2020 Georgia Code
Title 17 - Criminal Procedure
Chapter 4 - Arrest of Persons
Article 2 - Arrest by Law Enforcement Officers Generally
§ 17-4-20. Authorization of Arrests With and Without Warrants Generally; Use of Deadly Force; Adoption or Promulgation of Conflicting Regulations, Policies, Ordinances, and Resolutions; Authority of Nuclear Power Facility Security Officer

1. An arrest for a crime may be made by a law enforcement officer:
   1. Under a warrant; or
   2. Without a warrant if:
      1. The offense is committed in such officer's presence or within such officer's immediate knowledge;
      2. The offender is endeavoring to escape;
      3. The officer has probable cause to believe that an act of family violence, as defined in Code Section 19-13-1, has been committed;
      4. The officer has probable cause to believe that the offender has violated a criminal family violence order, as defined in Code Section 16-5-95; provided, however, that such officer shall not have any prior or current familial relationship with the alleged victim or the offender;
      5. The officer has probable cause to believe that an offense involving physical abuse has been committed against a vulnerable adult, who shall be for the purposes of this subsection a person 18 years old or older who is unable to protect himself or herself from physical or mental abuse because of a physical or mental impairment; or
      6. For other cause there is likely to be failure of justice for want of a judicial officer to issue a warrant.
2. Sheriffs and peace officers who are appointed or employed in conformity with Chapter 8 of Title 35 may use deadly force to apprehend a suspected felon only when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect possesses a deadly weapon or any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury; when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses an immediate threat of physical violence to the officer or others; or when there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed so as to restrict such sheriffs or peace officers from the use of such reasonable nondeadly force as may be necessary to apprehend and arrest a suspected felon or misdemeanant.
3. Nothing in this Code section shall be construed so as to restrict the use of deadly force by employees of state and county correctional institutions, jails, and other places of lawful confinement or by peace officers of any agency in the State of Georgia when reasonably necessary to prevent escapes or apprehend escapees from such institutions.
4. No law enforcement agency of this state or of any political subdivision of this state shall adopt or promulgate any rule, regulation, or policy which prohibits a peace officer from using that degree of force to apprehend a suspected felon which is allowed by the statutory and case law of this state.
5. Each peace officer shall be provided with a copy of this Code section. Training regarding elder abuse, abuse of vulnerable adults, and the requirements of this Code section should be offered as part of at least one in-service training program each year conducted by or on behalf of each law enforcement department and agency in this state.
6. A nuclear power facility security officer, including a contract security officer, employed by a federally licensed nuclear power facility or licensee thereof for the purpose of securing that facility shall have the authority to:
   1. Threaten or use force against another in defense of a federally licensed nuclear power facility and the persons therein as provided for under Code Sections 16-3-21 and 16-3-23;
   2. Search any person on the premises of the nuclear power facility or the properties adjacent to the facility if the facility is under imminent threat or danger pursuant to a written agreement entered into with the local enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the facility for the purpose of determining if such person possesses unauthorized weapons, explosives, or other similarly prohibited material; provided, however, that if such person objects to any search, he or she shall be detained as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection or shall be required to immediately vacate the premises. Any person refusing to submit to a search and refusing to vacate the premises of a facility upon the request of a security officer as provided for in this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and
   3. In accordance with a nuclear security plan approved by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission or other federal agency authorized to regulate nuclear facility security, detain any person located on the premises of a nuclear power facility or on the properties adjacent thereto if the facility is under imminent threat or danger pursuant to a written agreement entered into with the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the facility, where there is reasonable suspicion to believe that such person poses a threat to the security of the nuclear power facility, regardless of whether such prohibited act occurred in the officer's presence. In the event of such detention, the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the facility shall be immediately contacted. The detention shall not exceed the amount of time reasonably necessary to allow for law enforcement officers to arrive at the facility.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 4603; Code 1868, § 4626; Code 1873, § 4723; Code 1882, § 4723; Penal Code 1895, § 896; Penal Code 1910, § 917; Code 1933, § 27-207; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1209, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 880, § 6; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1393, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 490, § 1; Ga. L. 1986, p. 657, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1251, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 624, § 1; Ga. L. 1997, p. 700, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 812, § 3/SB 532; Ga. L. 2013, p. 667, § 2/SB 86.)

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1997, "18" was substituted for "eighteen" in subsection (a).

- Uniform Crime Reporting, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Georgia Crime Information Center Council, Practice and Procedure, Rule 140-2-.12.

- For article, "Constitutional Criminal Litigation," see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 993 (1981). For article surveying developments in Georgia juvenile court practice and procedure from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 167 (1981). For annual survey of criminal law and procedure, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 103 (1983). For article, "Gender and Justice in the Courts: A Report to the Supreme Court of Georgia by the Commission on Gender Bias in the Judicial System," see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 539 (1992). For survey of 1995 Eleventh Circuit cases on constitutional criminal procedure, see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 765 (1996). For article, "Symposium Protect and Serve: Perspectives on 21st Century Policing January 20, 2017: State Labor Law and Federal Police Reform," see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 1209 (2017). For article, "Missing Police Body Camera Videos: Remedies, Evidentiary Fairness, and Automatic Activation," see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 57 (2017). For article, "Symposium Protect and Serve: Perspectives on 21st Century Policing January 20, 2017: Youth/Police Encounters on Chicago's South Side: Acknowledging the Realities," see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 1079 (2017). For article, "Symposium Protect and Serve: Perspectives on 21st Century Policing January 20, 2017: Commodifying Policing: A Recipe for Community-Police Tensions," see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 1047 (2017). For article, "Symposium Protect and Serve: Perspectives on 21st Century Policing January 20, 2017: The Problematic Prosecution of an Asian American Police Officer: Notes: From a Participant in People v. Peter Liang," see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 1023 (2017). For article, "Symposium Protect and Serve: Perspectives on 21st Century Policing January 20, 2017: Keynote Address," see 51 Ga. L. Rev. 981 (2017). For article, "Police Pursuits: A Comprehensive Look at the Broad Spectrum of Police Pursuit Liability and Law," see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 511 (2006). For survey article on criminal law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (2007).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Grounds for Warrantless Arrest
• Authority of Local Officers
• Jury Instructions

General Consideration

Section codifies common-law rule.

- This section is a codification of the common-law rule of arrest with perhaps a slight enlargement of the power of arrest. Though at common law an officer might arrest for a breach of peace committed in the officer's presence without a warrant, the arrest must have been made within a reasonable time after the commission of the offense, that is, the officer must immediately set about the arrest, and follow up the effort until the arrest is made. There must be a continued pursuit and no cessation of acts tending toward the arrest from the time of the commission of the offense until the apprehension of the offender. Johnson v. Mayor of Americus, 46 Ga. 80 (1872); Yates v. State, 127 Ga. 813, 56 S.E. 1017, 9 Ann. Cas. 620 (1907).

- O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 applies to arrests for misdemeanors as well as for felonies. King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382, 288 S.E.2d 644 (1982).

Defendant's argument that the defendant's motion to dismiss the citation the police officer issued to defendant for hit and run should have been dismissed because the officer did not see the defendant commit the offense had to be rejected as the statute the defendant cited for that proposition, O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a), only applied when a custodial arrest was involved and no custodial arrest was involved in the defendant's case. Davis v. State, 261 Ga. App. 539, 583 S.E.2d 214 (2003).

- Summary judgment in favor of police personnel was proper in an action against a police chief and officers for false imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20 because the record did not show any support for the plaintiff's contentions that the actions of the police officers in arresting the plaintiff, following an altercation and in the absence of exigent circumstances, demonstrated the requisite malice to overcome official immunity under state law. Plaintiff's unsupported allegations of conspiracy to frame the plaintiff for an altercation are insufficient to pierce the protections of official immunity on these claims. Goree v. City of Atlanta, 276 Fed. Appx. 919 (11th Cir. 2008)(Unpublished).

In an arrest for driving under the influence, the arrestee's false imprisonment claim failed because the officer was entitled to official immunity since the officer was performing a discretionary act when the officer arrested the arrestee; the arrestee's general allegations of malice did not overcome official immunity. Bannister v. Conway, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2013).

- Warrantless arrest may be made under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 only when the probable cause necessary for a constitutional arrest under the federal constitution is present. Glean v. State, 268 Ga. 260, 486 S.E.2d 172 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1079, 118 S. Ct. 860, 139 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1998).

Construed with § 17-4-23. - O.C.G.A. § 17-4-23 gives a police officer the option to issue a citation, but does not restrict the power given to police in O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 to make custodial arrests for crimes committed in the officers' presence. Brock v. State, 196 Ga. App. 605, 396 S.E.2d 785 (1990); Polk v. State, 200 Ga. App. 17, 406 S.E.2d 548 (1991); Edwards v. State, 224 Ga. App. 332, 480 S.E.2d 246 (1997).

Construed with § 40-13-2.1. - Having elected to issue a citation, a deputy cannot make a custodial arrest of a driver when the driver refuses to sign the citation. Instead, a deputy shall follow the procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 40-13-2.1(a). The language of that statute makes clear that once a deputy or officer issues a citation, the deputy or officer is obligated to follow the procedures set forth in the statute. State v. Torres, 290 Ga. App. 804, 660 S.E.2d 763 (2008).

- Neither the self-defense statute nor the arrest statute automatically prohibits the discharge of a firearm if the lives of innocent people may be in danger, and when a mandatory prohibition against such an action in a police department work rule conflicted with these statutes it was invalid and could not form the basis for a police officer's suspension. Allen v. City of Atlanta, 235 Ga. App. 516, 510 S.E.2d 64 (1998).

- It is equally as necessary to get a warrant when an offense is committed against an individual as it is when the offense is against society as a whole. Gordy v. State, 93 Ga. App. 743, 92 S.E.2d 737 (1956).

- When a person is in custody and is not free to leave the office of the law enforcement officer, the person is under arrest. Robinson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 741, 305 S.E.2d 381 (1983).

- In a false imprisonment case, the existence of probable cause standing alone is not a complete defense because, even if probable cause to believe a crime has been committed exists, a warrantless arrest would still be illegal unless the arrest was accomplished pursuant to one of the "exigent circumstances" applicable to law enforcement officers enumerated in O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 or applicable to private persons as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-4-60. Arbee v. Collins, 219 Ga. App. 63, 463 S.E.2d 922 (1995).

Summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of the employer based on the employer procuring the employee's false imprisonment when the employee was arrested by a detective because, although two of the loss prevention officers both averred that neither of the officers encouraged or directed the police to arrest the employee, the officers told a third loss prevention officer that the officers were going to obtain the employee's arrest based on a videotape; there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the employer directly or indirectly caused the police to arrest the employee; and a question of fact remained regarding whether the detective had probable cause to believe that the employee was involved in the theft or lied when denying being so involved. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 330 Ga. App. 340, 765 S.E.2d 518 (2014).

Summary judgment was improperly granted to the employer because a question of fact remained as to whether the employer procured the employee's false imprisonment as there was a conflict in the evidence about whether the employer caused the detective to arrest the employee as the evidence did not show as a matter of law that the police made a sufficiently independent investigation of the theft; and because a question of fact remained as to whether the detective had probable cause to arrest the employee in connection with the theft as there was a dispute about whether the employee actually saw a person take the electronics out of a case and failed to report it, giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the employee was working with the thieves. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 330 Ga. App. 340, 765 S.E.2d 518 (2014).

- Constitution at a minimum requires the imposition of a neutral, detached magistrate in the procedure to make an independent judicial determination of probable cause prior to issuing an arrest warrant or some other warrant authorizing the seizure of allegedly obscene material to be used as evidence. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).

- There was no evidence that the defendant, who murdered the victim with a rifle, was attempting to effect a valid citizen's arrest and, hence, the defendant was not entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge. It was not reasonable for the defendant to attempt an arrest with a semi-automatic weapon which the defendant was not licensed to carry as deadly force in effecting an arrest is limited to self-defense or to a situation in which it is necessary to prevent a forcible felony. Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 405 S.E.2d 660 (1991).

- There was evidence that the off-duty officer's duties as a security guard included arresting disorderly persons to remove the persons from the premises, so it cannot be said as a matter of law that the arrest was lawful under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a). Rather, whether the arrest was lawful as one made by a police officer is a jury question. Smith v. Holeman, 212 Ga. App. 158, 441 S.E.2d 487 (1994).

- In a prosecution against police officers for manslaughter, arising out of the shooting of the victim in a parking lot following a report that the victim had threatened someone with a knife, the justification charge given was wholly inadequate, as it applied to ordinary citizens, not to law enforcement officers acting in the line of duty, who are allowed to use deadly force on the reasonable belief that the suspect possesses a deadly weapon. Because this omission was harmful as a matter of law, the case was reversed, notwithstanding the fact that the charge was verbally requested after the jury began deliberating. Robinson v. State, 221 Ga. App. 865, 473 S.E.2d 519 (1996).

- Deputy sheriff who rammed a fleeing suspect's car causing injury to the suspect was not entitled to qualified immunity from suit alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure because a reasonable officer would have known that a vehicle could be used to apply deadly force to effect a seizure, and that deadly force could not constitutionally be used to apprehend a fleeing suspect wanted only for speeding. Harris v. Coweta County, 406 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2005).

- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of drugs and a handgun found during the warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle as the arrest of the defendant's passenger on an outstanding warrant authorized the stop of the defendant's vehicle and the mobility of the car, coupled with the existence of probable cause to believe the car contained marijuana, based on the officer smelling the marijuana upon approaching the vehicle, authorized the search. Somesso v. State, 288 Ga. App. 291, 653 S.E.2d 855 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0505, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 281 (Ga. 2008).

Officer may arrest a suspect without an arrest warrant if an offense has been committed in the officer's presence and while an officer generally must have a search warrant or consent to enter a home to make an arrest, an officer can enter a home to arrest a suspect when the officer has followed the suspect there in "hot pursuit." A suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place ... by the expedient of escaping to a private place. For Fourth Amendment purposes, one who is in the threshold of one's dwelling is in a public place and not within the dwelling. Lawson v. State, 299 Ga. App. 865, 684 S.E.2d 1 (2009), cert. dismissed, No. S10C0118, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 195 (Ga. 2010), cert. denied, No. S10C0117, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 206 (Ga. 2010).

- Defendant failed to show trial counsel's performance was deficient for failing to challenge the arrest warrant on the basis that the warrant was not properly sworn because the record showed that the defendant was taken into custody and arrested before the warrant was issued and there was a valid, warrantless arrest of the defendant, making the later-issued warrant superfluous; thus, any defect in the arrest warrant was moot, and a challenge to the arrest warrant would have been futile. Williams v. State, 326 Ga. App. 784, 757 S.E.2d 448 (2014).

- Trial court erred by granting the defendant's motion to suppress after concluding that the state failed to prove the legality of the defendant's arrest for failing to tender the open container ordinance as the trial court was required to go on to address and rule on whether the drugs discovered during the subsequent search of the backpack in the vehicle constituted tainted fruit of the arrest based on the officers' testimony regarding the smell of marijuana. State v. Alford, 347 Ga. App. 208, 818 S.E.2d 668 (2018).

Cited in Glaze v. State, 156 Ga. 807, 120 S.E. 530 (1923); Seals v. State, 33 Ga. App. 818, 128 S.E. 224 (1925); Whitfield v. State, 51 Ga. App. 439, 180 S.E. 630 (1935), overruled on other grounds, Worthen v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 22 (Ga. 2019); Griffin v. State, 183 Ga. 775, 190 S.E. 2 (1937); Booker v. State, 183 Ga. 822, 190 S.E. 356 (1937); Sheppard v. Hale, 58 Ga. App. 140, 197 S.E. 922 (1938); Murphy v. City of Atlanta, 64 Ga. App. 752, 14 S.E.2d 232 (1941); Newmans v. State, 65 Ga. App. 288, 16 S.E.2d 87 (1941); Bentley v. State, 70 Ga. App. 494, 28 S.E.2d 658 (1944); Cawthon v. State, 71 Ga. App. 497, 31 S.E.2d 64 (1944); Smith v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 71 Ga. App. 697, 32 S.E.2d 105 (1944); Benford v. State, 73 Ga. App. 426, 36 S.E.2d 833 (1946); Moore v. State, 205 Ga. 37, 52 S.E.2d 282 (1949); Goodwin v. Allen, 89 Ga. App. 187, 78 S.E.2d 804 (1953); Hill v. Henry, 90 Ga. App. 93, 82 S.E.2d 35 (1954); Sharpe v. Lowe, 214 Ga. 513, 106 S.E.2d 28 (1958); Crosby v. State, 100 Ga. App. 49, 110 S.E.2d 94 (1959); Savannah News-Press, Inc. v. Harley, 100 Ga. App. 387, 111 S.E.2d 259 (1959); Mullins v. State, 216 Ga. 183, 115 S.E.2d 547 (1960); Collins v. United States, 289 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1961); Pistor v. State, 219 Ga. 161, 132 S.E.2d 183 (1963); Pugh v. State, 219 Ga. 166, 132 S.E.2d 203 (1963); Hart v. United States, 316 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1963); Paige v. State, 219 Ga. 569, 134 S.E.2d 793 (1964); Raif v. State, 219 Ga. 649, 135 S.E.2d 375 (1964); Barron v. State, 109 Ga. App. 786, 137 S.E.2d 690 (1964); Walker v. State, 220 Ga. 415, 139 S.E.2d 278 (1964); Graham v. State, 111 Ga. App. 542, 142 S.E.2d 287 (1965); Harris v. State, 221 Ga. 398, 144 S.E.2d 769 (1965); Bloodworth v. State, 113 Ga. App. 278, 147 S.E.2d 833 (1966); McEwen v. State, 113 Ga. App. 765, 149 S.E.2d 716 (1966); Manuel v. United States, 355 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966); Lovelace v. United States, 357 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1966); Henderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1968); Crone v. United States, 411 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1969); Davidson v. State, 125 Ga. App. 502, 188 S.E.2d 124 (1972); Vaughn v. State, 126 Ga. App. 252, 190 S.E.2d 609 (1972); Bradford v. State, 126 Ga. App. 688, 191 S.E.2d 545 (1972); Patterson v. State, 126 Ga. App. 753, 191 S.E.2d 584 (1972); Barnwell v. State, 127 Ga. App. 335, 193 S.E.2d 203 (1972); Traylor v. State, 127 Ga. App. 409, 193 S.E.2d 876 (1972); Blair v. State, 230 Ga. 409, 197 S.E.2d 362 (1973); Brooks v. State, 129 Ga. App. 109, 198 S.E.2d 892 (1973); Brooks v. State, 129 Ga. App. 393, 199 S.E.2d 578 (1973); Brice v. State, 129 Ga. App. 535, 199 S.E.2d 895 (1973); Ivins v. State, 129 Ga. App. 865, 201 S.E.2d 683 (1973); Caito v. State, 130 Ga. App. 831, 204 S.E.2d 765 (1974); Jones v. State, 131 Ga. App. 699, 206 S.E.2d 601 (1974); Luke v. State, 131 Ga. App. 799, 207 S.E.2d 213 (1974); Meneghan v. State, 132 Ga. App. 380, 208 S.E.2d 150 (1974); Godwin v. State, 133 Ga. App. 397, 211 S.E.2d 7 (1974); McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974); Patterson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 742, 212 S.E.2d 858 (1975); Lawson v. State, 234 Ga. 136, 214 S.E.2d 559 (1975); Wright v. State, 134 Ga. App. 406, 214 S.E.2d 688 (1975); Sanders v. State, 235 Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975); Little v. State, 136 Ga. App. 189, 220 S.E.2d 490 (1975); Lentile v. State, 136 Ga. App. 611, 222 S.E.2d 86 (1975); Mitchell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 658, 222 S.E.2d 160 (1975); Allen v. State, 137 Ga. App. 21, 222 S.E.2d 856 (1975); Pate v. State, 137 Ga. App. 677, 225 S.E.2d 95 (1976); Reeves v. State, 139 Ga. App. 214, 228 S.E.2d 201 (1976); Keating v. State, 141 Ga. App. 377, 233 S.E.2d 456 (1977); Quarles v. State, 142 Ga. App. 394, 236 S.E.2d 139 (1977); Floyd v. State, 142 Ga. App. 425, 236 S.E.2d 157 (1977); Carroll v. State, 142 Ga. App. 428, 236 S.E.2d 159 (1977); State v. Handspike, 240 Ga. 176, 240 S.E.2d 1 (1977); Johnson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 826, 240 S.E.2d 207 (1977); Smith v. State, 144 Ga. App. 785, 242 S.E.2d 376 (1978); Walker v. State, 144 Ga. App. 838, 242 S.E.2d 753 (1978); Reese v. State, 145 Ga. App. 453, 243 S.E.2d 650 (1978); Cook v. State, 145 Ga. App. 544, 244 S.E.2d 64 (1978); Dougherty v. State, 145 Ga. App. 718, 244 S.E.2d 638 (1978); State v. High, 145 Ga. App. 772, 244 S.E.2d 888 (1978); Morgan v. State, 241 Ga. 485, 246 S.E.2d 198 (1978); State v. Stone, 147 Ga. App. 192, 248 S.E.2d 228 (1978); Kiriaze v. State, 147 Ga. App. 832, 250 S.E.2d 568 (1978); Booker v. State, 242 Ga. 773, 251 S.E.2d 518 (1979); Parks v. State, 150 Ga. App. 446, 258 S.E.2d 66 (1979); Washington v. State, 245 Ga. 117, 263 S.E.2d 152 (1980); State v. Sanders, 154 Ga. App. 305, 267 S.E.2d 906 (1980); Baxter v. State, 154 Ga. App. 861, 270 S.E.2d 71 (1980); Starr v. State, 159 Ga. App. 386, 283 S.E.2d 630 (1981); Ellis v. State, 248 Ga. 414, 283 S.E.2d 870 (1981); Butler v. State, 159 Ga. App. 895, 285 S.E.2d 610 (1981); Nelson v. State, 160 Ga. App. 168, 286 S.E.2d 504 (1981); Blackwell v. State, 248 Ga. 138, 281 S.E.2d 599 (1981); Robertson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 715, 288 S.E.2d 362 (1982); Mobley v. State, 164 Ga. App. 154, 296 S.E.2d 617 (1982); Cornelius v. State, 165 Ga. App. 794, 302 S.E.2d 710 (1983); Collins v. Sadlo, 167 Ga. App. 317, 306 S.E.2d 390 (1983); Mines v. State, 167 Ga. App. 766, 307 S.E.2d 291 (1983); Bodiford v. State, 169 Ga. App. 760, 315 S.E.2d 274 (1984); Edwards v. State, 169 Ga. App. 958, 315 S.E.2d 675 (1984); Bowen v. State, 170 Ga. App. 49, 316 S.E.2d 33 (1984); Crews v. State, 170 Ga. App. 104, 316 S.E.2d 549 (1984); Powell v. State, 170 Ga. App. 185, 316 S.E.2d 779 (1984); Waits v. State, 172 Ga. App. 524, 323 S.E.2d 624 (1984); Parker v. State, 172 Ga. App. 540, 323 S.E.2d 826 (1984); Scott Hous. Sys. v. Hickox, 174 Ga. App. 23, 329 S.E.2d 154 (1985); Stansell v. State, 174 Ga. App. 511, 330 S.E.2d 441 (1985); Moore v. State, 174 Ga. App. 826, 331 S.E.2d 115 (1985); Ridley v. State, 176 Ga. App. 669, 337 S.E.2d 382 (1985); Rogers v. State, 256 Ga. 139, 344 S.E.2d 644 (1986); Minor v. State, 180 Ga. App. 869, 350 S.E.2d 783 (1986); Young v. City of Atlanta, 631 F. Supp. 1498 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Parrish v. State, 182 Ga. App. 247, 355 S.E.2d 682 (1987); Robinson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 423, 356 S.E.2d 55 (1987); Harley v. State, 183 Ga. App. 253, 358 S.E.2d 653 (1987); Ferguson v. City of Doraville, 186 Ga. App. 430, 367 S.E.2d 551 (1988); Roberson v. State, 186 Ga. App. 808, 368 S.E.2d 568 (1988); Dorsey v. State, 187 Ga. App. 725, 371 S.E.2d 207 (1988); Arnold v. State, 198 Ga. App. 514, 402 S.E.2d 312 (1991); Mitchell v. State, 200 Ga. App. 146, 407 S.E.2d 115 (1991); Lufburrow v. State, 206 Ga. App. 250, 425 S.E.2d 368 (1992); Watkins v. State, 206 Ga. App. 575, 426 S.E.2d 26 (1992); State v. Weathers, 234 Ga. App. 376, 506 S.E.2d 698 (1998); Schroeder v. State, 261 Ga. App. 879, 583 S.E.2d 922 (2003); Hight v. State, 293 Ga. App. 254, 666 S.E.2d 678 (2008); Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d 7 (2008).

