354 Ga. App. 643, 839 S.E.2d 684 (2020).

- When the claimant suffered a cerebral hemorrhage at claimant's place of employment, the injury and resulting paralysis did not arise "in the course of and out of his employment" when it was shown that the injury was a result of disease and not of exertion on the job. Bussey v. Globe Indem. Co., 81 Ga. App. 401, 59 S.E.2d 34 (1950).

- When there was evidence that claimant pharmacist was working longer hours than usual while a coemployee was on vacation, that claimant's work involved some physical exertion which contributed to a cerebral hemorrhage, and that the claimant, as the result of the stroke, lost mental powers and became permanently disabled, an award of compensation was authorized. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gilliam, 88 Ga. App. 451, 76 S.E.2d 834 (1935).

Paralysis due to cerebral hemorrhage in one suffering from arteriosclerosis, because of continuous exertion for 40 minutes in lifting sacks of cement, is within the operation of provision for compensation for injury resulting from accident. Griggs v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 61 Ga. App. 448, 6 S.E.2d 180 (1939), aff'd, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

When, immediately after assisting another employee in unloading 600 sacks of cement weighing 94 pounds each, an employee became ill and suffered a stroke permanently paralyzing the employee's left limbs, and a doctor testified that the exertion of the work caused a rupture of a blood vessel, resulting in paralysis, finding that the injury was accidental and compensable under this section, even though the employee was doing the usual work of employment in the usual way, and that the employee was at the time suffering with arteriosclerosis or high blood pressure, was authorized. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).

When a deceased employee suffered a cerebral hemorrhage resulting in death, which condition was brought about or contributed to by exertion in doing the employee's work, and was not the result of or caused by drinking of iced tea, an award of compensation was authorized. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Powell, 84 Ga. App. 235, 65 S.E.2d 825 (1951).

An award granting compensation for the death of a state revenue agent who died as the result of a cerebral hemorrhage precipitated or brought on by excitement incurred in the course of employment, while the individual was engaged in the discharge of their duty as a revenue agent, was proper. State Dep't of Revenue v. Snelling, 84 Ga. App. 238, 65 S.E.2d 822 (1951).

A showing that the cause of an employee's death is cerebral hemorrhage or some other disease with which exertion on the part of the employee may be expected to concur in precipitating an attack, and that the employee, so suffering, exerted oneself in the course of employment, is sufficient to authorize an award in the employee's favor; both disease and exertion must be shown, however. Shelby Mut. Cas. Co. v. Huff, 87 Ga. App. 463, 74 S.E.2d 251 (1953).

When the cause of death is cerebral hemorrhage or some other disease with which exertion on the part of the employee, as shown by the evidence, may be expected to concur in precipitating an attack, and when such employee, so suffering, exerts oneself in the course of employment, the facts are sufficient to authorize an award in the claimant's favor. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Wright, 92 Ga. App. 224, 88 S.E.2d 205 (1955).

- Since there was conflicting testimony of two doctors as to whether a blow on the head sufficient to cause an intracranial hemorrhage would leave an external trauma, a finding that in view of the fact that the deceased had no external trauma or evidence of a blow the deceased did not strike the deceased's head in a fall suffered on the job sufficiently to cause intracranial hemorrhage from which the deceased died was authorized. Butler v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 87 Ga. App. 113, 73 S.E.2d 86 (1952).

D. Other Illnesses

Heat stroke.

- Evidence on behalf of the claimant which only inferentially established that claimant was actually engaging in the duties of employment at or near the time when the claimant was prostrated by a heat stroke, and which failed to establish that exertion on the claimant's part, or excessive heat constituting a hazard of the employment, in any way contributed to the seizure, was insufficient to support an award. Globe Indem. Co. v. Simonton, 88 Ga. App. 694, 76 S.E.2d 837 (1953).

- Since there was no evidence as to the cause of death of an employee who collapsed and almost immediately died while engaged in the course of the employee's normal and daily employment, there was nothing upon which a finding of fact that such employee sustained an "accident arising out of" employment might be predicated, and an award in favor of dependent claimant of such employee was unauthorized. Shelby Mut. Cas. Co. v. Huff, 87 Ga. App. 463, 74 S.E.2d 251 (1953).

- Evidence showing that the claimant, after promotion to a supervisory position, began regularly working long hours, underwent a personality change involving extreme worry and nervousness, and experienced chest pains, coupled with expert testimony that stress can be a contributing factor to atherosclerosis, was sufficient to support the board's conclusion that the claimant's coronary bypass operation was a result of job-related stress and thus compensable. Zippy Mart, Inc. v. Fender, 170 Ga. App. 617, 317 S.E.2d 575 (1984).

