2020 Georgia Code
Title 15 - Courts
Chapter 1 - General Provisions
§ 15-1-3. Powers of Courts Generally

Every court has power:

1. To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence and, as near thereto as is necessary, to prevent interruption, disturbance, or hindrance to its proceedings;
2. To enforce order before a person or body empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
3. To compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process and to the orders of a judge out of court in an action or proceeding therein;
4. To control, in the furtherance of justice, the conduct of its officers and all other persons connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter appertaining thereto;
5. To administer oaths in an action or proceeding pending therein and in all other cases when it may be necessary in the exercise of its powers and duties;
6. To amend and control its processes and orders, so as to make them conformable to law and justice, and to amend its own records, so as to make them conform to the truth; and
7. To correct its own proceedings before final judgment.

(Orig. Code 1863, §§ 200, 3428; Code 1868, §§ 194, 3448; Code 1873, §§ 206, 3499; Code 1882, §§ 206, 3499; Civil Code 1895, §§ 4047, 5118; Civil Code 1910, §§ 4644, 5702; Code 1933, §§ 24-104, 81-1202.)

- Powers of courts with regard to management of churches, § 14-5-45.

- For article comparing sections of the Georgia Civil Practice Act with preexisting provisions of the Georgia Code, see 3 Ga. St. B. J. 295 (1967). For article, "The Civil Jurisdiction of State and Magistrate Courts," see 24 Ga. St. B. J. 29 (1987). For annual survey of domestic relations law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 133 (2006).

ANALYSIS

• General Consideration
• Discretion of Court
• Preserving and Enforcing Order
• Compelling Obedience to Judgments, Orders, and Process
• Conduct of Officers and Other Persons
• Oaths
• Amendments

General Consideration

Inherent powers.

- Every court possesses inherent powers not specifically granted. Johnson v. State, 177 Ga. 881, 171 S.E. 699 (1933).

Inherent power of courts should never be impaired or destroyed to such an extent that the court cannot exercise a power necessary to the court's proper functioning. Evans v. State, 69 Ga. App. 178, 24 S.E.2d 861 (1943).

- Unless expressly authorized, a court has no authority to transfer a case from itself to another court, and thereby give the other court possession of the case to hear and determine the case, although the other court would have had jurisdiction of the cause if the case had come to the court by due process. Burgess v. Nabers, 122 Ga. App. 445, 177 S.E.2d 266 (1970), but see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. VIII.

- In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the judge of the superior court has inherent power as the presiding officer of the court to appoint the foreperson of a grand jury from the number of those duly selected and required to serve. This authority vested in the judge by law is not affected by the custom of permitting the members of the grand jury to elect a foreperson. Peeples v. State, 178 Ga. 675, 173 S.E. 850 (1934).

- Trial court properly refused to accept plaintiff's pro se filings since plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time of the filings. Jacobsen v. Haldi, 210 Ga. App. 817, 437 S.E.2d 819 (1993).

- Superior court of the county in which defendant was convicted of murder had authority, on defendant's motion for new trial, to order an expert evaluation of defendant, who was incarcerated beyond the boundaries of the county in which the court sat. Zant v. Brantley, 261 Ga. 817, 411 S.E.2d 869 (1992).

- Georgia Industrial Commission (now State Board of Workers' Compensation) is not a court of general jurisdiction, nor even of limited common-law jurisdiction, but is an industrial commission made so by express terms of the act of the legislature to administer the act's provisions as provided therein. As such, the administrative commission possesses only such jurisdiction, powers, and authority as are conferred upon the commission by the legislature, or such as arise therefrom by necessary implication to carry out the full and complete exercise of the powers granted. No power of reopening or rehearing a case on the case's merits, in which a decree has been entered, and of determining anew the liability or nonliability of the employer, is granted, except as provided by former Code 1933, § 114-709 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104). Dempsey v. Chevrolet Div., 102 Ga. App. 408, 116 S.E.2d 509 (1960). (See also Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. I specifically empowering General Assembly to confer quasi-judicial powers on agencies).

- Magistrate court had the authority to enter an order in a dispossessory action directing the landlord to perform repairs to the tenant's apartment since a magistrate court was entitled to exercise such powers as were necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate the court's judgments. H. J. Russell & Co. v. Manuel, 264 Ga. App. 273, 590 S.E.2d 250 (2003).

- In an action in which a superior court granted defendant's motion for a new trial, as amended, based on a finding that a jury charge was erroneous and harmful, a second order which clarified that the new trial was to be held on only one of the multiple offenses of which defendant had been convicted was a proper clarification order under O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3(6), rather than an improper reconsideration order; the content and context of the second order indicated that the order was clearly for clarification purposes, based on the state's request for clarification, and the superior court had previously denied reconsideration of the new trial order because reconsideration was requested out of term. Barlow v. State, 279 Ga. 870, 621 S.E.2d 438 (2005).

