2020 Georgia Code
Title 15 - Courts
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 15-1-4. Extent of Contempt Power

1. The powers of the several courts to issue attachments and inflict summary punishment for contempt of court shall extend only to cases of:
   1. Misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of such courts or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
   2. Misbehavior of any of the officers of the courts in their official transactions;
   3. Disobedience or resistance by any officer of the courts, party, juror, witness, or other person or persons to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the courts;
   4. Violation of subsection (a) of Code Section 34-1-3, relating to prohibited conduct of employers with respect to employees who are required to attend judicial proceedings; and
   5. Violation of a court order relating to the televising, videotaping, or motion picture filming of judicial proceedings.
2. No person shall be imprisoned for contempt for failing or refusing to pay over money under any order, decree, or judgment of any court of law or any other court of this state when he denies that the money ordered or decreed to be paid over is in his power, custody, or control until he has a trial by jury in accordance with the following provisions:
   1. The allegation of the plaintiff, receiver, referee, or any other person or persons that the defendant accused of contempt has a certain sum of money within his power, custody, or control, which he is withholding or refuses or fails to pay over, and the denial of the defendant that he has the power, custody, or control of the money shall form the issue to be tried by the jury, and the jury shall decide the issue of fact;
   2. The issue being made, a bond may be required in the discretion of the court for the appearance of the defendant for trial, which bond shall be of sufficient size to ensure the attendance of the defendant to appear and answer the final judgment or decree in the case and shall be approved by the judge. On failure of the defendant to appear, the bond shall be forfeited as in criminal cases. If bond is required but not posted the defendant may be committed to jail for safekeeping until trial; and
   3. The judge presiding shall cause questions to be propounded in writing to the jury and every question propounded shall be answered by the jury in its verdict. Upon the answers made, the judge shall adjudge or decree whether the defendant is in contempt. Either party shall have the right to move for a new trial and to appeal as in other civil cases.
3. When a person who is gainfully employed violates an order of the court granting temporary or permanent alimony or child support and the judge finds the person in contempt of court, the sentencing judge may sentence the respondent to a term of confinement in a diversion center and participation in a diversion program if such a program has been established by a county pursuant to the provisions of Article 5 of Chapter 3 of Title 42.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 4593; Code 1868, § 4614; Code 1873, § 4711; Code 1882, § 4711; Ga. L. 1892, p. 65, § 1; Civil Code 1895, § 4046; Civil Code 1910, § 4643; Code 1933, § 24-105; Ga. L. 1987, p. 1156, § 2; Ga. L. 1990, p. 590, § 1; Ga. L. 1996, p. 649, § 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 734, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 5-1/HB 310.)

- Contempt generally, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IV.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1987, subsection (b), as enacted by Ga. L. 1987, p. 1156, § 2, was redesignated as subsection (c).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1996, the (1) designation was deleted from subsection (c).

- Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment by this Act shall apply to sentences entered on or after July 1, 2015.

- For article, "The Appellate Judiciary of Georgia and Contempt Out of Court," see 2 Ga. L. Rev. 341 (1968). For article discussing the validity of contempt of court sanctions based upon a party's disobedience of an injunction constituting a void prior restraint of constitutionally-protected activity, see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 246 (1973). For article, "Contempt of Court in Georgia," see 23 Ga. St. B. J. 66 (1987). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2015). For article, "How Not to Get Thrown in Jail," see 22 Ga. Bar. J. 17 (June 2017). For comment on Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 101 Ga. App. 105, 113 S.E.2d 148 (1960), see 12 Mercer L. Rev. 284 (1960). For comment on Renfroe v. State, 104 Ga. App. 362, 121 S.E.2d 811 (1961), see 24 Ga. B. J. 544 (1962). For comment, "Civil Contempt and Child Sexual Abuse Allegations: A Modern Solomon's Choice?," see 40 Emory L. J. 203 (1991).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Powers of Courts
• Contempt
• Procedure
• A. Proof
• B. Defenses
• C. Enforcement of Orders
• Interference with Administration of Justice
• Discretion of Court

General Consideration

Use of contumacious language in court.

- Fact that the court has made a ruling which seems completely unjustified or beyond the authority of the court does not give the aggrieved party the license to use contumacious language in the presence of the court concerning such a ruling. White v. State, 105 Ga. App. 616, 125 S.E.2d 239, rev'd on other grounds, 218 Ga. 290, 127 S.E.2d 668 (1962).

- Trial court's contempt power is not limited to contempt acts occurring after date of domestication of foreign judgment. Martin v. Martin, 244 Ga. 68, 257 S.E.2d 903 (1979).

- Attorney may not be held in contempt of court merely for presenting in good faith a motion which the attorney has a right to make, nor may an attorney be held in contempt merely because, having filed such a motion, the attorney fails to prevail on the motion. In re McLarty, 152 Ga. App. 399, 263 S.E.2d 194 (1979).

- Contemnor's testimony that contemnor had no intent to violate an order is not binding on the court. Schiselman v. Trust Co. Bank, 246 Ga. 274, 271 S.E.2d 183 (1980).

Cited in Smith v. State, 36 Ga. App. 37, 135 S.E. 102 (1926); Evans v. White, 178 Ga. 262, 172 S.E. 913 (1934); Wilkins v. Jordan, 50 Ga. App. 119, 177 S.E. 344 (1934); Benton v. State, 58 Ga. App. 633, 199 S.E. 561 (1938); Poss v. Norris, 197 Ga. 513, 29 S.E.2d 705 (1944); Alred v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 205 Ga. 371, 54 S.E.2d 240 (1949); Thomas v. Hubert, 84 Ga. App. 710, 66 S.E.2d 924 (1951); City of Macon v. Massey, 214 Ga. 589, 106 S.E.2d 23 (1958); Palmer v. Bunn, 218 Ga. 244, 127 S.E.2d 372 (1962); Crudup v. State, 218 Ga. 819, 130 S.E.2d 733 (1963); Henderson v. State Bd. of Exmrs., 221 Ga. 536, 145 S.E.2d 559 (1965); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Greene, 116 Ga. App. 783, 159 S.E.2d 87 (1967); Brown v. State, 226 Ga. 114, 172 S.E.2d 666 (1970); Haire v. Branch, 129 Ga. App. 164, 199 S.E.2d 127 (1973); Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 131 Ga. App. 567, 206 S.E.2d 583 (1974); Murphy v. State, 132 Ga. App. 654, 209 S.E.2d 101 (1974); Jones v. State, 134 Ga. App. 611, 215 S.E.2d 483 (1975); Hall v. Hall, 242 Ga. 15, 247 S.E.2d 754 (1978); In re Pruitt, 249 Ga. 190, 288 S.E.2d 208 (1982); Carter v. Data Gen. Corp., 162 Ga. App. 379, 291 S.E.2d 99 (1982); In re Henritze, 181 Ga. App. 560, 353 S.E.2d 58 (1987); In re Victorine, 230 Ga. App. 209, 495 S.E.2d 864 (1998); Affatato v. Considine, 305 Ga. App. 755, 700 S.E.2d 717 (2010).

Powers of Courts

1. In General

- Several courts of this state have power to attach and punish for contempt any party who disobeys or resists any lawful order granted by such courts. Crawford v. Manning, 12 Ga. App. 54, 76 S.E. 771 (1912).

- Trial court has power to see that there be compliance with the intent and spirit of the court's decrees and no party should be permitted to take advantage of the letter of a decree to the detriment of the other party. Davis v. Davis, 243 Ga. 421, 254 S.E.2d 370 (1979); Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 246 Ga. 266, 271 S.E.2d 175 (1980).

- Trial judge is the one best qualified to determine whether or not the plaintiff, as a witness, placed oneself in contempt. Crute v. Crute, 86 Ga. App. 96, 70 S.E.2d 727 (1952).

- Powers of court are applicable to misbehavior of any officer of the court in the officers' official transactions. West v. Field, 181 Ga. 152, 181 S.E. 661 (1935).

O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4(a)(2) is intended to impose upon officers of the courts engaged in the officers' official transactions a higher duty to the court than is demanded of the broader group of individuals listed in § 15-1-4(a)(3) who are arguably subject to the contempt powers only for failure to comply with those commands of the court spread upon the record in written form. In re Smith, 211 Ga. App. 493, 439 S.E.2d 725 (1993).

- That given act may be indictable does not deprive court of power of dealing with the act as contempt of court. Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168, 36 S.E. 630, 78 Am. St. R. 157, 50 L.R.A. 691 (1900).

- Court has jurisdiction and is empowered to deal with the matter of contempt at any time during the progress of the litigation before the court. West v. Field, 181 Ga. 152, 181 S.E. 661 (1935).

Court may not modify previous decree in contempt order; however, a court may always interpret and clarify the court's own orders. The test to determine whether an order is clarified or modified is whether the clarification is reasonable or whether the clarification is so contrary to the apparent intention of the original order as to amount to a modification. Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 246 Ga. 266, 271 S.E.2d 175 (1980).

