Errata: State v. Ricardo Lopez
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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
October 27, 2010
A. John Voelker
Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals
Appeal No.
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
petition to review an adverse decision by the
Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Cir. Ct. No. 2007CF592
2009AP2727-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN
IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
RICARDO LOPEZ,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Sheboygan County: TIMOTHY M. VAN AKKEREN, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Brown, C.J., Neubauer, P.J., and Reilly, J.
¶1
BROWN, C.J.
Ricardo Lopez appeals from a judgment of
conviction and an order denying postconviction relief by which he sought to
withdraw his plea to second-degree sexual assault of a child. Lopez contends that
he did not enter his plea of no contest knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. He
No. 2009AP2727-CR
claims that he did not understand the constitutional rights he was waiving by
accepting the plea. To support this claim, he points to the transcript of the plea
colloquy and alleges that it was deficient, in part because the trial court did not
adequately ascertain that he understood the constitutional rights he was waiving.
He further alleges that his attorney failed to explain his constitutional rights to
him. At a postconviction motion hearing, the trial court acknowledged that the
plea colloquy was deficient, but nonetheless found that there was enough
information in the record to conclude that Lopez’s plea was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2
On September 5, 2007, Lopez was charged with one count of
first-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of thirteen, without great bodily
harm (as a repeater), and two counts of misdemeanor bail jumping (as a repeater)
in violation of WIS. STAT. §§ 948.02(1)(b), 939.50(3)(b), 939.62(1), 939.51(3)(a)
and 946.49(1)(a) (2007-08).1 On October 16, 2007, Lopez entered a plea of no
contest to an amended count of second-degree sexual assault of a child.
A
sentencing hearing was held on January 22, 2008, and Lopez was sentenced to ten
years of initial confinement plus eight years of extended supervision.
¶3
Lopez then filed a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief,
alleging that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered
1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise
noted.
2
No. 2009AP2727-CR
because he did not understand his constitutional rights.2 Lopez argues (and the
trial court agreed) that his plea colloquy was deficient on its face. Specifically, the
trial court acknowledged that it had not “determined if any threats or promises
were made to [Lopez] to force him to enter the plea.” The trial court also did not
explain or list Lopez’s constitutional rights at the plea hearing; it merely
confirmed that Lopez had signed and understood the plea questionnaire and the
rights therein.
¶4
At the postconviction motion hearing, defense counsel testified that
he could not remember his specific interactions with Lopez but that he could
testify to his own custom and practice. He then testified that he does not always
go over each constitutional right with each client. He stated:
I will sometimes ask if they can tell me what the word
“subpoena” means. That’s my little test word. If they
appear to know what they’re doing, I leave them in peace
and tell them to ask me questions if they have any. But
then I watch them check it off, and I don’t check off the
box unless I see them check off the box first.
¶5
On appeal, Lopez points out that he only has an eighth-grade
education, presumably to argue that he would not have understood his rights in
writing. The State counters that despite his education level, Lopez has extensive
experience with the criminal justice system, including convictions for disorderly
conduct, possessing drugs and drug paraphernalia, attempted theft, obstructing,
2
In his postconviction motion, Lopez actually made several arguments as to why his
plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. However, on appeal his only argument is that
he did not understand his constitutional rights. In his brief, Lopez mentions in passing that there
may be other areas where the trial court and trial attorney did not ascertain his understanding—
the elements of the offense, the factual basis of the plea, and the range of punishment. However,
these arguments are undeveloped and we will not develop them for him. See State v. Gulrud, 140
Wis. 2d 721, 730, 412 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1987).
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No. 2009AP2727-CR
failing to report to jail, battery, hit and run, sexual assault of a child, and murder.
The State argues that this experience shows that he would have had additional
exposure to the legal system and its terminology in the past.
