2020 Georgia Code
Title 24 - Evidence
Chapter 10 - Best Evidence Rule
§ 24-10-1003. Admissibility of Duplicates

A duplicate shall be admissible to the same extent as an original unless:

1. A genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
2. A circumstance exists where it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.

(Code 1981, §24-10-1003, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

- Primary evidentiary value of photostatic copies of records produced from microfilm and print-out copies of computer records, § 50-18-96.

Admissibility of duplicates, Fed. R. Evid. 1003.

- For article, "The Admissibility of Computer-Generated Evidence in Georgia," see 18 Ga. St. B.J. 137 (1982). For annual survey on evidence law, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 81 (2014).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Carbon Copies
• Application

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 138, § 2, Ga. L. 1858, p. 53, § 1, former Code 1863, §§ 3741, 3744, and 3745, former Penal Code 1895, § 996, former Civil Code 1910, §§ 5761 and 5829, former Code 1933, §§ 38-206, 38-212, 38-214, 38-702, Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1, and O.C.G.A. §§ 24-5-2,24-5-21,24-5-25, and24-5-26, are included in the annotations for this Code section. The reader is also advised to consult the annotations under O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-901 through24-9-904, for annotations discussing identity, authentication, and foundation issues related to duplicates and copies.

- Existence of a genuine original was essential to the admissibility of a copy and therefore whether there was any primary evidence relating to the existence of a genuine original deed became a material question. Latham v. Fowler, 199 Ga. 648, 34 S.E.2d 870 (1945), later appeal, 201 Ga. 68, 38 S.E.2d 732 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-214).

Former statute simply permitted photostatic, microphotographic, and photographic reproductions of original writings or records made in the regular course of business to be admitted in evidence without accounting for the original. Knudsen v. Duffee-Freeman, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 872, 99 S.E.2d 370 (1957) (decided under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1); Ricketts v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 483, 194 S.E.2d 311 (1972);(decided under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1).

- Former law applied to those deeds and instruments that were, by law, authorized and required to be recorded. Gill v. Strozier, 32 Ga. 688 (1861) (decided under Ga. L. 1858, p. 53, § 1).

- Provisions of Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1, permitting the introduction of photostatic copies of original writings or records made in the regular course of business to be introduced as original evidence in a case did not have any bearing upon former Code 1933, § 38-709. Ga. L. 1950, p. 73 applied to situations where the contents of the document were sought to be introduced because the document itself had a bearing upon the issues sought to be proved, the test of admissibility being relevancy and materiality, while documents containing signatures introduced under the provisions of former Code 1933, § 38-709 did not necessarily have any bearing upon the issue being tried, and their sole purpose was to establish a criterion by which the genuineness or forgery of the signature on some other document relevant to the cause could be established. Mitchell v. State, 89 Ga. App. 80, 78 S.E.2d 563 (1953) (decided under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1).

- When more than one copy of a document was executed at the same time, any copy thereof was a duplicate original, and it was primary evidence of the agreement instead of secondary evidence. Raulerson v. Jones, 122 Ga. App. 440, 177 S.E.2d 181 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-206).

- Former best evidence rule required that the court be satisfied that the better evidence had not been willfully destroyed nor voluntarily withheld, but the rule did not exact that the loss or destruction of the document should be proven beyond all possibility of a mistake; the rule only demanded that a moral certainty should exist that the court has had every opportunity for examining and deciding the cause upon the best evidence within the power or ability of the litigant. Fowler v. Latham, 201 Ga. 68, 38 S.E.2d 732 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-214).

Execution as well as existence of written contract must be proved before a copy can be used as evidence. Bigelow v. Young, 30 Ga. 121 (1860) (decided under former law); Durham v. Holeman, 30 Ga. 619 (1860);(decided under former law).

- Evidence that a contract was executed by the treasurer of an insurance company, without proof of the treasurer's authority so to do, was insufficient to show that the original contract was the act of the company and did not satisfy the law. Brown v. Bass, 132 Ga. 41, 63 S.E. 788 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 996).

- When the witnesses, if any, were unknown, it was not necessary to prove that the alleged lost original writing was executed with any particular formality in order to admit secondary evidence of the writing's contents. Sharp v. Autry, 185 Ga. 160, 194 S.E. 194 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-214).

Execution may be proved by circumstances when no direct evidence of the execution of a written instrument was attainable. Sharp v. Autry, 185 Ga. 160, 194 S.E. 194 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-214).

- Papers which are executed simultaneously with the original, by the same stroke of the pen or the typewriter, are admissible as primary evidence without accounting for the original because the papers are considered duplicate originals. Strickland v. Foundation Life Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 614, 200 S.E.2d 306 (1973) (decided under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1).