- Despite the fact that sufficient evidence supported a civil contempt finding, the trial court erred in continuing a father's incarceration after the father established an inability to pay the child support arrearage and the court lacked any authority to confine the father in a diversion center or to place the father in a work release program pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4(c). Gallaher v. Breaux, 286 Ga. App. 375, 650 S.E.2d 313 (2007).

- Supreme Court of Georgia has long held that a person is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of ability to pay or contempt for failure to pay alimony and child support and while none of the opinions appear to address the plain meaning of O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4(b) or its similarly worded predecessor statutes, this is ultimately of no consequence as the Georgia Court of Appeals is bound by these decisions and must apply them. Bernard v. Bernard, 347 Ga. App. 429, 819 S.E.2d 688 (2018).

2. Limits Imposed by Legislature

Limits on exercise of power.

- This Code section is designed to limit courts in exercise of contempt power. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).

- All constitutional courts have the inherent power to define and punish contempt and this right was not denied or limited by this section. Jones v. State, 39 Ga. App. 1, 145 S.E. 914 (1928); Evans v. State, 69 Ga. App. 178, 24 S.E.2d 861 (1943); Vines v. State, 69 Ga. App. 175, 24 S.E.2d 864 (1943).

Power of constitutional court to define and classify contempt of court was not limited by this section. Cobb v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 200 S.E. 796, answer conformed to, 59 Ga. App. 695, 2 S.E.2d 116 (1939).

- As to courts created by the Constitution, the right to define contempt cannot be abridged or taken away by legislative action. In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665, 76 S.E. 397 (1912).

If the court is created by the Constitution, the legislature cannot, without express constitutional authority, define what is contempt, and declare that the court shall have jurisdiction over no acts except those specified. Cobb v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 200 S.E. 796, answer conformed to, 59 Ga. App. 695, 2 S.E.2d 116 (1939).

Georgia Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IV) does not confer authority upon the legislature to define what is contempt, and to declare that the court shall have jurisdiction over no acts except those specified, because the power to punish contempt is inherent in every court of record. Wood v. State, 103 Ga. App. 305, 119 S.E.2d 261 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).

- Georgia Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IV) does not confer authority to define contempt, but only the power to prescribe the punishment after conviction. Cobb v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 200 S.E. 796, answer conformed to, 59 Ga. App. 695, 2 S.E.2d 116 (1939).

- Whatever may have been the power of judges at common law to adjudge, as for a contempt of court, any person for an act done or writing published calculated to bring the court or the judge into contempt and lower the person's authority, the power of the judges in Georgia to punish for a criminal contempt of court was limited by law as provided in this section. Townsend v. State, 54 Ga. App. 627, 188 S.E. 560 (1936).

This Code section, insofar as the statute sought to limit the jurisdiction of a constitutional court to punish contempts to certain specified acts, is not binding upon such courts; the courts may go beyond the provisions of the statute in order to preserve and enforce the court's constitutional powers by treating as contempt acts which clearly invade the court's powers. Cobb v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 200 S.E. 796, answer conformed to, 59 Ga. App. 695, 2 S.E.2d 116 (1939); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960); Wood v. State, 103 Ga. App. 305, 119 S.E.2d 261 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).

Power to punish contempt is inherent in every court of record. Cobb v. State, 187 Ga. 448, 200 S.E. 796, answer conformed to, 59 Ga. App. 695, 2 S.E.2d 116 (1939).

Inherent power of courts should never be impaired or destroyed to such an extent that the courts cannot exercise a power necessary to the court's proper functioning. Evans v. State, 69 Ga. App. 178, 24 S.E.2d 861 (1943).

This Code section did not restrict the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt, but criminal contempt involves some disrespectful or contumacious conduct towards the court. In re Brookins, 153 Ga. App. 82, 264 S.E.2d 560 (1980).

- Courts have inherent power to punish direct criminal contempts committed in the court's presence summarily and without hearing, the judge being aware by use of the judge's own senses of what has transpired. Martin v. Waters, 151 Ga. App. 149, 259 S.E.2d 153 (1979).

- Although summary punishment is always and rightly regarded with disfavor, there is no doubt that the summary contempt power is still available to courts, under appropriate circumstances, to control judicial proceedings. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S. Ct. 1440, 71 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982).

- Constitutional courts of Georgia have inherent and legislative authority to punish for contempt any person in disobedience of the court's judgments, orders, and processes. In re Boswell, 148 Ga. App. 519, 251 S.E.2d 596 (1978).

- It is fundamental that every court possesses the inherent power to preserve and enforce order and compel obedience to the court's judgments and orders, to control the conduct of the court's officers and all other persons connected with the judicial proceedings before the court and to inflict summary punishment for contempt upon any person failing and refusing to obey any unlawful order of such court. Farmer v. Holton, 146 Ga. App. 102, 245 S.E.2d 457 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S. Ct. 1499, 59 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1979), overruled on other grounds, In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985).

Contempt

1. In General

- It is contempt of court to remove, conceal, or destroy, for the purpose of defeating the court's jurisdiction, documents which are known to be the subject matter of proceedings pending before the court. Crute v. Crute, 86 Ga. App. 96, 70 S.E.2d 727 (1952).

Contempt will lie for failure to pay alimony award even though the decree contains no specific command to pay. Martin v. Martin, 244 Ga. 68, 257 S.E.2d 903 (1979).

- Motion which contains knowingly false accusations against the court and which is filed for the purpose of denigrating the court or impugning the court's integrity must certainly be characterized as contumacious. In re McLarty, 152 Ga. App. 399, 263 S.E.2d 194 (1979).

- Whether the contempt be regarded as one of the court or of the grand jury, the result is the same since if there is a contempt of the grand jury, this is also a contempt of the court, as the grand jury is a constituent part of the court, and anyone whose conduct interferes with or has a tendency to obstruct the grand jury may be found to be in contempt. Wood v. State, 103 Ga. App. 305, 119 S.E.2d 261 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).

- It is contempt of court to threaten or to endeavor to intimidate a witness in a pending action. Renfroe v. State, 104 Ga. App. 362, 121 S.E.2d 811 (1961), for comment, see 24 Ga. B. J. 544 (1962), overruled on other grounds, In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985).

Any interference or attempt to interfere with witnesses by means of bribery, intimidation, inducements, or other unlawful means, in order to induce the witnesses to testify falsely, or to change or modify the witnesses' testimony, or to suppress facts, constitutes contempt, which it is the duty of the courts to guard against zealously and to punish. Renfroe v. State, 104 Ga. App. 362, 121 S.E.2d 811 (1961), for comment, see 24 Ga. B. J. 544 (1962), overruled on other grounds, In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985).

- It is contempt of court to attempt by unlawful means to procure a witness to testify in a case contrary to the witness's previous testimony, even though the testimony so sought is the truth. Renfroe v. State, 104 Ga. App. 362, 121 S.E.2d 811 (1961), for comment, see 24 Ga. B. J. 544 (1962), overruled on other grounds, In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985).

- It was contempt of court for the accused to make to the father and brother of the witness statements intending that the statements should be communicated to the witness since such statements naturally tended to coerce and were expected to coerce the witness. Herring v. State, 165 Ga. 254, 140 S.E. 491 (1927); Herring v. State, 37 Ga. App. 594, 141 S.E. 89 (1928).

- Having invoked the judicial powers of the court in relation to a motion for new trial, an attorney appointed to represent an indigent defendant has the responsibility to resolve the issues presented thereby within the parameters of time established by the court. By utterly ignoring the scheduled date and thereafter stating categorically that the attorney would no longer represent the defendant, the attorney exposes oneself to a contempt action. Jordan v. State, 166 Ga. App. 627, 305 S.E.2d 165 (1983).

- Summary punishment for contempt was authorized since counsel insisted on making a tender of proof after the jury was excused for the night and without the judge's approval instead of waiting for the jury to begin the jury's deliberations the next day. Heilman v. DOT, 162 Ga. App. 547, 290 S.E.2d 189 (1982), overruled on other grounds, Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Funk, 263 Ga. 385, 435 S.E.2d 196 (1993).

- Words "willful refusal" and "ability to pay" are not words of art which must appear in every contempt order regarding child support. Rather, it is only necessary that the order specify sufficient facts to show that the respondent was in contempt of court. Floyd v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 551, 277 S.E.2d 658 (1981).

- When, on motion for contempt, an order is entered requiring payment of sums for child support which are past due, a person can be ordered to jail by a subsequent order, entered after a hearing finding that the prior order has been disobeyed. Floyd v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 551, 277 S.E.2d 658 (1981).

- Superior court was authorized to inflict summary punishment for contempt predicated upon the wilful failure of a sheriff, an officer of the court, to obey an oral direction by the court to transfer a defendant to a jail in another county, but was not authorized to temporarily suspend the sheriff, an elected officer, from the sheriff's position. In re Irvin, 171 Ga. App. 794, 321 S.E.2d 119 (1984), modified on other grounds, 254 Ga. 251, 328 S.E.2d 215 (1985).

