2020 Georgia Code
Title 16 - Crimes and Offenses
Chapter 10 - Offenses Against Public Administration
Article 2 - Obstruction of Public Administration and Related Offenses
§ 16-10-25. Giving False Name, Address, or Birthdate to Law Enforcement Officer

A person who gives a false name, address, or date of birth to a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties with the intent of misleading the officer as to his identity or birthdate is guilty of a misdemeanor.

(Code 1933, § 26-2506, enacted by Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1; Ga. L. 1989, p. 224, § 1.)

- For article, "Constitutional Criminal Litigation," see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 993 (1981). For article, "Misdemeanor Sentencing in Georgia," see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 8 (2001).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Application

General Consideration

Applicability.

- O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25 is not written in terms of misleading only law enforcement or peace officers of Georgia, but also applies to any law enforcement or peace officer. Rucker v. State, 191 Ga. App. 108, 381 S.E.2d 91 (1989).

Construction with O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20. - When, after viewing the transaction between the defendant and the police officer as a whole, it was apparent that the same evidence could be used to prove both the offense of giving a false name and the offense of making a false statement, the appeals court reversed the defendant's felony conviction and remanded the case for sentencing under the misdemeanor statute. Dawkins v. State, 278 Ga. App. 343, 629 S.E.2d 45 (2006).

Application

Lesser included offenses.

- Trial court properly entered judgments of conviction after defendant was found guilty of five counts of forgery in the first degree as the evidence was sufficient to support those convictions; the five forgeries pertained to the false name on defendant's driver's license and the false name defendant signed on four documents filled out when defendant was arrested; the offense of giving a law enforcement officer a false name, a misdemeanor, was not a lesser included offense of forgery of the first degree. Quaweay v. State, 274 Ga. App. 657, 618 S.E.2d 707 (2005).

- Since the defendant testified to using both names "in a legal content" but admitted the name the defendant gave police officers was not the name found on the defendant's birth certificate, social security card, or former driver's license, evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that the defendant violated former Code 1933, § 26-2506 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25). Johnson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 273, 253 S.E.2d 889 (1979).

When defendant was stopped in an airport by a Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) agent, who was identified as a law enforcement officer, and the defendant showed the agent an airline ticket and told the agent that the name on the ticket was defendant's, but within one minute or less produced a driver's license with defendant's correct name, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for the offense of giving a false name to a law enforcement officer. Hunter v. State, 190 Ga. App. 24, 378 S.E.2d 352 (1989).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction, after defendant gave police defendant's father's first name as defendant's last name, regardless of whether Indian custom recognized such name usage, where there was ample evidence from which the court could have concluded that defendant meant to deceive the police by giving that name. Rajappa v. State, 200 Ga. App. 372, 408 S.E.2d 163 (1991).

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25, where defendant responded to police officer's legitimate inquiry with one name, but produced a temporary identification card containing another. Hopkins v. State, 209 Ga. App. 337, 433 S.E.2d 423 (1993).

Evidence that defendant gave the arresting officer a false name, that defendant presented no evidence that the name defendant provided to the officer appeared on defendant's official birth certificate, social security card, or driver's license, and that defendant's true name was used in another case in a different county was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for giving a false name. Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. App. 30, 567 S.E.2d 693 (2002).

- Trial court properly denied a defendant's motion for a new trial, and there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for giving a false name to the police officers who arrested defendant as defendant's assertion that defendant accidentally gave defendant's birth name, as opposed to defendant's adopted name, was not proven as defendant provided no evidence of a birth certificate showing the name actually given to the officers; defendant presented no evidence that the name given was ever used by defendant at any other time; and defendant failed to produce any evidence that defendant was adopted. Griffin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 618, 662 S.E.2d 171 (2008).

- Police had probable cause to arrest defendant for the offense of giving a false name with the intent to mislead the officers where defendant gave two different names upon being asked for identification. Stanley v. State, 213 Ga. App. 95, 443 S.E.2d 633 (1994).

- When an officer was attempting to arrest suspects on a battery charge without a warrant, for a battery not committed in the officer's presence, the conviction arising out of false names given to the officer in the course of such attempted arrest must be reversed. Scott v. State, 123 Ga. App. 675, 182 S.E.2d 183 (1971).

