2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 8 - Offenses Involving Theft
Article 1 - Theft
§ 16-8-7. Theft by Receiving Stolen Property

1. A person commits the offense of theft by receiving stolen property when he receives, disposes of, or retains stolen property which he knows or should know was stolen unless the property is received, disposed of, or retained with intent to restore it to the owner. "Receiving" means acquiring possession or control or lending on the security of the property.
2. In any prosecution under this Code section it shall not be necessary to show a conviction of the principal thief.

(Laws 1833, Cobb's 1851 Digest, pp. 807, 808; Code 1863, §§ 4382, 4383; Code 1868, §§ 4420, 4421; Code 1873, §§ 4488, 4489; Code 1882, §§ 4488, 4489; Penal Code 1895, §§ 171, 172; Penal Code 1910, §§ 168, 169; Code 1933, §§ 26-2620, 26-2621; Ga. L. 1961, p. 118, § 1; Code 1933, § 26-1806, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1969, p. 857, § 4.)

- For survey article on criminal law and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 89 (1982). For annual survey of criminal law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 129 (1986). For comment on Gaskins v. State, 119 Ga. App. 593, 168 S.E.2d 183 (1969), see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 481 (1971).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Elements of Crime
• Included Crimes
• Burden of Proof
• Jury Issues and Instructions
• Application
• Sentencing

General Consideration

Constitutionality.

- See Lee v. State, 239 Ga. 769, 238 S.E.2d 852 (1977).

Offense is intended to catch person who buys or receives stolen goods as distinct from the principal thief. Sosbee v. State, 155 Ga. App. 196, 270 S.E.2d 367 (1980).

- For impeachment purposes, crimes of "dishonesty" were limited to those crimes that bore upon a witness's propensity to testify truthfully; accordingly, misdemeanor theft by receiving stolen property was not a crime involving dishonesty within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(a)(3) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609). Adams v. State, 284 Ga. App. 534, 644 S.E.2d 426 (2007).

- Defendant is not prejudiced by lack of notice or threat of double jeopardy merely because the indictment fails to contain the words "or should know." State v. Bradbury, 167 Ga. App. 390, 306 S.E.2d 346 (1983).

If offense is alleged in language of statute, this is sufficient. Anderson v. State, 113 Ga. App. 670, 149 S.E.2d 398 (1966).

O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7 fails to designate offense as either felony or misdemeanor; thus, value of goods is only relevant under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12(a)(1) for purpose of sentencing. Pate v. State, 158 Ga. App. 395, 280 S.E.2d 414 (1981).

- Kidnapping, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a), had no element that the accused either stole property or received stolen property; in a case where defendant kidnapped the victim, then stole the victim's car, defendant's conviction for theft by receiving the stolen car, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), was not mutually exclusive of a kidnapping conviction and did not preclude prosecution for the kidnapping charge. State v. Fuller, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Mar. 9, 2004).

- Trial court properly imposed recidivist punishment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 based on the defendant's prior federal conviction for conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2314, because the conviction's elements matched felony conspiracy to commit a crime under Georgia law as defined in O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8. It did not match Georgia's receiving stolen goods crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7. Nordahl v. State, 306 Ga. 15, 829 S.E.2d 99 (2019).

- Trial court had jurisdiction over defendant being tried for the offense of theft by receiving stolen property even though defendant had not waived indictment regarding that offense, since O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70.1 allowed defendant to be tried on an accusation even when the defendant had not waived indictment. Gerrard v. State, 252 Ga. App. 767, 556 S.E.2d 131 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077, 122 S. Ct. 1960, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1021 (2002).

- Venue for defendant's theft by receiving trial was proper in Forsyth County as the deputy stopped the defendant driving a stolen car outside of a car dealership in Forsyth County; thus, the defendant exercised control over the stolen car in Forsyth County. Petty v. State, 271 Ga. App. 547, 610 S.E.2d 169 (2005).

State clearly demonstrated that venue was proper in Dawson County, Georgia for the defendant's trial for misdemeanor theft by receiving, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, since the defendant began driving away in a vehicle containing stolen goods. Dixson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 379, 721 S.E.2d 555 (2011).

- When the defendant sought review of an order denying the defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea in two separate appeals, and both appeals were dismissed, no further appeal was authorized. Tabatabaee v. State, 266 Ga. App. 462, 597 S.E.2d 518 (2004).

- Indictments charging two attorneys with theft by taking and by receiving in connection with a client's property transfers were sufficient in that the indictments tracked the statutory language, placed defendants on notice of the charges against the defendants, and sufficiently alleged a statute of limitations exception. Rader v. State, 300 Ga. App. 411, 685 S.E.2d 405 (2009).

There was no fatal variance between the allegations of theft by receiving and the proof because evidence that the defendant was the original thief was not uncontested; the direct and uncontested evidence did not identify the defendant as the original thief, and while an accomplice testified that the defendant was involved in shoplifting the items, the defendant was not with the accomplice and the codefendant when an officer saw them concealing clothing. Dixson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 379, 721 S.E.2d 555 (2011).

Cited in Howington v. State, 121 Ga. App. 715, 175 S.E.2d 41 (1970); Johnson v. State, 122 Ga. App. 769, 178 S.E.2d 772 (1970); Middle Ga. Livestock Sales v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 123 Ga. App. 733, 182 S.E.2d 533 (1971); D.P. v. State, 129 Ga. App. 680, 200 S.E.2d 499 (1973); Thomas v. State, 130 Ga. App. 613, 203 S.E.2d 922 (1974); Queen v. State, 131 Ga. App. 370, 205 S.E.2d 921 (1974); Jones v. State, 131 Ga. App. 699, 206 S.E.2d 601 (1974); Brindle v. State, 134 Ga. App. 257, 214 S.E.2d 182 (1975); Williams v. State, 135 Ga. App. 919, 219 S.E.2d 632 (1975); Mena v. State, 138 Ga. App. 722, 227 S.E.2d 411 (1976); Rogers v. State, 139 Ga. App. 656, 229 S.E.2d 132 (1976); Fair v. State, 140 Ga. App. 281, 231 S.E.2d 1 (1976); State v. Mabrey, 140 Ga. App. 577, 231 S.E.2d 461 (1976); Crowley v. State, 141 Ga. App. 867, 234 S.E.2d 700 (1977); Haugabrook v. State, 142 Ga. App. 714, 236 S.E.2d 890 (1977); Mathis v. State, 147 Ga. App. 148, 248 S.E.2d 212 (1978); Sanders v. State, 151 Ga. App. 590, 260 S.E.2d 504 (1979); United States v. Weiss, 599 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1979); Aldridge v. State, 153 Ga. App. 744, 266 S.E.2d 513 (1980); Mangrum v. State, 155 Ga. App. 334, 270 S.E.2d 874 (1980); Barrett v. State, 157 Ga. App. 174, 276 S.E.2d 857 (1981); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981); Payne v. State, 161 Ga. App. 233, 291 S.E.2d 236 (1982); Lumpkin v. State, 249 Ga. 834, 295 S.E.2d 86 (1982); Williams v. State, 163 Ga. App. 541, 295 S.E.2d 212 (1982); Johnson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 7, 296 S.E.2d 202 (1982); Gunn v. State, 163 Ga. App. 906, 296 S.E.2d 221 (1982); Adams v. State, 164 Ga. App. 295, 297 S.E.2d 77 (1982); Jones v. Kemp, 678 F.2d 929 (11th Cir. 1982); Scott v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Weaver v. State, 169 Ga. App. 890, 315 S.E.2d 467 (1984); Craig v. State, 170 Ga. App. 6, 316 S.E.2d 18 (1984); Walker v. State, 172 Ga. App. 7, 321 S.E.2d 772 (1984); Wallace v. State, 175 Ga. App. 685, 333 S.E.2d 874 (1985); Tenner v. Wallace, 615 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ga. 1985); Todd v. State, 184 Ga. App. 750, 362 S.E.2d 400 (1987); Crews v. State, 185 Ga. App. 494, 364 S.E.2d 625 (1988); Crumpton v. State, 185 Ga. App. 735, 365 S.E.2d 536 (1988); Curtis v. State, 190 Ga. App. 173, 378 S.E.2d 516 (1989); Davis v. State, 198 Ga. App. 375, 401 S.E.2d 581 (1991); Wright v. State, 220 Ga. App. 233, 469 S.E.2d 381 (1996); Blankenship v. State, 223 Ga. App. 264, 477 S.E.2d 397 (1996); Scruggs v. State, 227 Ga. App. 35, 488 S.E.2d 110 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Willis v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 685 (Ga. 2018); Brown v. State, 230 Ga. App. 190, 495 S.E.2d 858 (1998); Selley v. State, 237 Ga. App. 47, 514 S.E.2d 706 (1999); Ruffin v. State, 252 Ga. App. 289, 556 S.E.2d 191 (2001); Butler v. State, 294 Ga. App. 540, 669 S.E.2d 525 (2008); Davis v. State, 319 Ga. App. 501, 736 S.E.2d 160 (2012).