- Sheriff, as an officer of the court, could be held in contempt for failure to produce documents pursuant to a court order which, although not filed, was reduced to writing and delivered into the hands of sworn deputies for service on the sheriff. In re Smith, 211 Ga. App. 493, 439 S.E.2d 725 (1993).

- Once an objection has been made by an attorney and the court has made the court's considered ruling, subsequent contumacious conduct will not be excused merely for the fact that the conduct was committed by an officer of the court during court proceedings in an attempt to protect the rights of the attorney's client. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S. Ct. 1440, 71 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982).

- Evidence that the attorney failed to answer two calendar calls was sufficient to support a judgment of contempt. In re Brant, 230 Ga. App. 283, 496 S.E.2d 321 (1998).

- In a civil contempt order in a divorce case, the husband was properly ordered to pay $1,500 for each day that passed without him paying the wife insurance proceeds after he had disregarded a consent order to title a car in the wife's name and an oral order to pay her the insurance proceeds after the car was totalled, and he could avoid the daily payments simply by paying the proceeds; furthermore, the fact that the order to pay the proceeds was oral did not mean that the order was ineffective as a matter of law. Chatfield v. Adkins-Chatfield, 282 Ga. 190, 646 S.E.2d 247 (2007).

- Evidence was clearly sufficient under the reasonable doubt standard to find the appellants in willful contempt for disobedience or resistance by an officer of the court to a lawful command of the court. In re Farmer, 212 Ga. App. 372, 442 S.E.2d 251 (1994).

Trial court properly held a corporation in civil contempt after the corporation ordered services from a credit bureau pursuant to a temporary restraining order (TRO), yet the corporation refused to pay for the services since the TRO did not require that the corporation order services, the corporation ordered services after the credit bureau refused to provide the corporation with the new select service, the corporation failed to meet the corporation's burden of proof to show that the corporation was unable to pay for the services, no balance sheets or lists of assets and liabilities were presented, and there was no showing that the corporation made an effort to borrow the money or to make partial payments. Hamilton Capital Group, Inc. v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 266 Ga. App. 1, 596 S.E.2d 656 (2004).

Landowners were properly held in civil contempt for violating subdivision's restrictive covenants; using one of their two lots for ingress and egress to their other lot and maintaining a road between the lots were violations of the covenants, and the trial court's judgment provided that the landowners refrain from further covenant violations. Korowotny v. Outback Prop. Owners Ass'n, 291 Ga. App. 236, 661 S.E.2d 857 (2008).

Criminal contempt finding against an attorney and an order disallowing the attorney from seeking payment from the county for legal services to two indigent defendants under a theory of quantum meruit was upheld as the attorney failed to appear in court as commanded, provided no notice of a scheduling conflict, and failed to show that the attorney made any attempt to comply with Ga. Unif. St. Ct. R. 17.1. In re Otuonye, 279 Ga. App. 468, 631 S.E.2d 500 (2006).

Attorneys were properly held in criminal contempt under O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4(a)(3). To the extent that the attorneys believed that the trial court erred by ordering the attorneys to proceed based on an alleged conflict of interest, the attorney's remedy was to appeal, not to disobey the trial court's direct order. Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 653 S.E.2d 713 (2007).

Attorney was properly found in direct criminal contempt under O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4 for failure to appear at trial because while the attorney claimed that the attorney did not receive seven days' notice of the trial date under Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 32.1, the attorney's remedy was to seek a continuance as the attorney had received the trial court's directive to appear by fax and telephone call. In re Beckstrom, 295 Ga. App. 179, 671 S.E.2d 215 (2008).

- Juvenile court erred by summarily holding an attorney in contempt based on a per se rule. The juvenile court determined that a per se rule existed that an attorney was in contempt when the attorney claimed ineffectiveness against themselves, but no such per se rule existed and, therefore, it was error to have adjudicated the attorney in contempt. Morris v. State, 295 Ga. App. 579, 672 S.E.2d 531 (2009).

Order holding an attorney in contempt pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-11-5 and otherwise was improper because, inter alia, the trial court immediately imposed punishment and did not provide the attorney the opportunity to speak in the attorney's own behalf, the attorney was not put on notice that a continuation of the offending conduct would have constituted contempt, it was highly unlikely that the attorney's allegedly offending conduct should have had any impact on the deliberations of the factfinder, a juvenile judge, and the trial court acted without warning and had obviously lost the court's patience with the attorney and the attorney's client and imposed sanctions for contempt when other actions might have achieved the same result without the disruption to the case that these contempt citations had caused. In re Hughes, 299 Ga. App. 66, 681 S.E.2d 745 (2009).

2. Civil and Criminal Contempt

Civil and criminal contempt compared.

- Contempt may be civil or criminal; in the former, the proceeding in attachment is to enforce compliance with an order of court made for the protection of some right of the complaining party, while in criminal contempt, the proceeding is to punish the offender for disrespect to or contumacious conduct towards the court. Wagner v. Commercial Printers, Inc., 203 Ga. 1, 45 S.E.2d 205 (1947).

Contempt of court may be either civil or criminal, and criminal contempt, either direct or indirect. A direct criminal contempt relates to contumacious conduct, whether by word or deed, committed in the actual presence of the court. An indirect, or constructive contempt, consists of contumacious conduct outside the presence of the court which amounts to an obstruction of the administration of justice. Clark v. State, 90 Ga. App. 330, 83 S.E.2d 45 (1954).

- Basis for contempt action is "willful" refusal to comply with judgment or order of court. Griggers v. Bryant, 239 Ga. 244, 236 S.E.2d 599 (1977).

Attachment for contempt is either civil or criminal, or both; in the former, the attachment, being remedial, is merely to compel obedience to an order requiring the payment of money, or to do some act for the benefit of a party litigant, and when the party ordered fails to comply, not out of disrespect to the court, but for other causes within or outside the party's control. Evans v. White, 178 Ga. 262, 172 S.E. 913 (1934).

- "Criminal contempt" is that which involves some disrespectful or contumacious conduct toward the court. It involves action by the court to compel respect thereto, to vindicate the court's authority, and to enforce the lawful processes and actions of the court. It is direct and punishable summarily without notice and opportunity to be heard if committed in the presence of the court, and is exempt from those due process requirements. Farmer v. Holton, 146 Ga. App. 102, 245 S.E.2d 457 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S. Ct. 1499, 59 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1979), overruled on other grounds, In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985).

- "Direct criminal" contempt is one involving misbehavior in presence of court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice. Martin v. Waters, 151 Ga. App. 149, 259 S.E.2d 153 (1979); In re Jones, 198 Ga. App. 228, 401 S.E.2d 278 (1990), aff'd, 205 Ga. App. 166, 421 S.E.2d 538 (1992).

- "Criminal contempt" with unconditional imprisonment may be used to preserve the court's authority and to punish disobedience of the court's orders. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 244 Ga. 66, 257 S.E.2d 900 (1979).

- "Civil contempt" is conditional punishment which coerces contemnor to comply with court order. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 244 Ga. 66, 257 S.E.2d 900 (1979).

- Trial court's orders finding an ex-husband in civil contempt for failing to pay his ex-wife child support and alimony and incarcerating him until he purged the contempt were affirmed because the evidence established he was willfully failing or refusing to pay as he was living a comfortable life, drew a significant salary per month, had cash accounts with thousands of dollars in them, and no evidence of debt or borrowing money was presented. Bernard v. Bernard, 347 Ga. App. 429, 819 S.E.2d 688 (2018).

- Court may find that a contempt proceeding originated and pursued by a party seeking "civil contempt" should be treated as one for "criminal contempt." Schiselman v. Trust Co. Bank, 246 Ga. 274, 271 S.E.2d 183 (1980).

- Trial court had the power to inflict summary punishment on the contemnor as the contemnor was, as required by statute, an officer of the court (an attorney) who committed misbehavior in representing a client in the courtroom as the contemnor refused to proceed with the client's defense once the trial court denied the contemnor's request for continuance; also, the trial court did not violate the contemnor's rights as the contemnor did not have a right to a hearing or a right to counsel in the contemnor's direct criminal contempt case. In re Willis, 259 Ga. App. 5, 576 S.E.2d 22 (2002).

- Given the court's continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, a trial court possessed authority to enforce the child support provisions of a divorce decree prospectively and as to past violations. In exercising that authority, the trial court, as a matter of Georgia law, was able to impose contempt sanctions for willful violations of the court's decree. Baars v. Freeman, 288 Ga. 835, 708 S.E.2d 273 (2011).

- Trial court erred in holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hold the daughter in contempt of the divorce decree under O.C.G.A. § 15-1- 4(a)(3) because the daughter, acting as the ex-husband's power of attorney, had full knowledge of the order requiring the payment of the retirement benefits and aided in the non-payment of the funds in violation of the divorce decree and settlement agreement. Sullivan v. Bunnell, 340 Ga. App. 283, 797 S.E.2d 499 (2017).

