2020 Georgia Code
Title 24 - Evidence
Chapter 8 - Hearsay
Article 2 - Admissions and Confessions
§ 24-8-824. Only Voluntary Confessions Admissible

To make a confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.

(Code 1981, §24-8-824, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

- Prohibition against compelled self-incrimination, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XVI.

- For comment, "School Bullies - They Aren't Just Students: Examining School Interrogations and the Miranda Warning," see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 731 (2008).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Constitutional Considerations
• Voluntariness
• Procedural Considerations

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1868, § 3740, former Code 1873, § 3793, former Penal Code 1895, § 1006, former Penal Code 1910, § 1032, former Code 1933, § 38-411, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Any statement or conduct of a person, indicating a consciousness of guilt, when such person is, at the time or thereafter, charged with or suspected of a crime, is admissible against the person upon trial for committing the crime. Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323, 271 S.E.2d 471 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Fact that a confession was not reduced to writing does not render confession inadmissible. Hayes v. State, 152 Ga. App. 858, 264 S.E.2d 307 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Criminal confession is not rendered inadmissible because the language used therein indicates that the accused had committed another and separate offense. Dampier v. State, 245 Ga. 427, 265 S.E.2d 565, supplemented, 245 Ga. 882, 268 S.E.2d 349 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Any possible error in admitting a confession of a codefendant after the codefendant refused to testify is rendered harmless when the confession parallels the statements of the codefendants. Myrick v. State, 155 Ga. App. 496, 271 S.E.2d 637 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- When inadmissible evidence as to a confession is offered and admitted, its admission constitutes reversible error unless the jury is expressly instructed that the evidence is admitted for the purpose of impeachment only, whether or not a request to so charge be made, and whether or not any exceptions are made to the charge as given. Askea v. State, 153 Ga. App. 849, 267 S.E.2d 279 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- A confession is an admission freely and voluntarily made by the accused whereby the accused acknowledges personally to be guilty of the offense charged, and discloses the circumstances of the act, and the share and participation the accused had in the act. Allen v. State, 187 Ga. 178, 200 S.E. 109 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Pressley v. State, 201 Ga. 267, 39 S.E.2d 478 (1946); Johnson v. State, 204 Ga. 528, 50 S.E.2d 334 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Carter v. State, 90 Ga. App. 61, 81 S.E.2d 868 (1954);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- There is a difference between an incriminating statement and a confession of guilt. In the former only one or more facts entering into the criminal act is admitted, while in the latter the entire criminal act is confessed. Johnson v. State, 204 Ga. 528, 50 S.E.2d 334 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Carter v. State, 90 Ga. App. 61, 81 S.E.2d 868 (1954);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

True determinant of whether a defendant has made a confession or merely given a statement is whether the statement is offered by the accused as exculpatory or inculpatory. Sanford v. State, 153 Ga. App. 541, 265 S.E.2d 868 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

An admission of the main fact, from which the essential elements of the criminal act charged may be inferred, amounts to a confession of the crime itself. Sanford v. State, 153 Ga. App. 541, 265 S.E.2d 868 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

An admission of a fact not in itself involving criminal intent is not a confession. Carter v. State, 90 Ga. App. 61, 81 S.E.2d 868 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Unless the statement of the defendant is broad enough to comprehend every essential element necessary to make out the case against the defendant, it cannot be said to be an admission of guilt. Allen v. State, 187 Ga. 178, 200 S.E. 109 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Johnson v. State, 204 Ga. 528, 50 S.E.2d 334 (1948); Carter v. State, 90 Ga. App. 61, 81 S.E.2d 868 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Prima-facie showing of the admissibility of a confession is made by evidence of compliance with former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 in addition to evidence showing that defendant confessed after having been given defendant's Miranda rights. Pruitt v. State, 176 Ga. App. 317, 335 S.E.2d 724 (1985) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); Adams v. State, 186 Ga. App. 599, 367 S.E.2d 871; 186 Ga. App. 917, 367 S.E.2d 871 (1988), cert. denied,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

"Hope of benefit" to which former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 referred was usually a hope of lighter punishment. Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 274 S.E.2d 549, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 364, 70 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Within the context of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50, the slightest hope of benefit referred to a lighter sentence. Burton v. State, 212 Ga. App. 100, 441 S.E.2d 470 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Record did not show that the officer made any assurances to defendant that the defendant's sentence would be lighter if the defendant gave an incriminating statement and the officer's statement to the accused that substance abuse counseling was available was an offer of a collateral benefit which did not invalidate the statement. Burton v. State, 212 Ga. App. 100, 441 S.E.2d 470 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Promise by an officer to assist defendant in getting help through counseling did not constitute an impermissible hope of benefit under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Peinado v. State, 223 Ga. App. 271, 477 S.E.2d 408 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

An offer by officers to "help" defendant if defendant told the truth and the officer's statement that defendant would face a jury trial if defendant lied were not promises of an improper benefit that would render defendant's confession inadmissible under the "slightest hope of benefit" to which O.C.G.A. § 24-3-40 refers. Porter v. State, 264 Ga. App. 526, 591 S.E.2d 436 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- "Hope of benefit" to which former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 referred was usually a hope of lighter punishment. Consequently, being released was not a hope of benefit that would implicate that Code section. Further, even if the court were to find that the GBI agent said that the defendant would be released if the defendant gave the agent information, this would be an offer of a collateral benefit which did not invalidate the statement and thus the statement was admissible. Overton v. State, 295 Ga. App. 223, 671 S.E.2d 507 (2008), cert. denied, No. S09C0654, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 212 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Clear intention of the former statute was that a confession induced by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury could not be used against a defendant. Williams v. State, 239 Ga. 327, 236 S.E.2d 672 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

§ 24-3-53 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-823). - Both former Code 1933, §§ 38-411 and 38-420 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-824 and24-8-823) refer to evidence in criminal trials. The former statute recognized the distinction between admissions and confessions. In former Code 1933, § 38-420 only one or more facts entering into a criminal act were admitted, while in former Code 1933, § 38-411 the entire criminal act was confessed. Burns v. State, 188 Ga. 22, 2 S.E.2d 627 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Issue regarding voluntariness of confession pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 must be raised in the trial court. Turner v. State, 246 Ga. App. 49, 539 S.E.2d 553 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Trial court does not err in admitting defendant's oral admissions contained in the testimony of the investigating officer after the trial court as the trier of fact outside the presence of the jury determined the voluntariness of the defendant's admissions. Kelley v. State, 160 Ga. App. 343, 287 S.E.2d 68 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Court's decision to allow confession into evidence not error. Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. 419, 405 S.E.2d 686 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); Davis v. State, 271 Ga. 527, 520 S.E.2d 218 (1999);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Cited in Jones v. State, 350 Ga. App. 618, 829 S.E.2d 820 (2019).

Constitutional Considerations

In general.

- Admission in evidence of a confession voluntarily made, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury, does not contravene the provisions of the state constitution that no person shall be compelled to give testimony tending in any manner to incriminate oneself, nor is it inimical to anything contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Wilburn v. State, 141 Ga. 510, 81 S.E. 444 (1914) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032).

Use of threats or promises to coerce a criminal defendant to make a statement is contrary to Georgia law and to federal constitutional law. Young v. State, 243 Ga. 546, 255 S.E.2d 20 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Confessions, if made voluntarily without hope of benefit or fear of injury, are admissible and are not rendered inadmissible as violating the constitutional inhibition against self-incrimination by the fact that the confession is in affidavit form. Elliott v. State, 87 Ga. App. 456, 74 S.E.2d 366 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

It must be shown that no constitutional rights of the defendant were violated in obtaining statement when an in-custody written statement of a defendant is offered in evidence. Walker v. State, 226 Ga. 292, 174 S.E.2d 440 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 936, 92 S. Ct. 2845, 33 L. Ed. 2d 754 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Confessions which result from coercive interrogations conducted by private citizens are not subject to a constitutional due process analysis in determining whether or not to exclude the confession at trial. Griffin v. State, 230 Ga. App. 318, 496 S.E.2d 480 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's constitutional rights could not have been violated when the defendant was not under arrest or in custody at the time of the confession and no police or other law enforcement personnel were present. Gaston v. State, 153 Ga. App. 538, 265 S.E.2d 866 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- When the evidence heard was sufficient to authorize the trial court to determine that the defendant was advised of the defendant's rights, that the defendant was not placed under any duress, that the defendant seemed to understand the defendant's rights, that the defendant was not under influence of drugs or alcohol and that the defendant seemed completely aware of what was going on around the defendant, the defendant's confession was voluntarily elicited and not in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Simonton v. State, 151 Ga. App. 431, 260 S.E.2d 487 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Question by a defendant as to whether the defendant would have been arrested if the defendant asked for an attorney was not a clear request for counsel that required cessation of police questioning or clarification before continuing the interrogation and there was no evidence that the statement was given in fear of injury or for a hope of benefit; additionally, while the investigator lied to the defendant throughout the interview about the existence and amount of inculpatory evidence, nothing suggested that the investigator sought to procure a false statement. Wright v. State, 279 Ga. App. 155, 630 S.E.2d 656 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When a defendant objects to the admission into evidence of defendant's confession, the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary, and, if the confession is the product of a custodial interrogation by officers of the government, that the confession was preceded by the appellant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the appellant's Miranda rights. Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 261 S.E.2d 379 (1979), sentence vacated, 446 U.S. 961, 100 S. Ct. 2934, 64 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1980) (remanded for further consideration in light of Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980)) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Whether, after the Miranda warnings are given, the waiver of those rights was free and voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 587, 271 S.E.2d 719 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Trial court did not err by refusing to exclude the defendant's post-arrest statement, which admitted that the defendant was the shooter because the defendant did not explain how the Miranda warnings were inadequate; the defendant was advised of the rights both verbally and in writing and signed a waiver, and a detective testified that the detective secured the defendant's Miranda waiver before interrogating the defendant. Funes v. State, 289 Ga. 793, 716 S.E.2d 183 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress the statements made to the officers before the defendant's arrest because even assuming the officers erred when the officers failed to Mirandize the defendant immediately, the defendant's initial response to questioning had none of the earmarks of coercion and the officers did not exploit the unwarned admission to pressure the defendant into waiving the right to remain silent. State v. Richardson, 353 Ga. App. 368, 837 S.E.2d 524 (2020).

Due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that the trial judge determine whether a confession is voluntary before permitting the jury to consider the confession. Stone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 357, 271 S.E.2d 22 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Defendant's constitutional rights are violated when defendant's challenged confession is introduced without a determination by the trial judge of the confession's voluntariness after an adequate hearing. Strickland v. State, 226 Ga. 750, 177 S.E.2d 238 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- While non-custodial and custodial statements were properly admitted as not vitiating the defendant's constitutional rights once defendant invoked the right to counsel, a subsequent interview initiated by police violated this right; as a result, cocaine seized through information obtained from the interview had to be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When evidence shows that confessions were voluntarily made and were not induced by another by hope of award or fear of punishment, or when it is an issue of fact as to whether the confessions were properly obtained, defendant is not denied due process of law as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions, by their introduction in evidence against the defendant. Claybourn v. State, 190 Ga. 861, 11 S.E.2d 23 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Counsel did not perform deficiently by not making an objection to the affidavit of the appellant because the affidavit, written by the appellant, was hearsay, but it was nevertheless admissible as an admission by a party-opponent and such an admission by a defendant generally was not subject to the Confrontation Clause. Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 837 S.E.2d 272 (2019).

Voluntary character of the confession depends on the question whether the making of the statement was voluntary, and not whether the particular communication contained in the confession was voluntary. Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770, 48 S.E.2d 522 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Fact that the interrogating officer did not know the defendant's age, education, or familiarity with the "custodial experience" did not render the defendant's confession invalid or involuntary; further, the failure to advise the defendant as to the crimes about which the defendant was to be questioned before a Miranda waiver was irrelevant to whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Rivera v. State, 279 Ga. App. 1, 630 S.E.2d 152 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- To determine whether the state has proven that a confession was made voluntarily, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Presley v. State, 251 Ga. App. 823, 555 S.E.2d 156 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); Harrison v. State, 253 Ga. App. 179, 558 S.E.2d 760 (2002);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Given the totality of the circumstances, and the defendant's age, education, and knowledge of both the substance of the charge and nature of the rights to an attorney and to remain silent, because the defendant voluntarily gave a statement to a police detective about an uncharged armed robbery, absent any threats, coercion, or promises in exchange for doing so, the statement was admissible. Swain v. State, 285 Ga. App. 550, 647 S.E.2d 88 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Based on the totality of the circumstances and the undisputed evidence, because the defendant's confession to a police detective was voluntary and admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50, not coerced or received as a result of promises made, and not subject to exclusion due to improper methods used by the police, the trial court did not err in admitting the confession; further, exclusion of the confession was not required based on a violation of the defendant's right to counsel. Swain v. State, 285 Ga. App. 550, 647 S.E.2d 88 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

With regard to a defendant's conviction for rape of a minor relative, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to suppress a non-custodial audio recording of a statement the defendant made to the victim that the victim obtained via a hidden recorder as a hearing was held by the trial court on the admissibility of the recording at which time the trial court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's statement was made voluntarily and the victim did not promise the defendant anything to make the statement and did not threaten the defendant into making the statement. Flournoy v. State, 299 Ga. App. 377, 682 S.E.2d 632 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Any error in refusing to suppress the defendant's statements inside the patrol vehicle was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the later statements at the sheriff's department were preceded by Miranda warnings, were made after the defendant signed a waiver of rights, were made an hour-and-a-half later to different law enforcement officers, and were made without the new officers' reminding the defendant of any of the statements in the patrol vehicle. Spears v. State, 296 Ga. 598, 769 S.E.2d 337 (2015), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686, 820 S.E.2d 640 (2018).