Cited in Nichols v. State, 17 Ga. App. 593, 87 S.E. 817 (1916); Smith v. State, 36 Ga. App. 37, 135 S.E. 102 (1926); Barge v. Ownby, 170 Ga. 440, 153 S.E. 49 (1930); Grand Chapter, OES v. Wolfe, 175 Ga. 867, 166 S.E. 755 (1932); Spence v. Miller, 176 Ga. 96, 167 S.E. 188 (1932); Fielding v. M. Rich & Bros. Co., 46 Ga. App. 785, 169 S.E. 383 (1933); Brooks v. Sturdivant, 177 Ga. 514, 170 S.E. 369 (1933); Georgia Power Co. v. Ozburn, 53 Ga. App. 797, 187 S.E. 154 (1936); Benton v. State, 58 Ga. App. 633, 199 S.E. 561 (1938); Bradley v. Simpson, 59 Ga. App. 844, 2 S.E.2d 238 (1939); Bankers Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Kimberly, 60 Ga. App. 128, 3 S.E.2d 148 (1939); Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 153, 51 S.E.2d 13 (1948); Alred v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 205 Ga. 371, 54 S.E.2d 240 (1949); Banister v. Hubbard, 82 Ga. App. 813, 62 S.E.2d 761 (1950); McCartney v. McCartney, 217 Ga. 200, 121 S.E.2d 785 (1961); White v. State, 105 Ga. App. 616, 125 S.E.2d 239 (1962); Smith v. Hartrampf, 106 Ga. App. 603, 127 S.E.2d 814 (1962); Crudup v. State, 106 Ga. App. 833, 129 S.E.2d 183 (1962); Crudup v. State, 218 Ga. 819, 130 S.E.2d 733 (1963); Boatright v. Sosebee, 108 Ga. App. 19, 132 S.E.2d 155 (1963); A.A. Parker Produce, Inc. v. Mercer, 221 Ga. 449, 145 S.E.2d 237 (1965); Boockholdt v. Brown, 224 Ga. 737, 164 S.E.2d 836 (1968); Davis v. State, 127 Ga. App. 76, 192 S.E.2d 538 (1972); Van Keuren v. Loomis, 128 Ga. App. 136, 195 S.E.2d 776 (1973); Camp v. Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 590, 200 S.E.2d 332 (1973); Welch v. State, 130 Ga. App. 18, 202 S.E.2d 223 (1973); Camera Shop, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 130 Ga. App. 88, 202 S.E.2d 241 (1973); Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110, 205 S.E.2d 231 (1974); Murphy v. State, 132 Ga. App. 654, 209 S.E.2d 101 (1974); Nations v. State, 234 Ga. 709, 217 S.E.2d 287 (1975); Speagle v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 138 Ga. App. 384, 226 S.E.2d 459 (1976); Lowe v. State, 141 Ga. App. 433, 233 S.E.2d 807 (1977); McClain v. McClain, 241 Ga. 162, 243 S.E.2d 879 (1978); Gresham v. Rogers, 147 Ga. App. 189, 248 S.E.2d 225 (1978); Kelly v. State, 149 Ga. App. 222, 253 S.E.2d 860 (1979); Dennis v. State, 170 Ga. App. 630, 317 S.E.2d 874 (1984); Muff v. State, 254 Ga. 45, 326 S.E.2d 454 (1985); Smith v. State, 174 Ga. App. 647, 331 S.E.2d 14 (1985); Urban Medical Hosp. v. Seay, 179 Ga. App. 874, 348 S.E.2d 315 (1986); In re K.B., 188 Ga. App. 199, 372 S.E.2d 476 (1988); Chan v. W-East Trading Corp., 199 Ga. App. 76, 403 S.E.2d 840 (1991); Sunbelt Specialties v. Keith, 201 Ga. App. 167, 410 S.E.2d 364 (1991); Zeitman v. McBrayer, 201 Ga. App. 767, 412 S.E.2d 287 (1991); Rollins v. Southern Mtg. Co., 207 Ga. App. 215, 427 S.E.2d 581 (1993); Walton v. State, 207 Ga. App. 787, 429 S.E.2d 158 (1993); Marlowe v. Lott, 212 Ga. App. 679, 442 S.E.2d 487 (1994); In re Siemon, 264 Ga. 641, 449 S.E.2d 832 (1994); State v. Hall, 229 Ga. App. 194, 493 S.E.2d 718 (1997); Smith v. State, 245 Ga. App. 743, 538 S.E.2d 825 (2000); Blanton v. Duru, 247 Ga. App. 175, 543 S.E.2d 448 (2000); Harvey v. Lindsey, 251 Ga. App. 387, 554 S.E.2d 523 (2001); Wingate Land & Dev., LLC v. Robert C. Walker, Inc., 252 Ga. App. 818, 558 S.E.2d 13 (2001); Johnson v. State, 258 Ga. App. 33, 572 S.E.2d 669 (2002); Cheek v. State, 265 Ga. App. 15, 593 S.E.2d 55 (2003); Whitley v. Piedmont Hosp., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 649, 644 S.E.2d 514 (2007); Gary v. Gowins, 283 Ga. 433, 658 S.E.2d 575 (2008); In re Hadaway, 290 Ga. App. 453, 659 S.E.2d 863 (2008); McAlister v. Abam-Samson, 318 Ga. App. 1, 733 S.E.2d 58 (2012); Devlin v. Devlin, 339 Ga. App. 520, 791 S.E.2d 840 (2016).

Discretion in regulating and controlling business of court is necessarily confided to judge. Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 256 S.E.2d 63 (1979).

Pursuant to the court's inherent power under O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3(3) and (4), the superior court did not abuse the court's discretion, or usurp the authority of the county sheriff by ordering the sheriff to transport county jail inmates represented by the county public defender to the county courthouse for pre-arraignment meetings as those actions helped to ensure that the inmates received effective assistance of counsel. Brown v. Incarcerated Pub. Defender Clients Div. 3, 288 Ga. App. 859, 655 S.E.2d 704 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 406 (Ga. 2008).

- Orders directing prison or jail authorities to allow visits by defense team members under appropriately specified conditions are proper; trial courts have authority to control, in the furtherance of justice, the conduct of their officers and all other persons connected with a judicial proceeding before them. State v. Rowe, Ga. , 843 S.E.2d 537 (May 18, 2020).

- It is within the discretion of the court to require the plaintiff, suing for a physical injury alleged to be permanent, to submit to an examination by competent physicians. Richmond & D.R.R. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719, 9 S.E. 602, 14 Am. St. R. 189, 3 L.R.A. 808 (1889).

- No abuse of discretion arises when an examination is not ordered. City of Cedartown v. Brooks, 2 Ga. App. 583, 59 S.E. 836 (1907).

- Decision of retaining jury in session lies within discretion of court. Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 256 S.E.2d 63 (1979).

Requiring a jury to deliberate until the hour of 4 A.M. is not such an abuse of discretion requiring reversal if the jury already reached an agreement on two of three counts and indicated the jury was making progress toward reaching agreement on the third and last count. Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 256 S.E.2d 63 (1979).

- Since the defendant contended the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial based on plaintiff's behavior in that while plaintiff testified plaintiff was unresponsive, sobbed constantly, and made direct emotional speeches to the jury, but the record indicated that the trial court was monitoring plaintiff's testimony and instructed plaintiff on several occasions to be more responsive, no manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion for mistrial was found. Southern Ry. v. Lawson, 256 Ga. 798, 353 S.E.2d 491 (1987).

Denial of sanctions for defense counsel's improper remarks informing the jury that opposing counsel was representing plaintiffs on a contingent-fee basis was not an abuse of discretion since issues as to the amount of damages, addressed by the improper remarks, were not reached by the jury, and therefore no harm resulted. Stoner v. Eden, 199 Ga. App. 135, 404 S.E.2d 283, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 907, 404 S.E.2d 283 (1991).

- Discretion of the judges in all matters pertaining to contempt of their authority and mandates will never be controlled unless grossly abused. Crute v. Crute, 86 Ga. App. 96, 70 S.E.2d 727 (1952).

Discretion in regulating and controlling the business of the court is necessarily confided to the judge, who is invested with wide discretion in the exercise of which a reviewing court should never interfere unless it is made to appear that wrong or oppression has resulted from an abuse of discretion. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74, 114 S.E.2d 421, appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 290, 81 S. Ct. 63, 5 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1960); Barkett v. Jones, 142 Ga. App. 835, 237 S.E.2d 400 (1977).

If the legal rights of the parties are not prejudiced or denied, a reviewing court will not interfere with the discretion of the trial court in matters of practice in the hearing and disposition of causes before the court unless this discretionary power has been exercised in an illegal, unjust, or arbitrary manner. Bradford v. Parrish, 111 Ga. App. 167, 141 S.E.2d 125 (1965); Grossman v. Glass, 143 Ga. App. 464, 238 S.E.2d 569 (1977).

Reviewing court will not undertake to control the wide discretion vested in the trial court in the exercise of this fundamental power unless it is made to appear that wrong or oppression has resulted from an abuse of such discretion reposed in the court. Young v. Champion, 142 Ga. App. 687, 236 S.E.2d 783 (1977).

- Trial court properly denied a motion to correct a judgment entered against two debtors and the debtors' guarantors, five years and eight months after the expiration of the term of court in which the judgment was entered, as the debtors failed to show any entitlement to relief or exception as to why the debtors could not have timely sought the relief requested, and O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3(6) was unavailing because that section did not enable a court to change a judgment in substance or in any material respect. De La Reza v. Osprey Capital, LLC, 287 Ga. App. 196, 651 S.E.2d 97 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1928, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 819 (Ga. 2007).