Essential elements of offense of receiving stolen goods are: (1) that the accused bought or received the goods; (2) that the goods had been stolen by some person other than the accused; (3) that at the time of so doing the accused knew the same had been stolen; and (4) that in so doing the accused acted with criminal intent. Suggs v. State, 59 Ga. App. 331, 1 S.E.2d 39 (1939); Austin v. State, 89 Ga. App. 866, 81 S.E.2d 508 (1954).

Defendant's claim that defendant acquired stolen tools worth $800.00 by trading a dog worth $50.00 was sufficient circumstantial evidence alone to authorize defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property. Evidence that defendant knew that others had stolen company tools in the past supported a finding that defendant knew that the tools were stolen. Brown v. State, 265 Ga. App. 613, 594 S.E.2d 770 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, as the state introduced sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that the bathtub in the back of the defendant's truck had been stolen from the house, that the defendant knew or should have known that it was stolen, and that the defendant had acquired possession of it; however, since the state did not prove that the actual fair market value of the bathtub exceeded $500.00, the trial court erred in imposing a felony sentence as only a misdemeanor sentence was authorized. DeLong v. State, 270 Ga. App. 173, 606 S.E.2d 107 (2004).

Revocation of the defendant's probation based on theft by receiving was clearly erroneous after a stolen vehicle was seen at the defendant's home and later found in a yard next door to the defendant's home, but there was no evidence that the defendant was ever in possession or control of the vehicle, which was a necessary element of theft by receiving. Gonzales v. State, 276 Ga. App. 11, 622 S.E.2d 401 (2005).

Scienter is essential element of crime of receiving stolen goods and must be proved to warrant conviction. McGill v. State, 106 Ga. App. 482, 127 S.E.2d 332 (1962).

Knowledge and intent, being peculiarly subjective, may be inferred from circumstances. Washington v. State, 96 Ga. App. 844, 101 S.E.2d 885 (1958).

While the test of guilt in the offense of knowingly receiving stolen goods is not what an ordinarily reasonable man would believe, but what the defendant did in fact know, nevertheless, the jury may consider all the circumstances of the case in drawing its inference as to such knowledge. Hardy v. State, 100 Ga. App. 88, 110 S.E.2d 82 (1959).

Because the defendant borrowed a car in exchange for crack cocaine, and knew that the person lending the defendant the car did automobile body work for others and that the car was clearly undergoing body work, sufficient evidence supported the conviction for receiving stolen property under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a); a jury could have found that the defendant knew or should have known that the lender had no authority to loan the car and that the lender had converted the car to the lender's own use by renting the car to defendant in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-4(a), prohibiting theft by conversion, and O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, prohibiting theft by taking. McKinney v. State, 276 Ga. App. 75, 622 S.E.2d 427 (2005).

Circumstances to be considered include contradictory statements by the defendant, as well as facts which the jury might find sufficient to excite the suspicions of a man of ordinary prudence. Austin v. State, 89 Ga. App. 866, 81 S.E.2d 508 (1954).

Contradictory statement made by defendant coupled with apparent nonexistence of the person from whom defendant contended to have gotten the car, the place where defendant said defendant received it, and other circumstances, authorized the jury to find that the defendant received the automobile knowing it to have been stolen. Austin v. State, 89 Ga. App. 866, 81 S.E.2d 508 (1954).

- It is not a requirement of present law that the state prove the accused did not steal the goods. Weidendorf v. State, 215 Ga. App. 129, 449 S.E.2d 675 (1994).

Proof that the defendant knew or should have known that a gun the defendant tried to pawn was stolen was an essential element of the crime of receiving stolen property, and a conviction was reversed since the evidence showed no more than the defendant's possession of a stolen gun; no inference of guilty knowledge could have been drawn solely from the fact that the defendant tried to pawn the stolen gun and the evidence showed no additional circumstances from which a jury could rationally have inferred that the defendant knew or should have known that the gun was stolen. Wells v. State, 268 Ga. App. 62, 601 S.E.2d 433 (2004).

Knowledge that goods are stolen may well be deduced from conduct and behavior, the character of the person from whom received, and the kind of goods. Prather v. State, 116 Ga. App. 696, 158 S.E.2d 291 (1967).

Essence of crime of theft by receiving stolen property is that the defendant, with knowledge of the facts and without intent to return it to the owner, bought or obtained property which had been stolen by some person other than the defendant. Clark v. State, 144 Ga. App. 69, 240 S.E.2d 270 (1977); Dyer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 760, 258 S.E.2d 620 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Redding v. State, 192 Ga. App. 325, 384 S.E.2d 910 (1989).

- Defendant who is guilty of receiving stolen goods must hold the goods with knowledge that the goods are the property of another. Knowledge that goods have been stolen is felonious knowledge, and is the gist of the offense. Causey v. State, 139 Ga. App. 499, 229 S.E.2d 1 (1976).

Evidence that a defendant was in possession of a handgun that was labeled for law enforcement use did not support the defendant's conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) for theft by receiving stolen property as the label did not by itself establish the requisite knowledge that the handgun was stolen; the label did not exclude the possibility that the handgun had been given away or sold on the black market prior to the defendant purchasing the handgun. White v. State, 283 Ga. 566, 662 S.E.2d 131 (2008).

Evidence that a defendant possessed a cell phone, a debit card, and women's jewelry, all of which had been stolen a day earlier, while the defendant attempted to climb into a stranger's home, along with evidence that the defendant attempted to flee when caught climbing in the window, was sufficient to support convictions for criminal trespass and felony theft by receiving stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-21(b)(1) and16-8-7(a). Reese v. State, 313 Ga. App. 746, 722 S.E.2d 441 (2012).

Juvenile's adjudication of delinquency for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), theft by receiving, was supported by evidence of flight, the defendant's proximity to stolen items in the woods, the location of stolen items in the defendant's bedroom the day after the theft, and phone photographs of the juvenile with the stolen items including watches and firearms. In the Interest of T. J. J, 329 Ga. App. 537, 765 S.E.2d 704 (2014).

Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), was reversed because the firearm had been reported missing two months earlier, the defendant stated that the defendant had just bought the gun from a person the defendant did not know, and there was no evidence that the defendant knew or should have known that the firearm was stolen. McMurray v. State, 355 Ga. App. 420, 844 S.E.2d 303 (2020).

Knowledge that goods are stolen is an essential element of an offense under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7. Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396, 283 S.E.2d 625 (1981); Abner v. State, 196 Ga. App. 752, 397 S.E.2d 36 (1990).

Knowledge that goods were stolen when the defendant receives the goods is an essential element of the crime of theft by receiving stolen property. Hudgins v. State, 125 Ga. App. 576, 188 S.E.2d 430 (1972); Parrott v. State, 134 Ga. App. 160, 214 S.E.2d 3 (1975); Williamson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 329, 214 S.E.2d 415 (1975); Shorts v. State, 137 Ga. App. 314, 223 S.E.2d 504 (1976); LaRoche v. State, 140 Ga. App. 509, 231 S.E.2d 368 (1976); Saunders v. State, 145 Ga. App. 248, 243 S.E.2d 668 (1978); Davis v. State, 153 Ga. App. 847, 267 S.E.2d 263 (1980); Watts v. State, 157 Ga. App. 214, 276 S.E.2d 884 (1981).

Essential element of theft by receiving stolen property is that a person receives stolen property "which he knows or should know was stolen." Ingram v. State, 160 Ga. App. 300, 287 S.E.2d 304 (1981).

Knowledge requirement for theft by receiving is satisfied if the defendant either "knows or should know" the property was stolen. State v. Bradbury, 167 Ga. App. 390, 306 S.E.2d 346 (1983).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict that the defendant possessed a stolen motor vehicle under circumstances when the defendant knew or, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, should have known the vehicle was stolen since: (1) prior inconsistent statements of a witness were admissible as substantive evidence that the defendant possessed the stolen car within 72 hours after the loss was reported and that the car at that time had a shattered windshield and was missing all four hubcaps; (2) in addition to the strange appearance of the vehicle, the defendant abandoned the car after being spotted by the police, apparently in such haste that the defendant left behind the defendant's wallet containing the defendant's identification; and (3) someone had attempted to conceal the nature of the car as stolen by substituting an Alabama license plate for the owner's North Carolina tag, and the next day, the defendant was driving a different vehicle, also with a stolen Alabama tag. Graham v. State, 236 Ga. App. 673, 512 S.E.2d 921 (1999).

Jury was authorized to infer the defendant's guilty knowledge from evidence of the defendant's flight and from the similar transaction evidence adduced; further, since the defendant waived the defendant's privilege to remain silent, the defendant's refusal to answer the prosecutor's questions regarding the defendant's possession of the car could also be considered as evidence of the defendant's guilty knowledge. Reedman v. State, 265 Ga. App. 162, 593 S.E.2d 46 (2003).

Defendant's knowledge that the property the defendant possessed was stolen was sufficiently proved because the friend testified that the defendant said defendant got an automobile in the defendant's possession from "one of the jobs where he had been entering people's homes," and a jury was entitled to believe this testimony and infer that the defendant knew the car was stolen. Johnson v. State, 276 Ga. App. 505, 623 S.E.2d 706 (2005).