Trial court did not err when the court admitted evidence of a custodial statement that the defendant gave after being arrested as under the totality of the circumstances the recording of the interview supported the trial court's finding that the defendant's statement was not given as a result of any promise of reduced criminal punishment as the defendant continued to deny involvement and there was no showing that the defendant interpreted the detective's statement as an offer of reduced punishment. Finley v. State, 298 Ga. 451, 782 S.E.2d 651 (2016).

Appellant's statement to law enforcement was not involuntary as the appellant was advised of the appellant's Miranda rights numerous times (and had executed a written waiver), a video-recorded statement plainly reflected that both the appellant and law enforcement understood that the appellant was free to leave anytime during the interview, and the investigator's statement that the appellant would never see the light of day if not truthful was an exhortation to tell the truth, not a promise of a lighter punishment. Price v. State, 305 Ga. 608, 825 S.E.2d 178 (2019).

- When the court denied the defendants' motions to suppress the defendant's confessions, implicit in the ruling was the court's finding that the statements were freely and voluntarily made, without hope of benefit or reward. Eady v. State, 182 Ga. App. 293, 355 S.E.2d 778 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

A person who is mentally ill can be competent to make a voluntary confession. Johnson v. State, 256 Ga. 259, 347 S.E.2d 584 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

When an admission of guilt was not product of interrogation but was spontaneous statement of the defendant the statement is admissible. Williams v. State, 159 Ga. App. 772, 285 S.E.2d 232 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Hope of reward or fear of punishment which renders confession inadmissible, etc. is that which is induced by another. Jones v. State, 18 Ga. App. 310, 89 S.E. 347 (1916) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Phinazee v. State, 22 Ga. App. 258, 95 S.E. 878 (1918); Hill v. State, 148 Ga. 521, 97 S.E. 442 (1918) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216, 154 S.E.2d 443 (1967); Dickey v. State, 157 Ga. App. 13, 276 S.E.2d 75 (1981) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Although the interrogating officer did tell defendant that the defendant was helping defendant by telling the truth, that judges love to hear that defendants helped the police, and that although telling the truth put defendant right in the hot seat, it also showed that the defendant cooperated, these statements, when combined with repeated statements that the officer could not promise any help, did not constitute the kind of "hope of benefit" which was contemplated by former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Stephens v. State, 164 Ga. App. 398, 297 S.E.2d 90 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Even though interrogating officer's deception may not have been intended to procure an untrue statement, since the deception was intended and indeed did induce defendant to confess in the hope of receiving a lighter punishment, the confession was not voluntary. State v. Ritter, 268 Ga. 108, 485 S.E.2d 492 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's claim that defendant's statement was inadmissible on the basis that the statement was obtained by a threat of an increased punishment was not valid because the challenged words could only have been construed as the officer's assessment that the defendant's credibility was being destroyed and that defendant was imperiling any claim of innocence by insisting on a version of the facts which was so dramatically contrary to the evidence gathered by the police. Robinson v. State, 272 Ga. 752, 533 S.E.2d 718 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Court of appeals erred in affirming the defendant's conviction for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery and aggravated assault and in determining that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to suppress the confession as involuntary and induced by an improper hope of benefit because the defendant's confession had to be considered involuntary and inadmissible when the record showed that the defendant gave self-incriminating statement only after being told that the defendant could receive a "shorter term" by doing so, which was exactly the hope of benefit that was prohibited under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50; as a result, the defendant's confession was induced by a hope of benefit, it had to be presumed to be legally false, and it could not be the underlying basis of a conviction. Canty v. State, 286 Ga. 608, 690 S.E.2d 609 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant juvenile's incriminating statements to police were improperly admitted as the statements were not voluntary because, in the second interview, the detective grew frustrated with the defendant's denials of involvement in any other burglaries; and the detective told the defendant to tell the truth about those burglaries, explicitly threatening the defendant that the defendant would be charged with the other burglaries if the defendant did not tell the truth, and promising the defendant not to do anything if the defendant did tell the truth; thus, the defendant's confession was induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit as the defendant was told that confessing to the crime would result in not being charged at all. Jones v. State, 344 Ga. App. 774, 811 S.E.2d 496 (2018).

"Hope of benefit" contemplated by former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 must be induced by another; therefore, any hope which originated in the mind of the person making a confession would not exclude admission of the confession. Wesley v. State, 177 Ga. App. 877, 341 S.E.2d 507 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Gilbert v. State, 193 Ga. App. 283, 388 S.E.2d 18 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Hope or fear which originates in the mind of the person making the confession and which originates from seeds of the person's own planting would not exclude a confession. The hope or fear must be induced by another. Hall v. State, 180 Ga. App. 366, 349 S.E.2d 255 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); Shelton v. State, 196 Ga. App. 163, 395 S.E.2d 618 (1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. Burns, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (Ga. 2019); Ramos v. State, 198 Ga. App. 65, 400 S.E.2d 353 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

While former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 prohibits the introduction of a statement induced "by the slightest hope of benefit," the hope contemplated must be induced by another. Bryant v. State, 193 Ga. App. 840, 389 S.E.2d 405 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); Vineyard v. State, 195 Ga. App. 788, 395 S.E.2d 49 (1990);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

A hope or fear which originates in the mind of the person making a confession and which originates from seeds of one's own planting would not exclude a confession, and defendant's contention that the defendant viewed the investigative detective as a "mother figure" did not exclude defendant's confession. Owens v. State, 209 Ga. App. 272, 433 S.E.2d 382 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- During the defendant's interrogation for sales of XLR11, a Schedule I controlled substance, the investigators' comments such as, "there aren't anymore charges" and "what you're charged with now is what you're charged with," were promises not to bring additional charges and thus constituted a hope of benefit under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824; however, admission of the defendant's statements was harmless. To the extent Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279 (2010) is contrary, such decision is disapproved. Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 830 S.E.2d 195 (2019).

Confessions made as a tactical decision are admissible when the hope or fear is a product of the defendant's own mind rather than the result of inducement by others. Gray v. State, 240 Ga. App. 716, 523 S.E.2d 626 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Police officer's offer to assist defendant in finding a psychologist and the officer's suggestions that it best behooved the defendant to tell the truth did not constitute the hope of benefit prohibited by former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Clay v. State, 209 Ga. App. 266, 433 S.E.2d 377 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in suppressing the defendant's statements during the first two interviews because those statements were induced by promises related to the potential criminal charges the defendant faced. State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (2015).

- Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to exclude the defendant's statement as being induced by hope of benefit because the investigator's explanation of consecutive versus concurrent sentences and the options available to the district attorney's office merely emphasized the seriousness of the charges and amounted to no more than a permissible admonition to tell the truth. Lane v. State, 324 Ga. App. 303, 750 S.E.2d 381 (2013).

- Officer's testimony that the officer would inform the district attorney of defendant's cooperation was not sufficient to create a hope of benefit within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Autry v. State, 210 Ga. App. 150, 435 S.E.2d 512 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); McFadden v. State, 251 Ga. App. 342, 554 S.E.2d 323 (2001);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Any promise made to defendant to facilitate a change in defendant's jail cell was not a promise or hope of benefit which would taint defendant's otherwise voluntary confession. Billings v. State, 212 Ga. App. 125, 441 S.E.2d 262 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

No hope of benefit was created when the defendant asked the interrogating officer, "What should I do? Should I talk?" and the officer replied, "That's up to you, man. All you're going to do is help yourself out." Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 514 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1006, 120 S. Ct. 503, 145 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's statement given during an interview by a Department of Family and Children Services (DFACS) caseworker in the presence of two police officers was voluntary and not induced by deceit because neither the police nor DFACS offered defendant anything for the testimony. Moss v. State, 244 Ga. App. 295, 535 S.E.2d 292 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Officer's statements during interrogation to the effect that it would look better to the judge if defendant would confess to committing the murder rather than denying committing murder when the police could prove defendant was the murderer did not constitute a hope of benefit to elicit a statement. Taylor v. State, 274 Ga. 269, 553 S.E.2d 598 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

In defendant's trial on charges of malice murder, felony murder, and armed robbery, there was no evidence in the record that a police officer who took defendant's statement referred to any possibility of a lighter sentence when the officer questioned defendant, and the trial court properly rejected defendant's claim that defendant's statement to police should be suppressed because the officer who interviewed the defendant attempted to coerce defendant into giving a statement by informing defendant that police had defendant's fingerprints or because defendant held only a general equivalency diploma. Evans v. State, 277 Ga. 51, 586 S.E.2d 326 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

There was no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 regarding coercion of a statement because the officers made no promise to defendant that the defendant would not go to jail or that the defendant might receive a lighter sentence; the detectives only indicated that the detectives would note defendant's cooperation and the defendant's efforts to straighten out the defendant's life. Jones v. State, 270 Ga. App. 233, 606 S.E.2d 288 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's statements, wherein the defendant admitted the defendant's culpability in a victim's murder, were properly admitted as voluntary in the defendant's criminal trial as the defendants' claim that defendants were each induced by the hope of receiving benefits pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 lacked merit; the claims were contradicted by other testimony given by defendant that the defendant offered the statements freely, and one statement was not given in exchange for a plea agreement, as such agreement was already in place when the statement was made. Redwine v. State, 280 Ga. 58, 623 S.E.2d 485 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

While the defendant testified that the officers made certain promises to free the defendant, the interviewing officers testified that the officers made no promises or threats to the defendant, and the defendant signed a document in which the defendant acknowledged that no benefits had been promised the defendant, because some evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant's confession was voluntary, those findings were not clearly erroneous. Bowden v. State, 279 Ga. App. 173, 630 S.E.2d 792 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's statement to police was not rendered involuntary because the statement was given based upon a hope of benefit as there was no evidence in the record to suggest that the police offered the defendant the hope of lighter punishment in exchange for that statement. Givens v. State, 281 Ga. App. 370, 636 S.E.2d 94 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Statements by interrogating officers that the defendant should help oneself, that it was in the defendant's best interest to tell what the defendant knew, and that the officers would show the district attorney and the judge that the defendant did not want to help oneself, did not constitute a hope of benefit under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's confession was not rendered involuntary merely because the confession was made with the hope of benefit from the interrogating officers because the evidence demonstrated that any hope of benefit given by the officers was dispelled by one officer's statement that the officers had no influence over the defendant's possible punishment. Valentine v. State, 289 Ga. App. 60, 656 S.E.2d 208 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Given evidence that the defendant was not provided any assurances by law enforcement that any assistance offered to the defendant would prove beneficial, the defendant's subsequent statement to law enforcement was voluntarily made. Garcia v. State, 290 Ga. App. 164, 658 S.E.2d 904 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in admitting an alleged confession the defendant made to an investigator because the defendant gave a statement that implicated both the defendant and the defendant's sibling, and the trial court was fully authorized to find that the statement was not induced by any hope of benefit extended by a sergeant; thus, former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 did not prevent admission of the statement. Mitchell v. State, 292 Ga. App. 124, 663 S.E.2d 800 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

