State v. Garland D. Hampton

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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED November 18, 2014 Diane M. Fremgen Clerk of Court of Appeals Appeal No. NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and RULE 809.62. Cir. Ct. No. 1994CF943992 2014AP1020 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT I STATE OF WISCONSIN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, V. GARLAND D. HAMPTON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: STEPHANIE G. ROTHSTEIN, Judge. Affirmed. Before Curley, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ. ¶1 PER CURIAM. Garland D. Hampton, pro se, appeals from an order of the circuit court, denying his motion for resentencing. Hampton asserts that Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), requires resentencing. We agree No. 2014AP1020 with the circuit court that Miller does not apply to Hampton, so we affirm the order. ¶2 Hampton was charged with one count of first-degree intentional homicide with a dangerous weapon, as party to a crime, for events that happened on or about June 10, 1994. Then-fifteen-year-old Hampton was waived to adult court. See WIS. STAT. § 48.18(1)(a)1. (1993-94). A jury convicted Hampton on July 7, 1995. The circuit court sentenced Hampton to life imprisonment with a parole eligibility date of July 7, 2015, the earliest possible date. See WIS. STAT. § 973.014(1) (1993-94). Hampton appealed, but we affirmed. See State v. Hampton, 207 Wis. 2d 367, 558 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1996). Hampton has since filed a myriad of other postconviction motions but has been unsuccessful at changing his conviction and sentence. ¶3 In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller. The Court held that “mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment” prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See id., 132 S. Ct. at 2463-64, 2469. On April 21, 2014, Hampton filed a postconviction motion, seeking resentencing based on Miller. The circuit court denied the motion, explaining that Miller “does not apply to [Hampton’s] case because a parole eligibility date was set in his case, and he was not subjected to a mandatory life-without-parole sentence.” Hampton appeals. ¶4 Hampton asserts that the “mandatory life penalty,” as set out in WIS. STAT. §§ 940.01(1), 939.50(3)(a), and 973.014,1 is unconstitutional as applied 1 Hampton does not specify which version of the statutes he is referencing. 2 No. 2014AP1020 because it subjects juvenile offenders to the same penalty as adult offenders. He claims that Miller requires “judges to consider the background of juveniles, the circumstances of their crimes, and the extent of their involvement before imposing a life imprisonment sentence,” but the required life imprisonment sentence under WIS. STAT. § 940.01 “does not allow judges such discretion.” ¶5 “The constitutionality of a statutory scheme is a question of law that we review de novo.” See State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶44, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 N.W.2d 451. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is mirrored by substantially identical language in the Wisconsin Constitution. See id., ¶45. We generally interpret state constitutional provisions to be consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of parallel provisions in the United States Constitution. See id. ¶6 We also decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds. See State v. Castillo, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 492, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997). For that reason, we will assume without deciding that Miller is retroactively applicable to Hampton’s case. Even so, Miller does not require Hampton’s resentencing. ¶7 Miller disapproved of mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders, in part because they are akin to death sentences and because they are disproportionately harsher the younger the offender is. See id., 132 S. Ct. at 2466. In explaining the particular harms of such sentences, the Court wrote that “[s]uch mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.” Id. at 2467. ¶8 Hampton evidently believes that Wisconsin’s sentencing scheme does not allow such considerations, either. 3 Under WIS. STAT. § 940.01(1) No. 2014AP1020 (1993-94) and § 940.01(1)(a) (2011-12), first-degree intentional homicide is a class A felony. In either biennium, the penalty for a class A felony is life imprisonment. See WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3)(a). Thus, Hampton characterizes the statutes as requiring a “mandatory” life sentence that runs afoul of Miller. ¶9 In Miller, the Alabama and Arkansas sentencing courts could only impose sentences of life without parole on the juvenile offenders. See id., 132 S. Ct. at 2461-63. In Wisconsin, however, a circuit court imposing a sentence of life imprisonment must also exercise its discretion and determine when a defendant will be eligible for parole or extended supervision. See WIS. STAT. § 973.014(1) & (1g)(a) (2011-12). The circuit court, in determining parole or extended supervision eligibility, may consider the defendant’s age and related factors as part of its ordinary exercise of discretion. See State v. Odom, 2006 WI 145, ¶7, 294 Wis. 2d 844, 720 N.W.2d 695. ¶10 Currently, a circuit court may determine that an offender will not be eligible for release to extended supervision at any time. See WIS. STAT. § 973.014(1g)(a)3. (2011-12). This would effectively be a life-without-parole sentence. However, the circuit court in 1995 could not impose life without parole eligibility unless the defendant was also a persistent repeater, which Hampton was not. See WIS. STAT. §§ 973.014(2) (1993-94) & 939.62(2m) (1993-94). ¶11 Ultimately, Hampton was not sentenced as a juvenile to life without parole, which is the only sentence with which Miller was concerned. Instead, he was given life imprisonment with parole eligibility, which Miller suggests is an appropriate sentence for a juvenile. See id., 132 S. Ct. at 2460. And, while Hampton attempts to make an argument from the fact that his release to parole is not a certainty, the Supreme Court noted that “‘[a] State is not required to 4 No. 2014AP1020 guarantee eventual freedom,’ but must provide ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’” See id. at 2469 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)). Hampton will have that opportunity. Accordingly, the circuit court properly concluded that Miller does not apply, and it properly rejected Hampton’s motion for resentencing. By the Court.—Order affirmed. This opinion shall not be published. RULE 809.23(1)(b)5. (2011-12). 5 See WIS. STAT.

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