2020 Georgia Code
Title 24 - Evidence
Chapter 6 - Witnesses
Article 2 - Credibility
§ 24-6-622. Witness's Feelings and Relationship to Parties Provable

The state of a witness's feelings towards the parties and the witness's relationship to the parties may always be proved for the consideration of the jury.

(Code 1981, §24-6-622, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

- For annual survey on evidence law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 97 (2018). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 253 (2018). For comment on Smith v. State, 225 Ga. 328, 168 S.E.2d 587 (1969) and the right to prove relationship of a witness to a party, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 347 (1969).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Feelings
• Relationships

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1868, § 3820, former Code 1873, § 3876, former Code 1882, § 3876, former Civil Code 1895, § 5289, former Penal Code 1895, § 1023, former Civil Code 1910, § 5878, former Penal Code 1910, § 1049, former Code 1933, § 38-1712, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

- Public trial tends to ensure the truth by forcing those who testify to relate their memories without embellishment for fear that there may be those in attendance who could call the testimony into question if not truthful. Montgomery v. State, 156 Ga. App. 448, 275 S.E.2d 72 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

As one party to the trial, the state is entitled to require common witnesses, both those charged and observers of the charged acts, to present their version of the occurrences in the presence of each other, thereby minimizing witness bias or the possibility of each defendant singly shifting blame to other absent defendants without opportunity of searching inquiry into the truth. Montgomery v. State, 156 Ga. App. 448, 275 S.E.2d 72 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

- Statute was simply declaratory of a general common law principle. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Lybrend, 99 Ga. 421, 27 S.E. 794 (1896) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5289).

- As a general rule, a party may show any fact or circumstance that may affect the credibility of an opposing witness. Fowler v. Waldrip, 10 Ga. 350 (1851) (decided under former law); Simpson v. State, 78 Ga. 91 (1886); Daniel v. State, 103 Ga. 202, 29 S.E. 767 (1897) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3876); Neill v. Hill, 32 Ga. App. 381, 123 S.E. 30 (1924); Lloyd v. State, 40 Ga. App. 230, 149 S.E. 174 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Walker v. State, 74 Ga. App. 48, 39 S.E.2d 75 (1946); Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5878); Southeast Transp. Corp. v. Hogan Livestock Co., 133 Ga. App. 825, 212 S.E.2d 638 (1975);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1049);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

- In a criminal prosecution, it was error for the trial court to permit the state, in argument and in testimony, to identify a fingerprint expert who testified for the state as having originally been hired by the defendant; the fact of the expert's original employment by defendant was irrelevant and could be prejudicial. Blige v. State, 264 Ga. 166, 441 S.E.2d 752 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

Former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 and24-9-68 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 to24-4-403 and24-6-622) should be considered in pari materia; thus, even if testimony sought to be admitted relates to the feelings a witness has toward a party, if that particular feeling would have no relevance to the questions being tried by the jury, then such evidence may be excluded in the sound discretion of the trial court. Lockett v. State, 217 Ga. App. 328, 457 S.E.2d 579 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

In a personal injury suit filed by a car driver against a truck driver because the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the car driver's prior DUI charges and testimony by the investigating officer about charges filed against the car driver in traffic court, and by excluding an admission by the car driver's treating emergency room physician, a new trial was ordered. Laukaitis v. Basadre, 287 Ga. App. 144, 650 S.E.2d 724 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- It was not error to refuse to admit evidence pertaining to a witness's criminal record since there was nothing to show that the witness's past record would motivate the witness to be untruthful or "shade" the witness's testimony to please the state, there were no outstanding criminal charges against the witness, and the state did not open the door to admission of such evidence. Jenkins v. State, 215 Ga. App. 540, 451 S.E.2d 457 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

While it was error under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68 not to allow the defendant to cross-examine a witness about pending felony charges against the witness, it was highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict, and was therefore harmless error, because the witness was not present at the crime scene and the witness's testimony that the defendant bragged about committing an assault was put in doubt by another witness. Fields v. State, 285 Ga. App. 345, 646 S.E.2d 326 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

In a claim by the first defendant, the trial court did not improperly limit the second defendant's ability to cross-examine one of the state's witnesses about an alleged prior arrest for prostitution because the right to inquire into partiality and bias was not without limits; neither the first defendant nor the co-defendants presented any evidence to show that the witness at issue had any bias in favor of the state based on an alleged prostitution charge; and, while the second defendant asserted at trial that a prostitution charge had been dismissed shortly before trial, there was nothing in the record supporting that claim. Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 811 S.E.2d 399 (2018).