- When an employee afflicted with arteriosclerosis and heart disease was engaged at work in a narrow, deep ditch calking a pipe, in a cramped and stooped-over position, with a calking hammer, and was suddenly and unexpectedly stricken and died, it could be said as a matter of law that the employee died as the result of an accidental injury while engaged in the course and in the performance of an act connected with employment. Williams v. Maryland Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 649, 21 S.E.2d 478 (1942).

When an employee is afflicted with arteriosclerosis and is seized with an attack while in the course of employment, which attack causes the employee injury, such injury was a compensable accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, regardless of whether or not the attack was precipitated or induced by excessive exertion peculiar to the ailment of the employee. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Handspike, 76 Ga. App. 67, 44 S.E.2d 704 (1947).

- When an employee fell from a scaffold and fractured both heel bones in an accident in the course of and arising out of employment, and was continuously disabled for six weeks from the time of injury until the employee died of vascular disease, a finding that the employee's death was the result of an accidental injury was authorized, there being only opinion testimony to the contrary. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Marks, 88 Ga. App. 167, 76 S.E.2d 507 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Fowler v. City of Atlanta, 116 Ga. App. 352, 157 S.E.2d 306 (1967), for comment, see 16 Ga. B. J. 215 (1953).

- When an accident aggravated an employee's previous back injury, a disability later resulting therefrom was just as compensable as if such accident had produced an entirely new back injury and resulted in immediate disability. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am. v. Rucker, 87 Ga. App. 375, 73 S.E.2d 609 (1952).

- The denial of compensation for the death of an employee, when the evidence was that death resulted from tuberculosis which the employee had in a latent stage, but which flared into activity as a result of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, was properly set aside by the superior court. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maddox, 52 Ga. App. 416, 183 S.E. 570 (1935).

- Truck driver's injuries arose out of employment and not out of the driver's pre-existing diabetic condition, when the driver experienced dizziness and nausea and pulled off the road, and medical testimony showed that the driver's injuries were the result of exposure to cold, and not the result of a diabetic coma. H & H Trucking Co. v. Davis, 190 Ga. App. 754, 380 S.E.2d 301 (1989).

- A claimant is entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., for mental disability and psychological treatment which, while not necessarily precipitated by a physical injury, arose out of an accident in which a compensable physical injury was sustained, and that injury contributes to the continuation of the psychological trauma. The physical injury need not be the precipitating cause of the psychic trauma; it is compensable if the physical injury contributes to the continuation of the psychic trauma. Southwire Co. v. George, 266 Ga. 739, 470 S.E.2d 865 (1996); Atlas Automotive, Inc. v. Wilson, 225 Ga. App. 631, 484 S.E.2d 669 (1997).

- O.C.G.A. § 34-9-266 created an exception to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4), which allowed employees to obtain medical benefits when they had a pre-existing condition that was aggravated by a work-related injury, and the trial court erred by ordering the Georgia board of workers' compensation, appellate division, to award medical benefits to an employee who obtained treatment for hernias the employee developed before beginning work for the employer, after the employee aggravated the medical condition in a work-related accident. Union City Auto Parts v. Edwards, 263 Ga. App. 799, 589 S.E.2d 351 (2003).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Coverage of only part of workforce.

- The workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) does not permit an employer to become a subscriber to an insurance policy as to one part of its employees and to remain a nonsubscriber as to the remainder of its employees. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 654.

- In substance, the term "employee" includes every person in service of another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 658.

- The term "employer" as used in former Code 1933, § 114-716 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-12) must be interpreted to have the same meaning as set out in former Code 1933, §§ 114-101 and 114-102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1). 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-55.

- County employees have been included under workers' compensation since 1958, such coverage having been financed through general county tax funds. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-240.

- If the governing body of a county passes a resolution to extend workers' compensation coverage to various elected officers, that resolution must include all elected county officers. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-20.

- The county board of health exists as an operating arm of the county, and its employees would therefore be classified as county employees for workers' compensation purposes. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 590.

- Counties are employers within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), and a deputy sheriff of a county injured in the course of the deputy's employment would be covered by the terms thereof. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 613.

- As to the applicability of workers' compensation to school board personnel, see 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-240.

- Members of county boards of education are ordinarily county officers, and elected county officers are included as "employees" covered by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) when proper provision is made therefor by the county governing authority. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U71-37.

- Inasmuch as counties must provide workers' compensation benefits for all county school board employees working a full work week, whatever the duration of employment, such coverage must be provided in connection with head start programs administered by the county board of education; when, however, the head start program is administered by a private, nonprofit organization, there is no requirement that workers' compensation be provided. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-240.

- In determining whether a self-insured school system under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is required to expend funds to compensate and rehabilitate a former employee, the operative question is whether the employee received a compensable injury at a time when the person was an employee of the school system; if it is determined that the employee received a compensable injury which arose out of and in the course of employment, in effect, then the person's workers' compensation benefits, established by law, vested at that point. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-38.