¶6
Although the trial court determined that the plea colloquy was
deficient, it denied Lopez’s motion to withdraw his no contest plea, finding that
the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Lopez knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. In its decision, the
trial court pointed to the trial attorney’s testimony that Lopez’s lack of questions
about his rights, particularly given his criminal history, led the attorney to assume
that Lopez understood the rights he was relinquishing. Lopez appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶7
A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea after sentencing must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that withdrawal is necessary to avoid
manifest injustice. See State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶18, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716
N.W.2d 906. One way for a defendant to meet this burden is to show that he did
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter the plea. Id. A defendant who
demonstrates that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entered may withdraw that plea as a matter of right. Id., ¶19.
¶8
To ensure that pleas are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, trial
courts must engage defendants in adequate plea colloquies that comply with WIS.
STAT. § 971.08 and case law. See State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 266-72, 389
N.W.2d 12 (1986). The trial court may refer to the plea questionnaire, but the
questionnaire may not be a substitute for a personal, in-court colloquy. State v.
Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, ¶¶30-32, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 N.W.2d 794. If a defendant
shows that his plea was deficient, then the burden shifts to the State to show by
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No. 2009AP2727-CR
clear and convincing evidence that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary despite the inadequacy of the colloquy. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 27475. In attempting to meet this burden, the State may use the entire record and may
examine the defendant or defense counsel “to shed light on the defendant’s
understanding and knowledge.”
State v. Plank, 2005 WI App 109, ¶7, 282
Wis. 2d 522, 699 N.W.2d 235 (citation omitted).
¶9
When reviewing a decision on a motion to withdraw a plea, this
court accepts the trial court’s findings of evidentiary or historical fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19. However, whether a
plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered is a question of
constitutional fact that this court reviews independently. Id.
¶10
We agree with the trial court that the plea colloquy was deficient.
By merely asking Lopez whether he had read the plea questionnaire and
understood its contents, the trial court failed to establish that Lopez understood the
constitutional rights he was waiving by accepting the plea.
See Hoppe, 317
Wis. 2d 161, ¶¶30-32. This violation shifted the burden to the State to show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that Lopez entered his plea knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily despite the inadequacy of the colloquy when the plea
was taken. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-75.
¶11
Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the
State has met its burden. Despite the inadequacy of the plea colloquy, the record
shows that Lopez fully understood the constitutional rights he waived. First, the
record shows that the trial court did list Lopez’s constitutional rights at the initial
appearance, and Lopez affirmatively acknowledged that he understood them at
that time. Subsequently, Lopez again acknowledged his understanding of the
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No. 2009AP2727-CR
contents of his plea questionnaire by checking the boxes himself and signing it.
He affirmed it once more at the plea hearing by acknowledging that he had signed
the form and understood its contents.
¶12
Finally, we agree with the State’s underscoring of Lopez’s extensive
criminal history as a significant factor showing his knowing and voluntary waiver
of rights. It is quite apparent that Lopez was familiar with the court system,
despite his education level. While his criminal history is not dispositive, it is
appropriate to infer some understanding based on his prior experience. When
combined, Lopez’s multiple affirmations that he understood his rights, his
extensive criminal history, and the fact that he ultimately signed the plea
questionnaire and pled guilty lead us to believe that his plea was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.
¶13
We emphasize that we do not condone the routine that Lopez’s trial
attorney customarily uses with regard to plea questionnaires. By postulating that
if the client understands a certain legal term, he or she will understand everything
else, the attorney runs the risk that the client will not, in fact, understand
something of importance. We encourage defense counsel to be thorough—by
dissecting each constitutional right individually to make sure defendants
completely understand the constitutional rights they are waiving.
This goes
beyond asking if a defendant understands what is written on a form. Attorneys
should always go through each enumerated right to ascertain whether the
defendant truly understands what is being waived.
That being said, after
reviewing the record as a whole, we remain confident that Lopez understood the
constitutional rights he was waiving.
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
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No. 2009AP2727-CR
Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
7
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