In a prosecution for felony murder, armed robbery, and burglary, a defendant's post-Miranda statements were properly admitted at trial as a detective's telling the defendant the detective knew the defendant was not the shooter did not constitute the hope of a lighter sentence that tainted the voluntariness of the defendant's statements. Jackson v. State, 284 Ga. 484, 668 S.E.2d 700 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Second defendant's statements were voluntary because the statements were not obtained by deceit intended to elicit an untrue response and were not induced by the hope of benefit; the investigators' alleged deception regarding whether the investigators had articulated a belief as to the second defendant's participation in the crimes, or indeed had probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant, had no bearing on the voluntariness of the defendant's statement in the absence of any evidence that the investigative technique was designed to procure a false statement. Moreover, the description of the second defendant as "not a suspect" offered no hope of benefit because the statement offered no potential future outcome. Daniel v. State, 285 Ga. 406, 677 S.E.2d 120 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in failing to suppress the defendant's post-Miranda confession because the confession was not induced by the hope of benefit in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50; the interrogating officer repeatedly told the defendant that the officer could not offer any deals for lighter punishment. State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105, 686 S.E.2d 239 (2009), overruled on other grounds by State v. Abbott, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 173 (Ga. 2018) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in refusing to suppress statements the defendant made after an officer told the defendant that withholding information would make things worse for the defendant because the officer's statement to the defendant was, in context, an admonition not to damage the defendant's credibility but to tell the truth, and the statement did not show the physical or mental torture or the coercion by threats that constitutes the remotest fear of injury forbidden by former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50; since no promises of lighter punishment were made, such an admonition to tell the truth did not constitute hope of benefit so as to render involuntary any statement made thereafter. Madrigal v. State, 287 Ga. 121, 694 S.E.2d 652 (2010), overruled on other grounds, State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant waived the defendant's claim that the defendant's confession to the murder of the defendant's spouse was induced by a hope of benefit or a fear of injury, in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50, by failing to raise the issue at the Jackson v. Denno hearing, at a renewed Jackson v. Denno motion made at trial, or when the statements were introduced at trial. Turner v. State, 287 Ga. 793, 700 S.E.2d 386 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress a confession because investigators' statements that the defendant would go home after the interview did not offer the defendant a "hope of benefit" that would otherwise render the defendant's confession inadmissible, and the investigators' statement that the defendant would not be arrested on the spot was collateral and not the type of "hope of benefit" contemplated by former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50; even assuming that the statement was not collateral, any hope of benefit was dispelled by the officers' assertions that the officers had no control over what would ultimately happen to the defendant, and throughout the interview, the defendant expressed an understanding that there would be consequences for the defendant's actions. State v. Brown, 308 Ga. App. 480, 708 S.E.2d 63 (2011), aff'd, 290 Ga. 865, 725 S.E.2d 320 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's pre-arrest statements because the offer to obtain counseling for the defendant did not bear on the question of punishment but involved a collateral benefit, and promises of a collateral benefit did not impact a statement's admissibility; the defendant offered no evidence that the officers induced the defendant to believe the defendant would receive a three year sentence, but the defendant came up with that scenario on the defendant's own, and the trial court, therefore, properly found the defendant's statements were voluntary and admissible. Dunson v. State, 309 Ga. App. 484, 711 S.E.2d 53 (2011), cert. dismissed, No. S15C1215, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 580 (Ga. 2015) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err by allowing the defendant's inculpatory statements to police. An investigator's statement that defendant's lack of cooperation showed that the defendant was "not trying to help" oneself was an encouragement to tell the truth and did not constitute an impermissible hope of benefit under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Rogers v. State, 289 Ga. 675, 715 S.E.2d 68 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court's decision to admit the defendant's apology letter to the victims was not erroneous because the trial court was authorized to find that the investigative officer's techniques were not impermissible and did not render the apology letter involuntary; the investigating officer's request for an apology letter did not induce the defendant's confession because the investigating officer stated that the officer did not promise the defendant a reduced charge or sentence in exchange for the defendant's cooperation. Edwards v. State, 312 Ga. App. 141, 717 S.E.2d 722 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0363, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 221 (Ga. 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in admitting statements the defendant made during a custodial interrogation under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 because officers' statements that the defendant had to "man up" and "own up" to the charges and that the defendant's assistance would go a long way in helping the defendant out did not constitute promises of a lighter sentence; upon beginning the interview with the police, the defendant immediately told the officers that the defendant was willing to work with the officers if the officers were willing to work with the defendant, and the officers responded by stating that the officers had no authority to make promises but would listen. Nowell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 150, 717 S.E.2d 730 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's motion to suppress several statements made to the investigators was properly denied because the assurances made to the defendant, that the defendant could go home if the defendant told the truth and that investigators had no intention of charging the defendant, did not amount to a "hope of benefit" rendering the statements involuntary. Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018)(decided under former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-50 and24-3-51).

Trial court erred in suppressing the defendant's custodial statement pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 because it was not induced by a "hope of benefit" promised from the state; the defendant's statement was not actually induced by a belief that the defendant would not be charged with forcible rape, not be thrown in jail, and not have to register as a sex offender if the defendant confessed to having sex with the victim. State v. Munoz, 324 Ga. App. 386, 749 S.E.2d 48 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Officer did not improperly induce the defendant's custodial statement when, in response to the defendant's plea to "help me out," the detective stated: "All right. What I've got to do before I can talk to you is read you your rights, OK?" This statement was not a promise that rendered the defendant's statement involuntary under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824. Wilson v. State, 293 Ga. 508, 748 S.E.2d 385 (2013).

In defendant's felony murder trial, the defendant's statement to police was admissible because the sheriff's statement that no one was going to come after the defendant for getting rid of a dead body the defendant found in the defendant's home and that the most the defendant could be charged with would be disposing of a body was merely an exhortation to tell the truth and not a promise of benefit under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824. Currier v. State, 294 Ga. 392, 754 S.E.2d 17 (2014).

Record did not support the defendant's claim that the defendant's confession was induced by the hope of benefit as the detective denied promising anything to the defendant and the officers' comments regarding punishment amounted to explanation of the seriousness of the situation and admonitions to tell the truth. Lucas v. State, 331 Ga. App. 455, 771 S.E.2d 142 (2015).

The fact that the defendant might have hoped the police would offer the defendant something more if the defendant confessed did not render the statement inadmissible as the detective did not make an offer of a hope of benefit. Eason v. State, 331 Ga. App. 59, 769 S.E.2d 772 (2015).

Defendant's statements to police were voluntary and properly admitted at trial because none of the interview techniques utilized by the interrogating officers were impermissible; there was no evidence that the officers ever offered the defendant any leniency in charges or sentencing such as would amount to an improper hope of benefit; and there was no evidence of excessively lengthy interrogation, physical deprivation, brutality, or other such hallmarks of coercive police activity. Drake v. State, 296 Ga. 286, 766 S.E.2d 447 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's custodial statements were voluntary and admissible, although the defendant was only 19, the defendant was held in isolation for over an hour prior to being read the defendant's rights, and the defendant was videotaped while the defendant waited. Giving the defendant water and a cigarette was not a "hope of benefit" that prevented the confession from being admissible. Browner v. State, 296 Ga. 138, 765 S.E.2d 348 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the defendant's statement because the court did not err when the court concluded that the defendant's confession was voluntary as the officer's statements to the defendant were mere exhortations that the defendant should tell the truth as no hope of benefit sprung from the officer's statements. Morales v. State, 337 Ga. App. 614, 788 S.E.2d 535 (2016).

Detectives' statements to the defendant, acknowledging that the defendant wanted a deal and perhaps could get some arrangement, were not the type of promise that would render the defendant's statements to the detectives involuntary. Shepard v. State, 300 Ga. 167, 794 S.E.2d 121 (2016).

After the defendant was convicted of three malice murders and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, the trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the defendant's custodial statement because the trial court did not clearly err when the court found that no improper hope of benefit was raised by the statement about the defendant being present for the defendant's children as the children grew up or by the statement that the truth would set the defendant free. Huff v. State, 299 Ga. 801, 792 S.E.2d 368 (2016).

Defendant's statement was voluntary and was not induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit because the officer's statements were aimed at encouraging the defendant to come to the homicide office, not to give a statement to police; the officer's statement to the defendant over the phone before the defendant came to the homicide office that the shooting looked like self-defense did not amount to a representation that the defendant would not be arrested or charged or that coming to the homicide office would lead to a reduction in charges or sentencing; and the officer informed the defendant of the charges the defendant was facing before the defendant gave a statement. McCray v. State, 301 Ga. 241, 799 S.E.2d 206 (2017) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the statement the defendant gave to police because a review of the taped interview revealed that the interview lasted for approximately 24 minutes and that the complained of comments by the detective indicating that the detective would let the district attorney know of the defendant's cooperation did not occur until over 16 minutes into the interview; any of the defendant's incriminating statements that came prior to the detective's comments were not actually induced by those comments; and the defendant did not identify any specific incriminating statements made after the detective's comments that should have been suppressed as being induced by a hope of benefit. Kaye v. State, 341 Ga. App. 846, 801 S.E.2d 922 (2017)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court properly found, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824), that the defendant's confession was not made due to a promise of probation as the defendant was read Miranda rights and voluntarily waived the rights and the defendant confirmed that no one had made any promises in exchange for the defendant's statement. Thompson v. State, 345 Ga. App. 20, 812 S.E.2d 329 (2018)(decided under former O.C,G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the defendant's confession as the corporal's statements that the district attorney might ask the corporal for a recommendation and the corporal could inform the district attorney of the defendant's cooperation and might not recommend the maximum punishment was not the type of "hope of benefit" that would render the defendant's confession involuntary. Meddings v. State, 346 Ga. App. 294, 816 S.E.2d 140 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1476, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 78 (Ga. 2019).

Trial court did not err by admitting certain statements the defendant made while in police custody because the detective never told the defendant that the defendant would not be charged with murder, that the defendant would be charged with a lesser crime, or that the defendant would receive a shorter sentence if the defendant told the detective what happened and telling the defendant that the court having mercy on the defendant was not the type of exhortation by a law enforcement officer that rendered a confession inadmissible. Rosser v. State, 308 Ga. 597, 842 S.E.2d 821 (2020).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the statements the defendant made to a detective because the detective imploring the defendant to tell the truth was not improper as the detective never promised the defendant that the defendant would not be charged with a crime or that the defendant would receive reduced charges, sentencing or punishment if the defendant made incriminating statements; and the detective made it clear that the detective could not make any kind of promise about what would happen to the defendant. Dawson v. State, 308 Ga. 613, 842 S.E.2d 875 (2020)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err by failing to suppress statements the defendant made to detectives because, contrary to the defendant's claim, the statements were not induced by "hope of benefit" in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50, but were voluntarily made after the defendant was advised of and waived the defendant's rights under Miranda, without any promises from the detectives that the robbery charges would be reduced or dismissed. Tolbert v. State, 308 Ga. 185, 839 S.E.2d 592 (2020)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

When the defendant was convicted on two counts of child molestation, the defendant's statements to law enforcement officers were admissible as the statements were voluntary because the recordings of the defendant's interviews showed that the officers made the defendant no promises regarding counseling or any other aspect of the defendant's potential prosecution or punishment; and, after being told by an officer that the defendant could go to jail, the defendant admitted that the defendant touched the second victim. Pinkston v. State, 353 Ga. App. 88, 834 S.E.2d 571 (2019).

Trial court did not err in admitting into evidence the defendant's custodial statement because the investigators testified that the investigators found the defendant to be articulate and the investigators saw no indication that the defendant was intoxicated; the investigators, who were in plain clothes and unarmed, did not physically abuse or overtly intimidate the defendant; and, although the investigators told the defendant that the defendant could help the defendant by being honest and by telling the investigators what had really happened, those statements were not the equivalent of offering a hope of benefit. Perez v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 8, 2020).

Trial court did not err by admitting the defendant's custodial statement to law enforcement into evidence at trial based on the detectives offering the defendant a hope of benefit by stating that the defendant could face different potential charges depending on what had occurred, that those charges carried different sentences, and that the defendant had an opportunity to help the defendant's own self out by telling the truth because those types of statements by law enforcement officers did not amount to a hope of benefit under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824. Clay v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Aug. 24, 2020).