- An independent school system is subject to the provisions of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) relative to injuries sustained by the employees of that independent school system. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 67.

- Multi-county planning commissions created by participating counties and cities under Ga. L. 1957, p. 420, as amended, were not "employers" as defined in former Code 1933, §§ 114-101 and 114-102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1) for workers' compensation purposes. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-361.

- The definition of "employer" and "employee" in this section was broad enough to include a person who is in the service of a city under at least an implied contract in return for which the employee receives as wages quarters furnished to the employee rent free by the city. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 754.

- There is a difference between a state official and a state employee: an official is one who holds or is invested with an office, while an employee is one employed by another for wages or salary and is customarily in a position below the executive level. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-29.

Under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), an elected state official is not an employer, nor is the official, in most instances, an employee; however, each case should be determined on the merits. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-29.

- Under this section there can be no doubt that the departments of the state government are subject to the provisions of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) when such departments, or institutions under them come within the definition of "employer"; likewise, all employees of such departments are entitled to the benefits of that law when such employees come within the definition of "employee." 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 723.

The State Board of Education is subject to the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 284.

The State Department of Defense is an employer subject to the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-52.

- The Board of Regents may carry workers' compensation insurance to cover liability. 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 34.

- The widow of an employee of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation whose death arose out of and in the course of the employee's employment is entitled to death benefits under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 424.

- All laborers and skilled mechanics employed by the state would be considered employees, and should such a person suffer a total incapacity, that person would be entitled to recover weekly workers' compensation. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 658.

- A state prison inmate is not an employee of the state. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 656.

The workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) implies a voluntary relationship between the parties as employer and employee, and hence does not include prisoners who are compelled to perform manual labor for punishment of their offenses. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 656.

- Laborers and skilled mechanics employed by the State Board of Education as instructors at a state trade and vocational school are within the protection of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 658.

- Pupils at a state trade and vocational school are neither employees nor apprentices of the school, and the state would not be liable for accidental injury sustained by them. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 658.

- Students at an agricultural school working with a farm machinery dealer as part of their curriculum, with course credits given for work, are not employees within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 616.

- Nonpaid "beauty queens" of the various agricultural commodity commissions are not subject to the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) under any circumstances; however, Peach Queen, who receives a per diem salary, would be covered, provided that the law's various criteria are met. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-68.

- Volunteer firefighters are not entitled to workers' compensation from the State Forestry Commission. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 351.

- A Regional Forest Fire Protection Compact does not extend the definition of "employee" for the purpose of workers' compensation. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 353.

- Under the Neighborhood Youth Corps program, the local organization which supervises and controls the youths is their employer for workers' compensation purposes during the period of control. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-134.

- Newspaper dealers are employers within the meaning of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) and would be subject to the requirements thereof unless exempt because of having less than ten (now three) employees. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 613.

- If an injured newspaper delivery boy is employed by an independent contractor, the newspaper company is not liable for workers' compensation. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 613.

- Workers' compensation benefits should not be paid unless an injured employee has in fact sustained a compensable injury under this section. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-136.

- A state employee injured in an automobile accident during a period while at home recuperating from an injury for which workers' compensation was being paid was not entitled to compensation for the second injury since it did not arise out of and in course of employment. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 615.

- Employees who eat lunch and take coffee breaks or rest periods on the premises of the employer are not under the coverage of the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) when they stop work and start making preparations to eat their lunch or to take their coffee or rest breaks; however, if they leave the immediate premises of the employer for lunch, and could be expected to leave such premises, they remain within the scope of their employment for coverage under the law for a reasonable time in which to ingress and egress from their immediate work area. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-192.

- Since the State of Georgia was specifically included in former Code 1933, §§ 114-101 and 114-102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1) it was, by implication, included in former Code 1933, §§ 114-716 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-12), and the State of Georgia and all departments, instrumentalities, and authorities thereof must comply with the record-keeping provisions of former Code 1933, § 114-716. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-55.

- If an employee suffers an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and subsequently develops AIDS and can show that the disease is causally related to the accident, the condition would be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., so long as the claim was filed within the statutory period. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U88-7.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers' Compensation, §§ 1 et seq., 7.

- 99 C.J.S., Workers' Compensation, § 1 et seq.

- Workmen's compensation: liability of general or special employer for compensation to injured employee, 3 A.L.R. 1181; 34 A.L.R. 768, 58 A.L.R. 1467, 152 A.L.R. 816.

Workmen's compensation: compensation to workmen injured through smoking, 5 A.L.R. 1521.

Insanity as affecting right of employee to compensation, 6 A.L.R. 570.

Compensation for injuries during lunch hour on employer's premises, 6 A.L.R. 1151.

Workmen's compensation: compensation for death or injury from overexertion and excitement, 6 A.L.R. 1256.

