2021 Colorado Code
Title 18 - Criminal Code
Article 4 - Offenses Against Property
Part 1 - Arson
§ 18-4-101. Definitions

As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:

1. “Building” means a structure which has the capacity to contain, and is designed for the shelter of, man, animals, or property, and includes a ship, trailer, sleeping car, airplane, or other vehicle or place adapted for overnight accommodations of persons or animals, or for carrying on of business therein, whether or not a person or animal is actually present.
2. “Occupied structure” means any area, place, facility, or enclosure which, for particular purposes, may be used by persons or animals upon occasion, whether or not included within the definition of “building” in subsection (1) of this section, and which is in fact occupied by a person or animal, and known by the defendant to be thus occupied at the time he acts in violation of one or more of sections 18-4-102 to 18-4-105.
3. Property is that of “another” if anyone other than the defendant has a possessory or proprietary interest therein.
4. If a building is divided into units for separate occupancy, any unit not occupied by the defendant is a “building of another”.

History. Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 425, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-4-101 .

The words used in subsection (1) of § 18-4-105 are without technical meaning except for “building”, “property of another”, and “occupied structure”, which are all adequately defined by statute in this section. People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347 , 541 P.2d 687 (1975).

Scope of generic term “building”. In adopting the generic term “building” in amending the burglary statute, the general assembly intended to encompass not only the structures previously listed, but also to cover all types of structures known but not then included. Sanchez v. People, 142 Colo. 58 , 349 P.2d 561 (1960) (decided under former § 40-3-6 , CRS 53).

Rather than limiting the definition of a building to a structure with walls and a roof, which would include a telephone booth, it was the legislative intent that a building is a structure which has the capacity to contain and is designed for the habitation of man or animals or for the sheltering of property. Sanchez v. People, 142 Colo. 58 , 349 P.2d 561 (1960) (decided under former § 40-3-6 , CRS 53).

A trailer pulled by a truck tractor, with the capacity to contain, and the design for the sheltering of, property, which is hauled to a construction site and left there for the purpose of storing materials to be used on the project, is clearly a “building” within the statutory definition. People v. Simien, 671 P.2d 1021 (Colo. App. 1983).

When fenced enclosure not “building”. A fenced enclosure surrounding a concrete building which serves as a dog pound is not within the statutory meaning of “building” in subsection (1) so as to support a second degree burglary charge for the unlawful entry of the enclosure, where the fenced enclosure's design is directed to containment or exclusion and affords little protection against inclement weather and extreme temperatures. People v. Moyer, 635 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1981).

But within definition of “occupied structure”. A fenced enclosure surrounding a concrete building which serves as a dog pound is within the definition of “occupied structure” in subsection (2), so as to support a second degree burglary charge for the unlawful entry of the enclosure. People v. Moyer, 635 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1981).

Unfinished structure. Under former section, a structure was held to be a building, although it was yet incomplete and unfurnished. El Jebel Shrine Ass'n v. McGlone, 93 Colo. 334 , 26 P.2d 108 (1933).

“Dwelling” includes attached garage. A garage attached to a residence is part of a “dwelling” within the meaning of § 18-4-203(2) , burglary of a dwelling. People v. Jiminez, 651 P.2d 395 (Colo. 1982).

“Proprietary interest” is a protean concept, the meaning of which emerges from contextual use and application. People ex rel. VanMeveren v. District Court, 619 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1980).

Term “proprietary interest” is sufficiently broad to include a legally recognized security interest, such as that of a credit union, which the defendant has neither the right nor the authority to defeat or impair, even though he also had an interest in the secured property. People ex rel. VanMeveren v. District Court, 619 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1980).

The fact that wife's clothing may have been acquired during the course of her marriage to the defendant and may constitute “marital property” under § 14-10-113 does not create an ownership interest in that property in the defendant for purposes of § 18-4-103 . The evidence presented at the trial concerning wife's ownership is sufficient to support a finding of “property of another” and therefore defendant's arson conviction. People v. Sullivan, 53 P.3d 1181 (Colo. App. 2002).