- Evidence that the defendant directed loud, threatening comments toward several of the state's witnesses, engaging in behavior that created a clear and present danger to the orderly administration of justice was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the defendant was guilty of criminal contempt. Moton v. State, 332 Ga. App. 300, 772 S.E.2d 393 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of criminal contempt because the attorney voluntarily signed three petitions for scire facias without ensuring that the proper case number had been assigned to them; the attorney's actions were not merely negligent as the actions were in derogation of the attorney's responsibilities and duties as an officer of the court; although the attorney took some steps to remedy the discrepancy, the attorney did not follow through and personally ensure that the proper case number was utilized before filing the fourth petition; and the attorney did not do everything the attorney could have to ensure compliance with the trial court's orders not to file a fourth identical petition. In re Dillon, 344 Ga. App. 200, 808 S.E.2d 436 (2017), cert. denied, No. S18C0718, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 517 (Ga. 2018).

- Trial court judgment finding the defendant, an attorney, in criminal contempt was reversed because there was no evidence that the attorney waived the right to counsel. In re Thompson, 339 Ga. App. 106, 793 S.E.2d 462 (2016).

- Ex-husband was not entitled to a jury trial because the Supreme Court of Georgia has long held that a person is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of ability to pay or contempt for failure to pay alimony and child support. Bernard v. Bernard, 347 Ga. App. 429, 819 S.E.2d 688 (2018).

3. Acts Not Constituting Contempt

No contempt if court order violated not directed at person.

- Person cannot be held in contempt when court order violated was not directed at that person or there was no active interference with the performance of the court order. Yarbrough v. First Nat'l Bank, 143 Ga. App. 399, 238 S.E.2d 758 (1977).

- While the failure to comply with a judgment of court ordering one to pay alimony as found by a jury is punishable as a contempt, if, in the trial of a divorce action, before the jury's verdict is made the judgment of the court, the defendant, in whose favor a verdict for alimony has been returned, moves for a mistrial which is granted, the plaintiff cannot subsequently be held in contempt of court for failure to pay alimony as found by the jury since no judgment was ever entered upon the verdict. Harris v. Harris, 213 Ga. 751, 101 S.E.2d 706 (1958).

- If a court of equity should render a simple decree for money on a simple money verdict, the failure to pay the decree would not be contempt, nor could compulsory process against the person of the party in default be resorted to in order to enforce payment. London v. London, 149 Ga. App. 805, 256 S.E.2d 33 (1979).

Refusal or failure to pay money judgments is in no sense a contempt of court and imprisonment for such failure would be imprisonment for debt pure and simple. London v. London, 149 Ga. App. 805, 256 S.E.2d 33 (1979).

- Mere informal and voluntary agreement which is entered into with the court by one who is not a party to a cause pending before the court and in which there is no express command or prohibition of court directed to such volunteer may not constitute the basis for contempt proceedings predicated upon the failure of the volunteer to honor the agreement. In re Norris, 154 Ga. App. 173, 267 S.E.2d 788 (1980).

- It was error to hold a mother's friend in criminal contempt of a separation agreement on the ground that the friend had made disparaging remarks to a child about the child's father. The alleged comments did not occur in the trial court's presence, but were repeated by the child in an in camera conference, so there was no direct contempt; furthermore, there was no constructive contempt because the friend was not a party to the separation agreement and was not shown to have had notice of the provision the friend allegedly violated; moreover, the friend had not received due process in that the friend had no notice of the allegations and was not given the opportunity to defend against the allegations or even to respond to the allegations. In re Harris, 289 Ga. App. 334, 657 S.E.2d 259 (2008).

- While an unsuperseded order within the jurisdiction of a court must be obeyed, even though erroneous, and disobedience thereof is a contempt of court, yet if the court is without jurisdiction the order is a nullity, and a failure to obey the order is not a contempt. Campbell v. Gormley, 185 Ga. 65, 194 S.E. 177 (1937).

- If one indicted for a bailable offense has been arrested and has given bond for one's appearance and fails to appear, one can be rearrested on a new warrant, but there is no law in this state authorizing one's punishment for contempt of court for failing and refusing to appear in accordance with the terms of the bond. Paseur v. State, 152 Ga. App. 599, 263 S.E.2d 500 (1979).

- Because the United States Supreme Court opinion construed language, "or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice," in a federal statute similar to language in this section so as to refer only to geographical nearness and not to an act committed away from the courthouse, the Georgia Court of Appeals was constrained to hold that a publication made in a newspaper about a pending case cannot be contempt of court so as to be summarily punishable. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 101 Ga. App. 105, 113 S.E.2d 148 (1960) for comment, see 12 Mercer L. Rev. 284 (1960).

- Remarriage of the parties to original divorce decree nullified that decree and restored the parental rights of the parties to the same extent as if no divorce had been granted; consequently, the defendant could not be held in contempt for failing to comply with that decree. Warren v. Warren, 213 Ga. 81, 97 S.E.2d 349 (1957).

- If the basis for an injunction no longer exists because the authority to do that which was prohibited is subsequently granted, an action for contempt will not lie. Partain v. City of Royston, 248 Ga. 420, 284 S.E.2d 15 (1981).

- Mother would not be held in contempt of court for denying father court-ordered child visitation rights since the order was unreasonable in that the father had been indicted for molesting the child, the child was to be a witness against the father, and the child became physically ill when told about the impending visit. Beckham v. O'Brien, 176 Ga. App. 518, 336 S.E.2d 375 (1985).

- A 15-minute delay in county solicitor's (now district attorney) arrival for a court appearance while the solicitor was conducting business of the State Court of Coffee County, Georgia, did not constitute a sufficient predicate from which any rational trier of fact would find the essential elements of the criminal contempt charge against the solicitor without reasonable doubt. In re Hayes, 185 Ga. App. 818, 366 S.E.2d 204 (1988).

- Children of the fiduciary's incompetent ward failed to show that the fiduciary was in contempt of a settlement agreement since the fiduciary, who was the ward's second wife, failed to turn over the family heirloom silver to the children, but the agreement only required that the fiduciary do so "to the extent such heirlooms can be located," and the children failed to carry the children's burden of proof that the fiduciary had the silver and would not or could not turn the silver over to the children. Head v. Head, 234 Ga. App. 469, 507 S.E.2d 214 (1998).

- Trial court erred in holding a prospective adopter and the adopter's attorney in criminal contempt for purportedly willfully violating an order regarding the custody of the minor child at issue as the trial court's order regarding custody of the child was directed to the obligations of the natural mother only and no willful disobedience of the order was shown by the adopter and the attorney filing for a change of custody in another county to which the adopter had moved. In re Hadaway, 290 Ga. App. 453, 659 S.E.2d 863 (2008).

4. Contempt and Free Speech

No protection for contempt of court.

- Constitutional right of freedom of speech or of press was not intended as refuge for the contemner or slanderer or libelor. Contempt of court, slander, and libel constitute abuses of the privilege for the commission of which the offenders are justly and lawfully punishable. In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665, 76 S.E. 397 (1912).

- Due process, freedom of speech, and equal protection clauses of the Constitution of the United States do not bar punishment for contempt of court. Wood v. State, 103 Ga. App. 305, 119 S.E.2d 261 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).

- If an order of court forbidding the use of threats, violence, and intimidation for the purpose of preventing others from engaging in employment during a labor strike is violated, the violator can find no protection under the constitutional guaranty of free speech. Lassiter v. Swift & Co., 204 Ga. 561, 50 S.E.2d 359 (1948).

- Punishment for contempt of court is not prevented by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech since contempt of court is an abuse of the liberty of speech. Wood v. State, 103 Ga. App. 305, 119 S.E.2d 261 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).

- Errors in judgment or unsubstantiated opinions may be exposed, but not through punishment for contempt for expression. Under our system of government, counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).

Procedure

1. In General

- Contempt applications must be filed in county where divorce and alimony decree was entered, and this is so regardless of the fact that the respondent (the alleged contemnor) may not be a resident of that county, either having moved therefrom after the decree was entered or perhaps having never resided there. Austin v. Austin, 245 Ga. 487, 265 S.E.2d 788 (1980).

- Contempt of court cannot be properly punished by rulings upon demurrers (now motions to dismiss) to the petition. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Farrar, 171 Ga. 371, 155 S.E. 327 (1930).

- It is a question of law for the court to decide whether the courtroom conduct which is factually undisputed amounts to criminal contempt of court. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S. Ct. 1440, 71 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982).

- An order restraining the defendant from indorsing and cashing a check fairly comprehended disposition of the proceeds in the event of the collection of the funds by the defendant; and if the defendant, having cashed the check and received the proceeds before being served and informed of the restraining order, disposed of such proceeds after knowledge of the restraining order, the court did not err in adjudging the defendant in contempt for so doing. Reid v. McRae, 190 Ga. 323, 9 S.E.2d 176 (1940).