Injury from fumes or gases as accident or occupational disease within the meaning of the compensation statutes, 6 A.L.R. 1466; 23 A.L.R. 335, 90 A.L.R. 619.

Workmen's compensation: injuries received while performing service for employer before or after hours as arising out of and in the course of employment, 7 A.L.R. 1078.

Workmen's compensation: injury through curiosity as arising out of and in the course of employment, 7 A.L.R. 1305.

Workmen's compensation: compensation for death of or injury to peace officer employed in private plant, 8 A.L.R. 190.

Workmen's compensation: injury while making delivery as arising out of and in the course of employment, 8 A.L.R. 935; 23 A.L.R. 403.

Workmen's compensation: workman representing employees, or public, 8 A.L.R. 1064.

Workmen's compensation: compensation for loss or impairment of eyesight within Workmen's Compensation Acts, 8 A.L.R. 1324.

Workmen's compensation: provision denying compensation for injury through willful failure to use guard, or safety appliance, 9 A.L.R. 1377.

Workmen's compensation: operation of automobile or automobile truck as a hazardous occupation, 9 A.L.R. 1382.

Workmen's compensation: injury while riding to or from work in employer's conveyance as arising out of or in the course of employment, 10 A.L.R. 169; 21 A.L.R. 1223; 24 A.L.R. 1233; 62 A.L.R. 1438; 145 A.L.R. 1033.

Right of firemen and policemen to recover under workmen's compensation acts, 10 A.L.R. 201; 81 A.L.R. 478.

Workmen's compensation: injury to employee who is resting during working hours as arising out of and in the course of his employment, 10 A.L.R. 1488; 55 A.L.R. 981.

Workmen's compensation: right to compensation for results of exposure to contagious disease, 11 A.L.R. 790; 57 A.L.R. 631.

Workmen's compensation: hemorrhage as an accident, 13 A.L.R. 438.

Workmen's compensation: right to compensation in case of injuries sustained through horseplay, or fooling, 13 A.L.R. 540; 20 A.L.R. 882; 36 A.L.R. 1469; 43 A.L.R. 492; 159 A.L.R. 319.

Workmen's compensation: injury from burning due to matches carried by employee, 14 A.L.R. 278.

Applicability and effect of workmen's compensation acts in case of injuries to minors, 14 A.L.R. 818; 33 A.L.R. 337; 49 A.L.R. 1435; 60 A.L.R. 847; 83 A.L.R. 416; 142 A.L.R. 1018.

Workmen's compensation: injury from assault, 15 A.L.R. 588; 21 A.L.R. 758; 29 A.L.R. 437; 40 A.L.R. 1122; 72 A.L.R. 110; 112 A.L.R. 1258; 172 A.L.R. 997.

Workmen's compensation: what is casual employment, 15 A.L.R. 735; 33 A.L.R. 1452; 60 A.L.R. 1195, 107 A.L.R. 934.

Workmen's compensation: interest in the business or in corporation or firm owning the business as affecting right to compensation, 15 A.L.R. 1288; 81 A.L.R. 644.

Workmen's compensation: injury while leaving place of employment at unusual time for purposes not connected with the employment, 16 A.L.R. 1169.

Workmen's compensation: injury to employee while using an instrumentality of the employer for benefit of himself or third person, 16 A.L.R. 1364.

Workmen's compensation: injury to employee while away from plant, primarily to serve a purpose of his own or of another employee, but which may incidentally benefit employer, 18 A.L.R. 525.

Workmen's compensation: injury or death to which preexisting physical condition of employee causes or contributes, 19 A.L.R. 95; 28 A.L.R. 204; 60 A.L.R. 1299.

Workmen's compensation: death from heart disease, 19 A.L.R. 110; 28 A.L.R. 204; 60 A.L.R. 1299.

Workmen's compensation: injury from fumes or gases as accident or occupational disease, 23 A.L.R. 335; 90 A.L.R. 619.

Workmen's compensation: injury or death due to elements, 25 A.L.R. 146; 40 A.L.R. 400; 46 A.L.R. 1218; 53 A.L.R. 1084; 83 A.L.R. 234.

Workmen's Compensation Act: applicability of state compensation act to injury within admiralty jurisdiction, 25 A.L.R. 1029; 31 A.L.R. 518; 56 A.L.R. 352.

Workmen's compensation: injury received while doing prohibited act, 26 A.L.R. 166; 58 A.L.R. 197; 83 A.L.R. 1211; 119 A.L.R. 1409.

Workmen's compensation: injury to local solicitor, collector, or outside salesman as arising out of and in the course of the employment, 29 A.L.R. 120; 36 A.L.R. 474.

Workmen's compensation: injury from imprudence in eating or drinking, or mistake as to substance taken, as arising out of and in course of employment, 29 A.L.R. 433.