Copies of duplicate originals are admissible without accounting for the original. Strickland v. Foundation Life Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 614, 200 S.E.2d 306 (1973) (decided under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1).

Copies of duplicate originals were admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-10-1003 and24-10-1004), without accounting for the original. Ellerbee v. State, 215 Ga. App. 102, 449 S.E.2d 874 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-25).

Duplicate original of instrument admissible into evidence without violation of the best evidence rule. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Latimore, 151 Ga. App. 786, 261 S.E.2d 735 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-702).

- It is not necessary that a copy sought to be proved shall be identical with the original, but it may be either a literal or a substantial copy, provided other rules as to the admission of secondary evidence are satisfied. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Latimore, 151 Ga. App. 786, 261 S.E.2d 735 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-702).

- When a party to a cause serves on the opposite party, who is presumably in possession of a once existing material writing, a notice to produce such writing, and the party served responds that the writing is lost, or fails to produce the writing at the trial, secondary evidence as to the contents of the original writing becomes admissible. Middlebrooks v. Cabaniss, 193 Ga. 764, 20 S.E.2d 10 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-214).

Carbon Copies

Original of exhibit inadvertently removed from attorney's office.

- When a witness testified that the original of an exhibit was prepared by the witness, and that the exhibit was an exact copy of the original, and when the plaintiff's attorney stated in plaintiff's place that the original had been given to the attorney and several copies made, and also stated that through inadvertence the original went out of the attorney's office as an exhibit to the complaint and could not be located, the trial judge did not abuse judicial discretion in admitting the exhibit. Palmer v. Wilkins, 163 Ga. App. 104, 294 S.E.2d 355 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-21).

- When it is proved that a genuine original was executed, proof that a document is an exact carbon copy of that original is sufficient to admit it into evidence without proving the loss of the original. Mitchell v. United States, 214 Ga. 473, 105 S.E.2d 337 (1958) for comment, see 21 Ga. B.J. 553 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-212).

Trial court did not err in admitting certain copies of a store's receipts of defendant's fraudulent transactions rather than the originals as the store's loss prevention manager testified that although the originals had been maintained at the store, the manager had not been able to locate the receipts in time for trial and that the manager had made the copies of the original receipts, which accurately reflected the original receipts; defendant did not show that the best evidence rule had been violated. Epps v. State, 262 Ga. App. 113, 584 S.E.2d 701 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-2).

- If it was proved that a genuine original was executed, proof that a proffered document was an exact carbon copy of that original was sufficient to admit in evidence the carbon copy without proving loss of the original. Mitchell v. United States, 214 Ga. 473, 105 S.E.2d 337 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-702).

- In light of a landowner's testimony that the original cancelled checks and bank statements showing evidence of payment from 1986 for the land in question were unavailable, the trial court could not be said to have abused the court's discretion in allowing the landowner to introduce two "carbonless copies" of checks showing payment. Murray v. Stone, 283 Ga. 6, 655 S.E.2d 821 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-21).

- When a carbon copy of a letter was offered in evidence without any proof of the execution, mailing, or receipt of an original and the copy contained a signature only in type, the copy was prejudicial and the court erred in admitting the copy. Mitchell v. United States, 214 Ga. 473, 105 S.E.2d 337 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-702).

Application

1. In General

- Photocopy may not be admitted in evidence without accounting for the original except when there was proof that the copy was identical to the original. Lester v. Groves, 162 Ga. App. 590, 291 S.E.2d 785 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26).

Photocopies of claim forms identified as authentic by a witness are properly admissible under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1 without accounting for the original under former Code 1933, § 38-212. Strickland v. Foundation Life Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 614, 200 S.E.2d 306 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-212).

Photocopy of the forged check was admissible as a bank supervisor testified that the bank supervisor gave the check to the branch manager, who faxed a copy to the bank's corporate security; the state presented evidence that the original would have been stored at the branch or in the bank's loss prevention facility; and a supervisor testified that the check could not be located at either location. Thomas v. State, 319 Ga. App. 690, 738 S.E.2d 149 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26).

- When the party offering photostatic reproductions as evidence made no attempt to establish that the photocopies were made in the regular course of business and failed to properly account for the absence of the original, it was not error to refuse to admit the photocopies. State v. Mincey, 167 Ga. App. 850, 308 S.E.2d 18 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26).

- Court did not err in refusing to admit a photocopy of an insurance application form offered as evidence by the defendant since the defendant was in possession of the original and had made no attempt to establish that the photocopy was made in the regular course of business. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rhee, 160 Ga. App. 468, 287 S.E.2d 257 (1981) (decided under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1).