Grounds for Warrantless Arrest

1. In General

- Only three exceptions to the general rule that the law requires a warrant in order to render an arrest legal, whether the arrest be made by a police officer or any public officer, are recognized by this section. Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. 204, 18 S.E. 305 (1892); Graham v. State, 143 Ga. 440, 85 S.E. 328, 1917A Ann. Cas. 595 (1915).

- Unless an arrest without a warrant falls within the three exceptions specified in this section, it is an illegal arrest. Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 63 Ga. App. 880, 12 S.E.2d 398 (1940).

- An arrest for a crime may be made by an officer without a warrant in three instances only: (1) if the offense is committed in the official's presence; or (2) the offender is endeavoring to escape; or (3) for other cause there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant. Napier v. State, 200 Ga. 626, 38 S.E.2d 269 (1946); Finch v. State, 101 Ga. App. 73, 112 S.E.2d 824 (1960); Puckett v. State, 239 Ga. App. 582, 521 S.E.2d 634 (1999).

Warrantless arrest is not violative of O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 if the officer had probable cause to make an arrest, i.e., if the officer knew facts and circumstances, based on reasonably trustworthy information, sufficient to warrant a prudent man to believe that the defendant committed an offense. Ellis v. State, 164 Ga. App. 366, 296 S.E.2d 726 (1982), appeal dismissed, 462 U.S. 1113, 103 S. Ct. 3079, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1344, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119, 103 S. Ct. 3087, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1348 (1983); State v. Thurmond, 203 Ga. App. 230, 416 S.E.2d 529, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 529 (1992).

If a police officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant made terroristic threats, the officer's arrest and pat-down search of the defendant were lawful. Medlin v. State, 168 Ga. App. 551, 309 S.E.2d 639 (1983).

Warrantless arrest of the defendant for a domestic violence act of assault, given the information provided by the defendant's girlfriend, the girlfriend's obvious injuries, and the defendant's attempt to flee, was supported by sufficient probable cause and thus upheld on appeal. Rivers v. State, 287 Ga. App. 632, 653 S.E.2d 78 (2007).

- It is the facts and circumstances existing within the knowledge of the arresting officer at the moment arrest is made which are controlling. Barnett v. State, 204 Ga. App. 491, 420 S.E.2d 43 (1992).

- General Assembly by the enactment of Ga. L. 1951, p. 726, § 14 (see O.C.G.A.17-13-34), provided that an arrest without a warrant might be lawfully made by any peace officer upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Fields v. State, 211 Ga. 335, 85 S.E.2d 753 (1955); Peterkin v. State, 147 Ga. App. 437, 249 S.E.2d 152 (1978).

Arrest meeting the constitutional requirements of probable cause is valid whether or not O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 is violated. Quick v. State, 166 Ga. App. 492, 304 S.E.2d 916 (1983).

- Fact that the defendant is found not guilty of a charge is immaterial as to the legality of the arrest because it is not necessary that the accused be found guilty for the arrest may still be lawful. Brooks v. State, 166 Ga. App. 704, 305 S.E.2d 436 (1983).

- Warrantless arrest legal under federal law - that is, one made on the basis of probable cause - is legal under state law, and the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 and federal law are the same. State v. Thurmond, 203 Ga. App. 230, 416 S.E.2d 529, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 529 (1992).

- When the offender knows that the offender is under investigation, a police officer, once the officer finds probable cause for arrest, is justified in proceeding directly to arrest the offender without first obtaining a warrant. Fitzgerald v. State, 166 Ga. App. 307, 304 S.E.2d 114 (1983).

- Warrantless arrest may be made inside a suspect's home only with the suspect's consent or under exigent circumstances. Mincey v. State, 251 Ga. 255, 304 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S. Ct. 414, 78 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1983).

When a suspect is telephonically requested to exit the suspect's home and voluntarily does so, the suspect's arrest, outside the suspect's home, by officers who have probable cause to believe that the suspect has participated in a felony is constitutionally valid. Mincey v. State, 251 Ga. 255, 304 S.E.2d 882 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S. Ct. 414, 78 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1983).

Probable cause for an arrest without a warrant exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a belief by a person of reasonable caution that a crime has been committed. Cornelius v. State, 165 Ga. App. 794, 302 S.E.2d 710 (1983).

When at the time the defendant was arrested one officer had been told by the victim what happened and that the officer radioed other officers to alert the officers to look for the defendant and the defendant's vehicle, based on that information, another officer properly placed the defendant under arrest. Gilbert v. State, 209 Ga. App. 483, 433 S.E.2d 664 (1993).

- What is a reasonable articulable ground for the detention may be less than probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search, but must be more than mere caprice or arbitrary harassment. State v. Thurmond, 203 Ga. App. 230, 416 S.E.2d 529, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 529 (1992).

Probable cause that an act of family violence had been committed. Clark v. State, 180 Ga. App. 280, 348 S.E.2d 916 (1986).

Uncontradicted testimony of the police witness concerning the victim's statement accusing the victim's spouse of stabbing the victim, the presence of a stab wound on the victim's back, the presence of several weapons, and the disordered condition of the scene clearly established that the officers had probable cause to believe that an act of family violence had occurred. Watkins v. State, 183 Ga. App. 778, 360 S.E.2d 47 (1987).

Wife's statement to officers that her husband had struck her provided probable cause to arrest the defendant, and since the offense which the officers had probable cause to believe had been committed was an act of family violence, a warrantless arrest was authorized. McCauley v. State, 222 Ga. App. 600, 475 S.E.2d 669 (1996).

Victim's on-the-scene accusations against the defendant, along with "visible bodily harm" to the victim's face, provided sufficient probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed battery, and it was unnecessary for the officer to investigate the defendant's explanation of the domestic dispute as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20.1. McCracken v. State, 224 Ga. App. 356, 480 S.E.2d 361 (1997).

There was no error in the trial court's conclusion that the defendant's warrantless arrest after being found at the home of a friend was justified under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a) as another friend of the defendant had been found shot at the defendant's home, and by the time of the arrest the police knew that the defendant's spouse was missing, that the defendant and the defendant's spouse were estranged, and that the defendant had stalked and threatened the defendant's spouse, such that the police had probable cause to believe that an act of family violence had occurred, and the possibility that the spouse was still alive was an exigent circumstance which authorized the entry into the friend's home to arrest the defendant. Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 454, 579 S.E.2d 214 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106, 124 S. Ct. 1059, 157 L. Ed. 2d 892 (2004).