Preserving and Enforcing Order

Duty of administering justice and maintaining dignity and authority of court.

- Every court's judges are charged with the duty of administering justice and with maintaining the dignity and authority of the court. Johnson v. State, 177 Ga. 881, 171 S.E. 699 (1933).

Power to control proceeding of court is subject to proviso that in so doing a judge does not take away or abridge any right of a party under the law. State v. Colquitt, 147 Ga. App. 627, 249 S.E.2d 680 (1978).

- Every court has power to preserve and enforce order in the court's immediate presence, and as near thereto as is necessary to prevent interruption, disturbance, or hindrance to the court's proceedings. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74, 114 S.E.2d 421, appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 290, 81 S. Ct. 63, 5 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1960).

It is fundamental that every court possesses inherent power to preserve and enforce order and compel obedience to the court's judgments and orders, to control the conduct of the court's officers and all other persons connected with the judicial proceedings before the court, and to inflict summary punishment for contempt upon any person failing and refusing to obey any lawful order. Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 553, 170 S.E.2d 281 (1969); Farmer v. Holton, 146 Ga. App. 102, 245 S.E.2d 457 (1978), overruled on other grounds, In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 324 S.E.2d 443 (1985), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S. Ct. 1499, 59 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1979).

- Courts have the power to determine the manner in which the courts shall operate in order to administer justice with dignity and decorum, and in such manner as shall be conducive to fair and impartial trials, and ascertainment of the truth uninfluenced by extraneous matters or distractions, and may stop conduct of representatives of the press in any field of activity interfering with the orderly conduct of court procedure or creating distractions interfering therewith. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74, 114 S.E.2d 421, appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 290, 81 S. Ct. 63, 5 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1960).

- Trial court did not err by precluding the testimony of defendant's expert regarding possible causes of an accident deduced from an examination of the wrecked car as a sanction for the spoliation of the vehicle against an order of the court directing preservation. R.A. Siegel Co. v. Bowen, 246 Ga. App. 177, 539 S.E.2d 873 (2000).

Trial court erred in attributing bad faith to the plaintiff based upon the wrecker service's destruction of the truck because there was no way to construe the evidence so as to conclude that the wrecker service was acting as the plaintiff's agent when the service disregarded counsel's repeated requests to preserve the truck, and the striking of the plaintiff's complaint as a sanction was an abuse of discretion. Wilkins v. City of Conyers, 47 Ga. App. 469, 819 S.E.2d 885 (2018).

- All courts are clothed with the inherent power to punish for contempt. West v. Field, 181 Ga. 152, 181 S.E. 661 (1935).

- Question whether contempt has been committed is for trial court, and that court's adjudication will not be interfered with unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Berman v. Berman, 232 Ga. 342, 206 S.E.2d 447 (1974); Rutledge v. State, 151 Ga. App. 615, 260 S.E.2d 743 (1979).

- Disobedience to lawful order of court is obstruction of justice, and for such a violation the court, in order to compel respect or compliance, may punish for contempt. Griggers v. Bryant, 239 Ga. 244, 236 S.E.2d 599 (1977).

- Although summary punishment is always and rightly regarded with disfavor, there is no doubt that the summary contempt power is still available to courts, under the appropriate circumstances, to control judicial proceedings. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S. Ct. 1440, 71 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982).

- Under certain circumstances, the court may decide the sanctions provided by statute are too severe and apply less harsh measures under the court's inherent power to enforce obedience. Millholland v. Oglesby, 223 Ga. 230, 154 S.E.2d 194 (1967).

- In cases of constructive contempt of court if the alleged contumacious conduct is disobedience to a mandate of the court, not an act in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the law requires that a rule nisi issue and be served upon the accused, giving the accused notice of the charges against the accused, and that the accused be given an opportunity to be heard. Anthony v. Anthony, 240 Ga. 155, 240 S.E.2d 45 (1977).

- Notice given by the rule nisi is to afford the accused a reasonable time in which to prepare the accused's defense to the charge that the accused has violated the court's order. Anthony v. Anthony, 240 Ga. 155, 240 S.E.2d 45 (1977).

- Person may be held in contempt of a court order entered in a proceeding in which the person was not a party, if it is shown that the person sought to be held in contempt had actual notice of the order. Anthony v. Anthony, 240 Ga. 155, 240 S.E.2d 45 (1977).

- Court of ordinary (now probate court) has jurisdiction of matters pertaining to the estates of deceased persons, jurisdiction over administrators, jurisdiction to compel administrators to account for the assets of an estate in their possession or custody, and jurisdiction in such cases to attach and punish for contempt. Melton v. Jenkins, 50 Ga. App. 615, 178 S.E. 754 (1935).

- Judge of superior court, upon a finding that the administrator had in the administrator's possession, custody, and control, money which belonged to the estate of the deceased, and which the administrator failed and refused to pay into court for distribution among the heirs at law, as directed by a valid judgment of the court of ordinary (now probate court), acted within the judge's powers, not only in rendering a judgment ordering that the administrator pay the amount which the administrator held to the several heirs at law, to be applied against the judgment rendered in the court of ordinary (now probate court), but also in ordering that upon the administrator's failure to do so within seven days the administrator be adjudged in contempt of court and be committed to the common jail of the county. Lewis v. Grovas, 62 Ga. App. 625, 9 S.E.2d 282 (1940).

- It is a question of law for the court to decide whether the courtroom conduct which is factually undisputed amounts to criminal contempt of court. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S. Ct. 1440, 71 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982).

- When the contempt occurs totally in the presence of the judge, there is no necessity for the production of evidence. Indeed, there is no burden of persuading the trier of fact as there is no fact finding process to be conducted. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S. Ct. 1440, 71 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982).

- If the contumacious conduct is committed in the presence of the court in the immediate view of the judge, it is unnecessary for the court to apply any evidentiary standard of proof in order to summarily hold the contemnor in contempt of court. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S. Ct. 1440, 71 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982).

- Once an objection has been made by an attorney and the court has made the court's considered ruling, subsequent contumacious conduct will not be excused merely for the fact that the conduct was committed by an officer of the court during court proceedings in an attempt to protect the rights of the attorney's client. Farmer v. Strickland, 652 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S. Ct. 1440, 71 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1982).

- Because the record did not reveal any specific actions of the appellant justifying the use of restraints, the shackling of the appellant, which continued throughout the trial, injected partiality into the trial, infringed upon the appellant's presumption of innocence and prevented the fundamental fairness which attends a trial by jury. Pace v. State, 212 Ga. App. 489, 442 S.E.2d 307 (1994).

Use of an electronic prisoner restraint device shielded from the jury's view was permissible. Young v. State, 269 Ga. 478, 499 S.E.2d 60 (1998), overruled on other grounds, 287 Ga. 242, 695 S.E.2d 255 (2010).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by ordering the defendant to wear a restraint belt during trial as the defendant pointed to no assertions that the defendant made during the trial that wearing the restraint belt had an adverse effect on the defendant or that the belt prevented the defendant from assisting the defendant's attorney. Campbell v. State, 333 Ga. App. 829, 777 S.E.2d 507 (2015).