- Until a court order concerning a divorce settlement is set aside for whatever reason, the party protesting the order can be held in contempt for violating the order's provisions. Paisley v. Huddlestun, 244 Ga. 418, 260 S.E.2d 478 (1979).

§ 9-11-6(d) has no application to citation for contempt. - Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, §§ 5 and 6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(d)) applied to written motions in a pending case and had no application to a citation for contempt which was an independent proceeding authorized under former Code 1933, § 24-105 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4). Gibson v. Gibson, 234 Ga. 528, 216 S.E.2d 824 (1975).

- In a criminal contempt proceeding in which the trial judge has been called upon to rule on an attack on the judge's own impartiality and when marked personal feelings are manifested on both sides, the court should call upon one of the trial judge's fellow judges to adjudicate the contempt charges. In re McLarty, 152 Ga. App. 399, 263 S.E.2d 194 (1979).

- If a judge does not act the instant the contempt is committed, but waits until the end of the trial, on balance, it is generally wise if the marks of the unseemly conduct have left personal stings to ask a fellow judge to take the judge's place. Spruell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 99, 250 S.E.2d 807 (1978).

- While the trial judge, upon the occurrence in the judge's presence of contempt, may immediately and summarily punish the contempt, summary punishment may be delayed until after trial if the trial judge believes that the exigencies of the trial require such action. Spruell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 99, 250 S.E.2d 807 (1978).

Award of custody of minor child to plaintiff was erroneous in proceeding for contempt as the question of custody of a child was not before the court. Warren v. Warren, 213 Ga. 81, 97 S.E.2d 349 (1957).

- Court can apply the proper punishment for any contempt that exists, but that cannot be mingled with a judgment in a proceeding to obtain damages and injunction ad interim. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Farrar, 171 Ga. 371, 155 S.E. 327 (1930).

- If the trial court issues an order finding the appellant in contempt of court but does not impose punishment, no final judgment has been entered and the case is still pending in the court below and an appeals court cannot review the lower court's decision. In re Crudup, 149 Ga. App. 214, 253 S.E.2d 802 (1979).

- Though, as a general rule, all communications on the part of the client to an attorney are privileged, and therefore the attorney cannot be compelled to disclose the communications, still, in a civil proceeding, if there is evidence sufficient to authorize the court to adjudge that the attorney knows the identity and residence of the client, and the injury is restricted to that question alone, the attorney may be compelled to disclose the attorney's knowledge as to the residence of the client in order that the client may be served with a copy of the petition and process since otherwise the rights of the petitioner, if any, would be denied. West v. Field, 181 Ga. 152, 181 S.E. 661 (1935).

- Provision of law for a summary rule against an attorney at law is penal in its nature and must be strictly construed; consequently, the right to rule an attorney for money alleged to be in the attorney's hands as such attorney depends on the existence of the relation of attorney and client and is limited to the client. Blanch v. Roberson, 69 Ga. App. 423, 25 S.E.2d 720 (1943).

Right to rule an attorney at law and compel the attorney to pay over money which the attorney has collected is limited to the client. It follows that if, as the result of a lawsuit instituted by an attorney for the client, money has come into the hands of the attorney, the defendant in that suit who claims title to the money, but who is not the client of the attorney, cannot enforce the client's claim by rule against the attorney. Blanch v. Roberson, 69 Ga. App. 423, 25 S.E.2d 720 (1943).

2. Procedural Issues

A. Proof

- Under the law, the burden is on the moving party to show the facts necessary to establish contempt. This burden must be carried by clear and convincing evidence. While proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required, the authorities sometimes say that more than preponderance of proof is required. FTC v. Blaine, 308 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Ga. 1970).

Burden of establishing the fact of contempt is on the party asserting contempt. Martin v. Waters, 151 Ga. App. 149, 259 S.E.2d 153 (1979).

- Only burden resting on the plaintiffs was to prove that the defendants disobeyed the injunction in the manner alleged in the petition. If the charge imposed upon the plaintiffs the additional burden of establishing the right to have the plant closed, this was an additional burden of proof impossible to carry, for as this court has pointed out, under the law of contempt, such relief was not available in the proceedings to have the defendants cited for disobedience of an injunction granted in a case when no money or other property was sued for. A charge imposing a heavier or different burden than that required by the law of the case is hurtful error and requires the granting of a new trial. Bennett v. Bagwell & Stewart, Inc., 216 Ga. 290, 116 S.E.2d 288 (1960).

- Defendant was charged with civil contempt in that the act complained of was one in violation of an injunctive order which was issued to protect the right of the employer to be free from violence towards the employer's property or the employer's employees and those persons seeking to work for the employer, either upon the employer's property or at any place; being a civil case a preponderance of the evidence would be sufficient to authorize a verdict against the defendant. Wagner v. Commercial Printers, Inc., 203 Ga. 1, 45 S.E.2d 205 (1947).

- If the order holding the defendant in contempt recited that the conduct found to be contumacious occurred in open court and in the presence of the court and that the contemnee willfully refused to obey the court's orders and repeatedly attempted to argue after having been fully heard, and after the opinion of the court had been pronounced, and that the conduct of defendant was intended by the defendant to be contemptuous of the court and that the conduct interfered with the lawful administration of justice, the order recited facts which warranted the trial judge in holding the defendant in contempt of court. Boatright v. State, 106 Ga. App. 801, 128 S.E.2d 559 (1962).

- To sustain a judgment holding individuals who were not parties to main suit and were not named in court order forbidding the use of threats, violence, and intimidation in labor dispute in contempt, the evidence must show that those individuals acted after having actual knowledge of the court's order. Lassiter v. Swift & Co., 204 Ga. 561, 50 S.E.2d 359 (1948).

- Evidence authorized a finding that the defendant was guilty of contempt in that there was a deliberate purpose or calculation to improperly influence a juror designate (one who had been drawn as a juror), and that that purpose or calculation was accompanied by a definite act or declaration on the part of the contemnor in an effort to carry that purpose of calculation into effect; the failure of the undertaking was immaterial except as to the punishment to be inflicted. Summers v. State ex rel. Boykin, 66 Ga. App. 648, 19 S.E.2d 28 (1942).

- Without evidence to show otherwise, it is assumed that a person violates a decree deliberately. Sanborn v. Sanborn, 224 Ga. 792, 164 S.E.2d 563 (1968).

- If the contumacious conduct is committed in the presence of the court in the immediate view of the judge, it is unnecessary for the court to apply any evidentiary standard of proof in order to summarily hold the contemnor in contempt of court. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S. Ct. 1440, 71 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982).

When the contempt occurs totally in the presence of the judge, there is no necessity for the production of evidence. Indeed, there is no burden of persuading the trier of fact as there is no fact-finding process to be conducted. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S. Ct. 1440, 71 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982).

- Both a parent's ability to pay child support and a parent's willful refusal to do so are essential to finding the parent in contempt for failure to pay such support in accordance with a court order. Floyd v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 551, 277 S.E.2d 658 (1981).

Defenses to both civil and criminal contempt are that the order was not sufficiently definite and certain, was not violated, or that the violation was not willful (e.g., inability to pay or comply). Schiselman v. Trust Co. Bank, 246 Ga. 274, 271 S.E.2d 183 (1980).

- Ordinarily, one charged with contempt of court for failure to comply with a court order makes a complete defense by proving that one is unable to comply. A court will not imprison a witness for failure to produce documents which one does not have unless one is responsible for the document's unavailability, or is impeding justice by not explaining what happened to the documents. FTC v. Blaine, 308 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Ga. 1970).

- It is essential to constitute contempt that thing ordered to be done be within power of person against whom order is directed. In re Brookins, 153 Ga. App. 82, 264 S.E.2d 560 (1980).

- Sentence of court, imposed upon defendant in defendant's absence, is absolutely void, and cannot be enforced against the defendant. Martin v. Waters, 151 Ga. App. 149, 259 S.E.2d 153 (1979).

C. Enforcement of Orders

Tardiness or failure of party or witness to appear.

- If a witness or litigant who has been ordered to appear at a given time is tardy in arrival, or does not make an appearance as ordered, the question arises whether the delay or nonappearance was a willful and contumacious flaunting of the appearance ordered by the rule nisi, whether it was accidental, or whether it was due to some unavoidable cause; the normal procedure when a party or witness who has been ordered to appear does not do so is to arrest a party or witness under a bench warrant at which time the cause of the delay can be inquired. Martin v. Waters, 151 Ga. App. 149, 259 S.E.2d 153 (1979).

- Proper course to pursue is to issue an attachment for the person who has failed to respond to the rule nisi for contempt, have the person arrested and brought into court, and to deal with the person in the manner provided by law. Martin v. Waters, 151 Ga. App. 149, 259 S.E.2d 153 (1979).

- Superior court awarding alimony by virtue of the court's jurisdiction originally invoked by plaintiff in a divorce suit had jurisdiction to enforce payment by attachment for contempt against plaintiff after plaintiff changed plaintiff's residence to another county. Curtright v. Curtright, 187 Ga. 122, 200 S.E. 711 (1938).