- Although the trial court erred in excluding evidence that a supervising officer subsequently made a threat against the defendant because the evidence was admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68, the trial court's exclusion of the evidence provided no ground for reversal since the supervising officer's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of two other witnesses, and the excluded evidence did not challenge the credibility of the other two witnesses; thus, the evidence that the defendant committed obstruction as charged in the accusation was overwhelming, and it was highly probable that the trial court's error did not contribute to the verdict. Edwards v. State, 308 Ga. App. 569, 707 S.E.2d 917 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- In the absence of any evidence regarding the feelings or bias of witnesses toward defendant, or why the witnesses were familiar with defendant's appearance, defendant's requested charge on the language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68 was not authorized. Scruggs v. State, 227 Ga. App. 35, 488 S.E.2d 110 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- Trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury regarding former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68, as it was sufficient that the jury was charged that, in passing upon credibility of witnesses, it could consider their interest or lack of interest in the occurrences about which the witnesses testified. Stinson v. State, 256 Ga. App. 902, 569 S.E.2d 858 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- Because the defendant never argued in the trial court that the testimony the prosecuting attorney elicited by the cross-examination of a defense witness was not probative of any relationship between the defendant and the witness under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68, there was nothing for the court of appeals to review on appeal; at trial, defense counsel never argued that the questions the prosecuting attorney proposed to ask, and ultimately did ask, of the witness would not elicit testimony showing some relationship between the two and that the proposed cross-examination, therefore, was not probative of a relationship under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68, and although defense counsel objected that the pending charge was not a conviction, that was a different objection than the one the defendant raised on appeal. Luckie v. State, 310 Ga. App. 859, 714 S.E.2d 358 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1803, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 965 (Ga. 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

Cited in Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 794 S.E.2d 67 (2016); Luckie v. Berry, 305 Ga. 684, 827 S.E.2d 644 (2019).

Feelings

In general.

- State of the witness's feelings to the parties may always be proved for the consideration of the jury. Bishop v. State, 9 Ga. 121 (1850) (decided under former law); Whitlow v. State, 74 Ga. 819 (1855); Durham v. State, 45 Ga. 516 (1872) (decided under former law); Skipper v. State, 59 Ga. 63 (1877); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Lybrend, 99 Ga. 421, 27 S.E. 794 (1896) (role of accused unpopular with witness) (decided under former Code 1868, § 3820); Shaw v. State, 102 Ga. 660, 29 S.E. 477 (1897); Patman v. State, 61 Ga. 379 (1878) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3876); Daniel v. State, 103 Ga. 202, 29 S.E. 767 (1897); Purdee v. State, 118 Ga. 798, 45 S.E. 606 (1903) (personal conduct) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3876); McDuffie v. State, 121 Ga. 580, 49 S.E. 708 (1905) (witness subject to similar acts of injury as done by accused) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3876); Sasser v. State, 129 Ga. 541, 59 S.E. 255 (1907) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Parker v. State, 11 Ga. App. 251, 75 S.E. 437 (1912); 17 Ga. App. 252, 87 S.E. 705 (1915) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Smith v. State, 12 Ga. App. 13, 76 S.E. 647 (1912); Sisk v. Landers, 67 Ga. App. 538, 21 S.E.2d 449 (1942) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Walker v. State, 74 Ga. App. 48, 39 S.E.2d 75 (1946); Miller v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Harrell v. State, 139 Ga. App. 556, 228 S.E.2d 723 (1976);later appeal,(subordination of another witness) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1049);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1049);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

Statute relates to the state of the witness's feelings to the parties, and not the state of the feelings of a party toward the witness. Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610, 44 S.E.2d 174 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

Trial court did not err in refusing to permit the condemnee to show, by a witness for the condemnee, the bias and prejudice of a witness for the condemnor against the condemnee, where the questions asked the witness related to the feelings of the condemnor's witness at a time before the trial and did not attempt to show the feelings of the condemnor's witness at the time of the trial. Sutton v. State Hwy. Dep't, 103 Ga. App. 29, 118 S.E.2d 285 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

- Cross-examination of an adverse witness as to interest, attitude, and feelings is admissible. Jeter & Forbes v. Haviland, Keese & Co., 24 Ga. 252 (1858) (decided under former law); Carmichael v. Silvers, 90 Ga. App. 804, 84 S.E.2d 688 (1954); Miller v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712); Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974); Harrell v. State, 139 Ga. App. 556, 228 S.E.2d 723 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

Jury may not arbitrarily disregard the testimony of a witness by reason of interest in the result. Carmichael v. Silvers, 90 Ga. App. 804, 84 S.E.2d 668 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

