Lawson v. Mercer County Commission
Annotate this Case
September 1996 Term
_____________
No. 23399
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WALTER O. LAWSON, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs
v.
THE COUNTY COMMISSION OF MERCER COUNTY AND
DON B. MEADOWS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SHERIFF OF MERCER COUNTY,
Defendants
________________________________________________________________
Certified Question from the Circuit Court of Mercer County
Honorable John R. Frazier, Judge
Civil Action No. 95-CV-328-F
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED
________________________________________________________________
Submitted: September 17, 1996
Filed: December 17, 1996
Dwayne E. Cyrus, Esq. W. T. Weber, Jr., Esq.
Kathryn Reed Bayless, Esq. W. T. Weber, III, Esq.
Bayless, McFadden & Cyrus Weber & Weber
Princeton, West Virginia Weston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs Attorneys for the Defendants
Charles D. Smith, Esq.
Prosecuting Attorney
Princeton, West Virginia
The Opinion of the Court was delivered Per Curiam.
JUDGE RECHT, sitting by temporary assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "West Virginia Code, 58-5-2 (1967), allows for certification of a
question arising from a denial of a motion for summary judgment. However, such
certification will not be accepted unless there is a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual
record on which the legal issues can be determined. Moreover, such legal issues must
substantially control the case." Syllabus Point 5, Bass v. Coltelli, 192 W. Va. 516, 453 S.E.2d 350 (1994).
2. "A statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be
applied." Syllabus Point 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 186 W. Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992).
3. "Judicial interpretation of a statute is warranted only if the statute is
ambiguous and the initial step in such interpretative inquiry is to ascertain the legislative
intent." Syllabus Point 1, Ohio County Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W. Va. 552, 301 S.E.2d 183 (1983).
4. "A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the
spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a
part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all
existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation
of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith." Syllabus
Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W. Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908).
5. "The repeal of a statute by implication is not favored, and where two
statutes are in apparent conflict, the Court must, if reasonably possible, construe such statutes
so as to give effect to each." Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. Graney v. Sims, 144 W. Va. 72,
105 S.E.2d 886 (1958).
6. "It is the duty of a court to construe a statute according to its true intent,
and give to it such construction as will uphold the law and further justice. It is as well the
duty of a court to disregard a construction, though apparently warranted by the literal sense
of the words in a statute, when such construction would lead to injustice and absurdity."
Syllabus Point 2, Click v. Click, 98 W. Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925).
Per Curiam:See footnote 1
We are presented in this case with four questions certified by the Circuit Court
of Mercer County regarding the method of calculating the annual salary increment for deputy
sheriffs as provided for in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985). The circuit court certified the
following four questions:
1. Is W. Va. Code 7-14-17c vague and ambiguous?
ANSWER: Yes
2. Does the annual salary increase/increment provided
deputy sheriffs in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c become a part of the
deputy's base pay?
ANSWER: No
3. Is the annual calculation of the increase/increment in W.
Va. Code 7-14-17c for subsequent years of service performed
by a compounding (as opposed to cumulative) approach as
reflected in the attached chart?
ANSWER: No
4. For a claim arising under W. Va. Code 7-14-17c and
where deputies are employed pursuant only to written order
only of County Commission, is the applicable period of
limitations, under W. Va. Code 55-2-6:
a. 5 years ANSWER: Yes
b. 10 years ANSWER: No
The certified questions are the result of the circuit court's denial of the parties'
motions for partial summary judgment. "West Virginia Code, 58-5-2 (1967),See footnote 2 allows for
certification of a question arising from a denial of a motion for summary judgment.
However, such certification will not be accepted unless there is a sufficiently precise and
undisputed factual record on which the legal issues can be determined. Moreover, such legal
issues must substantially control the case." Syllabus Point 5, Bass v. Coltelli, 192 W. Va.
516, 453 S.E.2d 350 (1994). Because there is a sufficiently precise and undisputed factual
record upon which the legal issues can be determined, and because these legal issues
substantially control this case, the questions are properly certified under W. Va. Code 58-5-2
(1967). We therefore have jurisdiction to consider the questions certified by the circuit court.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs in this case are active and retired deputy sheriffs of Mercer
County. In their amended complaint against the County Commission of Mercer County
(hereinafter "County Commission"),See footnote 3 which was filed on August 22, 1995, the deputy
sheriffs allege that they are entitled to back pay because the County Commission has
incorrectly interpreted and administered an annual incremental salary increase statute, W.
Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985); therefore, the County Commission has improperly withheld
wages from the deputy sheriffs in violation of the West Virginia Wage Payment and
Collection Act, W. Va. Code 21-5-1 to -18 (1996).
On September 8, 1995, the deputy sheriffs filed a motion for partial summary
judgment requesting the circuit court to rule as a matter of law that the County Commission
has misapplied W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985) since its enactment ten years ago, and
therefore, has underpaid the deputy sheriffs for the past ten years.
Conversely, the County Commission filed its own motion for summary
judgment on October 19, 1995, requesting the court to rule as a matter of law that the County
Commission had in fact properly applied the incremental increase statute so that no
additional compensation is due.
The circuit court, after conducting a hearing on the parties' motions on
December 20, 1995, and after reviewing all relevant papers, denied both parties' motions in its Order of January 5, 1996 and certified the questions set forth above in an order entered
January 12, 1996.
II.
DISCUSSION
We review questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court under a
de novo standard. Syllabus Point 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., ___ W. Va. ___, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
A.