Compelling Obedience to Judgments, Orders, and Process

Judgment or decree to enforce prior judgment.

- If it is brought to the attention of the judge that the judge's judgment upon the same issue in granting an interlocutory injunction against the enforcement of certain tax assessments by the mayor and council is being set at naught and disregarded, the judge can entertain an ancillary proceeding and render such judgment or decree as would enforce the judge's prior judgment until it should be reversed; and an objection based on lack of jurisdiction of the judge to issue an injunction upon the amendment is without merit. City of Macon v. Ries, 180 Ga. 371, 179 S.E. 529 (1935).

- Court of Appeals has the power to entertain a petition for mandamus or prohibition in order to enforce the court's judgments. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Moran, 248 Ga. 461, 284 S.E.2d 256 (1981).

- When the venue is changed, the first court does not lose power to enforce the court's judgment changing the venue. Ruffin v. State, 28 Ga. App. 40, 110 S.E. 311 (1921).

Superior court rendering the final order placing the custody of the parties' minor child in the appellant retains jurisdiction to enforce the court's order by attachment for contempt, notwithstanding the fact that subsequent to the rendition of the order the appellant may have removed the appellant's residence to another county. Ogletree v. Watson, 223 Ga. 618, 157 S.E.2d 464 (1967).

- Superior court, awarding alimony in virtue of the court's jurisdiction originally invoked by plaintiff in divorce suit, had jurisdiction to enforce the court's payment by attachment for contempt against the plaintiff after the plaintiff changed the plaintiff's residence to another county. Curtright v. Curtright, 187 Ga. 122, 200 S.E. 711 (1938).

- Trial court that ordered a judgment debtor to convey shares of stock to the court for levy and execution retained jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the levy orders, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3(3) and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV, and compelling the debtor to reconvey assets of the corporation to the judgment creditor, the new shareholder. Clark v. Chapman, 301 Ga. App. 117, 687 S.E.2d 146 (2009).

- Action by a father for the loss of the services of his minor child should not be dismissed because the child, after reaching majority, refused to obey an order of the court in which the action was pending requiring the child to submit to a physical examination. Bagwell v. Atlanta Consol. S. Ry., 109 Ga. 611, 34 S.E. 1018, 47 L.R.A. 486 (1900).

- One who dispossesses the receiver of property consigned to that person by the court dispossesses the court, and of course becomes in contempt of court; and one may be punished for contempt and the property may be restored. A contempt of court being complete by dispossessing the receiver, the fact that no injunctive order has been passed does not affect the case. Coker v. Norman, 162 Ga. 351, 133 S.E. 740 (1926).

- When a person has been tried and convicted in the county court, and has petitioned the judge of the superior court for a writ of certiorari, and the petition is sanctioned, and the writ issued, and the judge of the county court refuses to answer as required by the writ, the judge of the superior court, in term time, has power to attach the county court judge for contempt. Pittman v. Hagans, 91 Ga. 107, 16 S.E. 659 (1892).

- Public housing tenant's answer was struck since the tenant was five minutes late for trial after having been warned not to be late. Truitt v. Housing Auth., 235 Ga. App. 92, 507 S.E.2d 781 (1998).

- Georgia court which issued a divorce judgment that has not been modified by a court of another state with jurisdiction to do so may hear a Georgia-resident, non-custodial parent's allegations of contumacious conduct leveled against the nonresident custodial parent; a Georgia court has the statutory power to compel obedience to the court's judgments, as well as the inherent power to enforce the court's orders through contempt proceedings, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-81 et seq., does not provide the exclusive means by which a party may seek enforcement of the custody provisions of a Georgia judgment. Dyer v. Surratt, 266 Ga. 220, 466 S.E.2d 584 (1996).

- It was not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to strike a wife's pleadings in a divorce after the wife failed to appear at a final custody hearing because: (1) O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3 gave the trial court such authority for the wife's wilful refusal to participate; (2) the wife was warned to check for notices of upcoming hearing dates; and (3) despite proper notice, the wife chose not to participate or state why. Pennington v. Pennington, 291 Ga. 165, 728 S.E.2d 230 (2012).

- Since the defendant was charged with battery against a specific female victim, the trial court had authority to revoke defendant's bail bond following defendant's violation of conditions thereof that forbade the defendant to threaten, harass, stalk, or abuse the victim. Clarke v. State, 228 Ga. App. 219, 491 S.E.2d 450 (1997).

- Defendant's criminal contempt conviction was reversed as the trial court relied on another court's ex parte immunity grant in ordering the defendant to testify and neither court made a finding that defendant's testimony was "necessary to the public interest" as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-28 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-5-507); the state had to grant a valid immunity as broad in scope as the privilege the state replaced and show the applicability of that state immunity to the witness. In re Long, 276 Ga. App. 306, 623 S.E.2d 181 (2005).

- Trial court did not engage in the required analysis for a witness asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege, but merely declared that answering the questions concerning knowledge of the court's order regarding removing a child from a father's home would not incriminate the witness; at a minimum, such knowledge would establish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prove the witness was in contempt of that order and the trial court's finding of contempt based on the witness's refusal to answer the question was improper. In re Tidwell, 279 Ga. App. 734, 632 S.E.2d 690 (2006).

Conduct of Officers and Other Persons

Paragraph (4) codifies ancient right.

- Paragraph (4) is a codification of a right which has inhered in courts from ancient times. Lowe v. Taylor, 180 Ga. 654, 180 S.E. 223 (1935).

- In a trespass action against a sign leasing corporation for unauthorized placement of a sign, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in ordering the corporation to deposit income from operation of the sign into the court's registry. Courtesy Leasing, Inc. v. Christian, 266 Ga. 187, 465 S.E.2d 443 (1996).

Broad powers given to trial courts by paragraph (4) of O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3 to manage the cases over which the courts preside authorized the trial court to order the deposit into the registry of funds. Such funds were due by the plaintiffs to the defendants under a prior settlement agreement which the plaintiffs alleged was breached by the defendants since the action made entitlement to the funds an issue and, under the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiffs may have been excused from further performance under the agreement by the defendants' breach. Eichelkraut v. Camp, 236 Ga. App. 721, 513 S.E.2d 267 (1999).

- Courts have the inherent power to adequately control, in furtherance of justice, officers, parties, jurors, witnesses, and others connected with a pending case. Crosby v. Potts, 8 Ga. App. 463, 69 S.E. 582 (1910).

- It is essential that control of persons referred to in paragraph (4) be exercised in a matter which is before the court. Lowe v. Taylor, 180 Ga. 654, 180 S.E. 223 (1935).

- Attorney at law admitted to practice in the courts of this state is an officer of the courts, and as such, is as much subject to the power of the court to control the conduct of persons present in the courtroom as others are subject thereto. Kellar v. State, 226 Ga. 432, 175 S.E.2d 654 (1970).

Contempt against a lawyer was affirmed when the lawyer failed to appear at the call of the client's case, failed to file a conflict letter, failed to notify the trial court of the lawyer's unavailability, failed to notify the client that the lawyer would not be in court, and, after being haled into court to explain the lawyer's conduct, the lawyer failed to acknowledge that the lawyer had not complied with Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 17.1(B) regarding notification of conflicts and had, thus, inconvenienced both the court and the lawyer's client, and lastly, displayed contumacious behavior at the contempt hearing. In re Herring, 268 Ga. App. 390, 601 S.E.2d 839 (2004).