- Permitting defendant to smoke was a collateral benefit and was insufficient hope of benefit to render defendant's statement inadmissible. White v. State, 266 Ga. 134, 465 S.E.2d 277 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Merely telling a defendant that his or her cooperation will be made known to the prosecution does not constitute the "hope of benefit" sufficient to render a statement inadmissible. Leigh v. State, 223 Ga. App. 726, 478 S.E.2d 905 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga. App. 70, 487 S.E.2d 608 (1997);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Officer's statement that defendant's cooperation would be made known to the prosecutor did not render defendant's confession to molesting defendant's stepdaughter involuntary. Frei v. State, 252 Ga. App. 535, 555 S.E.2d 530 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Detective's implied promises to tell the judge of defendant's cooperation did not constitute the kind of hope of benefit contemplated by former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Tucker v. State, 231 Ga. App. 210, 498 S.E.2d 774 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Though the defendant enumerated as error the admission of a custodial statement into evidence, claiming the statement was induced by hope of benefit of a lesser sentence in that a detective stated that the detective was going to be the prosecuting officer and that the detective would like to be able to tell the judge that the defendant was honest and cooperated with the detective since the detective specifically testified that the detective did not promise the defendant any hope of benefit, the statement was not coerced under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 and was admissible. Cooper v. State, 257 Ga. App. 896, 572 S.E.2d 417 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Detectives did not improperly induce or promise defendant that they would talk to the judge and the prosecutor about defendant being cooperative, which might increase defendant's chances of getting a bond, as these statements did not guarantee defendant anything. Jackson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 451, 585 S.E.2d 745 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

An officer's implied promise to tell the trial judge of the defendant's cooperation was not a "hope of benefit" making defendant's statements involuntary under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Davis v. State, 292 Ga. App. 782, 666 S.E.2d 56 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Interrogating officer's statements to defendant that defendant was in big trouble and, in effect, that the officer could help defendant if defendant cooperated were not offers of hope of benefit or threat of injury. Davis v. State, 245 Ga. App. 508, 538 S.E.2d 159 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Mere explanations of defendant's arrest and of the law did not constitute an improper offer of some hope of benefit. State v. Todd, 250 Ga. App. 265, 549 S.E.2d 821 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Officer's urging defendant to tell the truth if defendant wanted ":the officer] to be in a position to do anything to say that you cooperated" did not create a hope of a lighter sentence or any other hope of benefit. Caldwell v. State, 249 Ga. App. 885, 549 S.E.2d 449 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Defendant's custodial statement to the police was admissible because it was made voluntarily as defendant did not contend that an interrogating officer mentioned a confession or sentence, only that the officer periodically stated that defendant would soon be released, while questioning continued; nothing suggested that freedom would be forthcoming if defendant confessed to committing crimes. Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2d 312 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- In the defendant's malice murder trial, the trial court erred in allowing incriminating statements the defendant made in custody because it was clear from the defendant's restatement of the warnings that the defendant did not understand the rights, and although the officer then explained the right to remain silent, the officer did not explain the remaining rights. Without knowledge of the rights, the defendant's waiver was not voluntary. Benton v. State, 302 Ga. 570, 807 S.E.2d 450 (2017).

- While the defendant claimed that a custodial statement was made to keep defendant's spouse from going to jail, and therefore was made under duress, an agent testified that the agent told the defendant that the spouse was not going to be arrested, and denied telling the spouse that the spouse was going to be arrested, so a trial court's ruling that the defendant's statement was voluntary pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 was not error. Kania v. State, 280 Ga. App. 356, 634 S.E.2d 146 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress a confession was proper as a police officer testified that the confession was not given in reliance on a promise not to arrest the two women in the house; further, the defendant's testimony that the confession was given in exchange for not arresting the women did not render the confession involuntary since there was no promise to treat the defendant favorably and any promise of a benefit to the defendant's relatives was collateral to the defendant. Jackson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 716, 634 S.E.2d 846 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Officer's promise to help the defendant with a drug problem was a collateral benefit, and did not bear on the question of punishment; hence, the trial court did not clearly err in admitting the defendant's statement in evidence as such did not amount to a promise of leniency in exchange for the statement. Smith v. State, 281 Ga. App. 91, 635 S.E.2d 385 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Investigator's actions in requesting that the defendant's bond be lowered did not amount to the slightest hope of benefit under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Gonzalez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 843, 643 S.E.2d 8 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Accommodating a meeting between the defendant's wife and the defendant did not amount to the "slightest hope of benefit" which would have rendered the defendant's statement involuntary and inadmissible as it was not uncommon for a suspect in custody to be allowed to speak with a family member, and the record showed that the defendant reinitiated further communication with police and made a knowing and intelligent waiver of any right to counsel previously invoked. Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Defendant's statement introduced into evidence was voluntarily given without any hope of benefit; the interrogating officer's comments about punishment amounted to no more than an explanation of the seriousness of the defendant's situation, and the officer's requests to the defendant to permit the officer to help were the equivalent of the officer's urging the defendant to tell the truth, which would not invalidate a confession. Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- An officer's statement that if adults were arrested, their children would routinely be taken to the county department of family and children services was merely a recounting of fact, not a threat of injury or promise of hope of benefit within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Rubia v. State, 287 Ga. App. 122, 650 S.E.2d 797 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- With regard to a defendant's conviction for child molestation, the trial court did not err by admitting the defendant's confession at trial as although the defendant may have been coaxed into providing the statement by an investigator, in doing so, the investigator did not offer any hope of benefit or fear of injury. Dexter v. State, 293 Ga. App. 388, 667 S.E.2d 172 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- An officer told the defendant that one of the defendant's accomplices had told the officer the truth but the other two had not, so those accomplices would get no "favors" from the officer. As the officer's reference to "favors" did not suggest that the defendant might receive a lighter sentence by cooperating, the defendant's subsequent statement was admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Simpson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 760, 668 S.E.2d 451 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Defendant's convictions for armed robbery and robbery by intimidation were appropriate because the defendant voluntarily confessed to the defendant's involvement in the crimes. A statement by police that made the defendant aware of the potential legal consequences was in the nature of a mere truism and did not constitute a threat of injury or promise of benefit within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Cantrell v. State, 299 Ga. App. 746, 683 S.E.2d 676 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When the detective told defendant that the detective could not and would not make any promises, just that any cooperation would be favorable to the investigation, defendant's statement was made voluntarily without the slightest hope of benefit. Evans v. State, 248 Ga. App. 99, 545 S.E.2d 641 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Codefendant's motion to suppress was properly denied as the codefendant's confession was not made with a hope of benefit in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 since the codefendant told the detectives that the codefendant wanted to go home and a detective replied "let's straighten this out and we'll see about getting you home"; the statement did not relate to either the charge or sentence that the codefendant was facing, nor did the detective give codefendant a hope of a lighter sentence in return for the codefendant's statement. Smith v. State, 269 Ga. App. 133, 603 S.E.2d 445 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Defendant's confession was admissible because the trial court could have concluded that any promise of leniency for defendant was contingent on future assistance by defendant and was unrelated to defendant's confession. Bailey v. State, 248 Ga. App. 120, 545 S.E.2d 659 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Although the victim's mother allegedly agreed to have the charges dropped if the defendant confessed, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50, the confession was made voluntarily, and could be submitted to the jury for consideration. Davenport v. State, 277 Ga. App. 758, 627 S.E.2d 133 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant's statements were voluntarily made (and not improperly induced by anything said to the defendant by the victim's parent) because the defendant did not point to any evidence indicating that the defendant was threatened by the statement that the victim's parent made, that the defendant believed the parent had any power to prevent the defendant from getting out of jail, or that the parent was acting as an agent of the state when the parent made that statement; and the defendant did not make any incriminating statements on October 4 after speaking to the victim's parent. Carter v. State, 302 Ga. 685, 808 S.E.2d 704 (2017)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Confessions made during plea negotiations with the prosecutor are not admissible because the confessions are made in the hope that the defendant will get a better deal than otherwise possible. Gray v. State, 240 Ga. App. 716, 523 S.E.2d 626 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When a conviction was based upon confessions induced by the threatening acts of the parties obtaining the confessions, though no language was used expressly extending the hope of benefit or fear of injury, a new trial will be ordered. Irwin v. State, 54 Ga. 39 (1875) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3793).

- Confessions are not admissible if there is evidence, arising from the testimony as to the circumstances under which the confession was made, that the making of the confession was induced by the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury. King v. State, 155 Ga. 707, 118 S.E. 368 (1923) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Goodwin v. State, 45 Ga. App. 593, 165 S.E. 453 (1932); McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 182 S.E. 618 (1935) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Jordan v. State, 77 Ga. App. 656, 48 S.E.2d 756 (1948); Lemon v. State, 80 Ga. App. 854, 57 S.E.2d 626 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Harrison v. State, 253 Ga. App. 179, 558 S.E.2d 760 (2002);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Although inducement was held out by one person, and the confession was subsequently made to another, who has no knowledge of such inducement, and who offers none personally, such confession is involuntary. Thomas v. State, 169 Ga. 182, 149 S.E. 871 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032).

- Mere fact that the accused was in custody, or under arrest at the time the confession was made, did not render the confession incompetent if in fact it was made voluntarily within the legal meaning of the term. Wilburn v. State, 141 Ga. 510, 81 S.E. 444 (1914) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Bradberry v. State, 170 Ga. 859, 154 S.E. 344 (1930); Russell v. State, 196 Ga. 275, 26 S.E.2d 528 (1943) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Trial court's determinations that the defendant was not in custody when the defendant made a pre-Miranda statement, and that the statement was voluntary, were based at least partly on a material factual finding that was clearly erroneous, that being that the defendant drove to the police station, as the testimony indicated that the defendant was taken there by law enforcement officers. Stallings v. State, 343 Ga. App. 135, 806 S.E.2d 613 (2017).

- Voluntary confession or incriminatory statement is not inadmissible merely because it was made pending an illegal arrest. Campbell v. State, 90 Ga. App. 1, 81 S.E.2d 880 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Statement made by an accused is not rendered inadmissible solely because the accused has not been told why the accused was under arrest at the time of the making of the statement. Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 263 S.E.2d 916, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849, 101 S. Ct. 138, 66 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Fact that the state did not show that the defendant prior to making certain incriminatory statements had been apprised by the interrogating officers of the nature of the investigation and its possible consequences did not affect the admissibility or voluntary character of the statements made by the defendant. Gossett v. State, 105 Ga. App. 17, 123 S.E.2d 322 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Surroundings by which the declarant may be environed may be more ominous and more potential in inducing a confession than the use of threats. Moon v. State, 12 Ga. App. 614, 77 S.E. 1088 (1913) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032).

Legality, duration, and conditions of detention are relevant in the determination of voluntariness of an accused's statement. Pless v. State, 142 Ga. App. 594, 236 S.E.2d 842 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Statement that it is always better to tell the truth is not such a hope of benefit as would render a confession inadmissible. Wilson v. State, 19 Ga. App. 759, 92 S.E. 309 (1917) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Hicks v. State, 178 Ga. 561, 173 S.E. 395 (1934); McKennon v. State, 63 Ga. App. 466, 11 S.E.2d 416 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770, 48 S.E.2d 522 (1948); Daniel v. State, 150 Ga. App. 798, 258 S.E.2d 604 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Askea v. State, 153 Ga. App. 849, 267 S.E.2d 279 (1980); Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 271 S.E.2d 168 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 274 S.E.2d 549 (1981); Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Kettman v. State, 257 Ga. 603, 362 S.E.2d 342 (1987); Stowers v. State, 205 Ga. App. 518, 422 S.E.2d 870 (1992) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); 205 Ga. App. 901, 422 S.E.2d 870 (1992); Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732, 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Duke v. State, 268 Ga. 425, 489 S.E.2d 811 (1997); Gilliam v. State, 268 Ga. 690, 492 S.E.2d 185 (1997) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Collis v. State, 252 Ga. App. 659, 556 S.E.2d 221 (2001);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);cert. denied,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Trial court did not err by admitting into evidence defendant's pretrial statements in response to allegations of physical child abuse by officers from another jurisdiction and officials' statements telling defendant defendant's cooperation would be conveyed to the prosecuting attorney because the defendant personally never claimed defendant's statement was given either under the force of coercion or in the hope of a benefit. Helton v. State, 206 Ga. App. 600, 426 S.E.2d 172 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's statements because the statements were voluntary as the officer did not tell the defendant that the defendant could not leave until the officer heard what the officer wanted, and the detective's statements that the defendant's friend and mother could be arrested if the evidence showed they were involved in the crime were mere truisms or recounting of facts rather than a threat of injury or promise of benefit. Moore v. State, 325 Ga. App. 749, 754 S.E.2d 792 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Officer's statement to the defendant, given after the defendant invoked the right to counsel, in which the officer expressed the officer's knowledge of the request for a lawyer, urged the defendant not to say anything, and told the defendant that everyone should have the opportunity to bury their loved ones, as did the officer recently when the officer's father and brother died, was not calculated to procure an untrue statement, and because the defendant was not threatened with fear of injury nor promised hope of benefit, because there was no deception, nor did the police inject religion into the exchange, and because the officer's speech was not coercive police activity, the police did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against coerced self-incrimination; however, while the defendant's statements themselves, in which the defendant confessed to killing the defendant's uncle and told the police where the defendant disposed of the body, were inadmissible based on the defendant's invocation of the right to counsel, nevertheless the fruits of the statements were admissible. State v. Woods, 280 Ga. 758, 632 S.E.2d 654 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Statement by officer that the officer was considering charging defendant's girlfriend was a mere "truism" or recounting of facts, rather than a threat of injury or promise of benefit. Anderson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 608, 481 S.E.2d 595 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Advice from officer that suspect will feel better if the suspect tells the truth will not render confession inadmissible. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Juvenile's statement was not induced in the hope of benefit based on an officer's comment that the juvenile needed to tell the truth "because it would mean a lot in the end." In re J.L., 229 Ga. App. 447, 494 S.E.2d 274 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Officer's statement after arrest that "no lawyer can do you any good at this point" did not render defendant's statements involuntary. Gober v. State, 264 Ga. 226, 443 S.E.2d 616 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When an officer interviewing the defendant told the defendant that the defendant's spouse was the target of an investigation, this did not make the defendant's confession involuntary under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. The officer, who sought to deflect attention from the spouse's role as the tipster who led police to the defendant, had not created a fear of injury invalidating the confession as the defendant had not exonerated the spouse during the interview but implicated the spouse in other illegal activity. Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 535, 662 S.E.2d 305 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Fact that a confession was procured by the employment of falsehood by a police officer, detective, or other person does not alone exclude the confession, where not calculated to do other than elicit the truth and does not prevent the confession from being free and voluntary. Moore v. State, 230 Ga. 839, 199 S.E.2d 243 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Confession otherwise admissible is not inadmissible because the confession was prompted by advice of a relative of the defendant. Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 273 S.E.2d 124 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976, 101 S. Ct. 2059, 68 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 835, 286 S.E.2d 427 (1982);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Defendant's custodial statement to the police was admissible because the statement was made voluntarily as even if an interrogating officer allowed defendant to overhear a coconspirator's implication of defendant, there was no evidence that the officer was attempting to procure an untrue statement from defendant. Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2d 312 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Hope of lighter punishment, induced by other person, is usually "hope of benefit", etc. referred to in former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Wesley v. State, 177 Ga. App. 877, 341 S.E.2d 507 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Gilbert v. State, 193 Ga. App. 283, 388 S.E.2d 18 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); State v. Barber, 197 Ga. App. 353, 398 S.E.2d 419 (1990); In re R.J.C., 210 Ga. App. 286, 435 S.E.2d 759 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in finding that a portion of the defendant's police interview was inadmissible because it was induced by an officer's statement that "the person that cooperates is the person that gets help," made after the defendant and two accomplices were arrested, and the statement indicated that if the defendant cooperated truthfully, the defendant would get a lighter sentence than the accomplices. State v. Robinson, 326 Ga. App. 63, 755 S.E.2d 869 (2014).