- Powell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 801, 295 S.E.2d 560 (1982); State v. Gunter, 249 Ga. App. 802, 549 S.E.2d 771 (2001).

Trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained after the defendant's car was impounded during a traffic stop because, even though the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on criminal database search results that the defendant's car was not insured, once the defendant provided proof of insurance in an acceptable manner, the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant or issue the defendant a citation; and, without probable cause to issue the citation, the officer had no basis for impounding the defendant's vehicle. State v. Lewis, 344 Ga. App. 630, 811 S.E.2d 436 (2018).

- Defendant's arrival with a police suspect at a hidden drug transaction location and the defendant's attempt to leave the scene at the time of the suspect's arrest supported a finding that the police had probable cause on which to arrest the defendant. Fowler v. State, 201 Ga. App. 417, 411 S.E.2d 335 (1991).

Since police officers knew that a fatal stabbing and robbery had occurred that morning, that the defendant had been at or near the scene of the murder, that the defendant had threatened the victim only a week before, and that the defendant had been treated that morning for a wound, the protective search for weapons made by the police officers was constitutionally permissible. Further, as the search was proper, the police were also authorized to arrest the defendant when the police found a pistol concealed on defendant's person. Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 615, 449 S.E.2d 516 (1994).

- Probable cause for warrantless arrest of the defendant as the defendant left the defendant's home was properly established through the defendant's identification from videotapes by bank coworkers and by a police officer who had known the defendant for 25 years, and by the defendant's payments in cash to four financial institutions. Brown v. State, 262 Ga. 728, 425 S.E.2d 856, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 998, 114 S. Ct. 565, 126 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1993).

- Officers were justified in arresting the defendant for driving under the influence and operating a vehicle after being declared a habitual violator since once the defendant had been stopped, the officers observed that the defendant appeared to be intoxicated, and the defendant admitted being a habitual violator. Cheatham v. State, 204 Ga. App. 483, 419 S.E.2d 920 (1992).

- Power to make a warrantless arrest of a known probation violator is not limited to the probation supervisor, under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-38, but also includes a law enforcement officer with general arrest powers who has trustworthy information as to the probation violation. Battle v. State, 254 Ga. 666, 333 S.E.2d 599 (1985).

Suspect found wearing incriminating type of shoe justified warrantless arrest. Clinkscale v. State, 158 Ga. App. 597, 281 S.E.2d 341 (1981).

Defendant's appearance, a cut in defendant's jacket shoulder, defendant's proximity to the burglary site, the observation of a running person believed by the officer to be the same one stopped pursuant to the officer's description by the other officer a few minutes later, the short time between the report of the burglar alarm and the apprehension of the defendant, the absence of anyone else in the area matching the suspect's description, the defendant's nervousness, and the deputy's knowledge of the defendant's prior record of burglary and escape, added up to probable cause to arrest the defendant. State v. Wilson, 179 Ga. App. 334, 346 S.E.2d 111 (1986).

- It is the duty of an officer to disclose the officer's official character to the person whom the officer is arresting. Douglas v. State, 152 Ga. 379, 110 S.E. 168 (1921).

- Officer who arrests an alleged offender must also inform the accused of the nature of the charge. Dorsey v. State, 7 Ga. App. 366, 66 S.E. 1096 (1910).

- Arrest without a warrant, unless made under circumstances declared by statute to permit an arrest without a warrant, is illegal and is a tort for which an action will lie as well as when arrest is under process of law but without probable cause and maliciously made. Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 74 Ga. App. 823, 41 S.E.2d 576 (1947).

- To avoid liability for false imprisonment, it must be shown not only that the arrest was valid but also that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the charged offense had been committed. Amason v. Kroger Co., 204 Ga. App. 695, 420 S.E.2d 314 (1992).

- Whoever arrests or imprisons a person without a warrant is guilty of a tort, unless the arrestor can justify under some of the exceptions in which arrest and imprisonment without a warrant are permitted by law; and the burden of proving the existence of the facts raising the exception is upon the person making the arrest or inflicting the imprisonment. Vlass v. McCrary, 60 Ga. App. 744, 5 S.E.2d 63 (1939); Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).

- Under allegations that the plaintiff was arrested without a warrant when the plaintiff was not guilty of any offense under the state laws or under any city ordinance and, without being carried before a committing magistrate, was held under arrest and deprived of liberty until the plaintiff and the plaintiff's brother paid to the defendant a sum of money, whereupon the defendant accepted the money and caused or permitted the plaintiff to be released from custody, the arrest and detention of the plaintiff were clearly illegal, and a cause of action for false imprisonment was set out. Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).

- If, in a false imprisonment action there is evidence from which the jury would be authorized to find that the defendant in good faith and with probable cause arrested the prosecutor for drunkenness, any facts, circumstances, or information on which the defendant officer acted in making the arrest are admissible, not as proof of the facts, but as evidence that the officer in making the arrest did so upon a reasonable ground of suspicion. Henderson v. State, 95 Ga. App. 830, 99 S.E.2d 270 (1957).

- That the defendant matched the description of a drug dealer and that the defendant had "a large bulge" in the area of the defendant's pants where the informant had seen defendant conceal contraband was sufficient to verify the tipster's veracity and support the trial court's finding that the police had probable cause on which to arrest the defendant. Manzione v. State, 194 Ga. App. 227, 390 S.E.2d 121 (1990).

- Court found no impermissible conduct that would taint the subsequent arrest when the police and the defendant offered conflicting testimony regarding events which led to the defendant's arrest. State v. Thurmond, 203 Ga. App. 230, 416 S.E.2d 529, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 529 (1992).

Conviction of police officer for involuntary manslaughter was proper. O'Conner v. State, 64 Ga. 125, 37 Am. R. 58 (1879).

Words "in the presence" and "within his immediate knowledge" are synonymous; to justify the arrest without a warrant, the officer need not see the act which constitutes the crime taking place if by any of the officer's senses the officer has personal knowledge of the crime's commission. Marsh v. State, 182 Ga. App. 892, 357 S.E.2d 325 (1987); State v. Carranza, 217 Ga. App. 431, 457 S.E.2d 699 (1995), rev'd in part on other grounds, 266 Ga. 263, 467 S.E.2d 315 (1996); Youhoing v. State, 226 Ga. App. 475, 487 S.E.2d 86 (1997); Watson v. State, 243 Ga. App. 636, 534 S.E.2d 93 (2000).

- Constitutional validity of an arrest without a warrant depends upon whether the arresting officer has probable cause to believe the defendant is committing or has committed, an offense in the officer's presence. Brooks v. State, 166 Ga. App. 704, 305 S.E.2d 436 (1982).

Constitutional validity of an arrest without a warrant depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make the arrest - whether at the moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense. Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 227, 416 S.E.2d 771, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 771 (1992).

If any crime is committed in the arresting officer's presence, a warrantless arrest is legal. Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 156 S.E.2d 446 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 911, 88 S. Ct. 839, 19 L. Ed. 2d 885 (1968).

- When an individual commits an offense in his or her home and that offense is committed in the presence of a law enforcement officer, the officer is authorized to arrest the individual in the home without a warrant only when the officer's entry into the home is by consent or when there are exigent circumstances. Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263, 467 S.E.2d 315 (1996).

- When a crime is committed in the presence of an officer, it is not only the officer's right then and there to arrest without a warrant, but it is the officer's duty to do so. Yancy v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 96 Ga. App. 476, 100 S.E.2d 653 (1957), appeal dismissed, 213 Ga. 903, 102 S.E.2d 497 (1958).

- Although O.C.G.A. § 17-4-23(a) gives a police officer the option of issuing a citation, it does not restrict the power given to police in O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 to make custodial arrests for crimes committed in the officers' presence. Consequently, after a driver is arrested for a traffic violation, a police officer can lawfully search the interior of the driver's car. State v. Lowe, 263 Ga. App. 1, 587 S.E.2d 169 (2003).

Because an officer was authorized to arrest the defendant for weaving, a decision to impound the vehicle the defendant was driving was not unreasonable, and an inventory search of the vehicle was authorized; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. Lopez v. State, 286 Ga. App. 873, 650 S.E.2d 430 (2007).

Officers who see persons acting suspiciously may investigate, including "stop and frisk." Clark v. State, 131 Ga. App. 583, 206 S.E.2d 717 (1974).

- Officers have ample authority to investigate if the officers believe a crime has occurred or is about to occur in the officers' presence. Clark v. State, 131 Ga. App. 583, 206 S.E.2d 717 (1974).

Police officer had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest of a defendant for misdemeanor obstruction when the defendant, after being told not to move a car belonging to the defendant's girlfriend because the officer needed to check the car's registration to complete a shoplifting investigation of the girlfriend, the defendant disobeyed the officer and had a friend remove the car from a store lot. Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 677 S.E.2d 680 (2009).

- In an arrestee's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arresting the arrestee without probable cause, given the circumstances known to the officers as the officers observed a physical scuffle between the arrestee and another officer in an extremely crowded venue just before midnight on New Year's Eve, the officers had probable cause to arrest for simple battery. Robinson v. MARTA, 334 Ga. App. 746, 780 S.E.2d 400 (2015).

- While a police officer may arrest for a crime committed in the officer's presence, that is, of which the officer is aware through the use of the officer's senses, and while there are circumstances under which the officer may momentarily detain and question a citizen, if the officer is acting upon reasonable and articulable suspicion which may yet not amount to probable cause to believe a crime is being committed, this gives the officer no right, where a crime is not being committed in the officer's presence in such manner that it is known to the officer by the use of the officer's senses, to stop a vehicle and search the occupants, and calling the search a "frisk" in no way ameliorates the situation. A "frisk," if legal at all, is such only in exceptional circumstances and only for the very limited purpose of assuring the officer that the suspect whom the officer must accost is not going to turn upon the officer with a weapon. L.B.B. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 163, 198 S.E.2d 895 (1973).

- Under this section, an officer has no authority, upon bare suspicion or upon mere information derived from others, to arrest a citizen and search the citizen's person in order to ascertain whether or not the citizen is carrying a concealed weapon in violation of law. Pickett v. State, 99 Ga. 12, 25 S.E. 608 (1896).