Photostatic copies of claim forms identified as authentic by a witness are properly admissible. Strickland v. Foundation Life Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 614, 200 S.E.2d 306 (1973) (decided under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1).

- Trial court did not err when the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress even though the unsigned, unsworn document an investigator identified as the investigator's unsigned affidavit presented at the suppression hearing did not qualify as a "duplicate original" under Georgia law since the affidavit was not made by the same pen stroke at the same time or was not a copy executed at the same time as the "original" of the document; in light of an investigator's testimony concerning the loss of the sealed packet containing the original search warrants and affidavits, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court admitted secondary evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-21, i.e., the testimony of the investigator as to the contents of the missing affidavits. Baptiste v. State, 288 Ga. 653, 706 S.E.2d 442 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-21).

- Affidavits introduced in evidence that were reproductions of the original affidavits were admissible notwithstanding an objection based on the best evidence rule. Adams v. State, 217 Ga. App. 706, 459 S.E.2d 182 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26).

When, with regard to proof of transmittal of contraband to the state crime lab by certified mail, the state could only produce a photostatic copy of the certification receipt in lieu of the original and the defendant urged that, without an adequate explanation for the absence of the original certified mail receipt as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1002), the chain of custody was not sufficiently proven, but a deputy sheriff testified that the deputy would always make a copy of the certified mail receipt when the deputy mailed contraband to the state crime lab, but had been unable to locate the original receipt for this particular mailing, and identified the deputy's handwriting on the photostatic copy and noted that the certification number was identical to that on the state crime lab report, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the copy of the receipt had been made in the regular course of business so as to be admissible pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-14 and24-5-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-803 and24-10-1003). Spead v. State, 187 Ga. App. 359, 370 S.E.2d 213 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26).

- Trial court did not err in admitting a copy of the defendant's fingerprint card, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-14 and24-5-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-803 and24-10-1003), despite the defendant's claim that the testifying witness lacked personal knowledge with regard to the circumstances or time of the creation or transmission of the card as the card itself showed that the card was created and transmitted at the time of the defendant's arrest and was handled in the gathering agency's regular and routine course of business. Tubbs v. State, 283 Ga. App. 578, 642 S.E.2d 205 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26).

- As copies of magazines of the same issue are usually duplicates of the original, there was no error in admitting another copy of the same issue used by an investigating officer when the officer testified the magazine was identical. Verble v. State, 172 Ga. App. 321, 323 S.E.2d 239 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26).

- Bills from a court reporter for depositions and from company for the company's efforts to locate indemnitee, the photostatic copies of checks issued in payment of these bills, and the photostatic copy of check issued in payment of the claim were properly excluded under the best evidence rule. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 734, 347 S.E.2d 701 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-25).

- With regard to the defendant's conviction for criminal attempt to commit child molestation and related crimes, the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence transcripts of all of the online conversations between the defendant and a detective, posing as the 15-year-old victim, because the detective testified that the detective participated in all of the online conversations with the defendant; that the detective created the transcripts by copying the text exactly as the text appeared on the computer screen, without making any additions, omissions, or other alterations to that text; and that the transcript reflected the exact words used in the conversation, as well as the online names used by the persons who typed those words, which was sufficient to authenticate the transcript. Castaneira v. State, 321 Ga. App. 418, 740 S.E.2d 400 (2013).

- When the defendant was convicted of pimping a person under the age of 18, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and trafficking a person for sexual servitude, the copies of the birth certificate and social security card found in the victim's purse were admissible as there was never any issue raised that the copies of the documents entered into evidence were not accurate duplicates of those documents; and, although the victim at one time denied being the person identified in the documents, that did not bear on the admissibility of the copies as an accurate representation of what was found in the victim's purse. Mackey v. State, 342 Ga. App. 791, 805 S.E.2d 596 (2017).

- Digital photographs of what appeared on the screen of the victim's cell phone were duplicates and admissible to the same extent as the original. Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 807 S.E.2d 425 (2017).

- Trial court erred in denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment because the appellees failed to present evidence sufficient to create a jury issue as to whether the appellants had a duty to inspect the exhaust vent since no permits were produced as evidence and the appellants were only required to inspect if a permit was issued. Martin v. Ledbetter, 342 Ga. App. 208, 802 S.E.2d 432 (2017).

- In a civil forfeiture proceeding in connection with an action brought under the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., a witness's testimony regarding newspaper and billboard advertising, telephone calls, and credit card charges violated the best evidence rule because the state neither produced documentary evidence to support the statements, nor accounted for the absence of such evidence. Pabey v. State, 262 Ga. App. 272, 585 S.E.2d 200 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-25).