- Defendant's confessions made to a sheriff were based on a promise that the defendant would be prosecuted on only one count of burglary and were therefore involuntary under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. However, the defendant had identified defendant's connection with the defendant's accomplices prior to the involuntary statements, and the defendant's accomplices' testimony against the defendant was still admissible. Stidham v. State, 299 Ga. App. 858, 683 S.E.2d 906 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Defendant was granted new trial for convictions for felony murder and other crimes after it was determined that defendant's statement to detectives as to the location of the gun used in the murder and defendant's provision of the gun to two co-indictees was involuntary and inadmissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 as the statement was induced by a written promise not to press any additional weapons charges against defendant. Foster v. State, 283 Ga. 484, 660 S.E.2d 521 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When the officers told the defendant that defendant's stepfather and girlfriend, who were also arrested at the trailer, were going to remain under arrest pending a determination of who was in possession of the contraband, such a statement falls into the category of a mere "truism" or "recounting of the facts," rather than an offer of benefit or threat of injury. Sampson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 833, 303 S.E.2d 77 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Police officer's statement to a 17-year-old defendant that it would be better if the defendant cooperated with the police, and if the defendant does so, the officer will have to say in court that the defendant cooperated, does not constitute a "hope of benefit" making a subsequent confession inadmissible. Rounds v. State, 166 Ga. App. 212, 303 S.E.2d 543 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Offering to make known a suspect's confession to the district attorney and the trial judge is not an offer of benefit. McKenzie v. State, 187 Ga. App. 840, 371 S.E.2d 869, cert. denied, 187 Ga. App. 907, 371 S.E.2d 869 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); Sims v. State, 197 Ga. App. 214, 398 S.E.2d 244 (1990);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Agreeing to tell the trial judge of the defendant's cooperation if the defendant confesses does not constitute the "hope of benefit" contemplated by former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Moore v. State, 179 Ga. App. 488, 347 S.E.2d 318 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); Butler v. State, 194 Ga. App. 208, 390 S.E.2d 278 (1990); Carswell v. State, 268 Ga. 531, 491 S.E.2d 343 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); Martin v. State, 271 Ga. 301, 518 S.E.2d 898 (1999);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Encouraging cooperation by a defendant and promising to bring defendant's cooperation to the attention of the prosecutor or the trial judge does not constitute the "hope of benefit" contemplated by former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Bussey v. State, 202 Ga. App. 483, 414 S.E.2d 710 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's confession was voluntary and admissible because the investigators framed the investigators' inquiries in terms of what they wanted to be able to tell the judge, and any suggestions of a possible benefit were either nonspecific (e.g., "help yourself") or along the lines of allowing the defendant to have more credibility with the jury for being honest; the promises did not relate to the charges or sentence the defendant was facing so as to render the confession inadmissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824. Baughns v. State, 335 Ga. App. 600, 782 S.E.2d 494 (2016).

Investigator's statement to defendant that if the defendant cooperated, the investigator would let the district attorney know and it might help the defendant did not impermissibly hold out some hope of benefit so as to make defendant's confession inadmissible. Lyles v. State, 221 Ga. App. 560, 472 S.E.2d 132 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- An investigating officer's admission that the officer discussed bringing a lesser charge of theft by taking rather than armed robbery with a defendant, and the specific language in the defendant's written statement expressly admitting to the lesser offense, along with the statement to another officer that the crime was theft by taking, supported the trial court's factual finding that the defendant gave the custodial statement with the hope of benefit. Thus, the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to suppress the statement. State v. Klepper, 301 Ga. App. 753, 688 S.E.2d 673 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Officer's statement that the officer wanted to "help" the defendant was not an offer of reward which tainted the confession by inducing a hope of benefit in the defendant making the statement involuntary under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 234, 347 S.E.2d 553 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Officer's statement to a suspect that the officer was trying to help the suspect did not constitute the "slightest hope of benefit" under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 and did not require the exclusion of an inculpatory statement the defendant made in response to the officer's statement. Stringer v. State, 285 Ga. 842, 684 S.E.2d 590 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Promises to obtain psychiatric help and medical attention for defendant were not the kind of "hope of benefit" which would invalidate defendant's subsequent confession. Head v. State, 180 Ga. App. 901, 350 S.E.2d 854 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When the officer who took defendant's statement testified that it was defendant who first raised the notion of a reduction of bail bond, defendant's hope of benefit was not induced by another and would not serve to render defendant's confession inadmissible. Heard v. State, 165 Ga. App. 252, 300 S.E.2d 213 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50); Pounds v. State, 189 Ga. App. 809, 377 S.E.2d 722 (1989);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Even though attorney's advice to defendant was that if the defendant made a statement the state might negotiate a plea, defendant's statement was not the result of inducement by others since the questioning police officer made it clear that no promises were to be made in exchange for the statement. Williams v. State, 250 Ga. 553, 300 S.E.2d 301, overruled on other grounds by Venturino v. State, 830 S.E.2d 110, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 435 (Ga. 2019), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124, 103 S. Ct. 3097, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1356 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- That one party to the commission of a crime has confessed to that party's participation in the crime does not render the defendant's later confession involuntary. Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 313 S.E.2d 73 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Confession is not rendered inadmissible by an assurance that whatever help could be given would be given in keeping the defendant out of a certain prison, since this is similar to a promise to inform the court of a defendant's cooperation. Patrick v. State, 169 Ga. App. 302, 312 S.E.2d 385 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 509, 314 S.E.2d 909 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When an inculpatory statement was made by the fire department lieutenant in return for the investigator's alleged promise to "stop all the publicity against the fire and police department and not arrest and persecute anyone else," the promise pertained to collateral benefits and the trial court did not err in ruling the statement to be voluntary and admissible. Johnson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 71, 316 S.E.2d 160 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- An investigator's statement that the investigator would talk to the district attorney's office at a later time about having a warrant against the defendant dismissed was no more than a promise of a collateral benefit and thus did not make the defendant's custodial statement inadmissible under former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-50 and24-3-51 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824 and24-8-825). Boone v. State, 293 Ga. App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

It was not error for a trial court to decline to exclude the defendant's custodial statements on the theory that the statements were made based on an improper hope of benefit because an officer's promise not to tell the defendant's wife that the defendant had been arrested merely promised a collateral benefit which did not render the statements excludable. Millsaps v. State, 310 Ga. App. 769, 714 S.E.2d 661 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Statement that the defendant "needed" to tell the police officers if defendant knew anything about the crime does not render the confession involuntary. Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 313 S.E.2d 73 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Trial court's determination that defendant's confession was not rendered involuntary because the confession was induced by fear because of a deputy's statement during the post arrest interview purportedly threatening the defendant with a life sentence was supported by sufficient evidence. Baker v. State, 211 Ga. App. 515, 439 S.E.2d 668 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Defendant's fear when the detective interrogating defendant "hollered" at defendant was self-induced and not the "fear of injury" contemplated by former O.C.G.A § 24-3-50 since there was no evidence that the police had threatened to harm the defendant if the defendant did not make a statement. Mungin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 290, 358 S.E.2d 673, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 358 S.E.2d 673 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 908, 108 S. Ct. 1083, 99 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Defendant's claim that defendant's confession was the product of intimidation was not established by defendant's testimony that one of the interrogating officers became angry and brushed the officer's jacket back, revealing the officer's gun. Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 491 S.E.2d 791 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1127, 118 S. Ct. 1815, 140 L. Ed. 2d 953 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Withholding medical attention from defendant until after an interrogation was concluded does not render the defendant's statement to the police involuntary and having been induced by the hope of benefit since the evidence upholds the voluntariness of the statement. Cannon v. State, 257 Ga. 475, 360 S.E.2d 592 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Officer's statement that the defendant would not be taken to jail if the defendant submitted to a drug recognition examination did not amount to an improper hope of benefit in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 and, thus, the trial court did not err in failing to suppress evidence of the drug recognition exam. Edison v. State, 327 Ga. App. 366, 759 S.E.2d 247 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- It is not the law of this state that when a prisoner is known by police to be represented by counsel, anything the prisoner says to police in absence of counsel is per se inadmissible, whether voluntary or not. Pierce v. State, 235 Ga. 237, 219 S.E.2d 158 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Considering the totality of the circumstances a confession may be shown to be voluntary even though made in the absence of counsel after counsel has been retained or appointed. Pierce v. State, 235 Ga. 237, 219 S.E.2d 158 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Confession freely and voluntarily made is admissible in evidence against the defendant, although such confession is coupled with the proposition on defendant's part to settle or compromise the case or charge against the defendant; such an offer of settlement not being induced by another. Hecox v. State, 105 Ga. 625, 31 S.E. 592 (1898) (decided under former law); Grubbs v. State, 53 Ga. App. 377, 186 S.E. 140 (1936);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Defendant's confession made to the victim's parents was not involuntary on the basis that the confession was induced by the hope of benefit - specifically, the victim's parents' representation that the parents would not involve the police. Wiley v. State, 245 Ga. App. 580, 538 S.E.2d 483 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When evidence of a confession is offered by the state in a criminal case, and there is no objection by the defendant upon the ground that the alleged confession was not voluntarily made, the confession is admissible as a voluntary confession. Washington v. State, 24 Ga. App. 65, 100 S.E. 31 (1919) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032).

