2021 Colorado Code
Title 13 - Courts and Court Procedure
Article 22 - Age of Competence - Arbitration - Mediation
Part 2 - Uniform Arbitration Act
§ 13-22-207. Motion to Compel or Stay Arbitration

1. On the motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement:
   1. If the refusing party does not appear or does not oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate; and
   2. If the refusing party opposes the motion, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.

2. On the motion of a person alleging that an arbitration proceeding has been initiated or threatened but that there is not an agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue. If the court finds that there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, it shall order the parties to arbitrate.
3. If the court finds that there is no enforceable agreement, it may not invoke the provisions of subsection (1) or (2) of this section to order the parties to arbitrate.
4. The court may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or because one or more grounds for the claim have not been established.
5. If a proceeding involving a claim referable to arbitration under an alleged agreement to arbitrate is pending in court, a motion made under this section shall be filed with that court. Otherwise, a motion made under this section may be filed in any court pursuant to section 13-22-227.
6. If a party files a motion with the court to order arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim alleged to be subject to the arbitration until the ordering court renders a final decision under this section.
7. If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a claim subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay to that claim.

History. Source: L. 2004: Entire part R&RE, p. 1720, § 1, effective August 4.

This section is similar to former § 13-22-204 as it existed prior to 2004.

Annotator's note. Since § 13-22-207 is similar to § 13-22-204 as it existed prior to the 2004 repeal and reenactment of this part 2, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.

When arbitration proceedings stayed. A court is empowered to stay arbitration proceedings upon a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate; and where it is apparent from the language of the contract that the issue sought to be arbitrated lies clearly beyond the scope of the arbitration clause, a court cannot order arbitration. Cabs, Inc. v. Delivery Drivers Local 435, 39 Colo. App. 241, 566 P.2d 1078 (1977).

This section gives the court authority to stay an arbitration only if there is no arbitration agreement or it appears from the arbitration agreement that the claim sought to be arbitrated is beyond the scope of the arbitration clause. Sopko v. Clear Channel Satellite Servs., Inc., 151 P.3d 663 (Colo. App. 2006).

Where, however, there is an agreement to arbitrate and there is a reasonable basis for construing the agreement in support of arbitrability of the claim, the scope of the arbitration agreement must be determined by the arbitrator, not by the court. Sopko v. Clear Channel Satellite Servs., Inc., 151 P.3d 663 (Colo. App. 2006).

Scope of arbitration to be determined by arbitrator. Where there is a reasonable basis for construing the agreement in support of arbitrability, the legislative policy underlying the article requires that the scope of the arbitration be determined by the arbitrator. Cabs, Inc. v. Delivery Drivers Local 435, 39 Colo. App. 241, 566 P.2d 1078 (1977).

Order compelling arbitration not appealable. An order compelling parties to arbitrate is not a final appealable order. Frontier Materials, Inc. v. City of Boulder, 663 P.2d 1065 (Colo. App. 1983).

Uniform Arbitration Act authorizes party to arbitration agreement to apply to district court for order compelling arbitration. Thomas v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 532 (Colo. App. 1993).

Proper procedure to stay action pending arbitration. A stay of the proceeding preserves plaintiff's right to foreclose on its mechanic's lien if it prevails in arbitration. Mtn. Plains Constructors v. Torrez, 785 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1990).

Party's unsuccessful attempt to stay the arbitration of a contract dispute does not mean that the party is estopped from obtaining clarification of issues which may be arbitrated. Associated Natural Gas v. Nordic Petro., 807 P.2d 1195 (Colo. App. 1990).

A trial court has limited power to preserve the status quo even though there is a statutory requirement that a pending civil action be stayed pending an arbitrator's decision. Hughley v. Rocky Mtn. HMO, Inc., 927 P.2d 1325 (Colo. 1996).

Appealable order. A denial of a motion to compel arbitration is an appealable order. However, an immediate appeal is permissive and not mandatory. Therefore, an order denying a motion to compel arbitration may also be appealed after final judgment. Mtn. Plains Constructors v. Torrez, 785 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1990).

The phrase “proceed to summarily decide the issue” in subsection (1)(b) requires that a trial court considering a fraudulent inducement challenge to an arbitration agreement should begin by considering the undisputed affidavits, pleadings, discovery, and stipulations. If the material facts are undisputed, trial court can resolve the challenge on the record before it. J.A. Walker Co. v. Cambria Corp., 159 P.3d 126 (Colo. 2007).

If, however, the material facts are in dispute, the trial court should proceed expeditiously in holding an evidentiary hearing to consider the disputed facts and resolve the party's challenge to the arbitration agreement. J.A. Walker Co. v. Cambria Corp., 159 P.3d 126 (Colo. 2007).

Parties may enter into an enforceable agreement to arbitrate notwithstanding the absence of their signatures. Trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing to consider disputed facts and resolve the challenge regarding the existence of the alleged arbitration agreement. E-21 Eng'g v. Steve Stock & Assocs., 252 P.3d 36 (Colo. App. 2010).

Once the court determines that a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement exists, the court is divested of jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration and the proper procedure is to stay the proceedings until arbitration is completed. An order granting a motion to stay the proceedings is an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable. Lane v. Urgitus, 145 P.3d 672 (Colo. 2006).

Arbitration is a favored means of dispute resolution and any doubts about the scope of an arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Gergel v. High View Homes, LLC, 996 P.2d 233 (Colo. App. 1999); Lane v. Urgitus, 145 P.3d 672 (Colo. 2006).