- There is no authority under which a citizen may be arrested without a warrant and held for investigation to determine if the citizen has committed some crime merely because the person making the arrest has a suspicion that the person arrested may have committed some then unknown crime. Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354, 136 S.E.2d 169 (1964).

- To justify a police officer in making an arrest without a warrant, there must be an offense committed by the party arrested. O'Conner v. State, 64 Ga. 125, 37 Am. R. 58 (1879); Holliday v. Coleman, 12 Ga. App. 779, 78 S.E. 482 (1913).

- In determining whether a suspicious situation should be further investigated or an arrest based on probable cause made, an officer may rely upon information acquired through any of the officer's senses. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922 (1992).

Detective reasonably could conclude at that time that an exigent situation was at hand after the detective received complaints regarding loud noise from a certain vicinity; proceeding to that vicinity and after the officer observed through the officer's sense of hearing, while on a public road, screaming, hollering, and music. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922 (1992).

Officer has authority to arrest anyone of whom the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a felony without waiting first to procure a warrant. Chaney v. State, 133 Ga. App. 913, 213 S.E.2d 68 (1975); Elders v. State, 149 Ga. App. 139, 253 S.E.2d 817 (1979).

- County police, including the county sheriff, have general police power to investigate and make arrests as other law enforcement officials. Thus, a detective employed by the county sheriff's office may make an arrest without a warrant if a criminal offense is committed in the officer's presence or within the officer's knowledge. Perry v. State, 204 Ga. App. 643, 419 S.E.2d 922 (1992).

- Crucial question is whether the knowledge of the related facts and circumstances give the police officer cause and reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant committed an offense. If it did, an arrest without a warrant is legal. Creamer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 458, 258 S.E.2d 212 (1979).

What constitutes "reasonable grounds of suspicion" for warrantless arrest is generally to be determined under facts of individual case. Chaney v. State, 133 Ga. App. 913, 213 S.E.2d 68 (1975).

- There must be a middle ground between proof to a mathematical certainty that what one thinks one sees happening is in fact a violation of law, and mere suspicion that it may be a criminal act; it is frequently defined as probable cause. Harris v. State, 128 Ga. App. 22, 195 S.E.2d 262 (1973).

Arrest for offenses committed in officer's presence meets constitutional requirement of probable cause for arrest. Hunter v. Clardy, 558 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1977).

- Georgia courts have equated this section with the probable cause standard or engrafted a probable cause provision on that section. Nicholson v. United States, 355 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 974, 86 S. Ct. 1866, 16 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1966).

Georgia has apparently engrafted a probable cause requirement onto this section. United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129, 94 S. Ct. 866, 38 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1974).

- Police officer has a right to arrest without a warrant when the officer has probable cause to believe a crime is being committed in the officer's presence. Anderson v. State, 123 Ga. App. 57, 179 S.E.2d 286 (1970).

When knowledge of the related facts and circumstances gives police officers probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed an offense, an arrest, even without a warrant, is legal. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

If an officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a felony, an arrest is authorized. Arnsdorff v. State, 152 Ga. App. 515, 263 S.E.2d 176 (1979).

When the police officer observed the driver of the car travelling at a high rate of speed through the motel parking lot, probable cause existed to stop the driver and make a warrantless arrest of the driver for driving too fast for conditions. Sanders v. State, 204 Ga. App. 545, 419 S.E.2d 759 (1992).

- When dealing with probable cause, as the name implies, one deals with probabilities, not certainty, and the quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause is not that level which is necessary for proof of guilt in a trial. Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936, 100 S. Ct. 285, 62 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1979).

- In exigent circumstances such as the imminent removal or destruction of contraband, a police officer may arrest without a warrant, but there must be probable cause. Probable cause means reasonable grounds, and is that apparent state of facts which seem to exist after reasonable and proper inquiry. Rumor, suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is not sufficient and it is axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its justification. Kelly v. State, 129 Ga. App. 131, 198 S.E.2d 910 (1973).

- Whether or not the arrest violated this section, the constitutional validity of the arrest without a warrant depends upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make the arrest - whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which the officers had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. Peters v. State, 114 Ga. App. 595, 152 S.E.2d 647 (1966); Rockholt v. State, 129 Ga. App. 99, 198 S.E.2d 885 (1973); Lynn v. State, 130 Ga. App. 646, 204 S.E. 346 (1974); Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84 (1979); State v. Thomason, 153 Ga. App. 345, 265 S.E.2d 312 (1980), overruled on other grounds, State v. Stilley, 261 Ga. App. 868, 584 S.E.2d 9 (2003); Watson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 545, 265 S.E.2d 871 (1980); Thompson v. State, 155 Ga. App. 101, 270 S.E.2d 313 (1980).

Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which the officers had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974).

- Standard of probable cause is that of "a reasonable, cautious, and prudent peace officer" and must be judged in the light of the officer's experience and training. Harris v. State, 128 Ga. App. 22, 195 S.E.2d 262 (1973).

When police officer is informant, the reliability of the informant is presumed as a matter of law. Quinn v. State, 132 Ga. App. 395, 208 S.E.2d 263 (1974).

- Words "in his presence" in former Code 1933, § 27-207 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20) and "within his immediate knowledge" in former Code 1933, § 27-211 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-60) are synonymous. Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, 9 Ga. App. 672, 72 S.E. 51 (1911); Novak v. State, 130 Ga. App. 780, 204 S.E.2d 491 (1974); Forehand v. State, 130 Ga. App. 801, 204 S.E.2d 516 (1974); Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

Terms "within the presence of the officers," and "within their immediate knowledge," are synonymous. Harris v. State, 128 Ga. App. 22, 195 S.E.2d 262 (1973).

An offense is committed in the presence of an officer when the senses of the officer gave the knowledge the offense is being committed. Novak v. State, 130 Ga. App. 780, 204 S.E.2d 491 (1974); Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

- Because the defendant was arrested immediately after the defendant admitted to the police officer that the defendant threatened the victims, therefore, even though the initial threat was made outside of the officer's presence, it was within the defendant's immediate knowledge and justified the arrest. Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 517, 541 S.E.2d 112 (2000).

- Crime is committed in the presence of an officer if the officer sees the crime committed, or by the exercise of any of the officer's senses the officer has knowledge, together with what the officer sees, that a crime is being committed by the person sought to be arrested. Forehand v. State, 130 Ga. App. 801, 204 S.E.2d 516 (1974); Humphrey v. State, 231 Ga. 855, 204 S.E.2d 603, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 839, 95 S. Ct. 68, 42 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1974).

Probable cause was a complete defense to an arrestee's false imprisonment claim because the arrest for burglary was made pursuant to exigent circumstances as the suspected offense was committed in the officers' presence or within the officers' immediate knowledge; the officers found the arrestee inside a vacant home and saw that the back door appeared to have been forced open. Gray v. Ector, 541 Fed. Appx. 920 (11th Cir. 2013)(Unpublished).

- Under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a), an officer has probable cause to arrest for a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence. State v. Goolsby, 262 Ga. App. 867, 586 S.E.2d 754 (2003).

Warrantless arrest of the defendant was authorized on the ground that a sale of cocaine was committed in the officers' presence, and after the defendant retreated into a motel room, the exigencies of the situation demanded and excused an immediate entry into the room for the officer to arrest the defendant without a warrant; hence, suppression of the evidence seized thereafter would not have been granted. Fortson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 120, 640 S.E.2d 693 (2006).

Appeals court rejected the defendant's contention that the arrest was made without probable cause as the evidence sufficiently showed that the defendant's presence at the scene of an alleged robbery, coupled with the defendant's flight from police, justified the arrest. McCoy v. State, 285 Ga. App. 246, 645 S.E.2d 728 (2007).

- Evidence adduced on a motion to suppress is sufficient to authorize the arrest without a warrant as well as the search of the automobile when the burglar's tools and stolen merchandise are viewed and seen without a search of the automobile. Bass v. State, 123 Ga. App. 705, 182 S.E.2d 322 (1971).

- Subsequent search of a bag containing items stolen in a burglary was a lawful search incident to the arrest as: defendant was stopped a half mile from the burglary scene; defendant was sweating heavily, carrying a pair of leather gloves on a summer night; and was carrying a bag which the arresting officer testified to observing as loaded with numerous items including a checkbook bearing the address of the burglarized residence. Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 227, 416 S.E.2d 771, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 416 S.E.2d 771 (1992).

- Defendant was driving an automobile at a time when the officers knew the defendant's driver's license had been suspended and subsequently arrested the defendant; thus, the evidence found in the accompanying search of the car was admissible. Jackson v. United States, 352 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 825, 87 S. Ct. 55, 17 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1966).

- To justify an arrest without a warrant an officer need not see the act which constitutes the crime take place if by any of the officer's senses the officer has personal knowledge of the crime's commission. Forehand v. State, 130 Ga. App. 801, 204 S.E.2d 516 (1974); State v. Greene, 178 Ga. App. 875, 344 S.E.2d 771 (1986).

- When a breach of the peace is committed, it is to be regarded as in the officer's presence, so far as to authorize an arrest without a warrant, if the officer hears the noise of the disturbance and the outcries of the person assaulted, whether the officer sees the act itself or not. Ramsey v. State, 92 Ga. 53, 17 S.E. 613 (1893).

- When the crime of possessing marijuana is being committed in the presence of police officers, the arrest of a defendant without a warrant is permissible. Williams v. State, 129 Ga. App. 103, 198 S.E.2d 683 (1973).

When a police officer, upon observing a person smoking what the officer believes to be a marijuana cigarette and upon discovering a partially smoked cigarette in the same area, clearly has probable cause to believe the officer has witnessed the person possessing less than one ounce of marijuana, a misdemeanor (O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b)), thus authorizing a warrantless arrest. Corbitt v. State, 166 Ga. App. 311, 304 S.E.2d 123 (1983).

Possession of suspected drugs authorized the arrest of the defendant. Allison v. State, 188 Ga. App. 460, 373 S.E.2d 273 (1988); Watson v. State, 190 Ga. App. 696, 379 S.E.2d 817 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Berry v. State, 248 Ga. App. 874, 547 S.E.2d 664 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Bius v. State, 254 Ga. App. 634, 563 S.E.2d 527 (2002).

- Having seen the defendant commit the offense of marijuana possession during a "valid intrusion" into the defendant's yard, the officer needed no warrant to arrest the defendant. Jenkins v. State, 223 Ga. App. 486, 477 S.E.2d 910 (1996).