Injury to muscles or nerves attributable to occupation, but not due to a sudden event, as within Workmen's Compensation Act, 29 A.L.R. 510.

Lead or other occupational poisoning as within Workmen's Compensation Act, 29 A.L.R. 691; 44 A.L.R. 371.

Workmen's compensation: applicability to charitable institutions, 30 A.L.R. 600.

Workmen's compensation: injury after stopping work for reason not personal to employee as arising out of and in the course of employment, 30 A.L.R. 972.

Workmen's compensation: one employed concurrently or jointly by several, 30 A.L.R. 1000; 58 A.L.R. 1395.

Workmen's compensation: injury as a result of labor trouble, 31 A.L.R. 1085.

Workmen's compensation: injury to servant who lives on employer's premises as arising out of or in the course of the employment, 31 A.L.R. 1251; 56 A.L.R. 512; 158 A.L.R. 606.

Workmen's compensation: injury to employee temporarily leaving car or vehicle of employer for reasons personal to himself, 32 A.L.R. 806.

Workmen's compensation: kinship or family relationship between employer and claimant or employee, as affecting right to compensation, 33 A.L.R. 585.

Workmen's Compensation Act as affecting master's duty and liability under contract to furnish medical treatment to employees, 33 A.L.R. 1204.

Workmen's compensation: injury to employee while engaged on employer's work, but outside the scope of his usual duty, as arising out of and in the course of the employment, 33 A.L.R. 1335; 82 A.L.R. 1251.

Workmen's compensation: specific provisions exempting liability for injury caused by willful act directed against an employee for reasons personal to him or because of his employment, 35 A.L.R. 563.

Presumption against suicide in workmen's compensation cases, 36 A.L.R. 397.

Accident and disability insurance: when insured deemed to be totally and continuously unable to transact all business duties, 37 A.L.R. 151; 39 A.L.R. 1026; 69 A.L.R. 397; 41 A.L.R. 1376; 51 A.L.R. 1048; 79 A.L.R. 857; 98 A.L.R. 789.

Workmen's compensation: aggravation by particular condition or equipment of plant of injury which in its inception was not connected with the employment, 37 A.L.R. 771.

Workmen's compensation: external infection as accident or an accidental injury, 39 A.L.R. 871.

Workmen's compensation: external infection as accident or an accidental injury, 39 A.L.R. 871.

Workmen's compensation: illness or injury due to artificial temperature as compensable, 41 A.L.R. 1124; 53 A.L.R. 1095; 61 A.L.R. 218.

Workmen's compensation: neurasthenia as compensable, 44 A.L.R. 500; 86 A.L.R. 961.

Public officer as within Workmen's Compensation Act, 44 A.L.R. 1477.

Workmen's compensation: injury to teamster or truckman before or after hours of work, 48 A.L.R. 1400.

Workmen's compensation: injuries while entering or leaving place of employment as arising out of or in course of employment, 49 A.L.R. 424; 82 A.L.R. 1043.

Workmen's compensation: death or injury while traveling as arising out of or in the course of employment, 49 A.L.R. 454; 63 A.L.R. 469; 100 A.L.R. 1053.

Convict or prisoner as within Workmen's Compensation Act, 49 A.L.R. 1381.

Workmen's compensation: right of employee to compensation for injuries received while acting in an emergency, 50 A.L.R. 1148.

Ownership of leased or rented property as constituting business, trade, occupation, etc., within workmen's compensation acts, 50 A.L.R. 1176.

Municipal corporation as an employer within Workmen's Compensation Act, 54 A.L.R. 788.

Injury during earthquake as within Workmen's Compensation Act, 54 A.L.R. 1396.

Workmen's compensation: injury after discharge, 56 A.L.R. 859; 69 A.L.R. 1121.

Workmen's compensation: injury due to eating tainted food as one arising out of and in the course of employment, 57 A.L.R. 614.

Construction and effect of provisions as to age, or employment as affected by age, in policy insuring employer against liability, 59 A.L.R. 300.

Workmen's compensation: employee temporarily engaged in personal business, 59 A.L.R. 370; 66 A.L.R. 756.

Workmen's compensation: injury accidentally inflicted on employee while on employer's premises by one who was not an employee and had no connection with the work, 60 A.L.R. 1401.

Workmen's compensation: who are within provisions of act in relation to clerical work, 62 A.L.R. 348.

Condition of bodily organs due to particles of dust or other material incident to work as compensable within Workmen's Compensation Act not covering occupational diseases, 62 A.L.R. 1460; 97 A.L.R. 1412.

Right of one, other than employer of his insurer, liable under Workmen's Compensation Act, to indemnity or contribution from the employer of his insurer, 66 A.L.R. 1433.

Workmen's compensation: rights and remedies where employee was injured by a third person's negligence, 67 A.L.R. 249; 88 A.L.R. 665; 106 A.L.R. 1040.