Guilty knowledge may be shown by circumstances which would excite suspicion in mind of ordinarily prudent man. Hudgins v. State, 125 Ga. App. 576, 188 S.E.2d 430 (1972); Parrott v. State, 134 Ga. App. 160, 214 S.E.2d 3 (1975); Williamson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 329, 214 S.E.2d 415 (1975); Shorts v. State, 137 Ga. App. 314, 223 S.E.2d 504 (1976); LaRoche v. State, 140 Ga. App. 509, 231 S.E.2d 368 (1976); Saunders v. State, 145 Ga. App. 248, 243 S.E.2d 668 (1978); Barfield v. State, 149 Ga. App. 166, 253 S.E.2d 781 (1979); Brown v. State, 177 Ga. App. 778, 341 S.E.2d 226 (1986).

This guilty knowledge may be inferred from circumstances which would excite suspicion in the mind of an ordinarily prudent man. Beadles v. State, 151 Ga. App. 710, 261 S.E.2d 447 (1979); Watts v. State, 157 Ga. App. 214, 276 S.E.2d 884 (1981); Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396, 283 S.E.2d 625 (1981).

Gist of offense is actual state of defendant's mind when the defendant purchased property. Davis v. State, 119 Ga. App. 740, 168 S.E.2d 784 (1969).

Evidence that the defendant was present when the accomplice took another person's jewelry, which the accomplice placed on the front seat of the vehicle in which the defendant and the accomplice were riding, and that the accomplice then took the jewelry into a pawn shop several hours later and returned with cash, and without the jewelry, was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a). Gray v. State, 257 Ga. App. 393, 571 S.E.2d 435 (2002).

- State must present evidence which sufficiently identifies the goods found in the defendant's possession as being the same goods which were stolen. Causey v. State, 139 Ga. App. 499, 229 S.E.2d 1 (1976).

When identification of an exhibit as a stolen handgun was based solely upon nonprobative hearsay statements, there was no proof of a larcenous taking, and the defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property was reversed. Johnson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 356, 511 S.E.2d 921 (1999).

"After the fact knowledge" would tend to show guilty retention and will sustain conviction. Johnson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 768, 219 S.E.2d 25 (1975).

Any language in past cases indicating that only evidence of guilty knowledge at the time the goods were received will warrant conviction, is no longer controlling because the present law expressly mentions retention. Johnson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 768, 219 S.E.2d 25 (1975).

Retention of stolen property which a person knows or should know is stolen, without intent to restore it to the owner, will sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property even where guilty knowledge at the time of the acquisition of the stolen property is not shown. Poole v. State, 144 Ga. App. 228, 240 S.E.2d 775 (1977).

After the fact knowledge that goods are stolen and retention of the goods constitutes retaining stolen property and will support a conviction. Bremer v. State, 148 Ga. App. 461, 251 S.E.2d 355 (1978).

Included Crimes

Theft by receiving is not lesser included offense of theft by taking.

- These two crimes are so mutually exclusive that the thief and the receiver cannot even be accomplices. Sosbee v. State, 155 Ga. App. 196, 270 S.E.2d 367 (1980).

One cannot be convicted of both robbery of a vehicle and theft by receiving that vehicle. Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. 854, 413 S.E.2d 196 (1992).

Defendant could not be convicted of armed robbery of a car and theft by receiving the same car because the offenses were mutually exclusive and the convictions were based on proof sufficient to authorize conviction on either offense. Camsler v. State, 211 Ga. App. 826, 440 S.E.2d 681 (1994).

Trial court did not err in failing to give a requested jury instruction on a lesser offense of theft by receiving stolen property as theft by receiving stolen property is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery, theft by taking, or hijacking a motor vehicle. Mullins v. State, 267 Ga. App. 393, 599 S.E.2d 340 (2004).

Theft by receiving stolen property, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), was not a lesser included offense of theft by taking under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 because applying the required evidence test each crime required proof that the other did not; the former required a showing that the defendant knew or should have known that the gun the victim wanted to sell was stolen while the latter required that the defendant took the gun from the victim with intent to deprive the victim of the gun. Peoples v. State, 295 Ga. App. 731, 673 S.E.2d 82 (2009).

- It is not error for the trial court, in the absence of a written request, to fail to charge on the lesser crime of theft by receiving. Jacobs v. State, 140 Ga. App. 410, 231 S.E.2d 155 (1976).

As a matter of fact or of law, theft by receiving is not a lesser included offense of burglary. State v. Bolton, 144 Ga. App. 797, 242 S.E.2d 378 (1978).

Theft by taking, but not theft by receiving, may be lesser included offense to burglary. Breland v. Smith, 247 Ga. 690, 279 S.E.2d 204 (1981).

Because theft by receiving is not a lesser included offense of burglary, the trial court's reduction of the charge against appellant from burglary to theft by receiving was error as the bill of indictment did not charge the appellant with theft by receiving. Holloman v. State, 168 Ga. App. 683, 310 S.E.2d 734 (1983).

Theft by receiving stolen property contains elements not present in offense of burglary; only an intent to commit theft is required, not the completed act. Gearin v. State, 127 Ga. App. 811, 195 S.E.2d 211 (1973).

- Defendants' convictions for the crimes of burglary and theft by receiving as to one residence were reversed as one cannot be a principal thief of stolen property and at the same time be convicted of theft by receiving the same property. Clark v. State, 289 Ga. App. 612, 658 S.E.2d 190 (2008).

- After the defendant was indicted in Fulton County on charges of armed robbery and hijacking of a motor vehicle, but the defendant had been previously convicted in Clayton County of theft by receiving stolen property by retaining the same car on the same day, the defendant's plea in bar and motion to dismiss the Fulton County indictment was improperly denied as the charges in the Fulton County case were mutually exclusive of the defendant's prior conviction for theft by receiving because the theft by receiving conviction contained an implicit and necessary finding that the defendant did not steal the car, and the charges of armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle each required proof that the defendant actually took the car. Bonner v. State, 339 Ga. App. 539, 794 S.E.2d 186 (2016).

- Jury returned verdicts that were legally and logically irreconcilable when the jury found the defendant guilty of hijacking a motor vehicle, necessarily finding that the defendant was the principal thief of the motor vehicle, and also finding the defendant guilty of theft by receiving for retaining the same motor vehicle, finding that the defendant was not the principal thief of that vehicle. Accordingly, the defendant's convictions on those two counts were mutually exclusive. Middleton v. State, Ga. , 846 S.E.2d 73 (2020).

Burden of Proof

State's burden of proof.

- Although one admits buying and receiving goods shown by undisputed evidence to have been stolen, the burden is still upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the transaction occurred with guilty knowledge on the part of the accused. Prather v. State, 116 Ga. App. 696, 158 S.E.2d 291 (1967).

It need not be alleged or proved that defendant received goods directly from principal thief, provided defendant received the goods knowing the goods to have been stolen. Anderson v. State, 113 Ga. App. 670, 149 S.E.2d 398 (1966).

When an indictment charges the defendant with knowingly buying and receiving stolen goods, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant knowingly received the stolen goods from the principal thief, but if it is proved that the defendant received the goods, knowing the goods to be stolen, from any person whatsoever, the defendant would be guilty. Gaspin v. State, 76 Ga. App. 375, 45 S.E.2d 785 (1947); Tucker v. State, 94 Ga. App. 468, 95 S.E.2d 296 (1956).

- Law does not put the burden upon the possessor of stolen goods of proving that the possessor was not guilty of receiving the goods knowingly. Gaskin v. State, 119 Ga. App. 593, 168 S.E.2d 183 (1969) (for comment, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 481 (1971)).

When the principal thief is unknown, there is no burden on the state of proving that such thief was not the defendant. Poole v. State, 144 Ga. App. 228, 240 S.E.2d 775 (1977); Duke v. State, 153 Ga. App. 204, 264 S.E.2d 721 (1980).

- Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for acquittal made on the ground that the state failed to prove ownership of the stolen vehicles given certain inaccuracies as to title in the indictment since these variances neither misinformed the accused of the charges against the accused nor left the accused subject to subsequent prosecutions for the same offense. Holbrook v. State, 209 Ga. App. 301, 433 S.E.2d 616 (1993).

Charge should include whole of section; a deletion or omission of the portion "unless the property is received, disposed of, or retained with intent to restore it to the owner," was error. Boorstine v. State, 126 Ga. App. 90, 190 S.E.2d 83 (1972).

Charge of receiving stolen goods is equal charge to theft by taking and the punishment is the same. McRoy v. State, 131 Ga. App. 307, 205 S.E.2d 445 (1974).

- In a theft by receiving stolen goods trial, whether the explanation of the possession offered by the defendant in defendant's statement alone is a satisfactory explanation, is a question for the jury. Beadles v. State, 151 Ga. App. 710, 261 S.E.2d 447 (1979).

- When the evidence so authorizes, a jury must be instructed that the jury can convict of either robbery or theft by receiving, but not both. Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. 854, 413 S.E.2d 196 (1992).

- Defendant's oral request for a jury instruction on theft by receiving stolen property was properly denied because it is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery. Hawkins v. State, 242 Ga. App. 603, 528 S.E.2d 853 (2000).