- Magistrate lacked probable cause to issue a warrant for a defendant's arrest for providing false information to a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25; the fact that the defendant gave law enforcement officers two different addresses over a one-month period was not evidence that one of the addresses was false when the defendant gave the address. Anderson v. State, 305 Ga. App. 463, 699 S.E.2d 793 (2010).

- When a police officer's roadside inquiry into defendant's name and date of birth was not based upon articulable facts indicating that defendant was engaged in criminal activity, the officer was not lawfully discharging the officer's official duties as required for conviction of a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25. Holt v. State, 227 Ga. App. 46, 487 S.E.2d 629 (1997).

- Defendant's conviction for giving a false name was not supported by evidence that on three different occasions defendant gave different names to a law enforcement officer since such evidence did not support even an inference that defendant gave a false name to an officer on the occasion of defendant's arrest for shoplifting. Agony v. State, 226 Ga. App. 330, 486 S.E.2d 625 (1997).

- Defendant's prior convictions for felony forgery, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-1(a), misdemeanor theft by deception, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3(a), and misdemeanor giving a false name to a law enforcement officer, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25, were all less than 10 years old and involved dishonesty or false statements. Therefore, those convictions were admissible in the defendant's child molestation trial under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1(b) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609). Damerow v. State, 310 Ga. App. 530, 714 S.E.2d 82 (2011).

- Trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion in arrest of judgment since the accusation in effect incorporated the terms of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25. State v. Howell, 194 Ga. App. 594, 391 S.E.2d 415 (1990).

- Severance of charges of theft by shoplifting and giving a false name was not required when the false name charge arose from the circumstances of defendant's arrest for shoplifting. Agony v. State, 226 Ga. App. 330, 486 S.E.2d 625 (1997).

- Police officer does not have probable cause to believe a suspect has violated Georgia law by falsely identifying himself when the suspect refuses to furnish identification. The refusal to furnish identification may create suspicion that the suspect has used a false name, but falls far short of probable cause. United States v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 743 F.2d 1505 (1984).

- Defendant's act of giving the officer a false name and date of birth provided the officer with probable cause to arrest the defendant, conduct a search of the defendant for weapons and contraband incident to that arrest, and to search the passenger compartment of the defendant's vehicle and, thus, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during that search. Loveless v. State, 337 Ga. App. 894, 789 S.E.2d 244 (2016).

- Evidence that the juvenile defendant first gave the officers a false name and birthdate, as the defendant later demonstrated when the defendant provided the correct information, was sufficient to support the finding of delinquency for giving false information. In the Interest of G. M. W., 355 Ga. App. 151, 842 S.E.2d 920 (2020).

- See Walker v. State, 225 Ga. App. 19, 482 S.E.2d 515 (1997); Gibson v. State, 243 Ga. App. 610, 533 S.E.2d 783 (2000); Madge v. State, 245 Ga. App. 848, 538 S.E.2d 907 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient for conviction of giving a false name to a law enforcement officer, despite defendant's claim that defendant lacked the requisite intent because the police knew defendant's name. Flanders v. State, 230 Ga. App. 316, 496 S.E.2d 344 (1998).

When the trial judge referred to the defendant by defendant's real name without repudiation by the defendant, and when there was concordance between defendant's name and that of the person charged on the indictment upon which defendant pled guilty and signed defendant's real name, the identity of name presumptively imported identity of person, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, and that evidence was therefore sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for giving a false name to a law enforcement officer. Brown v. State, 236 Ga. App. 478, 512 S.E.2d 369 (1999).

When the totality of the circumstances, including the location of the car and the defendant's position in the car, indicated that defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle and in possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage, even though the defendant was not seen driving the car, there was sufficient evidence that the police officers' act of questioning the defendant was more than a consensual inquiry and was within the scope of the officers' official duties so that a jury could reasonably determine that defendant's use of a false name was a violation. Wynn v. State, 236 Ga. App. 98, 511 S.E.2d 201 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to show defendant's real name was different than the name defendant gave to a police investigator as defendant did not repudiate statements made by the trial court and defendant's own counsel that showed defendant's real name was different than the name defendant gave to the police investigator; thus, the evidence supported defendant's conviction for giving a false name. Singleton v. State, 259 Ga. App. 184, 577 S.E.2d 6 (2003).