- Juvenile court erred by summarily holding an attorney in contempt based on a per se rule. The juvenile court determined that a per se rule existed that an attorney was in contempt when the attorney claimed ineffectiveness against themselves, but no such per se rule existed and, therefore, it was error to have adjudicated the attorney in contempt. Morris v. State, 295 Ga. App. 579, 672 S.E.2d 531 (2009).

- As the right to represent oneself does not evaporate when an attorney is hired, a court errs in barring a party from representing oneself because an appearance has been made for the attorney by other attorneys; however, the court is not required to accept random appearances and filings by both the client and attorneys. If a party and the party's attorneys are unable to coordinate their efforts so that they speak with one voice, the court is empowered to appoint a leading counsel who shall be the spokesperson. Cherry v. Coast House, Ltd., 257 Ga. 403, 359 S.E.2d 904 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060, 108 S. Ct. 1015, 98 L. Ed. 2d 981 (1988).

- Court has inherent power to enforce disclosure by plaintiff applying to the court's forum for relief. Millholland v. Oglesby, 223 Ga. 230, 154 S.E.2d 194 (1967).

Court can compel attendance of witness under the court's power to control all persons connected with a judicial proceeding before the court. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Denmead, 83 Ga. 351, 9 S.E. 683 (1889).

- Court, in order to secure the presence of a witness in a criminal case, and to prevent the witness leaving the jurisdiction of the court prior to the trial, may require that the witness give bail for the witness's appearance, and, in default of the witness's giving bail, cause the witness to be held in confinement. Crosby v. Potts, 8 Ga. App. 463, 69 S.E. 582 (1910).

If it is necessary in order to secure the attendance of a witness at court to make the witness testify, the court has ample authority to secure the witness's attendance by requiring the witness to give bail, or in default thereof, to go to jail. Pullen v. Cleckler, 162 Ga. 111, 132 S.E. 761 (1926).

- No court should order a witness to be imprisoned in default of bond, except from grave necessity; unless the witness's testimony is material and important, and unless there is strong likelihood that, if the witness is not restrained by confinement or bond, the witness will violate the mandates of the subpoena and flee the limits of the state, the power should not be exercised. Lowe v. Taylor, 180 Ga. 654, 180 S.E. 223 (1935).

- In a contempt proceeding against a witness for refusing to testify, arising in a proceeding by a solicitor general (now district attorney) to revoke a previous order of the court admitting certain persons to practice law, which main proceeding was not a technical motion in arrest or motion to set aside, but was an independent proceeding quasi in rem at law, and invoked control by the court over the court's own officers, "extraordinary service" ordered by the court was not illegal so as to permit the witness to refuse to testify. Simpson v. Bradley, 189 Ga. 316, 5 S.E.2d 893 (1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 643, 60 S. Ct. 1105, 84 L. Ed. 1410 (1940).

- O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3 gives no authority, by in personam order, to compel the payment of private contractual obligations incurred by an attorney for court reporting services. Augustine v. Clifton, 248 Ga. 553, 284 S.E.2d 432 (1981).

- When, as the result of a lawsuit instituted by an attorney for a client, money has come into the hands of the attorney, the defendant in that suit who claims title to the money, but who is not the client of the attorney, cannot enforce the client's claim by rule against the attorney. Blanch v. Roberson, 69 Ga. App. 423, 25 S.E.2d 720 (1943).

- Right to rule an attorney, for money alleged to be in the attorney's hands as such, depends upon the existence of the relation of attorney and client and is limited to the client. Haygood v. Haden, 119 Ga. 463, 46 S.E. 625 (1904); Blanch v. Roberson, 69 Ga. App. 423, 25 S.E.2d 720 (1943).

- Trial court was within the court's authority to strike the party's answer and counterclaim and to bar the presentation of evidence after the party failed to personally appear throughout the litigation and disregarded multiple orders. Bayless v. Bayless, 280 Ga. 153, 625 S.E.2d 741 (2006).

- There was no merit to the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in that the trial court intimidated the defendant by admonishing the defendant about making objections during the trial; since the defendant was represented by counsel, the defendant had no right to personally make evidentiary objections or otherwise assume the role of co-counsel. Phillips v. State, 278 Ga. App. 439, 629 S.E.2d 130 (2006).

Oaths

Authority of commissioners to administer oaths.

- If a court is composed of commissioners, any one of the commissioners may administer oaths. Broadwater v. State, 10 Ga. App. 458, 73 S.E. 691 (1912).

- When the reading of the oath by another person is in the presence of the court, the competency of the person reading the oath is immaterial. Richards v. State, 131 Ga. App. 362, 206 S.E.2d 93 (1974).

- With regard to a defendant's convictions for incest and child molestation, the trial judge did not exhibit undue bias against the defense by reminding defense counsel that the swearing of witnesses fell within the dominion of the court. Hubert v. State, 297 Ga. App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (2009).

Amendments

1. In General

- Power to amend process given under the authority of paragraph (6) of this section is fully as broad and liberal as that allowed for the amendment of other pleadings. Everett v. McCary, 93 Ga. App. 474, 92 S.E.2d 112 (1956).

- Fact that the husband died prior to the entry of the judgment nunc pro tunc would not alter the power of the court to complete and amend the court's records so as to make the records speak the truth. Moore v. Moore, 229 Ga. 600, 193 S.E.2d 608 (1972).

- Judgment cannot be corrected so as to bind person not party to suit. Thompson v. American Mtg. Co., 122 Ga. 39, 49 S.E. 751 (1905).

- Defendant's filing of an application for discretionary appeal from a revocation of probation acted as a supersedeas to the same extent as a notice of appeal and thereby deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to enter an amended revocation order. Bryson v. State, 228 Ga. App. 84, 491 S.E.2d 184 (1997).

2. Scope of Power to Amend

Power to render records truthful.

- All courts have inherent power to amend their records to speak the truth. Vaughn v. Fitzgerald, 112 Ga. 517, 37 S.E. 752 (1900).

Every court has the power to amend and control the court's processes and orders so as to make the orders conform to law and justice, and to amend the court's records to conform to the truth. Cox v. LeRoy, 130 Ga. App. 388, 203 S.E.2d 863 (1973).

Every court has the inherent power and duty to correct the court's own records to make the records speak truth. Willis v. Jackson, 148 Ga. App. 432, 251 S.E.2d 341 (1978).

- If based solely on the record, and without the necessity for the introduction of extrinsic evidence, the court may, on the court's own motion and without notice, enter a judgment and decree correcting the court's own records nunc pro tunc at a later date; and since such entry simply perfects the record as between the parties the entry relates back to the time when the entry should have been entered, although a different rule would apply to sureties, intervening bona fide purchasers, or innocent third parties. Swindell v. Swindell, 208 Ga. 727, 69 S.E.2d 197 (1952); Moore v. Moore, 229 Ga. 600, 193 S.E.2d 608 (1972).