Because theft by receiving stolen property is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery, a defendant charged with two counts of party to the crime of armed robbery was not entitled to a jury instruction on theft by receiving stolen property. Dean v. State, 292 Ga. App. 695, 665 S.E.2d 406 (2008).

- Although the issue was moot, it was error in refusing to instruct the jury as to mere passenger. Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. App. 882, 637 S.E.2d 480 (2006).

Application

Defendant unaware vehicle was stolen.

- When all the evidence indicated that the defendant was simply along for the ride in a stolen van, and evidence was lacking that the defendant ever possessed or controlled the van or affirmatively acted as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, adjudication of delinquency for theft by receiving stolen property was erroneous. In re C.W., 226 Ga. App. 30, 485 S.E.2d 561 (1997); Harris v. State, 247 Ga. App. 41, 543 S.E.2d 75 (2000).

Juvenile court erred by adjudicating the defendant juvenile delinquent for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) by committing theft by receiving a stolen motorcycle because the evidence did not support the finding that the defendant should have known that the motorcycle was stolen; the defendant's testimony permitted an inference that only after learning of the theft did the defendant realize that the motorcycle was stolen, the defendant rode the motorcycle on the street in front of the victim's house, and there was no evidence that the defendant tried to conceal the motorcycle; absent evidence of the real value of the motorcycle at the time of the theft, the evidence did not support a finding that the price the defendant offered to pay for the motorcycle was grossly disproportionate to the value. In re J. L., 306 Ga. App. 89, 701 S.E.2d 564 (2010).

- State met the state's burden of proof and introduced sufficient evidence to convict the defendant on the charge of theft by receiving stolen property as the state introduced similar transaction evidence to show that the defendant, under similar circumstances about three years earlier, attempted to elude police while driving a car that the defendant knew was stolen, and such evidence was enough to allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the car the defendant used to try and elude police was stolen. Dorsey v. State, 261 Ga. App. 181, 582 S.E.2d 158 (2003).

Defendant was convicted of two counts of theft by receiving stolen property after VIN numbers had been falsified and the cars reported stolen and, furthermore, the defendant was unable to produce any paperwork supporting defendant's claimed lawful ownership. Clarke v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 8, 2020).

Buying at price grossly less than real value should excite suspicion in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable man. Hudgins v. State, 125 Ga. App. 576, 188 S.E.2d 430 (1972); LaRoche v. State, 140 Ga. App. 509, 231 S.E.2d 368 (1976); Moore v. State, 171 Ga. App. 911, 321 S.E.2d 413 (1984).

When it is shown that property was bought at a price grossly less than the property's value, the knowledge required by statute may be inferred and a conviction is authorized. Hudgins v. State, 125 Ga. App. 576, 188 S.E.2d 430 (1972).

Evidence of the purchase of property at a price grossly less than the real value is very often a sufficient circumstance to excite suspicion. Watts v. State, 157 Ga. App. 214, 276 S.E.2d 884 (1981).

Knowledge that goods are stolen is an essential element of the crime of theft by receiving stolen property. This guilty knowledge may be inferred from circumstances which would excite suspicion in the mind of an ordinary prudent man. Buying at a price grossly less than the real value is a sufficient circumstance to excite suspicion. Whitehead v. State, 169 Ga. App. 518, 313 S.E.2d 775 (1984); Maxwell v. State, 182 Ga. App. 571, 356 S.E.2d 533 (1987).

- Evidence that approximately 100 pieces of silverware were marked with the name "Ewing" would authorize the jury to find that this marking was an indication that this property did not belong to the defendant's companion, and that it would place defendant on notice as to its questionable origin. Barfield v. State, 149 Ga. App. 166, 253 S.E.2d 781 (1979).

- There was evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded that the defendant passenger was aware during the two hours that defendant spent in the small vehicle that it was stolen, in that the vehicle was being driven without keys, the steering wheel was damaged and the interior was disorderly, which was inconsistent both with the driver's ownership of the vehicle and with the driver's explanation that the driver borrowed it from a relative. The defendant's suspicious behavior at the convenience store and defendant's attempt to flee also indicated that defendant knew the vehicle was stolen. Hurston v. State, 202 Ga. App. 311, 414 S.E.2d 303 (1991).

Jury could infer knowledge that two rifles were stolen based upon the defendant's contradictory statements as to how the defendant came to possess the rifles and the character of the person from whom the rifles were received. Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 32, 561 S.E.2d 810 (2002).

Evidence provided ample support for jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of theft by receiving stolen property as it showed that defendant knew the vehicle tag on the stolen vehicle was stolen and that defendant did not intend to restore the tag to its rightful owner. Rose v. State, 258 Ga. App. 232, 573 S.E.2d 465 (2002).

Circumstantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, armed robbery, cruelty to children, theft by receiving stolen property, and possession of a firearm where: (1) defendant was driving a stolen car that the defendant knew was not the defendant's; (2) the defendant returned to the victims' house, which the defendant had left only a short time before, slowly circling the victims' residence, pointing at the house; (3) the defendant appeared to let codefendants out of the car for a specific purpose, since the defendant saw them enter the victims' home and waited for them, demonstrating that the defendant knew they would return shortly; (4) when codefendants ran back to the car and jumped in, defendant drove off in response to their rapid return; and (5) shortly thereafter, defendant abandoned the stolen car. Parnell v. State, 260 Ga. App. 213, 581 S.E.2d 263 (2003).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for theft of stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), because the defendant was driving one truck when the defendant was arrested for the crimes, and as to the other truck which was parked on property where the defendant was residing, there was sufficient evidence from the condition of the truck, which had an ignition that was tampered with and the name of a company that it was stolen from on the side, together with other evidence, that allowed an inference that defendant knew or should have known that the truck was stolen. Wynn v. State, 271 Ga. App. 10, 609 S.E.2d 97 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported a conviction for theft by receiving stolen property under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) because, while there was insufficient evidence that the DVD player found in the trash can belonging to the defendant's uncle was the same one that was stolen from the victim's residence, the state presented sufficient evidence that the racing jacket found in the trash can was the same one that was stolen from the victim's residence since the victim identified the brand, style, and color scheme of the jacket; testimony that the defendant told the uncle that the items in the trash can belonged to the defendant was sufficient to establish that the defendant had exercised control over the jacket, and the defendant's statement to the uncle that the defendant did not want the police to think that the defendant had stolen the jacket in the trash can, made at the same time that a police vehicle was parked across the street, demonstrated knowledge that the items were stolen. Duncan v. State, 278 Ga. App. 703, 629 S.E.2d 577 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence that the defendant, who was convicted of theft by receiving, knew that the two riding lawnmowers that the defendant sold were stolen. The defendant sold the lawn mowers at a grossly low price; the defendant simply knocked on an acquaintance's door to sell that buyer the first lawnmower and approached the second buyer, a stranger, through the buyer's employee to sell the other lawnmower; and the defendant lied to the second buyer that the lawnmower belonged to the defendant's allegedly deceased grandparent. Martin v. State, 300 Ga. App. 39, 684 S.E.2d 111 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), because the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the requisite knowledge that the four-wheeler had been stolen. The witness, who acquired the four-wheeler from a dealer by false pretenses, met with the defendant an hour or two later behind a motel and sold the four-wheeler to the defendant, whom the witness did not know, for cash and drugs in a meeting that was arranged by a third-party. Gillis v. State, 315 Ga. App. 803, 728 S.E.2d 324 (2012).

- Defendant could not be convicted of both armed robbery and theft by receiving because those crimes were mutually exclusive. By finding the defendant guilty of armed robbery, the jury necessarily found that the defendant was the person who had stolen the victim's purse and cellphone during the armed robbery and, thus, the defendant was the principal in the theft and could not also be guilty of receiving the same property. Turner v. State, 353 Ga. App. 741, 839 S.E.2d 310 (2020).

- Retention of stolen property which a person knows or should know is stolen without intent to restore the property to the owner will sustain conviction even when guilty knowledge at time of acquisition is not shown. Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396, 283 S.E.2d 625 (1981).

- Police officer's testimony concerning defendant's entry into an automobile and defendant's attempt to start the vehicle was evidence that defendant possessed or was in control of the automobile. Preston v. State, 183 Ga. App. 20, 357 S.E.2d 825, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 357 S.E.2d 825 (1987).

Trial court erred by adjudicating juvenile delinquent of theft by receiving stolen property since the only evidence tending to suggest that the juvenile acquired possession or controlled the vehicle was uncorroborated accomplice testimony. In the Interest of D.J., 253 Ga. App. 265, 558 S.E.2d 806 (2002).

Defendant's adjudication as delinquent for committing theft by receiving stolen property, a motor vehicle, was reversed on appeal since there was no evidence that the defendant ever possessed or controlled the car under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) or affirmatively acted as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. The defendant's mere presence as a passenger in the vehicle and the presence of a gasoline tank in the back seat where the defendant was observed sitting was insufficient to support any finding of guilt. In the Interest of J.Q.W., 288 Ga. App. 444, 654 S.E.2d 424 (2007).