After a defendant was charged with aggravated assault, but claimed self defense, the trial court erred in prohibiting the defendant from eliciting from the victim that the victim had pending a civil action against the defendant for the victim's injuries; the defendant was entitled to prove the victim's interest in the outcome of the criminal trial and so attack the victim's credibility, and to show the state of the witness's feelings toward the defendant and the witness's relationship to the defendant. Boggs v. State, 195 Ga. App. 605, 394 S.E.2d 401 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- Jury is authorized to consider the bias or prejudices of the witnesses in a criminal case, if any exist. Wall v. State, 153 Ga. 309, 112 S.E. 142 (1922) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1049); Couch v. State, 73 Ga. App. 153, 35 S.E.2d 708 (1945); Dennis v. State, 216 Ga. 206, 115 S.E.2d 527 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

Fact that, in the investigating officer's previous experience, most of the sexual abuse victims' mothers had sided with their defendant-husbands was not relevant to explain either the conduct or the testimony of the victim's mother in the instant case, insofar as the testimony did not relate to the state of specifically her feelings towards the parties and specifically her relationship to the parties. Lott v. State, 206 Ga. App. 886, 426 S.E.2d 667 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

In a prosecution for aggravated assault, when defendant was allowed to testify that the victim was a drug dealer who had furnished drugs to defendant's nephew, which had prompted the confrontation between them, the exclusion of additional evidence of the victim's drug dealing was not a curtailment of defendant's right to show the bias of the victim. Hayes v. State, 211 Ga. App. 801, 440 S.E.2d 539 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

In a criminal prosecution, when the state's eyewitness was never asked what the witness's personal feelings were toward defendant, further inquiry into the basis for any bias or prejudice that the witness might have against African-Americans would not have been relevant. Farley v. State, 225 Ga. App. 687, 484 S.E.2d 711 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to insist that the victim's entire diary go out with the jury in order to show the victim's animosity toward the defendant, the victim's father, as the diary showed only that the victim had negative feelings toward the victim's mother, not the defendant. Goggins v. State, 330 Ga. App. 350, 767 S.E.2d 753 (2014).

Trial court did not err in allowing the state to impeach the defendant's girlfriend using the girlfriend's first-offender plea because the state did not use the girlfriend's guilty plea to impeach the girlfriend's general credibility, but instead used the plea to show bias through evidence that the defendant had previously attempted to accept responsibility for the girlfriend's criminal conduct in a different matter, and the trial court acted well within the court's discretion in allowing the state to explore whether the defendant's previous attempt to accept responsibility for the girlfriend's criminal conduct might have influenced the girlfriend's trial testimony. Hall v. State, 335 Ga. App. 895, 783 S.E.2d 400 (2016)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in restricting the defendant's examination of an officer regarding the officer's alleged racial bias because the defendant had an opportunity to develop testimony regarding the officer's alleged racial bias but failed to do so, and, to the extent that the defendant's enumeration was premised upon evidence reflected in the officer's personnel file, the defendant failed to perfect the record with a sufficient proffer of the excluded evidence; although the officer's personnel file was presented to the trial court for consideration, such evidence was not introduced and included in the record for appellate review, and in the absence of the evidence, the court of appeals could not reach the merits of the claim. Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 692 S.E.2d 820 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- In a child molestation case, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to insist that the victim's entire diary go out with the jury because the evidence of the feelings of the victim, the defendant's daughter, toward the victim's parents showed that the victim had animosity toward the mother, rather than the defendant; and the diary entries which referenced the allegations that the defendant had fathered a child out of wedlock and failed to satisfy the financial obligations regarding the defendant's children would likely have undermined the defendant's good character defense. Goggins v. State, 330 Ga. App. 350, 767 S.E.2d 753 (2014).

- Intent or motive of a witness is a legitimate subject of inquiry, and the fact that a witness is influenced by financial considerations may affect a witness's credit and diminish the weight of a witness's testimony. Lloyd v. State, 40 Ga. App. 230, 149 S.E. 174 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1049).

If an attempt be made to discredit a witness on the ground that the witness's testimony is given under the influence of some motive prompting the witness to make a false or colored statement, the witness may be allowed to show in reply that the witness made similar declarations at a time when the motive imputed to the witness did not exist. Fuller v. State, 197 Ga. 714, 30 S.E.2d 608 (1944); Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

Relationships

In general.