- Every court, whether the court exercises exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, is vested with inherent power to control and amend the court's records, judgments, and processes, and to correct errors and mistakes in those records, judgments, and processes. Ellis v. Clarke, 173 Ga. 618, 160 S.E. 780 (1931).

Court whose sole purpose is to deal fairly and do justice to all parties can accomplish this purpose only by acting upon true and correct records; and if errors or mistakes are found in the court's records, whether they be honest mistakes or deliberate alterations, the court in the exercise of the court's inherent power can and should correct all such records. Beecher v. Carter, 189 Ga. 234, 5 S.E.2d 648 (1939).

- While a motion to vacate an order or judgment is one addressed to the court's sound discretion, such a motion should not be granted unless founded upon a meritorious reason. Drain Tile Mach., Inc. v. McCannon, 80 Ga. App. 373, 56 S.E.2d 165 (1949).

3. Timing of Changes and Relation Back

Control during term over orders and judgments.

- Court of record has plenary control of the court's orders and judgments during term rendered, and may amend, correct, modify, supplement, or vacate the orders and judgments; the exercise of this power during the term will not be disturbed unless there is an abuse thereof. Drain Tile Mach., Inc. v. McCannon, 80 Ga. App. 373, 56 S.E.2d 165 (1949).

During the term at which a judgment or ruling is made, the judge, in the exercise of the judge's own discretion to correct errors and to promote justice, has plenary power to amend, modify, revise, supplement, or even supersede, revoke, or vacate such previous judgment or ruling. Shockley v. Henselee, 114 Ga. App. 227, 150 S.E.2d 689 (1966).

- Trial judge can set aside a final order entered provided that the order is set aside during the same term in which the order is entered. Donnelly v. Stynchcombe, 246 Ga. 118, 269 S.E.2d 10 (1980).

- Judge had power at the subsequent term, in the direct proceeding against the defendant, after due notice and a hearing, to correct the paper inadvertently signed as a sentence and entered upon the minutes of the court, so that the paper conforms to the actual sentence orally pronounced. Pulliam v. Jenkins, 157 Ga. 18, 121 S.E. 679 (1923).

- Judgment may be revised or amended, or entered of record, nunc pro tunc, on proper motion, at a term subsequent to that at which the judgment was rendered so as to make the judgment speak the truth of the decision that was actually rendered, or to make the judgment conform to the verdict; but the judgment must be amended by an inspection of the record, including the pleadings and the verdict, without resort to extraneous evidence. Allen v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 611, 51 S.E.2d 872 (1949).

- Court may amend a judgment to make the judgment conform to the verdict, not only after the term in which the judgment was rendered, but after the case has been affirmed by an appellate court. Kerr v. Noble, 124 Ga. App. 722, 185 S.E.2d 807 (1971).

- If done at same term, court may make correction without notice to anyone; if at a subsequent term, the correction must be upon notice to the parties at interest. Ellis v. Clarke, 173 Ga. 618, 160 S.E. 780 (1931).

- Judgment regular on the judgment's face cannot at a subsequent term be amended in a material respect, even though the amendment makes the judgment conform to the original judgment as orally rendered if there has been no proceeding brought for that purpose, with due notice to parties whose rights are to be affected. Crowell v. Crowell, 191 Ga. 36, 11 S.E.2d 190 (1940).

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by permitting the insurance company to amend the company's answer to raise a statute- of-limitations defense to the tree service company owner's (owner's) personal injury claims after the entry of the pre-trial order because the owner failed to show any prejudice since the other defendants had raised the statute-of-limitations defense by the time the insurance company did, so the owner was on notice that the defense would be considered by the trial court. Popham v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 340 Ga. App. 603, 798 S.E.2d 257 (2017).

- Motion to revise or vacate an order or judgment not founded on a verdict made during the term at which rendered cannot be determined by any fixed rule, but the disposition thereof by the court depends on the circumstances of the case. Drain Tile Mach., Inc. v. McCannon, 80 Ga. App. 373, 56 S.E.2d 165 (1949).

- Entry on the issue docket of a superior court that a case is settled is prima facie true and cannot be collaterally attacked; but, in the absence of a signed order entered on the minutes of the court, such docket entry does not constitute a dismissal of the case, and may be set aside in a direct proceeding for that purpose in the exercise of the authority of the court to correct the court's records to make the records speak the truth. Head v. Yeomans, 189 Ga. 335, 6 S.E.2d 704 (1939).

- Based solely on the record, and without the necessity for the introduction of extrinsic evidence, the court may, on the court's own motion and without notice, enter such judgment and decree nunc pro tunc at a later date; and since such entry simply perfects the record, as between the parties the entry relates back to the time when the entry should have been entered. Swindell v. Swindell, 208 Ga. 727, 69 S.E.2d 197 (1952); Moore v. Moore, 229 Ga. 600, 193 S.E.2d 608 (1972).

Amendment to judgment to make the judgment conform to the verdict relates back to that which was amended. Further, the court may act on the court's own motion if a nunc pro tunc judgment is based solely on the record. Kerr v. Noble, 124 Ga. App. 722, 185 S.E.2d 807 (1971).

- Generally, a judgment entered nunc pro tunc relates back to the time when the judgment should have been entered and completes the record. If there are no intervening equities, the judgment so entered will sustain a plea of res judicata between the parties as to the matter involved in the litigation. Walden v. Walden, 128 Ga. 126, 57 S.E. 323 (1907).

Trial court did not err in entering a final divorce decree nunc pro tunc and ordering monthly installments of lump-sum alimony to begin almost five months before entry of the judgment because entry of the judgment nunc pro tunc and commencement of lump-sum alimony soon after the verdict was advantageous to a common law husband as the monthly payments thereof were $500 less than the monthly amount of temporary alimony. Norman v. Ault, 287 Ga. 324, 695 S.E.2d 633 (2010).

Trial court's entry of a divorce decree nunc pro tunc under O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3(6), which eliminated a "transition period" from supervised to unsupervised visitation between the husband and the children, was error as the court had orally announced that the court was providing the transition period for the welfare of the parties' two children. Sigal v. Sigal, 289 Ga. 814, 716 S.E.2d 206 (2011).

4. Restrictions on Substantive Changes

Substantive or material changes in judgment barred.

- This section does not enable a court to change a judgment in substance or in any material respect. Crowell v. Crowell, 191 Ga. 36, 11 S.E.2d 190 (1940).

- Power to amend and revise does not include power to supply judicial omissions so as to include what a court might or should have decided, but did not actually so decide. Allen v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 611, 51 S.E.2d 872 (1949).

- When founded on verdicts of a jury, and not the acts of the judge, the court may not amend the judgment so as not to follow the verdict. Cox v. LeRoy, 130 Ga. App. 388, 203 S.E.2d 863 (1973); Wimberly v. Medaris, 143 Ga. App. 805, 240 S.E.2d 200 (1977).

- While the superior court has the power and duty of correcting errors in the court's records, this rule does not authorize the court to allow, filed subsequent to judgment, additional pleadings which will materially change the pleadings on which the judgment was rendered; hence, if the plaintiff's amended motion for a new trial was heard and overruled, the trial judge did not err in disallowing a second amendment to the motion, offered several weeks after the date of the judgment overruling the original motion for the purpose of perfecting the assignments of error contained in the first amendment to the motion for a new trial. Nickerson v. Porter, 189 Ga. 671, 7 S.E.2d 231 (1940).