Regarding the defendants' convictions for burglary and theft by receiving stolen property, sufficient evidence authorized the jury's decision to reject one defendant's version of events - that defendants believed that the property involved belonged to an accomplice - because, with regard to one of the burglarized residences, the fact that defendants were unsuccessful in taking anything from the home was irrelevant to the burglary convictions since the crime was completed upon entry into the dwelling. As to the second residence, the fact that the property from that residence was found in the vehicle in which the defendants were in was sufficient to establish that the property had been stolen. Clark v. State, 289 Ga. App. 612, 658 S.E.2d 190 (2008).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for receiving stolen property because the evidence undisputedly demonstrated that the van had been stolen mere hours before the defendant was observed by deputies driving the van and when the deputies attempted to detain the defendant, the defendant attempted to strike two of them with the van and then fled the scene in the van. Miller v. State, 351 Ga. App. 757, 833 S.E.2d 142 (2019).

- When a suspect later identified as the defendant was pursued and apprehended within the immediate vicinity of a stolen rental truck, and the key to the rental truck was found in the defendant's pocket, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a trier of fact to find that the defendant retained the truck within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7. Floyd v. State, 207 Ga. App. 275, 427 S.E.2d 605 (1993).

- Stolen guns found in an abandoned and dilapidated trailer on property where the defendant lived with the defendant's parent did not support a conviction for theft by receiving under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) because the state did not show the defendant's control or possession of the trailer or the guns. Mock v. State, 306 Ga. App. 93, 701 S.E.2d 567 (2010).

- In some circumstances, a passenger may possess, control or retain a vehicle for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7. Hurston v. State, 202 Ga. App. 311, 414 S.E.2d 303 (1991).

- When appellant was placed in the trunk of a car or appellant's liberty otherwise restricted by being subjected involuntarily to the will of coconspirators, the coconspirators were in control and possession of this stolen automobile sufficient to support appellant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a). Watkins v. State, 207 Ga. App. 766, 430 S.E.2d 105 (1993), overruled on other grounds, West v. Waters, 272 Ga. 591, 533 S.E.2d 88 (2000).

Proof of possession of recently stolen property will not authorize inference that possessor received it with knowledge that the property was stolen. Shorts v. State, 137 Ga. App. 314, 223 S.E.2d 504 (1976); LaRoche v. State, 140 Ga. App. 509, 231 S.E.2d 368 (1976); Curry v. State, 144 Ga. App. 129, 240 S.E.2d 280 (1977); Watts v. State, 157 Ga. App. 214, 276 S.E.2d 884 (1981).

Fact that the defendant had possession of a stolen car was not alone sufficient to authorize a conviction for the offense of theft by knowingly receiving stolen property. Heard v. State, 126 Ga. App. 62, 189 S.E.2d 895 (1972).

Possession of stolen property alone is not sufficient to show guilty knowledge; however, possession together with other circumstances and evidence may be used to infer knowledge required by O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7. Ingram v. State, 160 Ga. App. 300, 287 S.E.2d 304 (1981).

Unexplained possession of recently stolen goods is not sufficient in itself to authorize conviction for receiving stolen goods. Pate v. State, 158 Ga. App. 395, 280 S.E.2d 414 (1981); Harris v. State, 239 Ga. App. 723, 521 S.E.2d 864 (1999).

In prosecution for receiving stolen property, judge's instruction to jury that recent possession of stolen property without satisfactory explanation is sufficient to establish criminal intent was error despite proper instruction on burden of proving criminal intent, and required reversal. Williams v. State, 159 Ga. App. 865, 285 S.E.2d 597 (1981).

Possession of stolen goods coupled with other circumstances and evidence may be used to infer knowledge, required by statute, that the goods were stolen. Beadles v. State, 151 Ga. App. 710, 261 S.E.2d 447 (1979); Pate v. State, 158 Ga. App. 395, 280 S.E.2d 414 (1981); Pruiett v. State, 159 Ga. App. 396, 283 S.E.2d 625 (1981); Wilson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 791, 440 S.E.2d 534 (1994); Shaheed v. State, 245 Ga. App. 754, 538 S.E.2d 823 (2000).

Unexplained possession of recently stolen property can be used in conjunction with other evidence to infer guilty knowledge, but standing alone the possession will not support the inference or authorize a conviction for the offense of theft by receiving stolen property. Curry v. State, 144 Ga. App. 129, 240 S.E.2d 280 (1977); James v. State, 150 Ga. App. 357, 258 S.E.2d 40 (1979).

Mere proof of possession, even though in the absence of an explanation, is not enough evidence to support a verdict of guilty of the offense of theft by receiving stolen property, but such possession, coupled with facts and circumstances from which knowledge may be inferred that the property so received was stolen, is sufficient to support the verdict. Cheek v. State, 170 Ga. App. 230, 316 S.E.2d 583 (1984).

Unexplained possession of recently stolen property, alone, is not sufficient to support a conviction for receiving stolen property, but guilt may be inferred from possession in conjunction with other evidence of knowledge. Abner v. State, 196 Ga. App. 752, 397 S.E.2d 36 (1990).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7 because the defendant was driving a stolen van only a few hours after the van was stolen, and there was an inference of guilt by the defendant's use of a false name to police. Naillon v. State, 276 Ga. App. 799, 625 S.E.2d 73 (2005).

- There is no authority which, as a matter of law, requires that proof of possession of goods taken in burglary must show "recent possession" in order for this evidence to corroborate accomplice's testimony. Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981).

Evidence showing manner in which defendant disposed of stolen vehicle is sufficient to establish guilty knowledge essential to support a conviction for theft by receiving stolen property. Callahan v. State, 148 Ga. App. 555, 251 S.E.2d 790 (1978).

Proof of from whom stolen article was received is not essential element of the crime of receiving stolen property. Abercrombie v. State, 145 Ga. App. 204, 243 S.E.2d 567 (1978).

- Element which amply justifies the conclusion of the jury that the defendant knew or should have known that the goods were stolen is the defendant's own admission that at the time the defendant received the item the defendant got the item through a shady deal or by means other than legal. Heilman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 775, 209 S.E.2d 220 (1974).

- Rational trier of fact could conclude that the juvenile knowingly came into possession of a stolen purse, and that the juvenile committed an act, which, if the juvenile were an adult, constituted the crime of theft by receiving as the purse was hidden in the juvenile's bedroom of which the juvenile had some degree of control and privacy. In the Interest of R.W., 257 Ga. App. 488, 571 S.E.2d 485 (2002).

There was sufficient evidence supporting an adjudication of juvenile delinquency based upon theft by receiving under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a); because the 14-year-old defendant could not drive, the defendant had no legitimate reason for possessing the key to a stolen car, which was silver, the defendant's sibling stated that the defendant had been bragging about driving a silver car, and the stolen car was found near the defendant's home. In the Interest of C.S., 284 Ga. App. 759, 644 S.E.2d 894 (2007).

- One may be legally convicted of a felony, other than treason or perjury, where the only evidence directly connecting the person with the offense charged is the testimony of an accomplice, and where the only corroboration is the testimony of other accomplices. Berry v. State, 124 Ga. App. 31, 183 S.E.2d 48 (1971).

- Evidence authorized a finding that there was a conspiracy between the accused and a third party to associate themselves in the unlawful enterprise of knowingly buying and selling the stolen goods in question (cigarettes), and that the act of the third party, who knowingly bought them from the thief or thieves, in legal contemplation was the act of both, and hence that in contemplation of law defendant knowingly bought the stolen goods from the thief, or thieves; therefore, the allegation in the indictment that the accused received the goods from the thief did not constitute a fatal variance. Gaspin v. State, 76 Ga. App. 375, 45 S.E.2d 785 (1947).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction of theft by receiving stolen property. See Perry v. State, 180 Ga. App. 273, 349 S.E.2d 25 (1986); Parrott v. State, 188 Ga. App. 564, 373 S.E.2d 828 (1988); English v. State, 202 Ga. App. 751, 415 S.E.2d 659 (1992); Leachman v. State, 226 Ga. App. 98, 485 S.E.2d 587 (1997); Hash v. State, 226 Ga. App. 643, 487 S.E.2d 452 (1997); Wilson v. State, 227 Ga. App. 59, 488 S.E.2d 121 (1997); Dunbar v. State, 228 Ga. App. 104, 491 S.E.2d 166 (1997); Willis v. State, 239 Ga. App. 607, 521 S.E.2d 662 (1999); Denson v. State, 240 Ga. App. 207, 523 S.E.2d 62 (1999); Ingram v. State, 268 Ga. App. 149, 601 S.E.2d 736 (2004).

- Evidence which showed sale and delivery of stolen shirts on a Saturday night in the defendant's hotel room, the shirts being brought in at a side door, and payment by the defendant of a price for the shirts which was in great disparity to their real value, was sufficient to sustain conviction of receiving stolen property. Williams v. State, 98 Ga. App. 346, 105 S.E.2d 771 (1958).