- Valid judgment for alimony may be enforced by attachment for contempt for nonpayment not arising from lack of ability to pay since the judgment goes further and expressly commands the payment of support which is a duty in which society has a substantial interest. Wilson v. Chumney, 214 Ga. 120, 103 S.E.2d 552 (1958).

- When a person has been tried and convicted in the county court, and has petitioned the judge of the superior court for a writ of certiorari, and the petition is sanctioned, and the writ issued, and the judge of the county court refuses to answer as required by the writ, the judge of the superior court, in term time, has power to attach the county court judge for contempt. Pittman v. Hagans, 91 Ga. 107, 16 S.E. 659 (1892).

- If a receiver has been directed by the court to deposit a fund arising from the sale of the property of the debtor in banks, subject to be withdrawn only on the debtor's check when the check has been countersigned by the judge presiding in the court which appointed the receiver, and in violation of the receiver's duty, and in disregard of the order of the court, the receiver obtains such fund from the banks on checks not countersigned, and appropriates the checks to the receiver's own use, then, regardless of the question whether or not the bank is liable for such wrongful payment, such receiver is in direct contempt of the court, whose officer the judge is. The receiver may be attached and punished for contempt in disregarding the orders of the court, and also for a failure or refusal, when so ordered, to pay into court the fund so misappropriated. Evans v. White, 178 Ga. 262, 172 S.E. 913 (1934).

- If a receiver is appointed for goods which are stored in a warehouse, such goods are in the possession of the receiver, and the custody of the property by the receiver of the court is the custody of the court, and a failure of the warehouseman to recognize such possession by the receiver and by the court would subject the warehouseman to attachment for contempt. United Bonded Whse., Inc. v. Jackson, 208 Ga. 552, 67 S.E.2d 761 (1951).

- If a judgment is passed in a habeas corpus case, awarding the custody of a minor child to the child's grandparents, and requiring the grandparents to surrender the child to the child's father at stated intervals upon the father's application therefor, and the grandparents refuse to comply with this provision in the order, the grandparents may be attached and punished for contempt. Crawford v. Manning, 12 Ga. App. 54, 76 S.E. 771 (1912).

- While attorneys as officers of the court are under a duty to maintain the integrity and dignity of the court and respect for the court's authority, for acts committed outside the presence of the court which do not constitute misbehavior as an officer of the court in an official transaction or disobedience or resistance of any lawful writ, etc., of the court, attorneys are no more amenable to attachment and summary punishment for contempt of court than are other persons. Townsend v. State, 54 Ga. App. 627, 188 S.E. 560 (1936).

Misbehavior of attorney as officer of court may properly be punished by attachment for contempt. West v. Field, 181 Ga. 152, 181 S.E. 661 (1935).

- Since a court has the authority to hold any witness in contempt for failing or refusing to appear and testify on a relevant matter, a fortiori the power lies to enforce the court's order as to a matter in furtherance of the jurisdiction of the court to one representing oneself to be counsel for a party before the court. In re Boswell, 148 Ga. App. 519, 251 S.E.2d 596 (1978).

3. Due Process

Contemnor entitled to due process requirements.

- Due process demands that the contemnor be cited, given notice, and allowed an opportunity to defend or excuse oneself. Moody v. State, 131 Ga. App. 355, 206 S.E.2d 79 (1974).

- If a criminal contempt act is not in the court's immediate presence, due process requires that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard. Martin v. Waters, 151 Ga. App. 149, 259 S.E.2d 153 (1979).

- Requirement of reasonable notice in a case involving an alleged indirect contempt is not satisfied by a showing that the accused was present in court at the time of trial and adjudication and had actual notice then and there of what was going on, but rather contemplates and necessitates a written notice fairly and fully informing the accused of the specific acts of contempt with which the accused is charged, and so given as to afford a reasonable time to make a defense. Crocker v. Crocker, 132 Ga. App. 587, 208 S.E.2d 602 (1974).

- Respondent in a citation for contempt is entitled to be apprised of the acts which respondent is charged with committing in violation of the injunctive order so that the respondent may be prepared to defend against such allegations on the hearing. Hortman v. Georgia Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 214 Ga. 560, 105 S.E.2d 732 (1958).

- If a person is on notice that the person is being tried for contempt and the movant seeks "such other sanctions as is appropriate to ensure the enforcement and the observance" of the court's order or seeks "such other relief as may be appropriate," the contemnor is on notice that the proceeding is both civil and criminal in nature and that criminal sanctions may be imposed in an appropriate case. Schiselman v. Trust Co. Bank, 246 Ga. 274, 271 S.E.2d 183 (1980).

- In cases of constructive contempt of court, if the alleged contumacious conduct is disobedience to a mandate of the court, not an act in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the law requires that a rule nisi issue and be served upon the accused, giving the accused notice of the charges against the accused, and that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard. Crocker v. Crocker, 132 Ga. App. 587, 208 S.E.2d 602 (1974).

Failure to give requisite rule nisi to alleged contemner may be waived. Crocker v. Crocker, 132 Ga. App. 587, 208 S.E.2d 602 (1974).

Waiver of failure to give requisite rule nisi cannot be imputed unless it be shown that the notice was unequivocally waived. Crocker v. Crocker, 132 Ga. App. 587, 208 S.E.2d 602 (1974).

- Notice given by rule nisi is to afford accused reasonable time in which to prepare the accused's defense to the charge that the accused violated the court's order. Crocker v. Crocker, 132 Ga. App. 587, 208 S.E.2d 602 (1974).

- If a contemner voluntarily appears and defends against the contempt proceedings, it is not required that the contemner be served with a rule nisi. Crocker v. Crocker, 132 Ga. App. 587, 208 S.E.2d 602 (1974).

Omission of word "criminal" in notice of contempt proceeding is not fatal if the notice fully described the conduct charged, there is no showing that the contemnor was prejudiced by the failure to clearly denominate the nature of the contempt proceeding, and the contemnor was accorded all rights due a defendant in a "criminal contempt" proceeding. Schiselman v. Trust Co. Bank, 246 Ga. 274, 271 S.E.2d 183 (1980).

- There is a type of contempt of court which is exempt from the due process requirements of notice and hearing. This is the direct summary criminal contempt "arising in the presence of the court which tends to scandalize it and hinder or obstruct the orderly processes of the administration of justice, the preservation of order and decorum in the court," etc., and which is committed "in the face of" or "in the immediate presence of" the judge. Moody v. State, 131 Ga. App. 355, 206 S.E.2d 79 (1974).

Direct summary criminal contempt which arises in the presence of the court and tends to scandalize it and hinder or obstruct the orderly processes of the administration of justice, the preservation of order and decorum in the court, etc., is exempt from the due process requirements of notice and hearing. Spruell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 99, 250 S.E.2d 807 (1978); In re McLarty, 152 Ga. App. 399, 263 S.E.2d 194 (1979).

- If a direct contempt is committed in the presence of the court, the offender is not entitled as a matter of right to a hearing before the court; the court may act on the court's own knowledge of the facts and proceed to impose punishment for the contempt; or the court may in the court's discretion allow a hearing; the refusal to allow a hearing does not deprive the defendant of the due process of law guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions. Martin v. Waters, 151 Ga. App. 149, 259 S.E.2d 153 (1979).

If contempt is direct or in presence of court, no service of any commitment is necessary. Hall v. Martin, 177 Ga. 238, 170 S.E. 41 (1933).

4. Jury Trials

No constitutional right to jury trial.

- Power to punish contempts summarily is incident to courts of record, and to try a case of contempt without the intervention of a jury violates no constitutional provision. In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665, 76 S.E. 397 (1912).

Defendants in a contempt case do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial even on pure questions of fact. Bennett v. Bagwell & Stewart, Inc., 216 Ga. 290, 116 S.E.2d 288 (1960).

Right to a jury trial did not extend to special summary proceedings including show cause hearings since the issue was whether a party should be held in civil contempt for violation of a previously issued injunction or order. Peacock v. Spivey, 278 Ga. App. 338, 629 S.E.2d 48 (2006).

Trial court did not err in refusing to allow for a jury trial regarding the contempt action against the ex-husband relating to a child support and attorney fee arrearage because the Georgia Supreme Court has long held that a person is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of ability to pay or contempt for failure to pay alimony and child support. McCarthy v. Ashment, 353 Ga. App. 270, 835 S.E.2d 745 (2019).

- Respondent in contempt proceedings is not entitled to a trial by jury except if a jury trial is expressly provided by statute. Branch v. Branch, 219 Ga. 601, 135 S.E.2d 269 (1964).

- Every court has power to compel obedience to the court's judgments, orders, and processes; and in a proceeding for contempt growing out of the alleged violation by the defendant therein of a mandamus absolute, the judge can determine all questions of fact without the intervention of a jury, except in the cases provided for in this section. Gaston v. Shunk Plow Co., 161 Ga. 287, 130 S.E. 580 (1925).