A court may refuse to compel arbitration upon application by a party showing an agreement to arbitrate, only if there is no agreement to arbitrate or if the issue sought to be arbitrated is clearly beyond the scope of the arbitration provision. Shorey v. Jefferson County Sch. District No. R-1, 807 P.2d 1181 (Colo. App. 1990); Eychner v. Van Vleet, 870 P.2d 486 (Colo. App. 1993); Gergel v. High View Homes, LLC, 996 P.2d 233 (Colo. App. 1999); Eagle Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Builders, Inc., 98 P.3d 915 (Colo. App. 2004).

In resolving a motion to compel arbitration the court must inquire whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties to the action, and whether the issues being disputed are within the scope of that agreement. Eychner v. Van Vleet, 870 P.2d 486 (Colo. App. 1993).

In considering a motion to compel arbitration, the court must first determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. Eagle Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Builders, Inc., 98 P.3d 915 (Colo. App. 2004).

Intertwining doctrine no longer good law in Colorado. Claims that are subject to an arbitration agreement must be arbitrated regardless of their joinder with non-arbitrable claims. Claims that are not subject to arbitration should be stayed or proceed separately in litigation based on the discretion of the trial court. Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apartments, 159 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2007) (overruling Sandefer v. District Court, 635 P.2d 547 (Colo. 1981)).

Intertwining doctrine does not prevent a court from ordering arbitration where all claims to be decided fall within the scope of an arbitration clause. Gergel v. High View Homes, LLC, 996 P.2d 233 (Colo. App. 1999); Eagle Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Builders, Inc., 98 P.3d 915 (Colo. App. 2004).

A signatory to an agreement containing an arbitration clause may be equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration when the signatory sues a nonsignatory on claims that (1) presume the existence of that agreement; or (2) allege interconnected and concerted misconduct between the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories related to that agreement. Meister v. Stout, 2015 COA 60 , 353 P.3d 916.

When facts and issues are intertwined, if some issues require arbitration and others do not, consideration of the interests of judicial economy, time, and expense leads to the conclusion that all the issues should be resolved by litigation. Atmel Corp. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 30 P.3d 789 (Colo. App. 2001), overruled in Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apartments, 159 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2007); Eagle Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Builders, Inc., 98 P.3d 915 (Colo. App. 2004), overruled in Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apartments, 159 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2007).

Determining whether the intertwining doctrine applies requires determinations as to whether any claims fall under the arbitration provision at issue and whether any nonarbitrable claims are so inextricably intertwined with the arbitrable claims as to prevent severance. Eagle Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Builders, Inc., 98 P.3d 915 (Colo. App. 2004), overruled in Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apartments, 159 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2007).

Intertwining doctrine does not prevent a court from ordering arbitration where all claims to be decided fall within the scope of an arbitration clause. Gergel v. High View Homes, LLC, 996 P.2d 233 (Colo. App. 1999); Eagle Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Builders, Inc., 98 P.3d 915 (Colo. App. 2004).

The right to compel arbitration is derived from contract. Unless the intent of the parties to the contract is to bring a nonparty within the scope of an arbitration agreement, one who is not a party to the contract lacks standing to compel, or to be subject to, arbitration. Eychner v. Van Vleet, 870 P.2d 486 (Colo. App. 1993); Parker v. Ctr. for Creative Leadership, 15 P.3d 297 (Colo. App. 2000); Eagle Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Builders, Inc., 98 P.3d 915 (Colo. App. 2004).

In determining whether the parties agreed or intended to submit an issue to arbitration, the ordinary principles of contract interpretation apply. Eagle Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Builders, Inc., 98 P.3d 915 (Colo. App. 2004).

In determining the scope of an arbitration clause, the court must strive to ascertain and give effect to the mutual intent of the parties and must consider the subject matter and purposes to be accomplished by the agreement. Eychner v. Van Vleet, 780 P.2d 486 (Colo. App. 1993); Hughley v. Rocky Mtn. HMO, Inc., 910 P.2d 30 (Colo. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 927 P.2d 1325 (Colo. 1996); Parker v. Ctr. for Creative Leadership, 15 P.3d 297 (Colo. App. 2000).

Arbitration agreement enforced notwithstanding the arbitration agreement's incorporation of an arbitral forum's rules that require a now defunct arbitrator to administer them. The agreement evidenced the parties' agreement to arbitrate any disputes that arose between them, without regard to who was named as arbitrator. Johnson-Linzy v. Conifer Care Comtys., 2020 COA 88 , 469 P.3d 537.

When arbitration agreement covers interpretation of contract terms, arbitrator, not court, empowered to decide whether dispute falls within scope of arbitration provision. BRM Constr., Inc. v. Marais Gaylord, L.L.C., 181 P.3d 283 (Colo. App. 2007).

If a party asserts that the entire contract is illegal, the court must determine this threshold issue first. R.P.T. v. Innovative Commc'ns, 917 P.2d 340 (Colo. App. 1996).

Allegations of fraudulent inducement directed specifically to an arbitration provision in a contract must be decided by a trial court; allegations of fraudulent inducement directed more broadly to the contract as a whole must be decided by the arbitrator. Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apartments, 159 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2007) (decided under law in effect prior to the 2004 repeal and reenactment).

Applied in Paul Mullins Constr. Co. v. Alspaugh, 628 P.2d 113 (Colo. App. 1980); Weedin v. United States, 509 F. Supp. 1052 (D. Colo. 1981 ); Sandefer v. District Court, 635 P.2d 547 (Colo. 1981); City & County of Denver v. Denver Firefighters Local 858, 663 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1983); Lawrence St. Part. v. Lawrence St. Vent., 786 P.2d 508 (Colo. App. 1989); Shorey v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 807 P.2d 1181 (Colo. App. 1990); Lane v. Urgitus, 145 P.3d 672 (Colo. 2006).