- If a prima facie case of admissibility of a confession is sought to be improperly established, but no proper objections are made to its insufficiency at the trial, the right to object will be presumed to have been waived. McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 182 S.E. 618 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

If a prima facie case of admissibility is sought to be improperly established, but no proper objections are made to its sufficiency at the trial, the right to object will be presumed to have been waived, and where timely objection or motion is made to exclude such testimony which at best still leaves in doubt whether statements were made which may have induced the confession or inculpatory statement, it is error not to reject such testimony of the confession or inculpatory statement. Lemon v. State, 80 Ga. App. 854, 57 S.E.2d 626 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- When not made freely and voluntarily, a confession is presumed to be legally false, and cannot be the underlying basis of a conviction; the failure to object to such evidence does not give the confession probative value where it is shown without dispute that the confession was not freely and voluntarily made. McKennon v. State, 63 Ga. App. 466, 11 S.E.2d 416 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

If the confession is admitted without timely objection and the evidence shows without dispute that the confession was not voluntary, then, whether the confession is objected to or not it is not legal evidence and has no probative value. The evidence, exclusive of the confession, must be sufficient to authorize a verdict of guilty after it appears that the confession was not voluntary, for the failure to object to the confession would not give the confession probative value; and since, without the confession, the verdict is unsupported by the evidence, the case, if not reversed on some other special ground, must be reversed solely on the general grounds. Sconyers v. State, 67 Ga. App. 902, 21 S.E.2d 504 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Absence of a signed waiver of rights does not render a confession inadmissible if the evidence otherwise authorized a finding of voluntariness. Patterson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 438, 254 S.E.2d 445 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Fact that no signed waiver was obtained from defendant did not militate against the finding that defendant's confession was freely and voluntarily given. Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 587, 271 S.E.2d 719 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Confessions are legal evidence. Unless the circumstances under which the confessions were made show the confessions were not voluntary, the confessions are admissible. If they are given in, and not objected to, it is too late after the verdict to say there was not sufficient inquiry into the circumstances. Hill v. State, 214 Ga. 794, 107 S.E.2d 662 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Mere fact that the defendant was 21 years old with a sixth grade education does not lead to the conclusion that the defendant was incapable of knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waiving defendant's constitutional rights. Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938, 100 S. Ct. 1332, 63 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 835, 286 S.E.2d 427 (1982);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Lack of literacy does not dictate determination that there has been no voluntary knowledgeable waiver. Watson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 618, 284 S.E.2d 636 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

A statement may be voluntary even if the suspect has a limited education. Harrison v. State, 253 Ga. App. 179, 558 S.E.2d 760 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Although defendant had refused to sign a written acknowledgment that defendant had been informed of defendant's right to remain silent and right to representation, defendant's subsequent acknowledgment in writing two hours later that the defendant had been informed of these rights supported the trial court's findings that defendant's statement was freely and voluntarily given. Pierce v. State, 209 Ga. App. 366, 433 S.E.2d 641 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Ten-hour lapse between the time of the waiver of rights and the actual confession at which time previous warnings were reiterated does not render a confession inadmissible. Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 273 S.E.2d 124 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 976, 101 S. Ct. 2059, 68 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Detective erroneously promised during an interview that a defendant would not be charged with an offense that required sex offender registration because a conviction for electronically furnishing obscene material to a minor under O.C.G.A. § 16-12-100.1 would require registration as a sex offender under O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12(e)(2); prior to the erroneous promise, the defendant's confession was voluntarily made under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 as the confession was made without the slightest hope of benefit. State v. Lee, 295 Ga. App. 49, 670 S.E.2d 879 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When a witness testified to the circumstances surrounding the confession, showing clearly that the confession was voluntary, a question then posed to the witness regarding the confession's voluntariness does not call for a conclusion. Satterfield v. State, 248 Ga. 538, 285 S.E.2d 3 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Because a police officer's statement to defendant juvenile that the officer would drive defendant home once they were through, even if construed as the promise of a benefit for defendant's confession, was only a collateral benefit that would not implicate the provisions of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50; thus, the trial court did not clearly err in finding the juvenile's statements to police were voluntary. In re D. T., 294 Ga. App. 486, 669 S.E.2d 471 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Habeas court properly granted the petition on the basis that the petitioner juvenile's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise the petitioner that inculpatory custodial statements by the petitioner could have been suppressed as involuntary because the petitioner was 14 years old at the time of the police interview, and had not yet entered high school, having failed the eighth grade; law enforcement's interview of the petitioner was a relatively lengthy two-and-a-half hours, and petitioner was held in the interrogation room for more than four hours; the officers used aggressive interrogation methods; and some of the officers' statements arguably constituted assurances creating a hope of a benefit. Oubre v. Woldemichael, 301 Ga. 299, 800 S.E.2d 518 (2017).

- When a police officer testified that the officer twice read defendant the defendant's rights, that the defendant indicated that the defendant did not want a lawyer but wanted to make a statement, that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and that the defendant's statement was made without threat or coercion or under any offer of hope or benefit, there was no error in admitting the defendant's statement. Jones v. State, 194 Ga. App. 746, 391 S.E.2d 663 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's interrogation in the office of a retail store by as many as five police officers at different times did not evince an unduly coercive environment since the main interrogating officer testified and denied the making of any promises or threats to defendant. Pinson v. State, 207 Ga. App. 734, 429 S.E.2d 106 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

In defendant's trial on charges of child molestation and statutory rape, the trial court found that defendant's waiver of Miranda rights applied to statements defendant made after defendant took a polygraph examination and not just to statements defendant made while taking the test, and the appellate court sustained that finding and held that the trial court properly admitted defendant's statements. Little v. State, 260 Ga. App. 87, 579 S.E.2d 84 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Prisoner's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was properly denied because the state habeas court correctly applied controlling federal precedent in finding that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment in that the prisoner's confession was made while the prisoner was sober and there was nothing to support an argument of involuntariness or intoxication. Therefore, the confession was admissible both under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1183, 129 S. Ct. 1336, 173 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's statements to a local detective regarding the defendant's role in three robberies were voluntary and, thus, admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 because the defendant was told that the defendant was not in custody when initially interviewed, defendant was not a suspect at that time, and defendant did not make a confession in the hope of some benefit; defendant was thought to be a witness to a robbery. Dean v. State, 292 Ga. App. 695, 665 S.E.2d 406 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's custodial statements were properly deemed voluntary under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. The defendant was advised of defendant's Miranda rights; signed a waiver of those rights; admitted no threats or promises were made; and, although the defendant claimed not to understand the Miranda rights due to limited mental capacity, there was no evidence the defendant was mentally or cognitively impaired. Inman v. State, 295 Ga. App. 461, 671 S.E.2d 921 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

In a statutory rape case, as the record showed that police had not misrepresented the 12-year-old victim's status to the defendant or promised that the defendant would be charged with rape only if the investigation established that the defendant had committed forcible rape, the defendant's confession and DNA test results which showed that the defendant was the parent of the victim's child were not inadmissible as having been obtained through trickery and deceit. Henry v. State, 295 Ga. App. 758, 673 S.E.2d 120 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

With regard to a defendant's malice murder conviction arising from the suffocation death of the defendant's newborn daughter, the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence the defendant's confession that acknowledged that the baby was breathing and whimpering after birth since, given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court's ruling that the confession was given freely and voluntarily after the court viewed the videotapes of the police interviews was not clearly erroneous and there was no merit to the defendant's contention that the confession was encouraged by threats, including that the investigation would turn to a romantic friend, since under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50, the remotest fear of injury that rendered a confession involuntary and inadmissible was physical or mental torture, which was not claimed. Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 677 S.E.2d 82 (2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1123, 130 S. Ct. 1076, 175 L. Ed. 2d 903 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Even if investigators' statements that the defendant would be allowed to go home after the interview constituted an improper "hope of benefit," the investigators did not actually induce the defendant's confession because the defendant made the incriminatory statements voluntarily; the defendant was familiar with the defendant's constitutional rights, was 19 years old at the time of the interview, was a high school graduate, was aware of the allegations against the defendant, was not in custody when the defendant initially confessed, was not yet indicted, and was questioned for approximately two hours but confessed after less than one hour. State v. Brown, 308 Ga. App. 480, 708 S.E.2d 63 (2011), aff'd, 290 Ga. 865, 725 S.E.2d 320 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court properly ruled that the defendant's inculpatory statement was not subject to suppression as involuntary because the defendant received Miranda warnings at the beginning of the interview, before making the statement, and the defendant acknowledged those warnings again part-way through the interview. Williams v. State, 314 Ga. App. 840, 726 S.E.2d 66 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not err in finding that the defendant freely and voluntarily made a statement to police admitting that the defendant knew methamphetamine was being manufactured in the garage a few feet from the defendant's three-month-old child because the defendant was advised of the Miranda rights, waived the right to counsel, and agreed to speak with the investigator and during that conversation made the admission. Blackwell v. State, 337 Ga. App. 173, 786 S.E.2d 552 (2016).

Trial court did not clearly err by denying the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress because the evidence supported the court's determination that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the defendant's rights and gave the defendant's statement as the detective testified and the video recording showed that the defendant was informed of the defendant's rights under Miranda and formally waived those rights, the defendant expressed the defendant's understanding and willingness to speak with police both by nodding to show assent and in writing, and the detective testified that the detective did not smell alcohol or marijuana on the defendant's breath, and the defendant's appearance indicated that the defendant was sober. Thomas v. State, 308 Ga. 26, 838 S.E.2d 801 (2020).

Defendant's confession was not involuntary even though the interrogating officers falsely told the defendant that the victim had woken up and told the officers that the defendant caused the victim's injuries as the statement that the victim was still alive was truthful and the defendant seemed to place little, if any, reliance on the statements regarding the victim's health and simply wanted to explain that the death was an accident. Mann v. State, 307 Ga. 696, 838 S.E.2d 305 (2020).

Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda at the time the defendant gave the defendant's statement, and the statement was properly admitted into evidence, because defendant went to the police station voluntarily and was allowed to leave once the questioning was finished; thus, a reasonable person in defendant's position would have concluded that the defendant was not under formal arrest and that the defendant's freedom was not restrained. Jones v. State, 270 Ga. App. 233, 606 S.E.2d 288 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

In action decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50, a detective's false claim that the defendant's DNA was found on the brass knuckles did not affect the admissibility of the defendant's confession, made after the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights. Johnson v. State, 295 Ga. 421, 761 S.E.2d 13 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's statement was not involuntary under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 because the defendant agreed to be interviewed at the police station, with an attorney, before the defendant was charged, and before the interview, the defendant and the attorney were told by the interviewer that the interviewer wanted to hear the defendant's side of the story relating to allegations of sexual battery and child molestation; no promises were made to the defendant regarding arrest or sentencing. Pollio v. State, 278 Ga. App. 729, 629 S.E.2d 583 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Testimony that the defendant, who worked as a detention officer, might be fired if the defendant did not talk to the investigator who questioned the defendant was true and was simply a recounting of fact and, thus, did not support a finding that the defendant's confession was coerced under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Duncan v. State, 315 Ga. App. 67, 726 S.E.2d 558 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's statements during a second interview with police were voluntary and admissible as the investigator's statements did not concern a charge or sentence facing the defendant and did not constitute physical or mental torture. Turner v. State, 296 Ga. 394, 768 S.E.2d 458 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court did not clearly err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the defendant's confession because, while the detective interviewing the defendant told the defendant that the defendant might garner sympathy by being honest and forthcoming, the officer did not promise a lighter sentence or reduced charges; and a detective's statement that the detective was getting "pissed off" did not amount to a threat of injury that rendered the defendant's confession inadmissible. Burden v. State, 332 Ga. App. 811, 775 S.E.2d 183 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Defendant's motion to suppress was properly granted in part, excluding any custodial statements the defendant made before the defendant was advised of the defendant's Miranda rights, but properly denied in part as to the statements made after the defendant received the Miranda warning as the defendant's statements were voluntary because the officer did not tell the defendant that the defendant would be better off if the defendant confessed or threaten injury if the defendant refused to cooperate as the officer merely warned the defendant of the consequences of lying to the police. Hudson v. State, 353 Ga. App. 223, 836 S.E.2d 217 (2019).