- Officer who entered a home in hot pursuit of the defendant who had committed a traffic violation in the officer's presence was authorized to make a warrantless arrest. State v. Nichols, 225 Ga. App. 609, 484 S.E.2d 507 (1997).

- An offense is within the presence of the arresting party when, although the arresting party cannot be cognizant of the offense by means of the arresting party's own senses, the defendant actually admits that the offense is in fact being so committed. Moore v. State, 128 Ga. App. 20, 195 S.E.2d 275 (1973).

- Fourth Amendment does not prohibit arrests for offenses committed outside the presence of the arresting state officer. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a) provides that an officer may arrest a suspect without a warrant in limited situations, including when the offense is committed in such officer's presence or within such officer's immediate knowledge; or for other cause if there is likely to be failure of justice for want of a judicial officer to issue a warrant. However, § 17-4-20(a) only applies to cases in which a custodial arrest is made and not when a private citizen reports an erratic driver who subsequently exits the vehicle outside of the officer's presence and then is arrested. State v. Cooper, 271 Ga. App. 771, 611 S.E.2d 90 (2005).

- Law enforcement officer may make an arrest without a warrant for an offense committed in the officer's presence, even if the arrest is outside the officer's jurisdiction. Wells v. State, 206 Ga. App. 513, 426 S.E.2d 231 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Burns, 829 S.E.2d 367, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 400 (Ga. 2019).

- Trial court did not err in granting police officers summary judgment in a citizen's action alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with the defendant's arrest because the arrest was lawful under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 since the obstruction occurred in the officers' presence; even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant, the officers had the authority and discretion to arrest outside the officers' jurisdiction for offenses committed in the officers' presence and, therefore, the officers' immunity could not be defeated by the officers' decision to arrest outside of the officers' jurisdiction. Taylor v. Waldo, 309 Ga. App. 108, 709 S.E.2d 278 (2011).

- Upon arriving at the scene, an officer observed the reported victim bleeding from the head and saw the defendant outside the victim's shop, and since the defendant became hostile when the officer attempted to ask the defendant what had happened, the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for a battery upon the victim as well as a battery upon the officer in that the defendant acted in a hostile manner and resisted arrest. Newsome v. State, 149 Ga. App. 415, 254 S.E.2d 381 (1979).

- Hearsay is admissible only to explain the officer's conduct, but not in proof of the fact, and hearsay statements may serve as the foundation for probable cause. Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936, 100 S. Ct. 285, 62 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1979).

- Officer is entitled to explain the basis for making an arrest and to testify as to all of the facts in connection with the arrest; the officer may testify relative to information which the officer obtained from others which afforded the basis for obtaining a warrant, or for making an arrest without a warrant. Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936, 100 S. Ct. 285, 62 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1979).

- Officer has a right to arrest for a crime committed in the officer's presence; but the rule does not apply if the officer does not act on the occasion the officer sees the crime committed, but delays and seeks to make the arrest after the officer had ample time and opportunity to procure a warrant. Yancey v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 96 Ga. App. 476, 100 S.E.2d 653 (1957), appeal dismissed, 213 Ga. 903, 102 S.E.2d 653 (1958).

Right to make a warrantless arrest for a crime for an offense committed in the officer's presence does not extend beyond a reasonable time and opportunity to procure a warrant. Williams v. State, 133 Ga. App. 66, 209 S.E.2d 729 (1974).

- When officers attempted, without a warrant, to arrest the defendant upon the mere oral complaint of another, and seize the defendant's person, the arrest was illegal. Porter v. State, 124 Ga. 297, 52 S.E. 283, 2 L.R.A. (n.s.) 730 (1905); Dorsey v. State, 7 Ga. App. 366, 66 S.E. 1096 (1910).

- When the detective unquestionably had reasonable and articulated cause to believe the driver of a blue and white Cadillac had committed an armed robbery, the police of another city were authorized to act upon the information supplied by the detective and make a warrantless arrest. Knighton v. State, 166 Ga. App. 390, 304 S.E.2d 512 (1983).

Arrests by police officer on authority of card signed by sheriff are illegal. Gordon v. Hogan, 114 Ga. 354, 40 S.E. 229 (1901); Cuddens v. State, 152 Ga. 195, 108 S.E. 788 (1921).

- Summary judgment was properly granted to a police officer on a restaurant invitee's false imprisonment claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20. The officer, who was told by the restaurant manager that the invitee refused an order to leave the premises, had probable cause to arrest the invitee without a warrant for criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21. Kline v. KDB, Inc., 295 Ga. App. 789, 673 S.E.2d 516 (2009).

- Exigent circumstances authorized an officer's warrantless arrest of a hotel guest for criminal trespass because the offense was committed in the officer's presence when the guest refused the officer's request to leave the hotel. Thus, the guest's false imprisonment claim against the hotel was properly dismissed on summary judgment. Lewis v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 310 Ga. App. 58, 712 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

- Search cannot be incident to an arrest if the officer has no reason to believe that the appellant committed a crime in the officer's presence. Brown v. State, 133 Ga. App. 500, 211 S.E.2d 438 (1974).

Since the defendant has committed no crime in the presence of the arresting officer, and the latter has no valid warrant, the arrest without a warrant will not justify a search, the result of which forms the basis of the charge. Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 219 S.E.2d 636 (1975).

- If there is no cause for arrest within the purview of a city ordinance, then a warrantless search and seizure is not legally supportable. Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 219 S.E.2d 636 (1975).

- Except for the exceptions of this section, a warrant is required to make an arrest legal, and if the arrest so measured is not legal when made, the arrest cannot be legitimated by fruit of a subsequent search. Grant v. State, 152 Ga. App. 258, 262 S.E.2d 553 (1979).

Evidence procured in connection with search made under illegal warrant is inadmissible unless it appears that a crime was being committed in the presence of the officer and that the search was incidental to an arrest therefor. Grant v. State, 152 Ga. App. 258, 262 S.E.2d 553 (1979).

- Ability to make a warrantless arrest for an offense committed in an officer's presence contemplates the officer's ability to determine that an offense has actually been committed; the officer was incorrect in the officer's belief that the officer or the officer's agents may properly make the initial determination concerning the obscenity of a publication and that the officer may make a warrantless arrest if the officer determines that the subject matter of a publication is obscene. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).

- When the officer's activities constituted a calculated scheme of warrantless arrests and harassing visits to retailers of publications, the substance of the procedures resulted in a "constructive seizure" of magazines from the shelves of the retail establishments and created an informal system of prior restraint in violation of U.S. Const., amends. 1, and 14. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 3031, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1131 (1980).

- Defendant who committed the offense of public indecency in the presence of a police officer was subject to warrantless arrest, and the officer was not required to obtain a warrant simply because the defendant was sitting on the defendant's porch. Collins v. State, 191 Ga. App. 289, 381 S.E.2d 430 (1989).

There was no excessive force sufficient to indicate an officer violated any clearly established constitutional right when a plaintiff, a woman in her eighth month of pregnancy, passed a road block without permission which provided the officer with arguable probable cause since the plaintiff drove away from the scene, where she then parked and ran into a building, and since the officer only firmly held her and contacted her abdomen in the process; the act of physically holding back a misdemeanor suspect who was attempting to leave the scene, even given her pregnant condition, was not disproportionate although the woman later miscarried. Moore v. Gwinnett County, 967 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081, 113 S. Ct. 1049, 122 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1993).

Officer that shot and killed a suspect was entitled to qualified immunity as to an excessive force claim because an objective officer in the officer's situation could have believed reasonably that the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officer's safety; the officer was acting inside the scope of the officer's discretionary authority when the shooting occurred because even if the officer was outside the officer's jurisdiction, the officer was authorized by Georgia law to conduct a warrantless arrest since the suspect was committing an offense, public indecency, within the officer's presence. Wilson v. Miller, 650 Fed. Appx. 676 (11th Cir. 2016)(Unpublished).

- Though evidence would not have been admissible if discovered as the result of the police officers' unconstitutional roadblock and illegal Terry-stop of the defendant's car before the defendant reached the roadblock, the defendant's gratuitous shoving of police was an aggravated battery, which justified the officers arresting the defendant then and there, even if the defendant was not subsequently charged with the offense of battery. The discovery of drugs the defendant threw while fleeing from that battery meant the discovery of the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop to justify its admission into evidence and denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. Strickland v. State, 265 Ga. App. 533, 594 S.E.2d 711 (2004).

Flight is ground for arrest without a warrant when there is reasonable cause to believe the fugitive is the offender and the flight itself makes it impracticable to go elsewhere in search of a warrant. Garrison v. State, 122 Ga. App. 757, 178 S.E.2d 744 (1970).

- As no criminal activity was observed by police, the mere fact that (according to police) defendant "ran" inside the apartment when the police drove up did not provide probable cause and/or exigent circumstances authorizing the police to enter the defendant's girlfriend's sister's apartment to arrest the defendant without a warrant. State v. Brown, 212 Ga. App. 800, 442 S.E.2d 818 (1994).

- Under this section, an officer can arrest without a warrant "an offender who is endeavoring to escape," even if the offense was less than a felony. Brooks v. State, 114 Ga. 6, 39 S.E. 877 (1901); Maughon v. State, 7 Ga. App. 660, 67 S.E. 842 (1910).

- Under this section, an officer can arrest without a warrant "an offender who is endeavoring to escape" even if the offense is merely distilling illicit liquor. Williams v. State, 148 Ga. 310, 96 S.E. 385 (1918).

- Under this section, an officer can arrest without a warrant "an offender who is endeavoring to escape" even if the offense was merely burglary. Jackson v. State, 7 Ga. App. 414, 66 S.E. 982 (1910).

- Misdemeanor convict who has escaped lawful confinement may be recaptured by any peace officer without a warrant. Williford v. State, 121 Ga. 173, 48 S.E. 962 (1904).

- Because the circumstances of the defendant's low-speed flight from an uniformed detective, who was driving an unmarked vehicle, were insufficient to present law enforcement with evidence of a particular crime, the defendant could not be charged with the crime of attempting to elude an officer, and police lacked the probable cause sufficient to warrant an arrest for the offense; thus, the search incident to the arrest was invalid, warranting suppression of the evidence seized. Stephens v. State, 278 Ga. App. 694, 629 S.E.2d 565 (2006).

Right to arrest suspected person without warrant is broader in felony than in misdemeanor cases. Chaney v. State, 133 Ga. App. 913, 213 S.E.2d 68 (1975).