- Relationship of a witness to a party is a relevant consideration for the jury. Fowler v. Waldrip, 10 Ga. 350 (1851) (decided under former law); Simpson v. State, 78 Ga. 91 (1886); Futch v. State, 90 Ga. 472, 16 S.E. 102 (1892), overruled on other grounds, Worthen v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 22 (Ga. 2019) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3876); Myers v. State, 97 Ga. 76, 25 S.E. 252 (1895); Shaw v. State, 102 Ga. 660, 29 S.E. 477 (1897) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3876); Daniel v. State, 103 Ga. 202, 29 S.E. 767 (1897); Brown v. State, 119 Ga. 572, 46 S.E. 833 (1904) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3876); Perdue v. State, 126 Ga. 112, 54 S.E. 820 (1906); Bates v. State, 4 Ga. App. 486, 61 S.E. 888 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Clark v. State, 5 Ga. App. 605, 63 S.E. 606 (1909); Union v. State, 7 Ga. App. 27, 66 S.E. 24 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Billings v. State, 8 Ga. App. 672, 70 S.E. 36 (1911); Watts v. State, 9 Ga. App. 500, 71 S.E. 766 (1911) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Smith v. State, 15 Ga. App. 713, 84 S.E. 159 (1915); Berry v. City of Jackson, 16 Ga. App. 479, 85 S.E. 683 (1915) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Lundy v. State, 144 Ga. 833, 88 S.E. 209 (1916); Neill v. Hill, 32 Ga. App. 381, 123 S.E. 30 (1924) (bailor and bailee); Lloyd v. State, 40 Ga. App. 230, 149 S.E. 174 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Georgia Hwy. Express, Inc. v. Sturkie, 62 Ga. App. 741, 9 S.E.2d 683 (1940); Walker v. State, 74 Ga. App. 48, 39 S.E.2d 75 (1946) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Carmichael v. Silvers, 90 Ga. App. 804, 84 S.E.2d 668 (1954); Dennis v. State, 216 Ga. 206, 115 S.E.2d 527 (1960) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1023); Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974); Southeast Transp. Corp. v. Hogan Livestock Co., 133 Ga. App. 825, 212 S.E.2d 638 (1975) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1049); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 242 Ga. 158, 249 S.E.2d 530 (1978);(police work);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1049);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1049);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5878);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5878);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1049);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(lover);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(prosecutor);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(employer and employee);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712);(marital status);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1712).

- In a personal injury action, it was not error to allow evidence showing the close relationship between the medical witness and the plaintiff, a long-time patient, and between the witness and plaintiff's counsel. Canada v. Shropshire, 232 Ga. App. 341, 501 S.E.2d 860 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

In defendant's trial on charges of malice murder and aggravated assault, the trial court did not err by allowing the state to ask an expert witness who opined that defendant was insane at the time defendant stabbed two people if the witness had been hired by defendant's counsel to testify in other cases and how much the witness was being paid to testify in defendant's case. Whitner v. State, 276 Ga. 742, 584 S.E.2d 247 (2003), overruled on other grounds, Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- In a medical malpractice action, the trial court did not err in limiting a patient's cross-examination of the doctor's expert witness, and hence, the patient's ability to show bias on the expert's part as: (1) the rules of evidence specifically prohibited a party from eliciting evidence that the expert had testified in a previous lawsuit, as such would have shown that the doctor had been sued before and suggested a proclivity for negligent conduct; and (2) the mere fact that a juror with an interest in the doctor's liability insurer would have been stricken for cause did not grant the patient an allowance to cross-examine a witness about that witness's interest in the insurer. Carlisle v. Abend, 288 Ga. App. 150, 653 S.E.2d 388 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- Trial court did not err in allowing the state to ask a defense witness whether the witness had a sexual relationship with defendant, not to impeach the witness by reason of the immorality, but to show the witness's intimate relations with the accused and the witness's probable bias as a witness. Watkins v. State, 206 Ga. App. 701, 426 S.E.2d 238 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

Even though the evidence already shows close friendship and cohabitation, a lesbian relationship between a party and a witness on the party's behalf may be proved to show their intimate relations and the witness's potential bias. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. 587, 452 S.E.2d 159 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Chrysler Group LLC v. Walden, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 154 (Ga. 2018) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- State was entitled to establish the homosexual relationship between the defendant and the state's key witness pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68 (see now O.C.G.A.24-6-622), and the state did not attempt to belabor the issue beyond this limited purpose. Moreover, trial counsel sought through voir dire to eliminate jurors who may have held biases against those practicing homosexuality. State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 715 S.E.2d 48 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- In a criminal prosecution, proof that the alibi witness had accused the defendant, her boyfriend, of kidnapping and rape but then declined to prosecute her paramour was relevant and admissible to show bias on her part as an alibi witness. Hood v. State, 245 Ga. App. 391, 537 S.E.2d 788 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- Jury could consider whether a witness had an interest in providing testimony favorable to the employer that insulated the employer from liability and whether the witness/employee received a promotion and pay increase as a reward for such testimony. McNeely v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 246 Ga. App. 852, 542 S.E.2d 575 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