- Evidence supported the defendant's conviction of theft by receiving stolen property and the defendant's sentence for a felony, since the defendant attempted to redeem a stolen lottery ticket, and thus was in receipt of the ticket at a time when it still had a redemption value of $5,000. Baker v. State, 234 Ga. App. 846, 507 S.E.2d 475 (1998).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendants' convictions for theft by receiving stolen property as a jury could reasonably believe that a wedding book found in the car being driven by the second defendant, and in which the first defendant was a passenger, was a book stolen from a married couple as one spouse identified the book and the book contained a notation stating that the book was dedicated to the couple. Haney v. State, 261 Ga. App. 136, 581 S.E.2d 626 (2003).

- Rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of theft by receiving stolen property, i.e., an automobile, since the defendant was observed getting into the vehicle immediately after a robbery, and a hammer exhibiting paint marks similar in color to that of the vehicle's broken steering column was found in the defendant's possession at the time of the defendant's arrest. Fair v. State, 198 Ga. App. 437, 401 S.E.2d 626 (1991).

Since a witness saw the defendant driving a van that had been stolen, the defendant lacked permission to use the van, there was no evidence that the defendant intended to return the van, and the defendant confessed to the defendant's love interest that the van was stolen, there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of theft by receiving in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a). Sexton v. State, 268 Ga. App. 736, 603 S.E.2d 66 (2004).

When a codefendant testified that the defendant was with the codefendant when the codefendant stole a truck, and another codefendant testified that it was obvious the truck was stolen since the ignition was damaged, there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant knew, or should have known, that the truck was stolen, and the defendant's conviction of theft by receiving the stolen truck was affirmed; there was also testimony, inter alia, that the defendant drove the truck and that the defendant's hat and guns were in the truck so the jury could have inferred that the defendant was in possession and control of the truck in Georgia. King v. State, 268 Ga. App. 811, 603 S.E.2d 88 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's theft by receiving stolen property conviction as there was no direct evidence as to who took the stolen car the defendant was driving at the time of the defendant's arrest, the defendant did not admit taking the car from the owner's driveway, and the defendant told the police that the defendant's cousin had purchased the car from the owner; in the absence of evidence proving that the defendant was the thief, the jury could infer that the defendant was guilty of theft by receiving. Petty v. State, 271 Ga. App. 547, 610 S.E.2d 169 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), since police who responded to a domestic disturbance call noticed a stolen vehicle behind an abandoned duplex, the defendant was found hidden in the duplex with the car keys, and the license plate on the stolen vehicle was registered in the defendant's name. Green v. State, 277 Ga. App. 867, 627 S.E.2d 914 (2006).

Defendant's warrantless arrest for theft under either O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2 or O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) was supported by probable cause as: (1) an officer observed the defendant banging on and breaking into a coin-operated air compressor in the middle of the night; (2) the officer recognized the air compressor as belonging to a gas station; (3) the officer had seen the defendant at the gas station less than 24 hours earlier; and (4) the defendant refused to provide information that would verify the claim that the defendant had lawfully obtained the compressor. Cole v. State, 273 Ga. App. 259, 614 S.E.2d 883 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of theft by receiving stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), and, thus, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1, because the defendant's vehicle was stopped for violating traffic laws, the defendant could not produce a driver's license or proof of insurance, the personal information the defendant gave conflicted with the information on the identification card, the vehicle defendant was driving had no vehicle tag, and the rental application found in the glove compartment along with the defendant's health insurance application showed that the car was rented to a person other than the defendant as the evidence showed that the defendant knew or should have known that the car was stolen. Richardson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 320, 620 S.E.2d 522 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for theft by receiving because the defendant admitted to participating in the theft of the mother-in-law's ring and was seen pawning the ring; the defendant also stipulated to the admission of polygraph examination results showing deception in the responses to direct questions about the defendant's involvement in the theft. Shelton v. State, 276 Ga. App. 685, 624 S.E.2d 262 (2005).

Because the defendant acted as lookout and immediately alerted an unidentified driver to the presence of a police officer, resulting in the unidentified driver's escaping, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aiding or abetting the unidentified driver in the crime of theft by receiving in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-8-7(a). Dixon v. State, 277 Ga. App. 656, 627 S.E.2d 406 (2006).

Because sufficient evidence as to the value of the stolen goods possessed by the defendant was presented, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on all the relevant issues, including value and the state's burden of proof, the defendant's convictions were upheld on appeal; moreover, the appeals court rejected the defendant's argument that the antique shop owners that the defendant tried to sell the stolen merchandise to were accomplices, as the owners could not have been indicted for the offense of theft by receiving stolen property and testified that they did not know the items were stolen. Price v. State, 283 Ga. App. 564, 642 S.E.2d 191 (2007).

There was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of theft by receiving stolen property, a car, since the defendant admitted that the defendant's fingerprints would be found in the car, the car was operated with a screwdriver, the car was used in the commission of an armed robbery in which the defendant participated, and the car had been parked in front of the defendant's apartment. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 866, 648 S.E.2d 183 (2007).

Sufficient evidence authorized the defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property because a testifying codefendant stated that the car the defendant drove on the night in question was stolen, had no keys in the ignition, and was operated by the use of a screwdriver; moreover, the defendant admitted to driving the car on that same night. Brown v. State, 289 Ga. App. 421, 657 S.E.2d 322 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to find a juvenile guilty of theft by receiving a stolen vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), as the juvenile was found guilty of the theft of the vehicle because the juvenile knew the vehicle was stolen yet got back in and used the vehicle for the juvenile's benefit. This evidence, combined with evidence that the vehicle was stolen from the juvenile's neighbor, was sufficient to establish that the juvenile knew the vehicle was stolen and that the juvenile had no right to exercise control over the vehicle. In the Interest of L.A., 292 Ga. App. 101, 663 S.E.2d 420 (2008).

While an assailant pointed a handgun to the victim's neck, the defendant and another assailant held and searched the victim and took the victim's cell phone and cash; the armed assailant, who had stolen the handgun, displayed the handgun to the others before the crimes were committed. Under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as an accomplice of theft by receiving and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Simpson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 760, 668 S.E.2d 451 (2008).

Evidence that auto parts and a shell of a stolen car lacking a vehicle identification number plate were found at the defendant's home, that the defendant was always working on cars, and that it was apparent that a lot of work on cars occurred at the home was sufficient to convict the defendant of theft by receiving a stolen car (O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a)) and operating a chop shop (O.C.G.A. § 16-8-82(1)). Xiong v. State, 295 Ga. App. 697, 673 S.E.2d 86 (2009).

Because the testimony of the victims in identifying the various items of property found at the defendant's residence and the circumstances of the disappearance of the items was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty of theft by receiving stolen property; the defendant was properly convicted of violating O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a). Allison v. State, 299 Ga. App. 542, 683 S.E.2d 104 (2009).

Although under Georgia law, a defendant could not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-8), the evidence corroborated some particulars of the accomplice's testimony implicating the codefendants in the charged crimes since all three of the victims from the three separate gas stations provided descriptions of their assailants that generally matched the codefendants and the accomplice, and all three victims also testified that their assailants brandished a handgun and a shotgun, which were indeed the weapons that were found at the scene where the stolen SUV crashed and where the accomplice was arrested. Accordingly, the evidence corroborating the accomplice's testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury's determination that the codefendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as parties to armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, hijacking a motor vehicle, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, theft by receiving, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41 (2010).

Under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, a person committed the offense of theft by receiving stolen property when the person received, disposed of, or retained stolen property which the person knew or should have known was stolen, and the state introduced testimony concerning the hijacking of that vehicle to show that the vehicle was stolen. Furthermore, the state was entitled to inform the jury of all the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime or crimes charged and the appellate court found no error in admitting the evidence as part of the res gestae even though it may have incidentally placed the codefendants' character in evidence. Daniels v. State, 306 Ga. App. 577, 703 S.E.2d 41 (2010).

Evidence at trial was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for two counts of armed robbery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a), and one count of theft by receiving stolen property, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), because the evidence showed that the defendant admitted to being present at the scene of the armed robberies, a victim identified the defendant in court as the person who robbed the victim at gunpoint, several items belonging to the victims were found in the defendant's home, the defendant and the defendant's girlfriend owned vehicles similar to those used in the robberies, and each victim testified that the robber worked in cooperation with an accomplice. Baker v. State, 307 Ga. App. 884, 706 S.E.2d 214 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C0940, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 517 (Ga. 2011).

Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving a stolen automobile was supported by evidence that the defendant had been driving a car without an ignition, which a witness assumed was stolen, and that the defendant and an accomplice went to see someone about a stolen automobile, which the accomplice and the defendant were planning to give back to the owner for a reward. Toro v. State, 319 Ga. App. 39, 735 S.E.2d 80 (2012).

- Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property was supported by the evidence as the state did not rely solely upon mere possession of a stolen dirt bike to support the state's case, but presented additional evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant knew or should have known that the bike was stolen, specifically, evidence that the brand new dirt bike had been physically abused in a manner inconsistent with ownership in a 24-hour period and that the dirt bike had been borrowed from an alleged friend with an unknown last name who disappeared after the defendant's arrest. Ridgeway v. State, 310 Ga. App. 6, 712 S.E.2d 84 (2011).