- Respondent was not entitled to a trial by a jury in a contempt proceeding on the issue of whether or not the respondent violated an injunctive order prohibiting the respondent from practicing dentistry without a license as such case did not fall within the class of proceedings for contempt provided for in this section wherein a jury trial was required. Hortman v. Georgia Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 214 Ga. 560, 105 S.E.2d 732 (1958).

- If there is a refusal to pay alimony, a court of record may punish for contempt without a jury trial. Lee v. Lee, 97 Ga. 736, 25 S.E. 174 (1896); Briesnick v. Briesnick, 100 Ga. 57, 28 S.E. 154 (1896); Stokes v. Stokes, 126 Ga. 804, 55 S.E. 1023 (1906).

This section does not require a jury trial if the respondent was cited for refusing to pay alimony judgment. Branch v. Branch, 219 Ga. 601, 135 S.E.2d 269 (1964).

- Presiding judge, if the judge deems it proper, may determine for oneself, without aid of a jury, all questions of fact arising upon the auditor's report; but inasmuch as the case upon which the contempt proceedings were founded is one in which the court is exercising chancery powers, this court sees no reason why the judge may not, if such course seems advisable to the judge, invoke the aid of a jury in arriving at a proper conclusion upon the questions of fact presented. It is a matter of discretion as to what method the judge will adopt to arrive at the actual truth to be ascertained. Bennett v. Bagwell & Stewart, Inc., 216 Ga. 290, 116 S.E.2d 288 (1960).

Interference with Administration of Justice

Misbehavior and disobedience that obstructs administration of justice.

- This section shall extend only to cases of misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of the courts or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of the courts in the officer's official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any officer of the courts, party, juror, witness, or other person or persons to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the courts. Wood v. State, 103 Ga. App. 305, 119 S.E.2d 261 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S. Ct. 1364, 8 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1962).

Because sufficient evidence existed to support a criminal contempt finding against an attorney based on that attorney's refusal to obey the trial judge's order to continue the representation of the attorney's criminal client, the trial judge was authorized to summarily find the attorney in contempt of court for directly disobeying an order of the court, misbehaving in the presence of the court, and obstructing the administration of justice. Lee v. State, 283 Ga. App. 369, 641 S.E.2d 615 (2007).

- Although misbehavior so as to obstruct the administration of justice is being subject to "summary punishment," that must yield to the fundamental constitutional right to due process of law if the misbehavior is not in the immediate presence of the court, so that it may "act on its own knowledge of the facts," summary punishment is not authorized, and due process demands that the contemnor be cited, given notice, and allowed an opportunity to defend or excuse the contemnor. McDaniel v. State, 202 Ga. App. 409, 414 S.E.2d 536 (1992).

Disobedience to lawful order of court is obstruction of justice, and for such a violation the court, in order to compel respect or compliance, may punish for contempt. Griggers v. Bryant, 239 Ga. 244, 236 S.E.2d 599 (1977).

- Constitution of Georgia guarantees the liberty of speech and of the press but does not protect an abuse of that liberty and obstructing the administration of justice by the courts of this state is an abuse of that liberty and will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court. McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78 (1953); Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).

- Inherent power of the courts to punish any publication calculated to interfere with the administration of justice is not restricted by the constitutional guaranties of liberty of the press for liberty of the press is subordinate to the independence of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice. McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78 (1953).

- Criticisms in newspaper articles which do not obstruct the administration of justice in the court do not constitute contempt of court. Townsend v. State, 54 Ga. App. 627, 188 S.E. 560 (1936).

- Rule for contempt issued by superior court judge based on a series of newspaper articles is fatally defective if the publications complained of were true, the publication related to a matter in another court and in no wise referred to the court issuing the rule and if the publication could not have obstructed or impaired the administration of justice in the court. McGill v. State, 209 Ga. 500, 74 S.E.2d 78 (1953).

- Alleged conduct of the defendant in uttering a certain phrase to the solicitor general (now district attorney) in the presence of the grand jury was not in the immediate presence or "face" of the court, but was under this section "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice," provided the alleged conduct of the contemnor showed that such conduct could obstruct the administration of justice. Adams v. State, 89 Ga. App. 882, 81 S.E.2d 507 (1954).

- Attorney's question in a criminal trial that purportedly "elicited testimony that his client was not found guilty at ... previous trial" did not justify a finding of contempt. In re Healy, 241 Ga. App. 266, 526 S.E.2d 616 (1999).

- Trial court did not err in the manner in which the court handled the defendant's summary punishment for contempt of court for misbehavior in the court's presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice after the defendant failed to appear before the trial court with the client the defendant was representing, particularly given the defendant's representation to the trial court via telephone that the defendant would be in court in a few minutes. In re Omole, 258 Ga. App. 725, 574 S.E.2d 912 (2002).

Discretion of Court

Regulating behavior of court officers.

- Trial court has very wide discretion in regulating and controlling the behavior of court officers in the conduct of the proceedings before the court, and this discretion will not be interfered with unless flagrantly abused. In re McLarty, 152 Ga. App. 399, 263 S.E.2d 194 (1979).

- In cases of contempt, the trial judge is vested with discretion in determining whether the judge's orders have been violated and how such infringements should be treated, and the Supreme Court will not disturb the judge's judgment unless it appears that the judge has abused the judge's discretion. Reid v. McRae, 190 Ga. 323, 9 S.E.2d 176 (1940).

Trial court in contempt case has wide discretion to determine whether orders have been violated. The court's determination will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 246 Ga. 266, 271 S.E.2d 175 (1980).

- Judgment rendered on a hearing of a contempt case will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court unless the judge has grossly abused the sound discretion vested in the judge in such a case. Wagner v. Commercial Printers, Inc., 203 Ga. 1, 45 S.E.2d 205 (1947).

Trial court's adjudication of contempt will not be interfered with unless there is a gross, enormous, or flagrant abuse of discretion. Renfroe v. State, 104 Ga. App. 362, 121 S.E.2d 811 (1961), overruled on other grounds, In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985), for comment, see 24 Ga. B. J. 544 (1962).

Discretion of the judges of the superior courts in all matters pertaining to contempt of the judges' authority and mandates will never be controlled unless grossly abused. White v. State, 105 Ga. App. 616, 125 S.E.2d 239, rev'd on other grounds, 218 Ga. 290, 127 S.E.2d 668 (1962); Miller v. Kaylor, 116 Ga. App. 668, 158 S.E.2d 260 (1967).

It is fundamental that every court possesses the inherent power to preserve and enforce order and compel obedience to the court's judgments and orders, to control the conduct of the court's officers and all other persons connected with the judicial proceedings before the court, and to inflict summary punishment for contempt upon any person failing and refusing to obey any lawful order of such court. An appellate court will not undertake to control the wide discretion vested in the trial court in the exercise of this fundamental power unless it is made to appear that wrong or oppression has resulted from an abuse of such discretion reposed in the court. Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 553, 170 S.E.2d 281 (1969); Young v. Champion, 142 Ga. App. 687, 236 S.E.2d 783 (1977).

Questions of contempt if committed in the actual presence of the court are for the court treated with contempt, and the trial court's adjudication of contempt will not be interfered with unless there is a flagrant abuse of discretion. Farmer v. Holton, 146 Ga. App. 102, 245 S.E.2d 457 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S. Ct. 1499, 59 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1979), overruled on other grounds, In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985).

Denial of sanctions for defense counsel's improper remarks informing the jury that opposing counsel was representing plaintiffs on a contingent-fee basis was not an abuse of discretion since issues as to the amount of damages, addressed by the improper remarks, were not reached by the jury, and therefore no harm resulted. Stoner v. Eden, 199 Ga. App. 135, 404 S.E.2d 283, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 907, 404 S.E.2d 283 (1991).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by not disqualifying the ex-wife's attorney after an alleged conflict of interest was established because the attorney denied there was a conflict after having talked briefly to the ex-husband's mother, and filed an affidavit from the law firm's administrator to that effect. McCarthy v. Ashment, 353 Ga. App. 270, 835 S.E.2d 745 (2019).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Magistrate may prevent interference with constable.

- Justice of peace (now magistrate) may prevent interference with a constable in making a levy through contempt processes. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-63.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contempt, §§ 68 et seq., 117, 123, 199, 205 et seq. 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review, § 200 et seq.

- 17 C.J.S., Contempt, §§ 7 et seq., 85. 50A C.J.S., Juries, § 147 et seq.

- Restitution as purging contempt in violating injunction, 2 A.L.R. 169.

Necessity of affidavit or sworn statement as foundation for constructive contempt, 2 A.L.R. 225; 41 A.L.R.2d 1263.

What courts or officers have power to punish for contempt, 8 A.L.R. 1543; 54 A.L.R. 318; 73 A.L.R. 1185.

Contempt: violation of injunction by one not a party to injunction suit, 15 A.L.R. 386.

