2021 Colorado Code
Title 2 - Legislative
Article 4 - Construction of Statutes
Part 2 - Construction of Statutes
§ 2-4-212. Liberal Construction

All general provisions, terms, phrases, and expressions, used in any statute, shall be liberally construed, in order that the true intent and meaning of the general assembly may be fully carried out.

History. Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1425, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-212. History. Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1425, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-212.

Analysis

• I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
• II. CONSTRUING STATUTES.
• III. CONSTRUING RULES OF PROCEDURE.

Law reviews. For article, “Legislative Bill Drafting”, see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 127 (1950).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

Applied in Posey v. District Court, 196 Colo. 396 , 586 P.2d 36 (1978) (decided under present section); In re U.M. v. District Court, 631 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1981); Franco v. District Court, 641 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1982); Mtn. Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1983).

The appropriate construction of a statute is a question of law. Wycon Const. v. Wheat Ridge Sanitation, 870 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1993).

The necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems have led to judicial approval of broad standards for administrative action, especially in regulatory enactments under the police power, and with respect to such types of legislation, detailed standards in precise and unvarying form would be unrealistic and more arbitrary than a general indefinite standard. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Gym of America, Inc., 177 Colo. 97 , 493 P.2d 660 (1972).

And a statute should be given construction which will render it effective in accomplishing purpose for which it was enacted. In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Court, 179 Colo. 270 , 499 P.2d 1169 (1972); Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Div., 183 Colo. 335 , 516 P.2d 634 (1973).

A statute should be construed to accomplish the purpose for which it is enacted. Firstbank of N. Longmont v. Banking Bd., 648 P.2d 684 (Colo. App. 1982).

Whether constitution or statute is involved, that interpretation which, brushing aside minor objections and trivial technicalities, effectuates the intent of the act, is a broad interpretation, and that which, regarding such objections and technicalities, fails to do so, is narrow. In re Senate Resolution No. 2, 94 Colo. 101 , 31 P.2d 325 (1933).

In construing either constitutional or statutory language the first requisite is to inquire what objective was sought to be accomplished by it. In re Questions Submitted by United States Dist. Court, 179 Colo. 270 , 499 P.2d 1169 (1972).

Court to discern legislative intent. In construing a statute, the court's task is to discern the intent of the general assembly. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1983); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986).

The primary goal of statutory construction is to effect the intent of the general assembly. Water Quality Control Div. v. Casias, 843 P.2d 665 (Colo. App. 1992).

To do this the court should strive to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the general assembly. A statute imperfect in its details is not void unless impossible of execution. The title of an act may be looked to in seeking the legislative intent, and the preamble as well. W. Lumber & Pole Co. v. City of Golden, 23 Colo. App. 461, 130 P. 1027 (1913); Dekelt v. People, 44 Colo. 525 , 99 P. 330 (1908).

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that the legislative intent should be ascertained and given effect whenever possible. People v. Stevens, 183 Colo. 399 , 517 P.2d 1336 (1973); People v. Sneed, 183 Colo. 96 , 514 P.2d 776 (1973).

No court should interpret a statute in such a manner as to frustrate the intent of the general assembly. Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Mack, 182 Colo. 34 , 510 P.2d 891 (1973).

The court may not infer the intent of the general assembly by review of a subsequent amendment to the statute, however. People v. Duncan, 109 P.3d 1044 (Colo. App. 2004).

Contemporaneous statements of individual legislators are relevant to judicial inquiry into legislative intent. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 690 P.2d 177 (Colo. 1984); In re Estate of Hill, 713 P.2d 928 (Colo. App. 1985).

Because in statutory construction, legislative intent is polestar. People v. Lee, 180 Colo. 376 , 506 P.2d 136 (1973); Firstbank of N. Longmont v. Banking Bd., 648 P.2d 684 (Colo. App. 1982); In re Estate of Hill, 713 P.2d 928 (Colo. App. 1985).

Also statutes must be construed to carry out their beneficent purposes, and not to defeat them. Eugene Cervi & Co. v. Russell, 31 Colo. App. 525, 506 P.2d 748 (1972), aff'd, 184 Colo. 282 , 519 P.2d 1189 (1974); Seibel v. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n, 34 Colo. App. 415, 530 P.2d 1290 (1974).