- If the trial court determined as a matter of law that there was no claim under an insurance policy, there could be no recovery of attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6, and the court was without power to modify the court's order denying an attorney's fees award to plaintiff after the term of court expired in which that order was made. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 242 Ga. App. 591, 530 S.E.2d 492 (2000).

5. Clerical Corrections

Court may order clerk to correct clerical error.

- If the clerk of the superior court, in issuing the writ of certiorari, made a clerical error in dating the writ, the judge of that court may pass an order authorizing the clerk to correct such error so as to make the writ bear the true date of issuance. Neal v. Neal, 122 Ga. 804, 50 S.E. 929 (1905).

- Power of courts to correct clerical errors and misprints and to make the record speak the truth by nunc pro tunc amendments after the term does not enable the courts to change their judgments in substance or in any material respect. Rogers v. Rigell, 183 Ga. 455, 188 S.E. 704 (1936).

- If the process contains a command to the defendant to appear in court at a certain time for a specified purpose, and if this process is actually executed by the proper officer, the mere fact that the formal direction to the officer to execute the process is omitted therefrom would be at most a mere clerical omission or irregularity, which could be cured by amendment. Gay v. Sylvania Cent. Ry., 79 Ga. App. 362, 53 S.E.2d 713 (1949).

Process is amendable so as to be made to "conform to law and justice." Minsk v. Cook, 48 Ga. App. 567, 173 S.E. 446 (1934).

- If, by virtue of a process, although defective, a defendant has been properly served by one lawfully authorized to effect the service, although the process was not so directed to the officer, and if that process has properly put the defendant on notice of the proceeding, and when defendant's appearance will be required, such process has properly served its purpose. Gay v. Sylvania Cent. Ry., 79 Ga. App. 362, 53 S.E.2d 713 (1949).

- Court of record, in the exercise of the court's inherent power, has continuing jurisdiction to enter judgment on a jury verdict at any time. Jefferson v. Ross, 250 Ga. 817, 301 S.E.2d 268 (1983), (overruling Maroska v. Williams, 146 Ga. App. 130, 245 S.E.2d 470 (1978)).

- Record which fails to state length of sentence may be corrected. Tyler v. State, 125 Ga. 46, 53 S.E. 818 (1906).

Transcript of charge to jury may be corrected. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Carroll, 143 Ga. 93, 84 S.E. 434 (1915).

- Since the jury pronounced an indeterminate sentence of three to five years, when in fact the jury should have been instructed to pronounce a determinate sentence, and the court, evidently convinced of the error, changed the sentence to three years, any errors involved were trifling and were harmless. Powell v. State, 115 Ga. App. 791, 156 S.E.2d 188 (1967).

Record of judgment is amendable to show true relation of parties as disclosed by execution. Safford v. Banks, 69 Ga. 289 (1882).

- Judge of a court of record may of the judge's own motion, when approving the minutes at the close of the term, expunge therefrom a judgment which the court is, as to the subject matter, without jurisdiction to render. Scott v. Hughes, 124 Ga. 1000, 53 S.E. 453 (1906).

- Failure of a defendant to appear and plead, in consequence of a misunderstanding between defendant and defense counsel, does not afford a meritorious reason for granting a motion to set aside a judgment, even though made during the term when the judgment was yet in the breast of the court. Drain Tile Mach., Inc. v. McCannon, 80 Ga. App. 373, 56 S.E.2d 165 (1949).

- Laches of plaintiff is not a sufficient reason for the court to exercise the court's plenary power and vacate an order dismissing a case for want of prosecution since neither the plaintiff nor plaintiff's counsel are present on the call of the case for trial. Drain Tile Mach., Inc. v. McCannon, 80 Ga. App. 373, 56 S.E.2d 165 (1949).

- Trial court, if no adverse rights have intervened, has jurisdiction nunc pro tunc to enter an order of dismissal accurately reflecting what occurred upon the trial of the case. Israel v. Joe Redwine Ins. Agency, 120 Ga. App. 14, 169 S.E.2d 347 (1969).

- It was within the power of the court to compel obedience to the court's judgments, orders, and process in an action or proceeding therein. This general power conferred by the law upon the courts and the specific power providing for rule nisi against officers contained in former Code 1933, § 24-209 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-13-4) authorized a proceeding when an execution was issued by the clerk contrary to the terms of the judgment and was paid by the defendant in fi. fa. and marked satisfied by the clerk. The court had the power to have the clerk recall such an execution and offer to refund the money paid to the clerk by the defendant in fi. fa. Miller Serv., Inc. v. Miller, 77 Ga. App. 413, 48 S.E.2d 761 (1948).

Corrections of mistake in minutes must not prejudice rights of third person. Barefield v. Bryan, 8 Ga. 463 (1850).

- If an order granted 24 years previously had not been placed upon the minutes of the court by the clerk, the judge ordered it done in order to make the minutes speak the truth. Ellis v. Clarke, 173 Ga. 618, 160 S.E. 780 (1931).

- Language "amend its own records" includes amending the record by reducing to writing an order which had previously existed only as an oral statement and was, therefore, not properly a part of the record at all, although it had been recognized as such during the trial of the case. Maloy v. Planter's Whse. & Lumber Co., 142 Ga. App. 69, 234 S.E.2d 807 (1977).

If the plaintiff files an amendment to the plaintiff's complaint and a motion to add parties, a proposed (unsigned) order granting the motion is placed in the file at the same time as the motion, a hearing on the motion is held, and the trial court, in the exercise of the court's discretion, orally grants the motion, all within the limitations period, but, through oversight, the court omits the actual signing of the order, the trial court does not err in later entering a nunc pro tunc order so as to correct the court's own oversight and to make the record speak the truth. Savannah Iron & Fence Corp. v. Mitchell, 168 Ga. App. 252, 308 S.E.2d 569 (1983).

- Motion to revoke and set aside an order of incorporation on the grounds that the movant had acquired prior use to the name used by the corporation, that its use would cause confusion and cloud titles of petitioners' property, and that it was improvidently granted because the movant was not given notice before the order of incorporation, and praying that it be set aside, is not an equity case within the meaning of that term as used in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Paras. II, III), defining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The grounds of the motion are not relievable only in equity. On the contrary, the motion is one to set aside an order of the court on an alleged legal ground and a court has jurisdiction with rule nisi or process to grant the relief prayed. Methodist Episcopal Church S., Inc. v. Decell, 60 Ga. App. 843, 5 S.E.2d 66 (1939).

- If county and jail inmates entered a settlement agreement whereby the county would take steps over an 18-month period to improve health services, but the county was held in contempt and given the opportunity to purge itself of contempt, the mere fact that the trial court's later order was beyond the original 18 month settlement terms did not prevent the trial court from finding the county had not purged the contempt; the expiration of the term did not halt the trial court's lawful efforts to coerce compliance, particularly when those efforts began long before the agreement was due to expire. DeKalb County v. Adams, 262 Ga. App. 243, 585 S.E.2d 178 (2003).