Workmen's compensation: injury to or incapacity of employee as result of vaccination, inoculation, or other medical or surgical treatment as compensable, 69 A.L.R. 863.

Juror as within Workmen's Compensation Act, 70 A.L.R. 1248.

Workmen's compensation: injury from assault, 72 A.L.R. 110; 112 A.L.R. 1258; 112 A.L.R. 1258.

Construction, application, and effect of provisions of workmen's compensation and employers' liability policy as regards employees not within operation of compensation acts, 73 A.L.R. 86; 117 A.L.R. 1299; 117 A.L.R. 1299.

Necessity and sufficiency of evidence that disease contracted by applicant for workmen's compensation is attributable to employment, 73 A.L.R. 488.

Workmen's compensation: deviation on personal errand as affecting question whether injury to employee on street or highway arose out of and in the course of employment, 76 A.L.R. 356.

Mingling of employer's purpose and employee's personal purpose in taking trip as affecting right to compensation under a Workmen's Compensation Act, 78 A.L.R. 684.

Workmen's compensation: street risk incurred in course of employment, 80 A.L.R. 126.

Helper, assistant, or substitute for an employee as himself an employee within contemplation of workmen's compensation act, 80 A.L.R. 522.

Workmen's compensation: interest in business, or in corporation or firm owning business, as affecting right to compensation, 81 A.L.R. 644.

Workmen's compensation: construction of provisions of acts regarding "waiting period," 81 A.L.R. 1261.

Mandamus to compel consideration, allowance, or payment of claim under workmen's compensation acts, 82 A.L.R. 1073.

Workmen's compensation: damage or injury to artificial member or other personal property of employee as compensable, 82 A.L.R. 1174.

Time to be considered in determining whether a case is within the earlier or later provisions of the workmen's compensation act, as regards compensation recoverable, 82 A.L.R. 1244.

Workmen's compensation: injuries incident to performance of employer's work in whole or in part at employee's home, 83 A.L.R. 216; 92 A.L.R. 1036.

Who are within provisions of workmen's compensation acts relating to hazardous employments or occupations, 83 A.L.R. 1018.

Workmen's compensation: injury to employee while in street in front of employer's premises when going to or coming from work, 85 A.L.R. 97.

Use by employee of his own motor vehicle as affecting question whether injury or death was within Workmen's Compensation Act, 85 A.L.R. 978; 96 A.L.R. 467.

Right to compensation for injury while going to or from work as affected by fact that compensation covers the time involved or cost of transportation, or both, 87 A.L.R. 250.

Construction, application, and effect of provisions of workmen's compensation acts that make one's status as employee dependent upon amount of earnings, 87 A.L.R. 958.

Workmen's compensation: accident as a necessary condition of compensation for injury in absence of explicit provision of statute in that regard, 94 A.L.R. 584.

Use by employee of his own motor vehicle as affecting question whether injury or death was within Workmen's Compensation Act, 95 A.L.R. 467.

Needy persons put to work by municipality or other public body as means of extending aid to them as within protection of Workmen's Compensation Act, 96 A.L.R. 1154; 127 A.L.R. 1483.

Injury to employee while being transported to or from work by fellow employee not obligated to do so arising out of and in the course of employment, 97 A.L.R. 555.

Workmen's compensation: compensation as affected by external infection from original injury or subsequent accident, 102 A.L.R. 790.

Workmen's compensation: termination of employment before occurrence of disability or disease attributable to employment as affecting right to compensation, 104 A.L.R. 1210.

Status of independent contractor as distinguished from employee for purposes of workmen's compensation act as affected by intention to evade or avoid the requirements of that act, 107 A.L.R. 855.

Workmen's compensation: what is casual employment, 107 A.L.R. 934.

Workmen's compensation: application to employees engaged in farming, 107 A.L.R. 977; 140 A.L.R. 399.

"Accidental injury" within workmen's compensation act as predicable upon sudden shock or fright without physical impact with person or employee, 109 A.L.R. 892.

Implied consent of nonresident or foreign corporation to jurisdiction in proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act as predicable upon facts which subject him or it to the substantive provisions of the act, 110 A.L.R. 1426.

Rights and obligations under Workmen's Compensation Act in respect of claims by employees of corporation during receivership or conservatorship of employer, 111 A.L.R. 328.

Status of gasoline and oil distributor or dealer as agent, employee, independent contractor, or independent dealer as regards responsibility for injury to person or damage to property, 116 A.L.R. 457; 83 A.L.R.2d 1282.

Workmen's compensation: compensation for disfigurement, 116 A.L.R. 712.

Teamster or truckman as independent contractor or employee under workman's compensation acts, 120 A.L.R. 1031.

Gradual occurrence of bruise or other traumatic injury or condition as accident within workmen's compensation act, 122 A.L.R. 839.

