2021 Colorado Code
Title 17 - Corrections
Article 27.5 - Intensive Supervision Programs
§ 17-27.5-104. Escape From Custody - Duties of Peace Officer or Community Parole Officer - Definitions

1. If an offender fails to remain within the extended limits on the offender's confinement as established under the intensive supervision program; or, having been ordered by the parole board, the executive director, or the administrator of the program to return to the correctional institution, neglects or fails to do so; or knowingly removes or tampers with an electronic monitoring device that the offender is required to wear as a condition of parole, the offender is deemed to have committed the offense of unauthorized absence and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as provided in section 18-8-208.2.
2. When a peace officer or community parole officer has probable cause to believe that an offender has committed unauthorized absence, as described in subsection (1) of this section and section 18-8-208.2, by knowingly removing or tampering with an electronic monitoring device that he or she is required to wear as a condition of parole, the officer shall immediately seek a warrant for the offender's arrest or effectuate an immediate arrest if the offender is in the presence of the officer; except that, before an officer arrests an offender pursuant to this subsection (2), the officer, if practicable, shall determine that the notification of removal or tampering was not merely the result of an equipment malfunction.
3. Subsequent to any arrest pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, if a peace officer or community parole officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed the offense of unauthorized absence pursuant to this section, the peace officer or community parole officer shall submit charges to the office of the district attorney for consideration of filing pursuant to section 16-5-205.
4. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
   1. “Peace officer” means a certified peace officer described in section 16-2.5-102.
   2. “Tampering” has the same meaning as set forth in section 17-1-102 (8.5).

History. Source: L. 89: Entire section added, p. 885, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2017: Entire section amended,(SB 17-048), ch. 94, p. 286, § 1, effective August 9. L. 2021: (1), (2), and (3) amended,(SB 21-146), ch. 459, p. 3085, § 9, effective July 6.

This section does not violate the separation of powers and nondelegation doctrines. The statute provides sufficient statutory standards and safeguards. People v. Sa'ra, 117 P.3d 51 (Colo. App. 2004).

This section does not violate the clear expression requirement. The subject of this section is clearly expressed in the title and failure to remain within the extended limits of confinement is essential to the accomplishment of the title. People v. Sa'ra, 117 P.3d 51 (Colo. App. 2004).

The phrase “extended limits on his confinement” is not unconstitutionally vague. People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326 (Colo. App. 2002).

The phrase “extended limits on his confinement” refers to geographic and time limits placed on the offender beyond those placed by incarceration in a correctional facility. People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326 (Colo. App. 2002).

Because defendant was specifically advised of his residential curfew and he acknowledged advisement of the contents of this residential curfew directive in writing, the directive constituted an extended limitation of defendant's confinement. People v. Williams, 33 P.3d 1187 (Colo. App. 2001); People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326 (Colo. App. 2002).

For purposes of escape, there is no conflict between the home detention statute and the intensive supervision program (ISP) statute. In an escape case, the court must make a factual determination whether a defendant was placed in home detention or ISP based on the different elements of home detention and ISP. Home detention and ISP are mutually exclusive, therefore once the court determines whether the defendant was in home detention or on ISP there is no conflict. People v. Smith, 77 P.3d 751 (Colo. App. 2003); People v. Sa'ra, 117 P.3d 51 (Colo. App. 2004).

The court did not err in instructing the jury under this section concerning custody or confinement where, taken together, the jury instructions, the information, and the parole mittimus signed by defendant indicate that he had sufficient notice that he could be liable for escape from custody. People v. Taylor, 74 P.3d 396 (Colo. App. 2002).

The court did not err when it instructed the jury on ISP escape without including the “extended limits” language of this section. People v. Sa'ra, 117 P.3d 51 (Colo. App. 2004).

This section applies to all parolees and not just those on discretionary parole. Colorado cases do not distinguish between mandatory and discretionary parolees. People v. Taylor, 74 P.3d 396 (Colo. App. 2002).

Assignment of defendant to a therapeutic community providing drug and alcohol treatment, as a place of residence during intensive supervision parole, constitutes confinement. People v. Taylor, 74 P.3d 396 (Colo. App. 2002).