- Evidence corroborating an accomplice's testimony was sufficient to authorize the jury's determination that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft by receiving because in addition to the accomplice's testimony, a deputy with the county sheriff's office observed the accomplice and a codefendant appear to shoplift at a store, after which they got into the defendant's car; the defendant did not stop when police chased the defendant but instead continued to drive evasively while the codefendant threw items out of the passenger window, and there were no receipts showing that the items had been purchased. Dixson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 379, 721 S.E.2d 555 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the codefendants' convictions for theft by receiving stolen property and conspiracy to commit theft by receiving stolen property since the testimony was sufficient to show that items of value, owned by someone other than the codefendants, were recovered from a warehouse over which the codefendants had control. A witness's misstatements concerning the specific address of the warehouse did not render the evidence insufficient as to the location from where the stolen property was recovered. Robinson v. State, 312 Ga. App. 736, 719 S.E.2d 601 (2011).

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for felony theft by receiving stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) because the jury was authorized to find that a ruby and diamond ring exceeding $500 in value had been stolen from the victim's house, that the defendant had acquired possession of the ring, and that the defendant knew or should have known the ring was stolen; although the defendant asserted that the ring found in the defendant's possession did not belong to the victim, that was a question for the jury as the trier of fact, and the jury had no obligation to believe the defendant's claim. Hogues v. State, 313 Ga. App. 717, 722 S.E.2d 430 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of theft by receiving stolen property under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, when the defendant made contradictory statements to the investigator concerning whether the defendant had sold a gun to anyone and the defendant's statement that the defendant had acquired the shotgun two years earlier from a co-worker conflicted with the victim's testimony as to when the victim's truck was broken into and when the shotgun was stolen. Those conflicts in evidence created credibility issues regarding the circumstances surrounding the defendant's possession of the shotgun, which the fact finder resolved adversely to the defendant. Bradley v. State, 317 Ga. App. 477, 731 S.E.2d 371 (2012).

Evidence that the defendant possessed items stolen from a second victim and others was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for theft by receiving the second victim's stolen property. Reeves v. State, 329 Ga. App. 470, 765 S.E.2d 407 (2014).

- State's summary of the facts provided a factual basis for the trial court to accept a defendant's Alford plea to possession of stolen property and the trial court fulfilled the court's obligation to attempt to resolve the conflict between the defendant's claim of innocence and the decision to plead guilty. The trial court found that the defendant's claim not to have known a car was stolen was "incredible," it was a rational decision for the defendant to plead guilty. Cameron v. State, 295 Ga. App. 670, 673 S.E.2d 59 (2009).

- Since police officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for theft by receiving stolen property, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7, based on a determination that the defendant had admitted to having received, stored, and disposed of a stolen four-wheeler, their search incident to the arrest was legal and defendant's subsequent motion to suppress, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30, was properly denied. James v. State, 265 Ga. App. 660, 595 S.E.2d 359 (2004).

- When four sport coats and a suit that were recently stolen from a local department store were found in the defendant's bedroom closet, this evidence, along with evidence showing that stolen merchandise is often traded for illegal drugs and evidence that the defendant was guilty of trafficking in cocaine was sufficient to authorize the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of theft by receiving stolen property beyond a reasonable doubt. Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 335, 384 S.E.2d 920, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 384 S.E.2d 920 (1989).

- Evidence that purse in defendant's possession contained stolen credit cards and driver's license with a stranger's name imprinted thereon was sufficient to support conviction of theft by receiving stolen property. Stovall v. State, 167 Ga. App. 69, 306 S.E.2d 14 (1983).

There was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant was guilty of theft by receiving stolen property when stolen property was not found in any portion of the apartment (shared with a codefendant) over which the defendant had control or possession; the fact that stolen property is often traded for drugs and that the defendant was guilty of trafficking in cocaine was insufficient evidence to authorize a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was in possession or control of the stolen property. Owens v. State, 192 Ga. App. 335, 384 S.E.2d 920, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 902, 384 S.E.2d 920 (1989).

When there was no evidence that identified any original thief other than the defendant and the defendant admitted to taking the jewelry and pawning the jewelry, there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for theft by receiving stolen property. Phillips v. State, 269 Ga. App. 619, 604 S.E.2d 520 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property was reversed as there was no evidence that the defendant ever possessed or controlled the stolen car, or affirmatively acted as a party to the crime, since the state only presented the police officers' general statements that based on conversations with the suspects, the officers believed the suspects were linked to the vehicle, that the defendant had given the officers a false name, and that the men were wearing wet clothing, which might have indicated that the suspects attempted to hide from the officers; there was no evidence that the steering column was damaged, that the car was driven without keys, that the defendant had stolen property in the defendant's possession, or that the defendant admitted doubts as to the car's ownership. Morgan v. State, 280 Ga. App. 646, 634 S.E.2d 818 (2006).

Evidence did not support conviction for theft by receiving stolen property under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) since the evidence showed no more than defendant's possession of stolen stereo speakers, which defendant testified were purchased at a flea market before the defendant later pawned the speakers to obtain money for gasoline; the speakers bore no signs that would cause an ordinary prudent person to believe that the speakers had been stolen, and no inference of guilty knowledge could be drawn solely from the fact that the defendant pawned speakers nearly a month after the speakers were stolen. Smith v. State, 290 Ga. App. 689, 659 S.E.2d 917 (2008).

Evidence was insufficient to sustain the codefendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) because the fact that the codefendant purchased a handgun that was found in the codefendant's apartment and had been reported stolen "on the street" did not prove knowledge that the handgun was stolen; no evidence was presented as to the age of the handgun the codefendant purchased or whether the handgun had been fired, and there was no evidence that, at the time the codefendant bought the handgun, the handgun was worth the amounts a police officer testified the officer had paid for new handguns or that there was such a gross disparity between the value of the handgun and the price the codefendant paid for the handgun as to excite suspicion. Rainly v. State, 307 Ga. App. 467, 705 S.E.2d 246 (2010).

Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's convictions for theft by receiving stolen property, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), because there was uncontroverted direct evidence that the defendant was the original thief, and no evidence identified any other person other than the defendant; there were video and still photographs, clearly revealing the defendant's unobstructed face and body from several angles, depicting the defendant as the taker of the property, not the receiver. Fields v. State, 310 Ga. App. 455, 714 S.E.2d 45 (2011).

Because there was no competent evidence to show that a memory card had been stolen, as the third victim failed to testify, only that the memory card had been reported stolen, the defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property as to that victim could not stand. Reeves v. State, 329 Ga. App. 470, 765 S.E.2d 407 (2014).

Because the state did not produce any evidence to establish that the defendant knew or should have known the gun found in the defendant's vehicle was stolen, the evidence was not sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property. Wooten v. State, 348 Ga. App. 408, 823 S.E.2d 98 (2019).

- Although the state pointed to the defendant juvenile's attempts to flee as guilty knowledge that the gun was stolen, as a minor, the defendant's mere possession of a gun was a crime and, thus, while the defendant's attempts to escape may reflect guilty knowledge of the gun's presence in the defendant's backpack, that evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the gun was stolen. In the Interest of G. M. W., 355 Ga. App. 151, 842 S.E.2d 920 (2020).

Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of theft by receiving stolen property because the robbery occurred almost a year after the handgun was stolen from its owner, and although the victim placed the gun in defendant's possession and control during the robbery and identified the handgun at trial, there was no evidence offered as to whether the defendant knew or should have known that the handgun was stolen. Defendant testified that the gun belonged to one of the other robbers, that the defendant had not pulled a weapon on anyone, and that they had not robbed the victim. Newsome v. State, 355 Ga. App. 13, 842 S.E.2d 339 (2020).

- Circumstantial evidence of a larcenous taking was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for theft by receiving beyond a reasonable doubt because the officer's testimony that radio dispatch identified the pistol as stolen was non-probative hearsay and the fact that the weapon was labeled for law enforcement use only and loaded with police-issue ammunition did not exclude the possibility that the weapon may have been given away or sold "on the black market" in violation of the warning. Lopez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 720, 578 S.E.2d 304 (2003).

Defendant was entitled to reversal of the conviction for theft by receiving because there was no evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the defendant knew or should have known that the gun used by the defendant was stolen. Thornton v. State, 292 Ga. 796, 741 S.E.2d 641 (2013).

Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction on one of the counts of theft by receiving stolen property because the state presented no evidence to show that it would have been readily apparent to the defendant that the car the defendant was riding in had been stolen, that the defendant had taken items from the car that belonged to the owner, or that the defendant admitted doubts as to the car's ownership; and the state presented no evidence that the defendant exerted possession or control over the car or otherwise participated in the theft of the car. Tigner v. State, 332 Ga. App. 808, 775 S.E.2d 180 (2015).

Evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of theft by receiving stolen property, specifically the handgun used to kill the second victim, because the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew, or should have known, the gun was stolen when the defendant received and retained the gun because, although the owner of the handgun testified the gun was stolen from the owner in North Carolina by a friend, that evidence shed no light on the defendant's knowledge of the provenance of the handgun, which the defendant claimed to have found behind a club. Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 773 S.E.2d 263 (2015).