Injury to employee while engaged in an effort beyond the scope of his duties to increase his value to employer as one arising out of and in the course of his employment, 123 A.L.R. 1176.

What constitutes "continuous employment" within provision of group insurance policy prescribing condition of disability benefits, 124 A.L.R. 1494.

Status of one as employee within Workmen's Compensation Act as affected by violation of statute in connection with his employment, 128 A.L.R. 1310.

Who are "workmen" or "operatives" within workmen's compensation act, 129 A.L.R. 990.

Workmen's compensation: responsibility of seller or purchaser of business or plant in respect of employee's claims under act for injury, 131 A.L.R. 1362.

Status of minor employed by parent as regards provision of workmen's compensation act relating to compensation thereunder or precluding action at law for injury, 132 A.L.R. 1030.

Status as employee or servant as affected by misrepresentations in obtaining employment, 136 A.L.R. 1124.

Insurance soliciting agent as employee or independent contractor within workmen's compensation acts, 138 A.L.R. 1122.

Injury to employee in course of employment but away from employer's place of business, due to a cause or risk to which others are also subject, as arising out of the employment, within Workmen's Compensation Act, 139 A.L.R. 1472.

Schoolteacher as an employee within workmen's compensation acts, 140 A.L.R. 1383.

Workmen's compensation as covering disease contracted by employee while on street or in traveling, 141 A.L.R. 806.

Workmen's compensation: injury to employee away from employer's premises during lunch hour, 141 A.L.R. 862.

Workmen's compensation: illness or injury from contaminated water, 141 A.L.R. 1490.

One temporarily impressed into public service in emergency, as within workmen's compensation act, 142 A.L.R. 657.

Workmen's compensation: injury while on way to or from work sustained by employee who does not work regular hours or is subject to call, 142 A.L.R. 885.

Workmen's compensation act as applicable to employee of concessionaire in department store, 142 A.L.R. 1400.

Industrial homeworkers as within social security, unemployment compensation, fair labor standards or workmen's compensation act, 143 A.L.R. 418.

Workmen's compensation: award with respect to operation performed to make use of corrective appliance possible or more effective, 143 A.L.R. 581.

Workmen's compensation: person in military or naval service, 143 A.L.R. 1532.

Workmen's compensation: death or injury incident to effort of employee or others for his relief in case of illness, 144 A.L.R. 361.

Workmen's compensation: person in military or naval service, 144 A.L.R. 1516.

Liability for injury to person or damage to property as result of "blackout," 147 A.L.R. 1442; 148 A.L.R. 1401; 150 A.L.R. 1448; 153 A.L.R. 1433; 154 A.L.R. 1459; 155 A.L.R. 1458; 158 A.L.R. 1463.

Workmen's compensation: injury or death of employee resulting from conduct of one to whom he had delegated performance of his duty, 148 A.L.R. 708.

Workmen's compensation: injury due to character or quality of material or equipment for cleansing or for other personal conveniences of employees, 148 A.L.R. 1017.

Transfer of business as affecting common-law remedy or workmen's compensation in respect of injuries subsequently sustained by employee, 150 A.L.R. 1166.

Workmen's compensation: person in military or naval service, 150 A.L.R. 1456.

Workmen's compensation: injury to servant who lives on employer's premises as arising out of and in the course of the employment, 158 A.L.R. 606.

Musicians or other entertainers as employees of establishment in which they perform, within meaning of workmen's compensation, social security, and unemployment insurance acts, 158 A.L.R. 915; 172 A.L.R. 325; 172 A.L.R. 325.

Workmen's compensation: injury to employee while in automobile parking lot, 159 A.L.R. 1395.

Accidental injury to employee while doing private work for his own benefit, following a continued practice in that regard, in employer's plant, 161 A.L.R. 1461.

Disability from use of intoxicants or drugs as within meaning of disability provision of insurance policy, 166 A.L.R. 833.

Workmen's compensation: coverage of industrial or business employee when performing, under orders, services for private benefit of employer or superior, or officer, representative, or stockholder of corporate employer, 172 A.L.R. 378.

Status of gasoline and oil distributor or dealer as agent, employee, independent contractor, or independent dealer as regards responsibility for injury to person or damage to property, 83 A.L.R.2d 1282.

Taxicab driver as employee of owner of cab, or independent contractor, within social security and unemployment insurance statutes, 10 A.L.R.2d 369.

Rupture of blood vessel following exertion or exercise as within terms of accident provision of insurance policy, 35 A.L.R.2d 1105.

Repeated absorption of poisonous substance as "accident" within coverage clause of comprehensive general liability policy, 49 A.L.R.2d 1263.

Route driver or salesman as independent contractor or employee of merchandise producer or processor, for purposes of respondent superior doctrine, 53 A.L.R.2d 183.