- Sentencing court improperly considered defendant's prior state court conviction because the state presented only hearsay, rather than competent evidence, showing that the state was unable to obtain a certified copy of the conviction, and there was no evidence regarding whether the state used due diligence to obtain such a copy. Brinkley v. State, 301 Ga. App. 827, 689 S.E.2d 116 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-2).

2. Real Estate Transactions

Deed on record.

- Deed should be held to be legally and properly on record by due proof of signing, sealing, and delivery until the contrary appears. Walls v. Smith, 19 Ga. 8 (1855) (decided under Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 138, § 2).

- If there is written evidence of title to land, that evidence must be produced in order to prove its contents and before secondary evidence is competent to show its contents, it must first be shown to the court that the original once existed, that the original was properly executed and that the original is either lost or destroyed, or for some other sufficient cause is not accessible to the diligence of the party. Head v. Lee, 203 Ga. 191, 45 S.E.2d 666 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-214).

- If a party wishes to introduce a copy of a deed in evidence, it will be a sufficient compliance with the rule to swear that the original deed in the party's belief was lost or destroyed, and the deed was not in the party's custody, power, or control. Ratteree v. Nelson, 10 Ga. 439 (1851) (decided under former law); Drew v. Drew, 146 Ga. 479, 91 S.E. 541 (1917);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5829).

When in a suit for land the right of the plaintiffs is predicated upon an alleged lost and unrecorded deed, proof of the existence of a genuine original must be established before secondary evidence relating thereto is admissible. Latham v. Fowler, 199 Ga. 648, 34 S.E.2d 870 (1945), later appeal, 201 Ga. 68, 38 S.E.2d 732 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-214).

- Certified copy of a petition filed by the plaintiffs' father (holder of life estate under the alleged deed) to sell for reinvestment and attaching a typewritten copy of what purported to be the alleged unrecorded deed did not establish that in fact a genuine deed had been executed. Latham v. Fowler, 199 Ga. 648, 34 S.E.2d 870 (1945), later appeal, 201 Ga. 68, 38 S.E.2d 732 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-214).

- If an original deed remains in existence in possession of the grantee, proof of the handwriting would be prima facie evidence that the deed was sealed and delivered; but when the deed is lost, positive proof of the handwriting is not to be expected or required, and the grantee must depend on other proof. Fowler v. Latham, 201 Ga. 68, 38 S.E.2d 732 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-214).

- When a deed has been recorded and lost and the record has been destroyed, a copy of the original may be proved by the person who made the deed, and the attesting witnesses need not be called for that purpose. Fletcher v. Horne, 75 Ga. 134 (1885) (decided under former Code 1863, §§ 3741, 3744, and 3745).

- Evidence of a statement by a defendant that the defendant knew such a deed as alleged by the plaintiffs was in existence in which the father and his children were grantees was not sufficient to establish the deed because such an admission was too indefinite to properly identify and establish the existence of any particular deed. Latham v. Fowler, 199 Ga. 648, 34 S.E.2d 870 (1945), later appeal, 201 Ga. 68, 38 S.E.2d 732 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-214).

3. Banking

Photostatic copy of bank account signature card.

- When the original of the bank account signature card was on file in the bank and the custodian of the bank's records brought with the custodian a photostatic copy, which was a copy routinely made in the normal course of business, the photostatic copy was admissible. Hawkins v. State, 167 Ga. App. 143, 305 S.E.2d 797 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26).

Photostatic copy of check drawn on a New York bank and returned for insufficient funds was properly identified as a bank record since the original was accounted for as having been returned to the defendant. Hamilton v. State, 118 Ga. App. 842, 165 S.E.2d 884 (1968) (decided under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1).

- Testimony of a claimant that the claimant had recently examined the books of a bank in another state was insufficient to show the authenticity of such books as a foundation for the admission of secondary evidence of their contents, it not appearing that the books were found in the custody of any trustee or officer of court in charge of such insolvent bank, or in the possession of any person whose duty it was to keep and preserve the books. McDonald v. Redding Lumber Co., 43 Ga. App. 656, 159 S.E. 888 (1931) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5761).

When the original, cancelled checks were returned by the payor bank to the bank's home office in another state, the photostatic copies of the issued checks were admissible under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-10-1003 and24-10-1004). Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 734, 347 S.E.2d 701 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26).

- Since the police department routinely made copies of currency used in drug buys, the photocopy of a $20 bill used as "buy money" in a drug transaction was admissible under either former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-10-1003 and24-10-1004) or former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-4 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1002). Johnson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 114, 497 S.E.2d 666 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-26).