Defendant's convictions of possession of cocaine, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), and giving a false name and date of birth, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25, were supported by sufficient evidence that, during a level-one encounter with an officer, the defendant gave the officer a false name and birth date, that, during a subsequent search of the defendant's person validly consented to by the defendant, the officer found documents that revealed the defendant's true identity and five pieces of a substance that the officer suspected was crack cocaine, that the officer's field test of the substance indicated positive for cocaine, that the substance was later tested at a state crime lab which confirmed that it was cocaine, and that there was a sufficient chain of custody for that substance. Postell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 275, 630 S.E.2d 867 (2006).

Because an officer was investigating a domestic disturbance at the time the defendant was asked for identification, and in doing so was authorized to identify the parties to the dispute and ensure that the situation was resolved before leaving the scene, the appeals court found sufficient evidence to uphold the defendant's conviction for giving a false name and date of birth to a law enforcement officer and reject the contrary claim that the officer was not discharging any official duties at the time the false information was given. Harper v. State, 285 Ga. App. 261, 645 S.E.2d 741 (2007).

Adjudication of delinquency for giving a false name to a law enforcement officer, carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a pistol by a person under the age of 18 was proper when the juvenile defendant who was driving a relative's vehicle had free run of the relative's property while the relative was deployed overseas; also, the defendant was in the vehicle the morning of and night before a traffic stop, defendant directed the other juvenile where to drive, neither gun was registered to the relative, defendant seemed to know about the guns' existence, and defendant gave a deputy false information about the defendant's identity. In the Interest of C.M., 290 Ga. App. 788, 661 S.E.2d 598 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for giving a false name to a law enforcement officer after the defendant was discovered at a construction site having no authority to be at the location and was in the process of removing an air conditioning unit. Further, the fact that the defendant eventually gave the defendant's true name to the police did not establish that the defendant somehow withdrew from the crime. Sanders v. State, 293 Ga. App. 534, 667 S.E.2d 396 (2008).

Trial court, the defendant 's own attorney, and the charging document - without objection or repudiation from the defendant - all identified the defendant by a name other than the name the defendant gave an officer. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant for giving a false name to an officer in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 564, 667 S.E.2d 410 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for giving false identifying information to law enforcement officers, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25. When defendant gave false identifying information to officers after a traffic stop, responding with two different birth dates, the defendant provided the officers with probable cause for arrest; it followed that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for giving false identifying information to and obstruction of law enforcement officers engaged in the lawful discharge of their official duties. Smith v. State, 294 Ga. App. 761, 669 S.E.2d 735 (2008).

Evidence that the defendant borrowed a sibling's car, struck the rear of a slower moving car leading to the deaths of the driver and passenger, the defendant identified herself as the sibling, and the defendant signed the sibling's name on the Miranda form and on the defendant's written statement supported the defendant's convictions for first degree homicide by vehicle, forgery, reckless driving, and giving a false name. Smith v. State, 319 Ga. App. 164, 735 S.E.2d 153 (2012).

Evidence that an officer was at the hospital to obtain information about the motorcycle accident when the defendant provided the officer with a different name was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for giving false information to a law enforcement officer. Ceballos v. State, 345 Ga. App. 714, 815 S.E.2d 89 (2018).

Evidence that an officer encountered the defendant outside the defendant's rooming house while investigating the victim's allegation of rape; the officer asked the defendant his name and the defendant gave several different names, social security numbers, and birth dates, none of which matched any information in the police database; and police did not learn the defendant's true identity until the defendant was fingerprinted at the police station was sufficient for the jury to convict the defendant of giving false information to a law enforcement officer. Riley v. State, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Sept. 9, 2020).

- Evidence was not sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for giving a false name to law enforcement despite the fact that the defendant's fingerprints were associated with one name, similar transaction evidence showed that the defendant was previously arrested under a second name, and the defendant gave neither name to the responding officer as the state did not show which was the defendant's true name and which name was false. Smith v. State, 322 Ga. App. 433, 745 S.E.2d 683 (2013).