In a vehicle collision that resulted in the death of the plaintiffs' four-year-old child, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the chief executive officer's compensation from the defendant because the chief executive officer was not a party, so the rule that the financial circumstances of a party were generally inadmissible did not apply; a jury could find that the chief executive officer's compensation package made the existence of bias in favor of the defendant more probable; and any concerns regarding prejudice had to yield to the statutory mandate that the state of a witness's feelings towards the parties and the witness's relationship to them could always be proved for the consideration of the jury. Chrysler Group, LLC v. Walden, 339 Ga. App. 733, 792 S.E.2d 754 (2016), aff'd, 303 Ga. 358, 812 S.E.2d 244 (2018).

In a products liability case, the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of a car manufacturer's CEO's compensation did not so dramatically outweigh its probative value that it required reversal of the jury verdict; the actions of the CEO in allegedly interfering with a government recall of the vehicle made the CEO's credibility and bias relevant. Chrysler Group, LLC v. Walden, 303 Ga. 358, 812 S.E.2d 244 (2018).

Evidence of defendant's gang affiliation shared with an alibi witnesses and a police officer's testimony that the name of the gang meant "I will die for you, you will die for me" was relevant to show the state of the witnesses' feelings toward defendant and the witnesses' relationship to the defendant. Hayes v. State, 265 Ga. 1, 453 S.E.2d 11 (1995). But see Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6, 515 S.E.2d 155 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- Because the defendant did not perfect the record with a sufficient proffer of the testimony of the victim's mother, the court of appeals was unable to reach the merits of the defendant's claim that his cross-examination of the mother would have shown that she had a possible bias or motive for testifying against the defendant and that the mother had made prior allegations that one of her children had been molested; even if review of the alleged error had not been waived, the defendant did not show how the trial court's ruling prevented him from showing any bias or prejudice against him on the part of the mother because the defendant was not prohibited from cross-examining the mother about the state of her feelings toward him pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68 and about his relationship with her, and the evidence at trial included the direct testimony of the victim, who testified as to the offenses the defendant committed against her, as well as the chemical evidence of the defendant's semen on the victim's bed sheets. Miceli v. State, 308 Ga. App. 225, 707 S.E.2d 141 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-68).

- In the defendant's trial for the murder of a former girlfriend's 13-month-old daughter, evidence that the defendant had abused the child's mother was not introduced for one of the purposes listed in O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b), but rather to show the mother's bias under O.C.G.A. § 24-6-622, which allowed evidence of a witness's feelings towards the parties and the witness's relationship to the parties. Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 824 S.E.2d 346 (2019).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Admissibility, to show bias or interest of witness, of evidence that he or his employer had compensated the party for whom he testified, in circumstances creating right to subrogation, 128 A.L.R. 1110.

Cross-examination of adversary witness regarding compromise or settlement of his claim against the party calling him, for purpose of affecting his credibility, 161 A.L.R. 395.

Relationship between party and witness as giving rise to or affecting presumption or inference from failure to produce or examine witness, 5 A.L.R.2d 893.

Right of accused in homicide case to cross-examine prosecution's witness as to latter's pending or contemplated civil action against accused arising out of same transaction, 41 A.L.R.2d 1205.

Preventing or limiting cross-examination of prosecution's witness as to his motive for testifying, 62 A.L.R.2d 610.

Necessity and sufficiency of foundation for discrediting evidence showing bias or prejudice of adverse witness, 87 A.L.R.2d 407.

Propriety of cross-examining witness as to illicit relations with defendant in criminal case, 25 A.L.R.3d 537.

Right to cross-examine prosecuting witness as to his pending or contemplated civil action against accused for damages arising out of same transaction, 98 A.L.R.3d 1060.

Adverse presumption or inference based on failure to produce or examine codefendant or accomplice who is not on trial - modern criminal cases, 76 A.L.R.4th 812.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or question examining doctor - modern cases, 77 A.L.R.4th 463.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine that party's attorney - modern cases, 78 A.L.R.4th 571.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine witness who was occupant of vehicle involved in accident - modern cases, 78 A.L.R.4th 616.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine spouse - modern cases, 79 A.L.R.4th 694.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine friend - modern cases, 79 A.L.R.4th 779.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine family member other than spouse - modern cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 337.

Adverse presumption or inference based on state's failure to produce or examine law enforcement personnel - modern cases, 81 A.L.R.4th 872.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine transferor, transferee, broker, or other person allegedly involved in transaction at issue - modern cases, 81 A.L.R.4th 939.