- In an identity fraud case, the transcript showed that the state never accounted for the original check when defense counsel objected on the ground that the admission of the original was the best evidence; therefore, it was error for the trial court to admit the photostatic copy pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-2 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-10-1003 and24-10-1004), but the error was harmless because the state's witnesses provided direct testimony regarding details about the check, and specifically testified regarding defendant's use of the identity fraud victim's driver's license; thus, the check itself was of little or no significance in determining defendant's guilt or innocence of identity fraud, and any error in admitting a photostatic copy of the check into evidence would not have influenced the jury's verdict in any way. Wilson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 39, 622 S.E.2d 411 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-5-2).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Photostatic copies made from microfilms are admissible as primary evidence. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 286 (decided under former law).

Microfilms of records would probably be admissible into evidence. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-91 (decided under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1).

Microfilm copies of scholarship agreements and notes would be admissible in evidence. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-142 (decided under Ga. L. 1950, p. 73, § 1).

Admissibility of Computerized Business Records, 14 POF2d 173.

Foundation for Offering Business Records in Evidence, 34 POF2d 509.

Routine Business Practice, 35 POF2d 589.

Recovery and Reconstruction of Electronic Mail as Evidence, 41 POF3d 1.

Establishing A Foundation to Admit Computer-Generated Evidence as Demonstrative or Substantive Evidence, 57 POF3d 455.

- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §§ 1066 et seq., 1250.

- 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1131 et seq. 32 C.J.S., Evidence, §§ 924, 939, 940, 949, 954 et seq. 32A C.J.S., Evidence, §§ 1049, 1050, 1089 et seq., 1093 et seq., 1100 et seq.

- Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evidence Act (U.L.A.) § 1.

- Release or assignment of interest by witness as removing disqualification to testify in action by or against estate of decedent, 28 A.L.R. 6.

Admissibility in evidence of audit or testimony of auditor or accountant, 52 A.L.R. 1266.

Admissibility of secondary evidence of incriminating document in possession of defendant, 67 A.L.R. 77.

Presumption or circumstantial evidence to establish missing link in chain of title, 67 A.L.R. 1333.

Use as evidence against officers, employees, or stockholders of corporation of illegally seized documents or other articles belonging to corporation, 78 A.L.R. 343.

Use of photograph, plan, map, cast, model, etc., as evidence as affected by marking or legends thereon, 108 A.L.R. 1415.

Photographic representation of writing as primary or secondary evidence, 142 A.L.R. 1270; 76 A.L.R.2d 1356.

Degree or quantum of evidence necessary to establish a lost instrument and its contents, 148 A.L.R. 400.

Verification and authentication of slips, tickets, bills, invoices, etc., made in regular course of business, under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, or under similar "Model Acts,", 21 A.L.R.2d 773.

Form, particularity, and manner of designation required in subpoena duces tecum for production of corporate books, records, and documents, 23 A.L.R.2d 862.

Sufficiency of certificate of acknowledgment, 25 A.L.R.2d 1124.

Admissibility of opinion of medical expert as affected by his having heard the person in question give the history of his case, 51 A.L.R.2d 1051.

Carbon copies of letters or other written instruments as evidence, 65 A.L.R.2d 342.

Necessity, in order to enter judgment by confession on instrument containing warrant of attorney, that original note or other instrument and original warrant be produced or filed, 68 A.L.R.2d 1156.

Admissibility in evidence of enlarged photographs or photostatic copies, 72 A.L.R.2d 308.

Photographic representation or photostat of writing as primary or secondary evidence within best evidence rule, 76 A.L.R.2d 1356.

Proof, in absence of direct testimony, of identity of motor vehicle involved in accident, 81 A.L.R.2d 861.

Preliminary proof, verification, or authentication of X-rays requisite to their introduction in evidence in civil cases, 5 A.L.R.3d 303.

Admissibility of newspaper article as evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein, 55 A.L.R.3d 663.

Applicability of attorney-client privilege to matters relating to drafting of nonexistent or unavailable nontestamentary documents, 55 A.L.R.3d 1322.

Admissibility of video tape film in evidence in criminal trial, 60 A.L.R.3d 333; 41 A.L.R.4th 812; 41 A.L.R.4th 877.

Proof of public records kept or stored on electronic computing equipment, 71 A.L.R.3d 232.

Admissibility of computerized private business records, 7 A.L.R.4th 8.

Application of best evidence rule to electronic evidence, including text messages and e-mail, 12 A.L.R.7th 1.