Defendant's conviction had to be reversed because the state could not prove that the tangible goods received by the defendant were the same goods that were taken from the owner because the goods the defendant received from the defendant's mistress were purchased with funds stolen from the mistress's employer and, thus, could not satisfy the "receiving stolen property" element. Lindsay v. State, 336 Ga. App. 330, 785 S.E.2d 6 (2016).

- Fact that a pistol was a stolen weapon and that the accused sat in the automobile seat under which the pistol was found is not alone sufficient to show that the accused had possession, and is insufficient to authorize a conviction for the offense of theft by knowingly receiving stolen property. Williamson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 329, 214 S.E.2d 415 (1975).

Conviction was reversed when the evidence showed that the defendant had some recent contact with the stolen car, but did not show that the defendant ever possessed or controlled the car or affirmatively acted as a party to the crime; mere proximity was insufficient to establish possession or control. Buchanan v. State, 254 Ga. App. 249, 562 S.E.2d 216 (2002).

There was insufficient evidence to convict the defendants, both of whom had been passengers in a vehicle the defendants knew had been stolen, of theft by receiving stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a); there was no evidence that the defendants did anything other than allow themselves to be transported in the vehicle or that the defendants intentionally aided or abetted the commission of a crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b). Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. App. 882, 637 S.E.2d 480 (2006).

Defendant's adjudication as delinquent for committing theft by receiving stolen property, a motor vehicle, was reversed on appeal since there was no evidence that the defendant ever possessed or controlled the car under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) or affirmatively acted as a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20. The defendant's mere presence as a passenger in the vehicle and the presence of a gasoline tank in the back seat where the defendant was observed sitting was insufficient to support any finding of guilt. In the Interest of J.Q.W., 288 Ga. App. 444, 654 S.E.2d 424 (2007).

- Defendant was entitled to reversal of the defendant's conviction for theft by receiving because there was only evidence that the defendant found a gun that was reported stolen, not that the defendant knew the gun was stolen. Stacey v. State, 292 Ga. 838, 741 S.E.2d 881 (2013).

- For purposes of Georgia's recidivist statute, the defendant's federal conviction for conspiracy to transport stolen goods, in which the defendant admitted that the defendant stole more than $5,000 worth of silver, and that the defendant transported that stolen property across state lines, was a conviction that would have constituted a felony under Georgia law based on the state offense of theft by receiving as the defendant received stolen property with a value that exceeded $500. Nordahl v. State, 344 Ga. App. 686, 811 S.E.2d 465 (2018), aff'd, 306 Ga. 15, 829 S.E.2d 99 (2019).

Sentencing

Participation in pretrial intervention program.

- Prosecution of the defendants for theft by taking and criminal trespass in Calhoun County, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-21(b) and16-8-2, was not prohibited by double jeopardy based on their prior entry into a pretrial intervention program under O.C.G.A. § 15-18-80(b) following charges of theft by receiving stolen property, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), in Irwin County because there was no prosecution in Irwin County within the meaning of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-3(14) and16-1-8(a)(1)-(2). Palmer v. State, 341 Ga. App. 433, 801 S.E.2d 300 (2017).

- Appellate court affirmed conviction of theft by receiving stolen property of some value but directed that appellant's sentence be vacated and that appellant be resentenced for a misdemeanor, where evidence was insufficient to establish that value of stolen property exceeded $200.00. Searcy v. State, 163 Ga. App. 528, 295 S.E.2d 227 (1982).

While value is not an element of the crime of theft by receiving stolen goods, it is relevant for the purpose of distinguishing between a misdemeanor and a felony for sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12. Ayers v. State, 164 Ga. App. 195, 296 S.E.2d 772 (1982).

Although relevant to the question of value, the cost of the property to the owner is not the ultimate determinate of whether the offense of receiving stolen property is punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor. Baker v. State, 234 Ga. App. 846, 507 S.E.2d 475 (1998).

Value of property that is the subject of a theft by receiving stolen property is the fair cash market value either at the time and place of the theft or at any time during the receipt or concealment of the property. Baker v. State, 234 Ga. App. 846, 507 S.E.2d 475 (1998).

Testimony by the owner concerning the purchase price, absent any other evidence of value, was insufficient evidence to establish that the value of the property exceeded $500. Denson v. State, 240 Ga. App. 207, 523 S.E.2d 62 (1999).

In a prosecution for theft by receiving stolen property under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), there was insufficient evidence to support felony sentencing under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12(a) because the evidence was only sufficient to authorize a conviction based on a stolen racing jacket, and there was no evidence showing that the value of the racing jacket exceeded $500. Duncan v. State, 278 Ga. App. 703, 629 S.E.2d 577 (2006).

Sentence based on theft by taking credit cards and theft by receiving the same credit cards is void. The crimes are mutually exclusive and defendant cannot be sentenced on both crimes. Syms v. State, 244 Ga. App. 21, 534 S.E.2d 502 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft by receiving stolen property where defendant kept a trailer that defendant did not own and used it for two months without contacting the police or the owner, even though the owner could have been identified, and a stolen license tag on the trailer, the removal of some of the owner's markings, and the reversal of the mud flaps to conceal the owner's identity were circumstantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant knew or should have known that the property was stolen. Ingram v. State, 268 Ga. App. 149, 601 S.E.2d 736 (2004).

- Because: (1) different facts were used to prove an aggravated assault and an armed robbery, specifically, that the armed robbery was complete after the defendant laid a handgun on the counter in the convenience store, demanded that the victim open the register, and a codefendant took money from the cash register; and (2) the separate offense of aggravated assault occurred when the defendant struck the victim in the head with the gun, the offenses did not merge as a matter of fact. Thus, the separate sentences imposed for each offense were upheld, and no double jeopardy violation occurred. Garibay v. State, 290 Ga. App. 385, 659 S.E.2d 775 (2008).

- Trial court did not err in resentencing the defendant to a probated sentence of ten years for a theft by receiving conviction, upon filing a motion under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12, with such sentence to commence ten years after the beginning of a term of imprisonment for an armed robbery conviction as: (1) the revised sentence did not impermissibly increase the original sentence imposed; (2) the revised probated sentence effected no change in the probation term to be served following the confinement for armed robbery, as both the original and revised sentences provided for five years of probation, consecutive to the defendant's confinement; and (3) the defendant failed to show fulfillment of the maximum legal term for the theft by receiving conviction, or that any of the probation requirements had been satisfied. Fair v. State, 281 Ga. App. 518, 636 S.E.2d 712 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0125, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 494 (Ga. 2007).

Stolen property acquired by a pawn shop remains the property of the original owner. 1996 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 96-24.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receiving and Transporting Stolen Property, § 1 et seq.

- 76 C.J.S., Receiving or Transferring Stolen Goods, § 1 et seq.

- Assisting in transportation or disposal of property known to have been stolen as rendering one guilty of larceny, 29 A.L.R. 1031.

Possession of recently stolen goods by one charged with receiving them as evidence on question of guilty knowledge, 68 A.L.R. 187.

Right of purchaser of stolen bonds, 85 A.L.R. 357; 102 A.L.R. 28.

Admissibility, in prosecution for receiving stolen property, of evidence of transactions other than, but similar to, that upon which the prosecution is based, for purpose of showing guilty knowledge or intent, 105 A.L.R. 1288.

May participant in larceny or theft be convicted of offenses of receiving or concealing the stolen property, 136 A.L.R. 1087.

Knowledge imputed to reasonable man as test of knowledge of defendant in prosecution for larceny or receiving stolen property, 147 A.L.R. 1058.

Charge of larceny or receiving stolen goods predicated upon taking or appropriation of waste paper or other articles deposited in street with intention to donate to patriotic or other cause, 156 A.L.R. 631.

Thief as accomplice of one charged with receiving stolen property, or vice versa, within rule requiring corroboration or cautionary instruction, 53 A.L.R.2d 817.

Receiving property stolen in another state or country as receiving stolen property, 67 A.L.R.2d 752.

Attempts to receive stolen property, 85 A.L.R.2d 259.

Sufficiency of description of stolen property in indictment or information for receiving it, 99 A.L.R.2d 813.

What amounts to "exclusive" possession of stolen goods to support inference of burglary or other felonious taking, 51 A.L.R.3d 727.

Receipt of public documents taken by another without authorization as receipt of stolen property, 57 A.L.R.3d 1211.

Receiver of stolen goods as accomplice of thief for purposes of corroboration, 74 A.L.R.3d 560.

Modern status: instruction allowing presumption or inference of guilt from possession of recently stolen property as violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, 88 A.L.R.3d 1178.

What constitutes "constructive" possession of stolen property to establish requisite element of possession supporting offense of receiving stolen property, 30 A.L.R.4th 488.

Conviction of receiving stolen property, or related offenses, where stolen property previously placed under police control, 72 A.L.R.4th 838.

Possession of stolen property as continuing offense, 24 A.L.R.5th 132.

Participation in larceny or theft as precluding conviction for receiving or concealing the stolen property, 29 A.L.R.5th 59.

What constitutes tax-deductible theft loss under 26 USCS § 165, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 229.