- Because both a wife and her counsel read and signed a settlement agreement reached during a divorce hearing, the agreement was enforceable even though some details remained to be decided, and it could not be rescinded based on a claimed error in the award of a home to the husband. However, a consent order based on the agreement should have been set aside under O.C.G.A. § 15-1-3(6) because the wife did not consent to the order and the trial court had the duty to determine whether the agreement was equitable. Buckner v. Buckner, 294 Ga. 705, 755 S.E.2d 722 (2014).

- In an action wherein a workers' compensation claimant revived a lump-sum judgment of $37,747.08 plus accrued interest, which had become dormant against an employer, the trial court properly refused to amend the 2006 judgment that revived the judgment to provide for weekly disability payments as the term of court ended and, therefore, the trial court had no authority to amend or alter that 2006 judgment. However, the trial court should have issued a writ of execution for the payments that became due after July 27, 2000, as those payments had not become dormant. Taylor v. Peachbelt Props., 293 Ga. App. 335, 667 S.E.2d 117 (2008).

- Trial court did not err by granting the wife's motion to disqualify counsel in a wrongful death action after finding that the lawyers repeatedly and intentionally contacted the wife's expert with the objective of interfering with the expert's appearance as a witness; the natural and foreseeable result of co-counsel's phone calls to the witness's employer was to have the expert pressured into withdrawing from the case. WellStar Health Sys. v. Kemp, 324 Ga. App. 629, 751 S.E.2d 445 (2013).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Choice of forum.

- Courts of Georgia may not restrict the suitor's choice of forum when jurisdiction of a cause of action is vested in more than one court. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-50.

- Trial judge is ultimately responsible for reducing sentence to writing, even though this duty may be delegated to another officer; in any event, the judge must sign the sentence. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-85.

- Court, assisted by the sheriff of the county, is responsible for undertaking measures necessary to ensure the safety of the court during a habeas corpus proceeding; however, this does not relieve the Board of Corrections from any of the Board's constitutional duties for the custody of inmates. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-57.

- Arrest warrant may be dismissed by the issuing judicial officer at the request of the prosecutor prior to the warrant's execution and need not be dismissed by the court having jurisdiction over the trial of the case. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-27.

- Justice of peace (now magistrate) may prevent interference with a constable in making levy through contempt processes. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-63.

Magistrate court may, sua sponte, order the release of arrestees who have been arrested without a warrant if no warrant has been procured as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62, and if an individual has been arrested with a warrant, but has not been afforded a first appearance hearing within 72 hours of the individual's arrest as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-4-26. 1988 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U88-14.

- Department of Public Safety officers are permitted to carry their service weapons and handguns into courthouses, but O.C.G.A. § 16-11-30 does not authorize the officers' entry into courtrooms where the courthouse's security plan and/or judges of that court have directed otherwise. 2017 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 17-5.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 36 et seq.

- 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 41 et seq.

- Power of court to amend indictment, 7 A.L.R. 1516; 68 A.L.R. 928.

Power of court to issue or to honor letters rogatory, 9 A.L.R. 966; 108 A.L.R. 384.

Forcing party or prosecuting witness to withdraw or not to institute action or proceeding as contempt of court, 23 A.L.R. 187.

Contempt for disobedience of mandamus, 30 A.L.R. 148.

Formality in authentication of judicial acts, 30 A.L.R. 700.

Procuring or attempting to procure witness to leave jurisdiction as contempt, 33 A.L.R. 607.

Inability to comply with judgment or order as defense to charge of contempt, 40 A.L.R. 546; 76 A.L.R. 390, 120 A.L.R. 703.

Power of judiciary to compel legislature to make apportionment of representatives or election districts as required by Constitution, 46 A.L.R. 964.

Judicial power in respect to consolidation or merger of railroads, 51 A.L.R. 1249.

What courts or officers have power to punish for contempt, 54 A.L.R. 318; 73 A.L.R. 1185.

Assaulting, threatening, or intimidating witness as contempt of court, 55 A.L.R. 1230; 52 A.L.R.2d 1297.

Authority of judge in respect of unfinished business of another judge, 58 A.L.R. 848.

Discretion of court to refuse jurisdiction of action against ancillary executor of administrator, 79 A.L.R. 1324.

Disciplinary power of court in respect of suretyship in judicial proceedings, 91 A.L.R. 889.

Power and duty of court as to continuation of action or prosecution upon refusal of city, county, or district attorney to proceed therewith, 103 A.L.R. 1253.

Power and duty of court to keep its files and records free from scandalous matter, 111 A.L.R. 879.

Discretion of trial court in criminal case as to permitting or denying view of premises where crime was committed, 124 A.L.R. 841.

Failure or refusal to surrender possession or disclose whereabouts of property in replevin as contempt, 130 A.L.R. 632.

Power to include separate acts of contempt in a single contempt proceeding, 160 A.L.R. 1104.

Dismissal of action for failure or refusal of plaintiff to obey court order, 4 A.L.R.2d 348; 56 A.L.R.3d 1109; 27 A.L.R.4th 61; 32 A.L.R.4th 212; 3 A.L.R.5th 237.

Right to punish for contempt for failure to obey court order or decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous, 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Blood grouping tests, 46 A.L.R.2d 1000.

Pleading and burden of proof, in contempt proceedings, as to ability to comply with order for payment of alimony or child support, 53 A.L.R.2d 591.

Prejudicial effect of trial judges remarks, during civil jury trial, disparaging the litigants, the witnesses, or the subject matter of the litigation, 83 A.L.R.2d 1128, 35 A.L.R.5th 1.

Trial court's appointment, in civil case, of expert witness, 95 A.L.R.2d 390.

Prejudicial effect, in argument or summation in civil case, of attacks upon opposing counsel, 96 A.L.R.2d 9.

Power of courts or other public agencies, in the absence of statutory authority, to order compulsory medical care for adult, 9 A.L.R.3d 1391.

Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to timely prosecute action, 15 A.L.R.3d 674.

Power of court to make or permit amendment of indictment with respect to allegations as to property, objects, or instruments, other than money, 15 A.L.R.3d 1357.

Inherent power of court to compel appropriation or expenditure of funds for judicial purposes, 59 A.L.R.3d 569.

Power of court to impose standard of personal appearance or attire, 73 A.L.R.3d 353.

Power of trial court to dismiss prosecution or direct acquittal on basis of prosecutor's opening statement, 75 A.L.R.3d 649.

Right of injured party to award of compensatory damages or fine in contempt proceedings, 85 A.L.R.3d 895.

Disruptive conduct of accused in presence of jury as ground for mistrial or discharge of jury, 89 A.L.R.3d 960.

Attorney's failure to attend court, or tardiness, as contempt, 13 A.L.R.4th 122.

Validity, propriety, and effect of allowing or prohibiting media's broadcasting, recording, or photographing court proceedings, 14 A.L.R.4th 121.

Court's witnesses (other than expert) in state criminal prosecution, 16 A.L.R.4th 352.

Power of court, in absence of statute, to order psychiatric examination of accused for purpose of determining mental condition at time of alleged offense, 17 A.L.R.4th 1274.

Emotional manifestations by victim or family of victim during criminal trial as ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial, 31 A.L.R.4th 229.

Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court under Rule 614 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 A.L.R. Fed. 498.