- Because the promise made by the defendant's spouse not to seek a divorce if the defendant talked to police regarding the crimes charged did not bear on the question of punishment, and served as merely a collateral benefit, the trial court did not err in finding the defendant's statement to be voluntary and in denying a motion to suppress the statement. Robbins v. State, 290 Ga. App. 323, 659 S.E.2d 628 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- See Frain v. State, 40 Ga. 529 (1869) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3740); Earp v. State, 55 Ga. 136 (1875); Burns v. State, 61 Ga. 192 (1878) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3793); Byrd v. State, 68 Ga. 661 (1882); Johnson v. State, 76 Ga. 76 (1885) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3793); Green v. State, 88 Ga. 516, 15 S.E. 10, 30 Am. St. R. 167 (1891); Smith v. State, 125 Ga. 252, 54 S.E. 190 (1906) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3793); Johnson v. State, 1 Ga. App. 129, 57 S.E. 934 (1907); Adams v. State, 129 Ga. 248, 58 S.E. 822, 17 L.R.A. (n.s.) 468, 12 Ann. Cas. 158 (1907) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3793); Hawkins v. State, 6 Ga. App. 109, 64 S.E. 289 (1909); Morris v. State, 33 Ga. App. 53, 125 S.E. 508 (1924) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1006); Lee v. State, 168 Ga. 554, 148 S.E. 400 (1929); Brown v. State, 52 Ga. App. 536, 183 S.E. 848 (1936) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1006); Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770, 48 S.E.2d 522 (1948); Biddy v. State, 127 Ga. App. 212, 193 S.E.2d 31 (1972) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1006); Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975); Porter v. State, 143 Ga. App. 640, 239 S.E.2d 694 (1977) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1006); State v. Ray, 272 Ga. 450, 531 S.E.2d 705 (2000); Patterson v. State, 274 Ga. 713, 559 S.E.2d 472 (2002) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- See Smith v. State, 139 Ga. 230, 76 S.E. 1016 (1913) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Sledge v. State, 24 Ga. App. 698, 102 S.E. 31 (1920); Whitworth v. State, 155 Ga. 395, 117 S.E. 450 (1923) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Bradberry v. State, 170 Ga. 859, 154 S.E. 344 (1930); White v. State, 177 Ga. 115, 169 S.E. 499 (1933) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Riley v. State, 180 Ga. 869, 181 S.E. 154 (1935); Simmons v. State, 181 Ga. 761, 184 S.E. 291 (1936) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Mincey v. State, 187 Ga. 281, 200 S.E. 144 (1938); Bryant v. State, 191 Ga. 686, 13 S.E.2d 820 (1941) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Russell v. State, 196 Ga. 275, 26 S.E.2d 528 (1943); James v. State, 86 Ga. App. 282, 71 S.E.2d 568 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Blackwell v. State, 113 Ga. App. 536, 148 S.E.2d 912 (1966); Williams v. State, 244 Ga. 485, 260 S.E.2d 879 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Gray v. State, 151 Ga. App. 684, 261 S.E.2d 402 (1979); Riden v. State, 151 Ga. App. 654, 261 S.E.2d 409 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Clayton v. State, 156 Ga. App. 285, 274 S.E.2d 682 (1980); Lane v. State, 247 Ga. 19, 273 S.E.2d 397 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Copeland v. State, 162 Ga. App. 398, 291 S.E.2d 560 (1982); McLeod v. State, 170 Ga. App. 415, 317 S.E.2d 253 (1984) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Smith v. State, 190 Ga. App. 702, 379 S.E.2d 643 (1989); Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 501 S.E.2d 562 (1998) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Gidden v. State, 234 Ga. App. 268, 506 S.E.2d 448 (1998); Heidler v. State, 273 Ga. 54, 537 S.E.2d 44 (2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 1029, 121 S. Ct. 1979, 149 L. Ed. 2d 771 (2001) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (2000), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 957, 122 S. Ct. 2659, 153 L. Ed. 2d 834 (2002);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court's determination that a law enforcement agent's claim that the defendant orally confessed to selling crack cocaine was more credible than the defendant's claim that there was no such oral confession was not clearly erroneous, such that the confession was properly admitted pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50. Harris v. State, 297 Ga. App. 589, 677 S.E.2d 763 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Trial court did not err in suppressing the defendant's pre-trial statement on voluntariness grounds because the defendant's testimony regarding statements made by police officers fully supported the trial court's findings of coercion and duress, and the testimony regarding statements police officers made, expressing anger at the defendant and blaming the defendant for damage to a police car and the death of police dogs, did not constitute inadmissible hearsay when those statements were not offered to prove the truth of the facts asserted therein but to show the defendant's fear of injury by the officers; the trial court did not err in believing the defendant's testimony over that of a detective because a portion of the detective's testimony was successfully impeached, none of the officers testified, and the state did not offer the officers as witnesses until its motion for reconsideration was filed. State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98, 686 S.E.2d 244 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Procedural Considerations

1. Use as Evidence

- Accused cannot defend against a criminal charge on the basis that a confession was not voluntary. Robinson v. State, 272 Ga. 752, 533 S.E.2d 718 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- It is a denial of due process of law for the state to use an involuntary statement against a defendant at trial for any purpose. Fain v. State, 165 Ga. App. 188, 300 S.E.2d 197 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Fact that defendant exposed the existence of a statement does not render the substance of the statement immune from the requirement for admissibility that the statement be given voluntarily. Fain v. State, 165 Ga. App. 188, 300 S.E.2d 197 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Once defendant raises the issue of voluntariness of a statement the state wishes to use for impeachment purposes and with a rebuttal witness, the defendant is entitled to a determination of the issue by the trial court before the statement can be used, although not to a separate "Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964)" hearing. Fain v. State, 165 Ga. App. 188, 300 S.E.2d 197 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- It is always reversible error to allow a confession or incriminatory admission in evidence against the maker thereof when the confession or admission is not free and voluntary or made with the hope of reward or immunity. Bryant v. State, 132 Ga. App. 186, 207 S.E.2d 671 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Without doubt, confessions must be voluntary, that is, if the confessions are made under the hope of reward or fear of hurt the confessions are not competent; but confessions are not illegal evidence, standing alone. Sconyers v. State, 67 Ga. App. 902, 21 S.E.2d 504 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Harrison v. State, 83 Ga. App. 367, 64 S.E.2d 83 (1951);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- If it does not appear that the confessions were not voluntary, and the confessions are introduced without objection, the confessions or incriminating statements are admissible and have probative value. Sconyers v. State, 67 Ga. App. 902, 21 S.E.2d 504 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Confession made involuntarily within the meaning of the former statute was without probative value. Allen v. State, 85 Ga. App. 355, 69 S.E.2d 638 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

If a confession is inadmissible because not voluntarily made, the confession may not be used for impeachment. Green v. State, 154 Ga. App. 295, 267 S.E.2d 898 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Confessions of a principal felon, as to the felon's own guilt, are competent evidence to show that fact on the trial of the accessory, but the confessions must be such as would be competent evidence on the trial of the principal, and must not be induced by another with the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury to the party making the confessions. Smith v. State, 46 Ga. 298 (1872) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3740).

- Defendant has no standing to complain of the voluntariness of the codefendant's confession. Myrick v. State, 155 Ga. App. 496, 271 S.E.2d 637 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

When oral confession was incorporated in written confession, any error in the confession's admission for jury consideration is harmless. Hammond v. State, 157 Ga. App. 647, 278 S.E.2d 188 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Admission into evidence of testimony as to a confession by defendant given in hope of reward did not require a new trial since another witness testified without objection to the same facts. Jones v. State, 181 Ga. 19, 181 S.E. 80 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- When a plea agreement was conditioned on defendant's giving a videotaped statement and, after defendant accepted the deal and gave the statement, defendant decided to plead not guilty, the statement was not admissible at defendant's trial. Corthran v. State, 268 Ga. 443, 491 S.E.2d 66 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Admission of the defendant's secretly-taped telephone conversation with a coconspirator did not violate former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-50 and24-9-20 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-5-506 and24-8-824); the elicitation of the defendant's unguarded response to a perceived confidante regarding the circumstances of the crimes in which they had both participated was clearly designed to procure an unfiltered, genuine statement from the defendant. Further, absent any evidence that the police investigative techniques were designed to induce the slightest hope of benefit or fear of injury, the resulting statements were not rendered involuntary. Thorpe v. State, 285 Ga. 604, 678 S.E.2d 913 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- With regard to a defendant's convictions for felony murder, with the underlying felony being rape, among other crimes, the trial court did not err by admitting the defendant's statements made to the police into evidence since the statements were not induced by fear of injury and hope of benefit. Specifically, the detectives' admonishing the defendant to be truthful was not a hope of benefit rendering the defendant's confession inadmissible nor did the detectives' suggestion that the defendant would be safer in custody induce fear of injury. Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 681 S.E.2d 130 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- A defendant's contention that the defendant's custodial statements, made without counsel present, should have been suppressed under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 because the defendant was read the defendant's rights, confirmed that those rights were understood, and signed a waiver of rights, and the officer repeatedly told the defendant that the officer could not promise the defendant any benefit. Stevens v. State, 286 Ga. 692, 690 S.E.2d 816 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court properly admitted the defendant's jailhouse statements as voluntary, spontaneous outbursts, made in an encounter that the defendant initiated, not in response to any questioning as the statements were made several hours after the defendant's interrogation, the statements were made in a different location than that interrogation, and the statements were made to different officers, which demonstrated a sufficient break from the defendant's earlier, involuntary statements to render the defendant's jailhouse statements voluntary and admissible. Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012), overruled in part by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Trial court erred by allowing the defendant's pre-trial statement, made without the defendant being advised under Miranda, to be used for impeachment purposes because the statement was made as part of plea negotiations and was not the product of the defendant's own mind or a tactical decision of defense counsel. Babbitt v. State, 337 Ga. App. 553, 789 S.E.2d 205 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1806, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 114 (Ga. 2017).

Former statute required as an indispensable foundation to the introduction of an alleged confession a showing that the confession was freely and voluntarily made and that the confession was not induced by another by the slightest fear of punishment nor the remotest hope of reward. Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190, 144 S.E.2d 103 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S. Ct. 639, 17 L. Ed. 2d 593, later appeal, 223 Ga. 465, 156 S.E.2d 65, rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 404, 88 S. Ct. 523, 19 L. Ed. 2d 634 (1967) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Requirement of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 for a hearing on the voluntariness of confessions applies equally to state and private actions. Griffin v. State, 230 Ga. App. 318, 496 S.E.2d 480 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- When a confession is challenged, as by objection to the confession's introduction in evidence, a separate hearing on the question of voluntariness must be held before the trial judge but when no challenge is made or ruling invoked, there is no requirement for such a hearing. Smith v. State, 131 Ga. App. 605, 206 S.E.2d 708 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

When the voluntariness of a confession is questioned it is necessary under the decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964) to have a separate hearing as to the confession's voluntariness before the confession is finally presented to the jury for consideration as to the confession's voluntariness. In the absence of a proper objection, however, there is no requirement for such a hearing. James v. State, 223 Ga. 677, 157 S.E.2d 471 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Royals v. State, 155 Ga. App. 378, 270 S.E.2d 906 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

In a prosecution for theft by taking, defendants were entitled to a preliminary hearing and threshold determination by the trial court on the voluntariness of written confessions defendants gave to an employee of a retail store. Griffin v. State, 230 Ga. App. 318, 496 S.E.2d 480 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Requirement for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness applies only if the evidence presents a fair question as to the confession's voluntariness. Carter v. State, 239 Ga. App. 549, 521 S.E.2d 590 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Burden of proof as to the voluntariness of a confession is upon the state. McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 182 S.E. 618 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Smith v. State, 132 Ga. App. 491, 208 S.E.2d 351 (1974); Jones v. State, 245 Ga. 592, 266 S.E.2d 201 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 530 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Burden of proof can shift. When such confession is shown to have been freely and voluntarily made, the burden is then on the defendant to show that the confession was not so made. Bradberry v. State, 170 Ga. 859, 154 S.E. 344 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032).

Standard for determining the admissibility of confessions is the preponderance of the evidence. Pierce v. State, 235 Ga. 237, 219 S.E.2d 158 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979); Jones v. State, 245 Ga. 592, 266 S.E.2d 201 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Lee v. State, 154 Ga. App. 562, 269 S.E.2d 65 (1980); Etterle v. State, 155 Ga. App. 210, 270 S.E.2d 376 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Whitacre v. State, 155 Ga. App. 359, 270 S.E.2d 894 (1980); Bridges v. State, 155 Ga. App. 369, 271 S.E.2d 25 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 271 S.E.2d 168 (1980); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 274 S.E.2d 549 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 364, 70 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Prima facie showing as to a confession's voluntary character must be made before the confession is admissible into evidence, and if this preliminary proof fails to make such a showing, the confession or statement must be excluded. Bryant v. State, 191 Ga. 686, 13 S.E.2d 820 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Sconyers v. State, 67 Ga. App. 902, 21 S.E.2d 504 (1942); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 48 S.E.2d 377 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Phillips v. State, 206 Ga. 418, 57 S.E.2d 555 (1950); Lemon v. State, 80 Ga. App. 854, 57 S.E.2d 626 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Until it affirmatively appears from testimony, without question, that proposed confession was freely and voluntarily made, without any extraneous inducement, the statement alleged to have been a confession must be excluded. McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 182 S.E. 618 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Russell v. State, 196 Ga. 275, 26 S.E.2d 528 (1943);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Alleged confession should be affirmatively shown to have been made without the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury before the state has succeeded in making a prima facie case as will establish that the confession was free from extraneous inducement. McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 182 S.E. 618 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Russell v. State, 196 Ga. 275, 26 S.E.2d 528 (1943); Lemon v. State, 80 Ga. App. 854, 57 S.E.2d 626 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the state has proven that a confession was made voluntarily. Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938, 100 S. Ct. 1332, 63 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Lee v. State, 154 Ga. App. 562, 269 S.E.2d 65 (1980); Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 271 S.E.2d 168 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Bassett v. State, 154 Ga. App. 829, 285 S.E.2d 260 (1981); Franklin v. State, 249 Ga. App. 834, 549 S.E.2d 794 (2001) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- On preliminary examination by the court, a witness should be permitted, over objection, to state an inference drawn from "collective facts" or to state in a shorthand way that a confession was freely and voluntarily made, without stating the circumstances under which the confession was made. Lemon v. State, 80 Ga. App. 854, 57 S.E.2d 626 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- If the evidence for the state makes out a prima facie case for the admission of such a confession, the court is not bound, before admitting the confession, to hear evidence on behalf of the accused, tending to show coercion or improper inducement in the confession's procurement. McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 182 S.E. 618 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Lemon v. State, 80 Ga. App. 854, 57 S.E.2d 626 (1950);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

A hearing at which the defendant is not allowed to present testimony on the surrounding circumstances affecting the voluntariness of the defendant's statements does not meet the standards of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Pittman v. State, 245 Ga. 453, 265 S.E.2d 592 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