Liability insurance: "accident" or "accidental" as including loss resulting from ordinary negligence of insured or his agent, 7 A.L.R.3d 1262.

Suicide as compensable under Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 A.L.R.3d 616.

Mental incapacity or disease as constituting total or permanent disability within insurance coverage, 22 A.L.R.3d 1000.

Construction and application of provision of liability policy, other than automobile liability, excluding from coverage injury or death of employee of insured, 34 A.L.R.3d 1397.

Workmen's compensation: injury sustained while attending employer-sponsored social affair as arising out of and in the course of employment, 47 A.L.R.3d 566.

Admissibility of opinion evidence as to employability on issue of disability in health and accident insurance and worker's compensation cases, 89 A.L.R.3d 783.

What conduct in willful, intentional, or deliberate within workmen's compensation act provision authorizing tort action for such conduct, 96 A.L.R.3d 1064.

Mental disorders as compensable under workmen's compensation acts, 97 A.L.R.3d 161.

Modern status of effect of state workmen's compensation act on right of third-person tort-feasor to contribution or indemnity from employer of injured or killed workman, 100 A.L.R.3d 350.

Unemployment compensation: trucker as employee or independent contractor, 2 A.L.R.4th 1219; 37 A.L.R. Fed. 95.

Liability of urban redevelopment authority or other state or municipal agency or entity for injuries occurring in vacant or abandoned property owned by governmental entity, 7 A.L.R.4th 1129.

Willful, wanton, or reckless conduct of coemployee as ground of liability despite bar of workers' compensation law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888.

Workers' compensation: student athlete as "employee" of college or university providing scholarship or similar financial assistance, 58 A.L.R.4th 1259.

Workers' compensation: injuries incurred during labor activity, 61 A.L.R.4th 196.

Workers' compensation: effect of allegation that injury was caused by, or occurred during course of, worker's illegal conduct, 73 A.L.R.4th 270.

Workers' compensation statute as barring illegally employed minor's tort action, 77 A.L.R.4th 844.

Ownership interest in employer business as affecting status as employee for workers' compensation purposes, 78 A.L.R.4th 973.

Workers' compensation: coverage of injury occurring in parking lot provided by employer, while employee was going to or coming from work, 4 A.L.R.5th 443.

Workers' compensation: compensability of injury during tryout, employment test, or similar activity designed to determine employability, 8 A.L.R.5th 798.

Right to workers' compensation for injuries suffered after termination of employment, 10 A.L.R.5th 245.

Jurors as within coverage of workers' compensation acts, 13 A.L.R.5th 444.

Workers' compensation: Lyme disease, 22 A.L.R.5th 246.

Workers' compensation: law enforcement officer's recovery for injury sustained during exercise or physical recreation activities, 44 A.L.R.5th 569.

Presumption or inference that accidental death of employee engaged in occupation of manufacturing or processing arose out of and in course of employment, 47 A.L.R.5th 801.

Employee's injuries sustained in use of employer's restroom as covered by workers' compensation, 80 A.L.R.5th 417.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered as result of sudden stimuli involving nonpersonnel action, 83 A.L.R.5th 103.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of sudden stimuli involving nonpersonnel action - compensability under particular circumstances, 84 A.L.R.5th 249.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli - Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions, 97 A.L.R.5th 1.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli - Requisites of, and factors affecting, compensability, 106 A.L.R.5th 111.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli - Compensability under particular circumstances, 107 A.L.R.5th 441.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli - Compensability under particular circumstances, 108 A.L.R.5th 1.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli - Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions and requisites of, and factors affecting, compensability, 109 A.L.R.5th 161.

Award of workers' compensation benefits to professional athletes, 112 A.L.R.5th 365.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli - Compensability of particular physical injuries or illnesses, 112 A.L.R.5th 509.

Compensability under occupational disease statutes of emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden stimuli, 113 A.L.R.5th 115.

Application of workers' compensation laws to illegal aliens, 121 A.L.R.5th 523.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli - Right to compensation under particular statutory provisions, 122 A.L.R.5th 653.

Application of the "mutual benefit" doctrine to workers' compensation cases, 11 A.L.R.6th 351.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli - Requisites of, and factors affecting, compensability, 13 A.L.R.6th 209.

Right to workers' compensation for injury suffered by worker en route to or from worker's home where home is claimed as "work situs", 15 A.L.R.6th 633.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of sudden mental stimuli - compensability of particular injuries and illnesses, 20 A.L.R.6th 641.

Workers' compensation: nonathlete students as covered employees, 33 A.L.R.6th 251.

Right to workers' compensation for physical injury or illness suffered by claimant as result of nonsudden mental stimuli - compensability under particular circumstances, 39 A.L.R.6th 445.

Liability for injury to garbage or sanitation worker exclusive of workers' compensation benefit, 14 A.L.R.7th 2.