- Even though an officer may have a legal right to make an arrest, still the officer can use no more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, and cannot use unnecessary violence disproportionate to the resistance offered. When the offense is a felony, a greater force even to the extent of slaying the offender in order to prevent the offender's escape may, when sufficient circumstances so indicate, be justified. But if the arrest is only for a misdemeanor, such extreme and deadly force merely to effect the arrest and prevent escape is not justified. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).

- Reason for limiting the powers of a peace officer in making an arrest for a person committing or attempting to commit a public offense of the grade of misdemeanor is that organized society will suffer less by the temporary escape of such person than it would if the officer should be permitted to take the person's life, or inflict upon the person great bodily harm, to prevent the person's escape. Palmer v. Hall, 380 F. Supp. 120 (M.D. Ga. 1974), modified, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975).

- Notion that a peace officer may, in all cases, shoot one who flees from the officer when about to be arrested is unfounded. Officers have no such power, except in cases of a felony, and then as a last resort, after all other means have failed. It is never allowed when the offense is only a misdemeanor. Palmer v. Hall, 380 F. Supp. 120 (M.D. Ga. 1974), modified, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975).

- Officers, who shot and killed a fleeing suspected felon armed with a knife, were entitled to official immunity because it was a discretionary act, during pursuit a bystander twice identified the suspect, and the suspect slashed a knife at one officer, posing an immediate threat of physical violence. Williams v. Boehrer, 530 Fed. Appx. 891 (11th Cir. 2013)(Unpublished).

Except in self-defense, an officer has no right to proceed to the extremity of shedding blood in arresting, or in preventing the escape of one whom the officer has arrested, for an offense less than a felony, even though the offender cannot be taken otherwise. Palmer v. Hall, 380 F. Supp. 120 (M.D. Ga. 1974), modified, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975).

Phrase "likely to be a failure of justice" means probable ground for believing that there will be failure of justice. Mitchell v. State, 226 Ga. 450, 175 S.E.2d 545 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024, 91 S. Ct. 585, 27 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1971).

- When a suspect is mobile and is seen leaving an area after having negotiated a sale with suspected stolen coins, a warrantless arrest is both reasonable and necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Williams v. State, 166 Ga. App. 798, 305 S.E.2d 489 (1983).

- Justification for a warrantless arrest, that there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of a judicial officer to issue a warrant, cannot be extended to excuse an illegal entry, especially when police officers did not decide to arrest until after the entry and the interrogation of the defendant. Griffith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 255, 322 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

For other cause when there is likely to be failure of justice for want of officer to issue warrant includes a situation when a police officer, knowing that a warrant has been issued for a felony, and with probable cause to believe that if the officer takes the time to procure the warrant the offender will escape, makes the arrest legal although the warrant is not in close physical proximity at the time. Croker v. State, 114 Ga. App. 492, 151 S.E.2d 846 (1966).

- Mere possibility of there being a failure of justice does not authorize an officer to attempt an arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant. Giddens v. State, 152 Ga. 195, 108 S.E. 788 (1921).

- This section has been equated with the probable cause test, or at least whether there was likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant was tested by the presence or absence of probable cause. Paige v. Potts, 354 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1965).

- When a lawful arrest cannot be made except under a warrant, it must, at the time of making the arrest, be in the possession of the arresting officer, or of another in the neighborhood with whom the officer is acting in concert. Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 163, 48 S.E. 910 (1904); Maughon v. State, 7 Ga. App. 660, 67 S.E. 842 (1910).

- If the arrest is without a warrant and is illegal, no amount of good faith or probable cause will excuse the defendants who were police officers. Vlass v. McCrary, 60 Ga. App. 744, 5 S.E.2d 63 (1939).

- Arrest without a valid warrant to detain the defendant places the detention in the same category as an arrest without a warrant. Grant v. State, 152 Ga. App. 258, 262 S.E.2d 553 (1979).

- When obtaining a warrant to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence would have required at least two hours, during which time physical evidence of the defendant's alleged intoxication would dissipate, the warrantless arrest was proper under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 (a). State v. Fleming, 202 Ga. App. 774, 415 S.E.2d 513 (1992).

Since evidence of the defendant's intoxication would have dissipated during the time it would have taken for the officer to obtain a warrant for the defendant's arrest, the warrantless arrest was proper under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20. Wadsworth v. State, 209 Ga. App. 333, 433 S.E.2d 419 (1993).

Every person has the right to resist an illegal arrest, and may use, in resisting the illegal arrest, such force as is necessary for the purpose. Ronemous v. State, 87 Ga. App. 588, 74 S.E.2d 676 (1953).

- One upon whom an arrest is unlawfully being made by an officer has the right to resist such arrest, force with force, proportionate to that being used by those detaining the person. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943); Smith v. State, 84 Ga. App. 79, 65 S.E.2d 709 (1951).

- Fact that the defendant's wife told the officers in the defendant's presence that he had beat her and she wanted him locked up did not render legal the arrest without a warrant of the defendant who was at home doing nothing when the police arrived, and the defendant was within his rights in resisting such arrest. Ronemous v. State, 87 Ga. App. 588, 74 S.E.2d 676 (1953).

- It is the duty of an officer, when authorized to arrest, but when the circumstances afford reason to believe that the officer's object and official character are unknown to the person whom the officer seeks to arrest, so to inform the person; but an omission to do so will not justify the person arrested, or sought to be arrested, in resisting the arrest if the person in fact already knows, or on reasonable and probable grounds believes, that the person is under a charge of felony for which an arrest is being attempted. Morton v. State, 190 Ga. 792, 10 S.E.2d 836 (1940).

- If, during an unlawful arrest, the officer commits, or reasonably appears about to commit a felony upon the arrestee, such as an assault with intent to kill, using a weapon likely to produce death, or if the officer's violent behavior is enough to frighten a reasonable person into expecting a felony and causes the detainee to act from fear rather than for revenge, the detainee may protect oneself without being guilty of a crime, even if the person slays the officer. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).

- Mere fact of unlawful arrest, in the absence of an application of unlawful force amounting to or reasonably appearing to amount to a felony, will not authorize the killing of the officer. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).

- If an officer does not attempt or reasonably appear to attempt a felony, but only the misdemeanor of an unlawful arrest, or if the person arrested is only put in fear of a lesser injury than that of a felony, killing of the officer would be manslaughter. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).

- To slay an officer to avoid being taken into custody, while having reasonable grounds of belief that the person is an arresting officer, and that the person's object is to make a lawful arrest for a felony, is murder. If the homicide is committed without reasonable cause to know the person's official character or purpose, and without malice, the homicide is manslaughter. Morton v. State, 190 Ga. 792, 10 S.E.2d 836 (1940).

- When a person is lawfully arrested and has notice or knowledge, or by belief or reasonable grounds for belief has the equivalent of knowledge, that the person making the arrest is an officer, it is the duty of the person arrested to submit quietly. If, under such circumstances and merely to prevent the officer from lawfully arresting the person in a lawful way, the person kills the officer, the crime is murder. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).

- If an offender has the equivalent of knowledge that the person making the arrest is an arresting officer, it is the duty of such person to submit quietly to arrest; and in case the person refuses to submit, the officer has the right to use such force as is reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest. Morton v. State, 190 Ga. 792, 10 S.E.2d 836 (1940).

- Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for an excessive force claim in a Bivens action because the officer was standing in a narrow space between two vehicles, the decedent was disobeying the officer's orders to put the decedent's hands up, and the decedent's car suddenly moved forward; in a split second decision, it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 to use deadly force when the officer had probable cause to believe that the officer's life was in peril. Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1109, 126 S. Ct. 1063, 163 L. Ed. 2d 887 (2006).

- No person should be punished for resisting or obstructing the illegal arrest of another. Prichard v. State, 160 Ga. 527, 128 S.E. 655 (1925).

- Whether a warrantless arrest violates the statutory authorization depends upon whether at the time of the arrest the officer had probable cause to make an arrest; when the officer was assaulted while in the execution of the officer's office, and when making the arrest was in the lawful discharge of the officer's office, physical resistance to the legal arrest was not authorized. Veit v. State, 182 Ga. App. 753, 357 S.E.2d 113 (1987).

- Because the police officer had grounds to arrest the defendant for public drunkenness and was in the process of making the arrest when the defendant shouted at the officer and attempted to walk away, conviction of the defendant for misdemeanor obstruction was proper even though the defendant was acquitted of the charge of public drunkenness. Williams v. State, 228 Ga. App. 698, 492 S.E.2d 708 (1997).

Probable cause and a warrant are not required for a search and seizure which is conducted pursuant to consent. Dawson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 199, 303 S.E.2d 532 (1983).

- Despite the fact that the trial court concluded that the second of two defendant's warrantless arrest was unauthorized under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(a), because mere acquiescence to the authority asserted by a police lieutenant by both the defendants could not substitute for a free and voluntary consent to search, the trial court erred in finding that the acquiescence granted valid consent to the officer. Thus, the trial court's grant of the motions to suppress was reversed, in part. Hollenback v. State, 289 Ga. App. 516, 657 S.E.2d 884 (2008).

This section applied to violations of municipal ordinances. State v. Koon, 133 Ga. App. 685, 211 S.E.2d 924 (1975); Whaley v. State, 175 Ga. App. 493, 333 S.E.2d 691 (1985).

- This section was applicable alike to state and municipal arresting officers. Faulkner v. State, 166 Ga. 645, 144 S.E. 193 (1928).

- Police officer under city ordinance is as much under the protection of the law in making an arrest as any public officer, such as sheriff, bailiff, or constable; therefore, a town police officer has the right to arrest a defendant, without a warrant, for a violation in the police officer's presence of a town ordinance. Palmer v. State, 195 Ga. 661, 25 S.E.2d 295 (1943).

- Authority to arrest provided by O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 does not create a duty to arrest for purposes of a tort action. Landis v. Rockdale County, 212 Ga. App. 700, 445 S.E.2d 264 (1994).

- Police officer of a city, in making an arrest for an offense against state law, or for a violation of an ordinance of the municipality, committed in the city limits, fell within the protection of this section. Thus, a city police officer had authority to arrest without a warrant one who violates a state statute in the officer's presence, or to arrest within the city one who violates a city ordinance in the officer's presence. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).

- In the absence of any evidence as to a warrant or as to any municipal ordinance that was violated, the burden was on the state to show that the defendant violated some law of the state in the presence of the deceased police officer. Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).