In making a determination of the voluntariness of a confession the defendant's testimony is relevant and such proof must be allowed if the defendant elects to testify in this regard. Stone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 357, 271 S.E.2d 22 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

When the voluntariness of a statement is not challenged, no violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 is asserted, and no hearing under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908) (1964) is required. Ward v. State, 242 Ga. App. 246, 529 S.E.2d 378 (2000), appeal dismissed, 299 Ga. App. 63, 682 S.E.2d 128 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Once the state had made a prima facie showing of voluntariness, the question of whether or not defendant's statement was freely and voluntarily given is one of fact for the jury's determination. Griner v. State, 121 Ga. 614, 49 S.E. 700 (1905) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1006); Cantrell v. State, 141 Ga. 98, 80 S.E. 649 (1913); Thomas v. State, 169 Ga. 182, 149 S.E. 871 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Bradberry v. State, 170 Ga. 859, 154 S.E. 344 (1930); Goodwin v. State, 45 Ga. App. 593, 165 S.E. 453 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); McLemore v. State, 181 Ga. 462, 182 S.E. 618 (1935); Bryant v. State, 191 Ga. 686, 13 S.E.2d 820 (1941) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1032); Sconyers v. State, 67 Ga. App. 902, 21 S.E.2d 504 (1942); Russell v. State, 196 Ga. 275, 26 S.E.2d 528 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Stroup v. Mount, 197 Ga. 804, 30 S.E.2d 477 (1944); Byars v. State, 73 Ga. App. 727, 38 S.E.2d 53 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 48 S.E.2d 377 (1948); Jackson v. State, 77 Ga. App. 635, 49 S.E.2d 198 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); 335 U.S. 905, 69 S. Ct. 403, 93 L. Ed. 439 (1949); Moore v. State, 221 Ga. 636, 146 S.E.2d 895 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Walker v. State, 226 Ga. 292, 174 S.E.2d 440 (1970); 408 U.S. 936, 92 S. Ct. 2845, 33 L. Ed. 2d 754 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Trask v. State, 132 Ga. App. 645, 208 S.E.2d 591 (1974); Frazier v. State, 150 Ga. App. 343, 258 S.E.2d 29 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Meyer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 613, 258 S.E.2d 217 (1979); Simonton v. State, 151 Ga. App. 431, 260 S.E.2d 487 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Doucet v. State, 153 Ga. App. 775, 266 S.E. 554 (1980); Myrick v. State, 155 Ga. App. 496, 271 S.E.2d 637 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);vacated on other grounds,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Omission to charge on the law of confessions, in the absence of a timely request, is not error. Allen v. State, 187 Ga. 178, 200 S.E. 109 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Mims v. State, 188 Ga. 702, 4 S.E.2d 831 (1939); Sconyers v. State, 67 Ga. App. 902, 21 S.E.2d 504 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Murray v. State, 214 Ga. 350, 104 S.E.2d 905 (1958); Staggers v. State, 101 Ga. App. 463, 114 S.E.2d 142 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974); 428 U.S. 910, 96 S. Ct. 3223, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1218 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Welch v. State, 235 Ga. 243, 219 S.E.2d 151 (1975);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);cert. denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Charge on the law of confessions, when unauthorized by the evidence, constitutes reversible error. Allen v. State, 187 Ga. 178, 200 S.E. 109 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 528, 50 S.E.2d 334 (1948); Carter v. State, 90 Ga. App. 61, 81 S.E.2d 868 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Sanford v. State, 153 Ga. App. 541, 265 S.E.2d 868 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Charge embodying the principles of law contained in former Code 1933, §§ 38-411 and 38-420 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-50 and24-3-53) is not error because of the failure to charge the principles of law which deal with the admissibility of such statement into evidence. Walker v. State, 226 Ga. 292, 174 S.E.2d 440 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 936, 92 S. Ct. 2845, 33 L. Ed. 2d 754 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- See Oglesby v. State, 80 Ga. App. 493, 56 S.E.2d 637 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Philpot v. State, 212 Ga. 79, 90 S.E.2d 577 (1955); Weatherby v. State, 213 Ga. 188, 97 S.E.2d 698 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Kennedy v. State, 156 Ga. App. 792, 275 S.E.2d 339 (1980); Kirton v. State, 246 Ga. App. 670, 541 S.E.2d 673 (2000) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

If the defendant wanted an elaboration of the charge actually given on confessions, the defendant should have submitted a timely written request. Webb v. State, 73 Ga. App. 748, 38 S.E.2d 54 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Because the defendant failed to request a charge on voluntariness of confessions and consideration of statements, admissions, and confessions, the defendant was precluded from asserting error on that basis; the trial court did not need to give an instruction on voluntariness of confessions absent a specific request therefor. Thorpe v. State, 285 Ga. 604, 678 S.E.2d 913 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Trial court did not err by denying the defendant's request to instruct the jury regarding the voluntariness of an eyewitness's prior inconsistent statement to police in which the eyewitness, the defendant's girlfriend, implicated the defendant in the victim's murder because the charge requested was based on a statute regarding the admissibility of a confession; and the charge requested was not applicable to the testimony of a witness other than the defendant. Poellnitz v. State, 296 Ga. 134, 765 S.E.2d 343 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

4. Review

Failure of defendant to request hearing.

- When the defendant did not request a hearing under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50 as to the admissibility and voluntariness of defendant's non-custodial admission, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to address the failure of the trial court to conduct a hearing as to that issue. Hawkins v. State, 236 Ga. App. 346, 512 S.E.2d 59 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Since there was no evidence a confession was false, the conclusion that the confession was voluntary was not clearly erroneous. Pinckney v. State, 259 Ga. App. 309, 576 S.E.2d 574 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by not moving to suppress incriminating statements that the defendant made to detectives at the defendant's house because the defendant did not show, inter alia, a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the statements been suppressed based on the other incriminating evidence against the defendant. Lucas v. State, 328 Ga. App. 741, 760 S.E.2d 257 (2014).

- Defendant failed to include the videotape or a transcript of the audio portion in the appellate record and the appellate court was unable to review defendant's contention that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress the videotaped statement to the police on the ground that certain comments by the interviewing detective constituted a hope of benefit. Clark v. State, 279 Ga. 243, 611 S.E.2d 38 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Judge's conclusion that the confession is voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity, although the judge need not make formal findings of fact or write an opinion. When there has been no ruling on the issue of voluntariness made with the required "unmistakable clarity," remand with instruction to conduct a further hearing and make a determination of voluntariness may be appropriate. Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 530 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

It is the duty of the Supreme Court of Georgia to independently review the evidence to determine whether the state has carried the state's burden of proving the admissibility of the accused's confession by a preponderance of the evidence. Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 261 S.E.2d 379 (1979), sentence vacated, 446 U.S. 961, 100 S. Ct. 2934, 64 L. Ed. 2d 819 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

- Trial court sits as the factfinder in a Jackson-Denno hearing (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)) regarding the voluntariness of a confession and its resolution of factual issues will be upheld by an appellate court unless it is clearly erroneous. Harrison v. State, 253 Ga. App. 179, 558 S.E.2d 760 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal. Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938, 100 S. Ct. 1332, 63 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Green v. State, 154 Ga. App. 295, 267 S.E.2d 898 (1980); Etterle v. State, 155 Ga. App. 210, 270 S.E.2d 376 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Phipps v. State, 155 Ga. App. 229, 270 S.E.2d 393 (1980); Whitacre v. State, 155 Ga. App. 359, 270 S.E.2d 894 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 271 S.E.2d 168 (1980); Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d 530 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411); Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119, 274 S.E.2d 549 (1981); Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-411).

Determinations regarding the facts and witness credibility are entirely within the purview of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless such determinations are clearly erroneous. Ward v. State, 234 Ga. App. 610, 507 S.E.2d 506 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

Trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress defendant's statement to police was proper and not clearly erroneous because the statement was found to have been made voluntarily, without the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50; as the police officer's statements to defendant were nothing more than routine police questioning, aimed at eliciting a response from defendant in custody, and statements from the officer that defendant may not have intended to kill the victim did not amount to a hope of benefit, nor did a statement that defendant would not be prosecuted on drug charges give defendant any hope of benefit, as it was made because there was no evidence of the drugs. Pittman v. State, 277 Ga. 475, 592 S.E.2d 72 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

- Because the supreme court ruled adversely to the defendant in the defendant's first appeal on the issue of whether an incriminating statement the defendant made during a custodial interrogation should have been suppressed as involuntarily made, that decision was the law of the case. Foster v. State, 290 Ga. 599, 723 S.E.2d 663 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-50).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 720.

Involuntary Confession - Psychological Coercion, 22 POF2d 539.

Custodial Interrogation Under Miranda v. Arizona, 23 POF2d 713.

Invalidity of Suspect's Waiver of Miranda Rights, 42 POF2d 617.

Invalidity of Confession or Waiver of Miranda Rights by Mentally Retarded Person, 42 POF3d 147.

- Necessity that confession in prosecution for homicide during perpetration of another felony be corroborated by other evidence of the commission of the other felony, 79 A.L.R. 508.

Right of defendant in criminal case, where state has introduced incriminating portion of conversation or statements made by him, to elicit or introduce in evidence his exculpatory statements, 118 A.L.R. 138.

Constitutional aspects of procedure for determining voluntariness of pretrial confession, 1 A.L.R.3d 1251, 132 A.L.R. Fed. 415.

Mental subnormality of accused as affecting voluntariness or admissibility of confession, 8 A.L.R.4th 16.

Sufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs, 25 A.L.R.4th 419.

Admissibility of confession or other statement made by defendant as affected by delay in arraignment - modern state cases, 28 A.L.R.4th 1121.

Voluntariness of confession as affected by police statements that suspect's relatives will benefit by the confession, 51 A.L.R.4th 495.

Confession by one who has been subjected to or threatened with physical suffering, 24 A.L.R. 703.

Voluntariness of confession admitted by court as question for jury, 85 A.L.R. 870; 170 A.L.R. 567.

Admissibility, on question as to voluntariness of confession, of events occurring, or statement made after the confession by defendant or others not as witnesses at trial, 85 A.L.R. 942.

Offer of defendant in criminal case to concede or stipulate fact, or his admission of same, as affecting prosecution's right to introduce evidence thereof, 91 A.L.R. 1478.

Duty of court to institute preliminary investigation as to voluntary or involuntary character of confession, 102 A.L.R. 605.

Presumption and burden of proof as to voluntariness of nonjudicial confession, 102 A.L.R. 641.

Right of witness to state his conclusion or opinion that confession was voluntary or involuntary, 114 A.L.R. 974.

Presence of jury during preliminary inquiry of court as to voluntariness of confession as prejudicial, 148 A.L.R. 546.

Suppression before indictment or trial of confession unlawfully obtained, 1 A.L.R.2d 1012.

Admissibility in evidence of unsigned confession, 23 A.L.R.2d 919.

Right of accused to show body to jury as evidence of violence by police in securing confession, 72 A.L.R.2d 1322.

Voluntariness and admissibility of minor's confession, 87 A.L.R.2d 624.

Impeachment of accused as witness by use of involuntary or not properly qualified confession, 89 A.L.R.2d 478.

Admissibility of confession as affected by its inducement through artifice, deception, trickery, or fraud, 99 A.L.R.2d 772.

Admissibility of confession by one accused of felonious homicide, as affected by its inducement through compelling, or threatening to compel, accused to view victim's corpse, 27 A.L.R.3d 1185.

What constitutes "custodial interrogation" within rule of Miranda v. Arizona requiring that suspect be informed of his federal constitutional rights before custodial interrogation, 31 A.L.R.3d 565.

Admissibility, in civil action, of confession or admission which could not be used against party in criminal prosecution because obtained by improper police methods, 43 A.L.R.3d 1375.

Admissibility of defense communications made in connection with plea bargaining, 59 A.L.R.3d 441.

Confession as defense in action for malicious prosecution, 66 A.L.R.3d 95.

Admissibility in evidence of confession made by accused in anticipation of, during, or following polygraph examination, 89 A.L.R.3d 230.

Admissibility of polygraph evidence at trial on issue of voluntariness of confession made by accused, 92 A.L.R.3d 1317.

Adequacy of defense counsel's representation of criminal client regarding confessions and related matters, 7 A.L.R.4th 180.

Sufficiency of showing that voluntariness of confession or admission was affected by alcohol or other drugs, 25 A.L.R.4th 419.

Admissibility of confession or other statement made by defendant as affected by delay in arraignment - modern state cases, 28 A.L.R.4th 1121.

Voluntariness of confession as affected by police statements that suspect's relatives will benefit by the confession, 51 A.L.R.4th 495.

Duty of court, in federal criminal prosecution, to conduct inquiry into voluntariness of accused's statement - modern cases, 132 A.L.R. Fed. 415.