Assault as contempt of court, 18 A.L.R. 212; 55 A.L.R. 1230; 52 A.L.R.2d 1297.

Procuring or attempting to procure witness to leave jurisdiction as contempt, 21 A.L.R. 247; 33 A.L.R. 607.

Inability to comply with judgment or order as defense to charge of contempt, 22 A.L.R. 1256; 31 A.L.R. 649; 40 A.L.R. 546; 76 A.L.R. 390; 120 A.L.R. 703.

Forcing party or prosecuting witness to withdraw or not to institute action or proceeding as contempt of court, 23 A.L.R. 187.

Decree or order which merely declares rights of parties without an express command or prohibition as basis of contempt proceeding, 29 A.L.R. 134.

Communicating with grand jury as contempt, 29 A.L.R. 489.

Affidavit to disqualify judge as contempt, 29 A.L.R. 1273.

Contempt for disobedience of mandamus, 30 A.L.R. 148.

Contempt in addressing letter to court or judge with regard to a pending case, 31 A.L.R. 1239.

Conduct of juror in respect of verdict as basis of charge of contempt, 32 A.L.R. 436.

Conduct pending receivership as contempt of court, 39 A.L.R. 6; 48 A.L.R. 241.

Preventing, obstructing, or delaying service or execution of search warrant as contempt, 39 A.L.R. 1354.

Duty of attorney to call witness or to procure or aid in procuring his attendance, 56 A.L.R. 174.

Commitment for contempt in failing to obey order of court as purging one of contempt, 56 A.L.R. 701.

Necessity that hearing be allowed before imposition of punishment for contempt, 57 A.L.R. 545.

Criticism of attitude of the court or judge toward violations of liquor law as contempt, 58 A.L.R. 1001.

Shadowing, or tampering or communicating with, jurors as contempt, 63 A.L.R. 1269.

Punishment of election officers for contempt, 64 A.L.R. 1019.

Refusal to keep promise to waive privilege against self-incrimination as contempt, 69 A.L.R. 855.

Criticism of court's appointment of receiver as contempt, 97 A.L.R. 903.

Refusal or failure of clerk of court to comply with direction of court or judge upon ground of its invalidity or supposed invalidity as contempt, 119 A.L.R. 1380.

Legislative power to abridge, limit, or regulate power of courts with respect to contempt, 121 A.L.R. 215.

Misconduct by jurors as contempt, 125 A.L.R. 1274.

Impersonation or false statement by juror as to his identity as ground for new trial, 127 A.L.R. 717.

Failure or refusal to surrender possession or disclose whereabouts of property in replevin as contempt, 130 A.L.R. 632.

Reversal, modification, dismissal, dissolution, or resettlement of injunction order or judgment as affecting prior disobedience as contempt, 148 A.L.R. 1024.

Necessity and sufficiency of making and recording subsidiary or detailed findings supporting adjudication of direct contempt, 154 A.L.R. 1227.

Freedom of speech and press as limitation on power to punish for contempt, 159 A.L.R. 1379.

Power to include separate acts of contempt in a single contempt proceeding, 160 A.L.R. 1104.

Fine for contempt as provable or dischargeable in bankruptcy, 163 A.L.R. 389.

Seizure or impoundment of property in contempt cases, 167 A.L.R. 713.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey court order or decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous, 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Punishment of civil contempt in other than divorce cases by striking pleading or entering default judgment or dismissal against contemner, 14 A.L.R.2d 580.

Procuring perjury as contempt, 29 A.L.R.2d 1157.

Bail jumping after conviction, failure to surrender or to appear for sentencing, and the like, as contempt, 34 A.L.R.2d 1100.

Limitations statute applicable to criminal contempt proceedings, 38 A.L.R.2d 1131.

Contempt: acts or conduct outside of courtroom or jury room as in federal court's presence, within 18 USC § 401(1), 42 A.L.R.2d 970.

Impeachment of witness by showing conviction of contempt, 49 A.L.R.2d 845.

Pleading and burden of proof, in contempt proceedings, as to ability to comply with order for payment of alimony or child support, 53 A.L.R.2d 591.

Allowance of attorneys' fees in contempt proceedings, 55 A.L.R.2d 979; 43 A.L.R.3d 793.

Sufficiency of notice to, or service upon, contemnor's attorney in civil contempt proceedings, 60 A.L.R.2d 1244.

Who may institute civil contempt proceedings, 61 A.L.R.2d 1083.

Published article or broadcast as direct contempt of court, 69 A.L.R.2d 676.

Use of affidavits to establish contempt, 79 A.L.R.2d 657.

Admissibility, in contempt proceeding against witness, of evidence of incriminating nature of question as to which he invoked privilege against self-incrimination, 88 A.L.R.2d 463.

Perjury or false swearing as contempt, 89 A.L.R.2d 1258.

Power to base separate contempt prosecutions or punishments on successive refusals to respond to same or similar questions, 94 A.L.R.2d 1246.

False or inaccurate report of judicial proceedings as contempt, 99 A.L.R.2d 440.

Circumstances under which one court can punish a contempt against another court, 99 A.L.R.2d 1100.

Delay in adjudication of contempt committed in the actual presence of court as affecting court's power to punish contemnor, 100 A.L.R.2d 439.

Use of intoxicating liquor by jurors: civil cases, 6 A.L.R.3d 934.

Criminal liability for obstructing process as affected by invalidity or irregularity of the process, 10 A.L.R.3d 1146.

Appealability of order directing payment of money into court, 15 A.L.R.3d 568.

Prejudicial effect of holding accused in contempt of court in presence of jury, 29 A.L.R.3d 1399.

Appealability of contempt adjudication or conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448.

Publication or broadcast, during course of trial, of matter prejudicial to criminal defendant, as contempt, 33 A.L.R.3d 1116.

Attorney's refusal to accept appointment to defend indigent, or to proceed in such defense, as contempt, 36 A.L.R.3d 1221.

Attacks on judiciary as a whole as indirect contempt, 40 A.L.R.3d 1204.

Defense of entrapment in contempt proceedings, 41 A.L.R.3d 418.

Propriety of requiring accused to give handwriting exemplar, 43 A.L.R.3d 653.

Right to counsel in contempt proceedings, 52 A.L.R.3d 1002.

Mortgagor's interference with property subject to order of foreclosure and sale as contempt of court, 54 A.L.R.3d 1242.

Picketing of court or judge as contempt, 58 A.L.R.3d 1297.

Assault on attorney as contempt, 61 A.L.R.3d 500.

Attorney's addressing allegedly insulting remarks to court during course of trial as contempt, 68 A.L.R.3d 273.

Conduct of attorney in connection with making objections or taking exceptions as contempt of court, 68 A.L.R.3d 314.

Refusal to answer questions before state grand jury as direct contempt of court, 69 A.L.R.3d 501.

Affidavit or motion for disqualification of judge as contempt, 70 A.L.R.3d 797.

Power of court to impose standard of personal appearance or attire, 73 A.L.R.3d 353.

Contempt for violation of compromise and settlement the terms of which were approved by court not incorporated in court order, decree, or judgment, 84 A.L.R.3d 1047.

Right of injured party to award of compensatory damages or fine in contempt proceedings, 85 A.L.R.3d 895.

Acquittal of criminal charges other than contempt as precluding contempt proceedings relating to same transaction, 88 A.L.R.3d 1089.

Oral court order implementing prior written order or decree as independent basis of charge of contempt within contempt proceedings based on violation of written order, 100 A.L.R.3d 889.

Violation of state court order by one other than party as contempt, 7 A.L.R.4th 893.

Attorney's failure to attend court, or tardiness, as contempt, 13 A.L.R.4th 122.

Validity, propriety, and effect of allowing or prohibiting media's broadcasting, recording, or photographing court proceedings, 14 A.L.R.4th 121.

Oral communications insulting to particular state judge, made to third party out of judge's physical presence, as criminal contempt, 30 A.L.R.4th 155.

Attorney's use of objectionable questions in examination of witness in state judicial proceeding as contempt of court, 31 A.L.R.4th 1279.

Contempt based on violation of court order where another court has issued contrary order, 36 A.L.R.4th 978.

Intoxication of witness or attorney as contempt of court, 46 A.L.R.4th 238.

Validity and construction of state court's order precluding publicity or comment about pending civil case by counsel, parties, or witnesses, 56 A.L.R.4th 1214.

Propriety of using contempt proceeding to enforce property settlement award or order, 72 A.L.R.4th 298.

Contempt: state court's power to order indefinite coercive fine or imprisonment to exact promise of future compliance with court's order - anticipatory contempt, 81 A.L.R.4th 1008.

Profane or obscene language by party, witness, or observer during trial proceedings as basis for contempt citation, 29 A.L.R.5th 702.

Right to appointment of counsel in contempt proceedings, 32 A.L.R.5th 31.

Holding jurors in contempt under state law, 93 A.L.R.5th 493.

Media's dissemination of material in violation of injunction or restraining order as contempt - federal cases, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 270.