- When a military police officer has lawful custody of a soldier under arrest for violation of military orders, and the soldier is violently and turbulently resisting the arrest, and when several civilians go to the assistance of the military police officer, and under such circumstances, a city police officer comes to the place and attempts to arrest the soldier, and is killed by the soldier, it is proper for the state to introduce in evidence the city ordinance defining "disorderly conduct," as illustrating the legality of the arrest, or attempt to arrest, by the city police officer. Reed v. State, 195 Ga. 842, 25 S.E.2d 692 (1943).

- Warrantless arrest which was otherwise authorized under this section was not rendered illegal merely because the arrest was effected while the individual arrested was in a vehicle not completely situated within the officer's jurisdictional limits. Rick v. State, 152 Ga. App. 519, 263 S.E.2d 213 (1979).

- If a municipal ordinance or a state law has been violated in the presence of a municipal police officer, it is not only the right but the duty of the officer to immediately make an arrest of the violator; under such circumstances it is not necessary, in order to establish the legality of the arrest, to show that the officer did not have the time and opportunity to procure a warrant. Reed v. State, 195 Ga. 842, 25 S.E.2d 692 (1943).

- Like other police officers or private persons, a sheriff has the power to arrest an offender without a warrant if the offense is committed in the sheriff's presence. Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622 (1942).

- Sheriff may seize unlawfully kept property without a warrant for search, seizure, or arrest of the offender when the sheriff lawfully enters a place of business open to the sheriff as well as other members of the public under an implied invitation to enter, and finds in such place of business "slot machines" illegally kept by the owner or operation of such place of business. But, the sheriff has no authority to search private premises of the owner to find slot machines in the absence of a warrant. Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 18 S.E.2d 622 (1942).

Inspectors of roads and bridges sworn in as deputy sheriffs may arrest for the violation of the criminal laws of this state. Earl v. State, 124 Ga. 28, 52 S.E. 78 (1905).

- While the jurisdiction of probation officers to arrest offenders is limited to one class of persons, the probationers under their supervision, their power of arrest is broader with regard to that class of persons than is the general power of arrest by officers since the probation officer may arrest a probationer without a warrant for the alleged violation of any condition of the offender's probation, which might be the commission of a felony or misdemeanor, or a mere violation of some rule prescribed for the offender's conduct, even though such violation of the conditions of the offender's probation was not committed in the probation officer's presence. Vandiver v. Manning, 215 Ga. 874, 114 S.E.2d 121 (1960).

- Even when a police officer violates a state arrest statute, the officer is not liable under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983) unless the officer also violated federal constitutional law governing warrantless arrests. Diamond v. Marland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975).

- Police officer was properly suspended for using a choke-hold on a handcuffed suspect in violation of department rules; O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20(d), prohibiting local rules that limited an officer's abilities to apprehend suspects, did not apply because the officer was not apprehending the suspect, but was trying to recover evidence from the defendant's mouth. Mercure v. City of Atlanta Civil Service Board, 327 Ga. App. 840, 761 S.E.2d 393 (2014).

Jury Instructions

Justification for warrantless arrest province of jury.

- Whether, under all the circumstances of the case, including the facilities for obtaining a warrant according to the spirit of this section, there was or was not cause for attempting the arrest without a warrant is a question for the jury. Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. 204, 18 S.E. 305 (1892).

- When, on the trial of a state trooper for false imprisonment, it appears from the evidence that the trooper's sole defense was that the trooper made the arrest for drunkenness upon the public highway without a warrant when the trooper in good faith had probable cause to believe that such offense was being committed in the trooper's presence, it is error requiring the grant of a new trial for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on this defense. Henderson v. State, 95 Ga. App. 830, 99 S.E.2d 270 (1957).

- Absent any evidence to show that an arrest without a warrant would have been authorized, the court erred in charging the jury that part of this section which declared the circumstances under which an arrest may be lawfully made without a warrant, since the jury was not also instructed that under the evidence the arrest would have been illegal. McIntosh v. State, 191 Ga. 736, 13 S.E.2d 770 (1941).

- When the arrest was made without a warrant, and the only basis for the arrest was that the crime was being committed in the presence of the person making the arrest, whether the defendant acted as an officer or as a private citizen was immaterial, since the person's authority as either was the same; therefore, the charge injecting this issue in the case could not have been confusing to the jury or harmful to the defendant. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Wenger, 90 Ga. App. 267, 83 S.E.2d 58 (1954).

- Charge in entire harmony but not in exact language is neither a misstatement of law nor misleading. Cobb v. Bailey, 35 Ga. App. 302, 133 S.E. 42 (1926).

Proper charge. Alexander v. State, 160 Ga. 769, 129 S.E. 102 (1925).

This section applied to both state and local officers. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-127.

- Sheriff, as a law enforcement officer, may effect an arrest either under a warrant, or without a warrant if the offense is committed in the sheriff's presence, or the offender is endeavoring to escape, or for other cause when there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-24.

- City police officer has authority to arrest without a warrant one who violates a state statute in the officer's presence, or to arrest within the city one who violates a city ordinance in the officer's presence. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 74.

Police officer of a city, in making an arrest for an offense against state law, or for a violation of an ordinance of the municipality committed in the city limits, falls within the protection of this section; thus, a city police officer has authority to arrest without a warrant one who violates a state statute in the officer's presence, or to arrest within the city one who violates a city ordinance in the officer's presence. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 581.

Municipal arresting officer has authority to arrest person, including even the sheriff of the county, within the corporate limits of the city, on a charge of violation of city ordinances, including the charge of public drunkenness. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 335.

- Any warrantless arrest made for violation of a city ordinance would have to be within the corporate limits of the city. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 74.

City police officer may not make arrests outside city limits without warrant. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 74.

- If a person is driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating drink or at a greater speed than 55 miles per hour in the presence of a city police officer, the police officer would be authorized to pursue the person beyond the city limits and make the arrest for violating a state law; a city police officer would have no authority to go beyond the city limits and arrest a person for the violation of a city ordinance. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 48.

- Officer from another state may proceed across the state line into Georgia in hot pursuit of an offender, but when the officer does so the officer assumes the character of a private individual and the officer is not clothed with the authority to make arrest for infractions of municipal ordinances. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 72.

- When a bondsman from another state requested a Georgia law enforcement officer to aid the bondsman in capturing the bond jumper from that foreign state, such a request would not meet any of the requirements of this section, which gave the sheriff the authority to arrest. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-24.

- Power of a public officer to make arrests under former Code 1933, § 27-207 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20) can be conferred solely by law and the State Board of Education is not possessed of any lawful power to make its security guards "officers" within the meaning of that section, or to otherwise confer upon them the arrest powers of a peace officer; the only power to arrest which a security guard employed by the State Board of Education would or could possess under law would be that limited power possessed by a private citizen under former Code 1933, § 27-211 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-60). 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-3.

- Constable was grouped with other "officers" as to arrest powers under former Code 1933, § 27-207 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20) and was required to execute all warrants directed to the constable by lawful authority under former Code 1933, § 24-817 (see O.C.G.A. § 15-10-102); logically, the constable would be authorized to use such force as is necessary to carry out duties to the same extent as are other officers when serving arrest warrants or lawfully making an arrest without a warrant, but the constable does not possess general police powers, and may carry a pistol only if licensed to do so by the procedure set forth in former Code 1933, §§ 26-2901, 26-2902, 26-2903, and 26-2906 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-126 and16-11-127). 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-30.

- While it is true that a private citizen may effect an arrest under former Code 1933, § 27-211 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-60), only a peace officer has the authority to make an arrest by serving a warrant. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-93.

- Under former Code 1933, § 27-207 (see O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20), a peace officer could arrest a sheriff with or without a warrant; however, coroners did not fall within the aegis of "peace officers," under former Code 1933, § 21-101 et seq. (see O.C.G.A. § 16-1-3) and, consequently, cannot arrest a sheriff in circumstances when a peace officer would be able to, but a private citizen would not. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-93.

- Lack of sufficient time to obtain a warrant fell within the "likely to be failure of justice" language of this section. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-30.

- Warrantless arrests may be legally effectuated by law enforcement officers under one of the exceptions to O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 or when arresting officers have probable cause to believe that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed; however, an illegal arrest alone will not be sufficient cause to vacate an otherwise valid conviction, and will not result in suppression of evidence absent a judicial determination that the arresting officer lacked probable cause in making the arrest. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U82-34.

- If the sheriff, in the sheriff's capacity as a law enforcement officer, undertakes to arrest an individual under circumstances which do not give the sheriff the authority to make arrests, it is an illegal arrest and as such may subject the sheriff to liability for false imprisonment. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-24.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arrest, § 13 et seq.

Police Officer's Use of Excessive Force in Making Arrest, 9 POF2d 363.

Lack of Probable Cause for Warrantless Arrest, 44 POF2d 229.

- 22 C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 53 et seq.

- Constitutionality of statute or ordinance authorizing an arrest without a warrant, 1 A.L.R. 585.

Degree of force that may be employed in arresting one charged with a misdemeanor, 3 A.L.R. 1170; 42 A.L.R. 1200.

Necessity of showing warrant upon making arrest under warrant, 40 A.L.R. 62.

Right to arrest without a warrant for unlawful possession or transportation of intoxicating liquor, 44 A.L.R. 132.

Arrest, or search and seizure, without warrant on suspicion or information as to unlawful possession of weapons, 92 A.L.R. 490.

Peace officer's delay in making arrest without a warrant for misdemeanor or breach of peace, 58 A.L.R.2d 1056.

Police officer's power to enter private house or enclosure to make arrest, without a warrant, for a suspected misdemeanor, 76 A.L.R.2d 1432.

Modern status of rules as to right to forcefully resist illegal arrest, 44 A.L.R.3d 1078.

What amounts to violation of drunken-driving statute in officer's "presence" or "view" so as to permit warrantless arrest, 74 A.L.R.3d 1138.

Concern for possible victim (rescue doctrine) as justifying violation of Miranda requirements, 9 A.L.R.4th 595.

Validity, in state criminal trial, of arrest without warrant by identified peace officer outside of jurisdiction, when not in fresh pursuit, 34 A.L.R.4th 328.

Validity of arrest made in reliance upon outdated warrant list or similar police records, 45 A.L.R.4th 550.

Application of "fireman's rule" to preclude recovery by peace officer for injuries inflicted by defendant in resisting arrest, 25 A.L.R.5th 97.

Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of privacy in driveways, 60 A.L.R.5th 1.

Propriety of police action involving application of choke hold, constriction of throat, or the like to prevent accused from swallowing evidence - state cases, 64 A.L.R.5th 741.