- When an alien appealed denial of cancellation of removal, the alien's violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25 was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude as it involved both dishonesty and the making of a false statement. Aderonke Aladesanmi v. United States AG, F.3d (11th Cir. Oct. 22, 2013)(Unpublished).

- Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury charge on the misdemeanor offense of giving a false name to a law enforcement officer under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25 because the conduct for which a defendant was indicted, falsely telling a GBI special agent that the defendant did not make a9-1-1 call regarding a fire at another agent's residence when in fact the defendant did make the call, would not constitute a violation of § 16-10-25; the defendant failed to show under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(a)(1) that the same conduct would result in the violation of the misdemeanor statute. Mahoney v. State, 296 Ga. App. 570, 675 S.E.2d 285 (2009).

- Trial court properly concluded that the search that led to the discovery of cocaine and marijuana did not violate the defendant's rights and properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress because by the time the drug dog arrived, the defendant was no longer in a temporary, second-tier encounter, investigative detention but, instead, was in a third-tier encounter, under arrest for giving false information to a law enforcement officer. Cromartie v. State, 348 Ga. App. 563, 824 S.E.2d 32 (2019).

- It was not an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant's motion for a new trial, requested to facilitate the defendant's efforts to become a naturalized citizen, because the trial court considered that the defendant's sentence for giving a false name to an officer had long since been served, that six years had passed since sentencing, and that the sentence was within the statutory guidelines for misdemeanors; claims the defendant's guilty plea was not voluntary were of no avail as the defendant failed to move to withdraw the plea or to appeal, and the time for doing so had expired. Elias v. State, 272 Ga. App. 506, 613 S.E.2d 157 (2005).

Cited in Mitchell v. State, 136 Ga. App. 658, 222 S.E.2d 160 (1975); United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1981); Mallory v. State, 164 Ga. App. 569, 298 S.E.2d 290 (1982); Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 300 S.E.2d 126 (1983); State v. Roberson, 165 Ga. App. 727, 302 S.E.2d 591 (1983); Taylor v. State, 181 Ga. App. 703, 353 S.E.2d 619 (1987); Preston v. State, 257 Ga. 42, 354 S.E.2d 135 (1987); Wade v. State, 184 Ga. App. 289, 361 S.E.2d 266 (1987); United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1987); Carroll v. State, 186 Ga. App. 145, 367 S.E.2d 81 (1988); Dixson v. State, 191 Ga. App. 410, 382 S.E.2d 357 (1989); Jivens v. State, 215 Ga. App. 306, 450 S.E.2d 328 (1994); Brown v. State, 224 Ga. App. 42, 479 S.E.2d 454 (1996); Grisson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 816, 484 S.E.2d 802 (1997); Cole v. State, 262 Ga. App. 856, 586 S.E.2d 745 (2003); Tiller v. State, 286 Ga. App. 230, 648 S.E.2d 738 (2007); Finnan v. State, 291 Ga. App. 486, 662 S.E.2d 269 (2008); McBee v. State, 296 Ga. App. 42, 673 S.E.2d 569 (2009); Connelly v. State, 298 Ga. App. 223, 679 S.E.2d 790 (2009); Henley v. State, 317 Ga. App. 776, 732 S.E.2d 836 (2012); Manhertz v. State, 317 Ga. App. 856, 734 S.E.2d 406 (2012).

Maintenance of records by Georgia Crime Information Center regarding violations of former Code 1933, § 26-2506 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25). See 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-33.

- When O.C.G.A. § 16-10-25, as amended, provides that a person who gives a law enforcement officer a false date of birth, as well as a false name or address, has committed a misdemeanor, and when the previous version of this offense had previously been designated as an offense for which those charged with a violation were to be fingerprinted the statutory amendment presents no reason for that designation to be withdrawn. The designation of this offense as an offense for which those charged with a violation are to be fingerprinted shall continue. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. 89-52.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S.

- 67 C.J.S., Obstruction of Justice or Governmental Administration, §§ 4, 18, 34.

- Criminal liability for false personation during stop for traffic infraction, 26 A.L.R.5th 378.

Defenses to state obstruction of justice charge relating to interfering with criminal investigation or judicial proceeding, 87 A.L.R.5th 597.