And, statute should be construed as whole so as to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Massey v. District Court, 180 Colo. 359 , 506 P.2d 128 (1973); Seibel v. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n, 34 Colo. App. 415, 530 P.2d 1290 (1974); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986); In re Davisson, 797 P.2d 809 (Colo. App. 1990).

In ascertaining the intent of a legislative body, and the meaning of its enactments, courts are required to give effect to every work, phrase, clause, sentence, and section, if it can be done. Blue River Defense Comm. v. Town of Silverthorne, 33 Colo. App. 10, 516 P.2d 452 (1973).

The words and phrases of a statute should be given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning. In re Davisson, 797 P.2d 809 (Colo. App. 1990); Gabriel v. City & County of Denver, 824 P.2d 36 (Colo. App. 1991).

Therefore, courts should not extend an enactment by construction beyond the expression of the act. Kellogg v. Hickman, 12 Colo. 256 , 21 P. 325 (1888).

Moreover, statute will not be construed in such way as to defeat legislative intent. Kellogg v. Hickman, 12 Colo. 256 , 21 P. 325 (1888); People v. Lee, 180 Colo. 376 , 506 P.2d 136 (1973); Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Mack, 182 Colo. 34 , 510 P.2d 891 (1973).

Although the construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to deference, courts are not bound by an agency construction that misapplies or misconstrues the law. Golden Aluminum v. Weld County Comm'rs, 867 P.2d 190 (Colo. App. 1993).

But courts and administrative agencies are not at liberty to substitute their own notions of public policy for public policy of state as declared by general assembly. Fleming v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 31 Colo. App. 463, 506 P.2d 158 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 183 Colo. 71 , 514 P.2d 1135 (1973).

Read and consider in context. In construing a section of a legislative act, it is fundamental that the whole of the act must be read and considered in context. Humana, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 189 Colo. 79 , 537 P.2d 741 (1975); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986).

Courts are not to presume that legislative body used language in statute idly and with no intent that meaning should be given to its language. Blue River Defense Comm. v. Town of Silverthorne, 33 Colo. App. 10, 516 P.2d 452 (1973).

Prior judicial construction of language presumed adopted in subsequent legislation. It is to be presumed that a general assembly is cognizant of and adopts the construction which prior judicial decisions have placed on particular language when such language is employed in subsequent legislation. Thompson v. People, 181 Colo. 194 , 510 P.2d 311 (1973).

Construction that converts statute into absurdity is a construction forbidden unless no other is possible. Seibel v. Colo. Real Estate Comm'n, 34 Colo. App. 415, 530 P.2d 1290 (1974).

And a statute imperfect in its details is not void unless impossible of execution. W. Lumber & Pole Co. v. City of Golden, 23 Colo. App. 461, 130 P. 1027 (1913); Dekelt v. People, 44 Colo. 525 , 99 P. 330 (1908).

The title of an act may be looked to in seeking the legislative intent, and the preamble as well. W. Lumber & Pole Co. v. City of Golden, 23 Colo. App. 461, 130 P. 1027 (1913); Dekelt v. People, 44 Colo. 525 , 99 P. 330 (1908).

But the generality of a title is no objection to it. Cardillo v. People, 26 Colo. 355 , 58 P. 678 (1899).

The use of the word “shall” in a statute is usually deemed to involve a mandatory connotation. People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986).

Constructions which defeat the obvious legislative intent of a statute should be avoided. People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986).

The rules of civil procedure should be liberally construed and that technical errors or defects in proceedings not affecting the substantial rights of parties should be disregarded. Moses v. Moses, 180 Colo. 397 , 505 P.2d 1302 (1973).

Because while unjustified delay in complying with procedural requirements is not condoned, to apply a strict technical application of time requirements appears to be a punitive disposition of the litigation, resulting in an arbitrary denial of substantial justice to petitioner, contrary to the spirit of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Moses v. Moses, 180 Colo. 397 , 505 P.2d 1302 (1973).

Moreover, provisions in law regarding extradition should not be so narrowly interpreted, as to enable offenders against the laws of a state to find a permanent asylum in the territory of another state. Boyd v. Van Cleave, 180 Colo. 403 , 505 P.2d 1305 (1973).