The first question we are asked by the circuit court to address is whether the
language in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985) is ambiguous. W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985)
provides:
Beginning on and after the effective date of this section
[July 1, 1985], every deputy sheriff with one year or more of
service shall receive an annual salary increase in the sum of five
dollars per month for each year of service up to a maximum of
sixteen years of service. Any incremental salary increase in
effect prior to the effective date of this section that is more
favorable to the deputy sheriffs entitled to such increase shall
remain in full force and effect to the exclusion of the provisions
of this section.
"A statute is open to construction only where the language used requires
interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions
or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree
as to its meaning." Hereford v. Meek, 132 W. Va. 373, 386, 52 S.E.2d 740, 747 (1949). We find that W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985) is susceptible to differing constructions in that the
term "receive an annual salary increase" can mean either that the increase becomes a part of
the annual salary (as contended by the deputy sheriffs), or that the increase is an addition to
the annual salary, as a salary supplement calculated upon years of service (as contended by
the County Commission). Because the statute can be read by reasonable persons to have
different meanings, we find the language of the statute to be ambiguous and accordingly
answer the first certified question in the affirmative.
"A statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied."
Syllabus Point 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 186 W. Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992). We now
address the remaining certified questions, applying traditional rules of statutory construction.
B.
The second question we are asked to consider is whether "the annual salary
increase/increment, provided to the deputy sheriffs in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c, become[s] a
part of the deputy's base pay."
We have determined that W. Va. Code 7-14-17c is ambiguous in that it is
susceptible to differing interpretations. "Judicial interpretation of a statute is warranted only
if the statute is ambiguous and the initial step in such interpretative inquiry is to ascertain the
legislative intent." Syllabus Point 1, Ohio County Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W. Va. 552, 301 S.E.2d 183 (1983). Our task then is to determine whether the Legislature intended this incremental increase to be made a part of the deputy sheriffs' base pay, or whether the
Legislature merely intended this increase to be a supplement to the deputy sheriffs' salaries.
In determining the intent of the Legislature at the time it enacts a law, we are
mindful of the following:
A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord
with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of
law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that
the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all
existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether
constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to
harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation
of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are
consistent therewith.
Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W. Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908). See also Syllabus
Point 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361
(1975) ("[s]tatutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied
together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the
enactments.").
The West Virginia Constitution expressly empowers the county commissions
within the State of West Virginia to administer the fiscal affairs of each county. The West
Virginia Constitution provides, in relevant part, that the county commissions "shall . . . under
such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have the superintendence and administration
of the . . . fiscal affairs of their counties." W. Va. Const. art IX, § 11. Consistent with this
constitutional mandate, the Legislature enacted W. Va. Code 7-7-7 (1982), which establishes
the guidelines to be used by the sheriff and county commission in determining the compensation of various county employees, including deputy sheriffs, within the county's
budget. The statute provides, in relevant part:
The county clerk, circuit clerk, joint clerk of the county
commission and circuit court, if any, sheriff, county assessor
and prosecuting attorney shall, prior to March second of each
year, file with the county commission a detailed request for
appropriations for anticipated or expected expenditures for their
respective offices, including the compensation for their
assistants, deputies and employees, for the ensuing fiscal year.
. . . .
The county commission shall, prior to March twenty-ninth of
each year by order fix the total amount of money to be expended
by the county for the ensuing fiscal year, which amount shall
include the compensation of county assistants, deputies and
employees. Each county commission shall enter its order upon
its county commission record.
The county clerk, circuit clerk, joint clerk of the county
commission and circuit court, if any, sheriff, county assessor
and prosecuting attorney shall then fix the compensation of their
assistants, deputies and employees based on the total amount of
money designated for expenditure by their respective offices by
the county commission and the amount so expended shall not
exceed the total expenditure designated by the county
commission for each office.
The county officials, in fixing the individual compensation of
their assistants, deputies and employees and the county
commission in fixing the total amount of money to be expended
by the county, shall give due consideration to the duties,
responsibilities and work required of the assistants, deputies and
employees and their compensation shall be reasonable and
proper.
W. Va. Code 7-7-7 (1982) (emphasis added).
The Legislature, consistent with the constitutional mandate contained in W.
Va. Const. art. IX, § 11, has enacted W. Va. Code 7-7-7 (1982) to enable the county
commissions with the aid and assistance of the county sheriffs, to establish the compensation
for deputy sheriffs within the boundaries of a county budget.
The deputy sheriffs ask this Court to determine that the annual salary increase
permitted within W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985) should be part of and blended into their fixed
base compensation that has been established by the county commission with the assistance
of the county sheriff within W. Va. Code 7-7-7 (1982). If we were to adopt the deputy
sheriffs' interpretation that the annual salary increase authorized in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c
(1985) is part of the base compensation, then that interpretation would usurp the authority
of the county commission, contrary to the constitutional mandate within W. Va. Const. art.
IX, § 11 and the enabling legislation within W. Va. Code 7-7-7 (1982). This we are not
permitted to do.
We are mindful that "[t]he repeal of a statute by implication is not favored, and
where two statutes are in apparent conflict, the Court must, if reasonably possible, construe
such statutes so as to give effect to each." Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. Graney v. Sims, 144
W. Va. 72, 105 S.E.2d 886 (1958). Is there another more reasonable construction of W. Va.
Code 7-14-17c (1985) which is not in direct and open conflict with W. Va. Code 7-7-7
(1982)?
A related statute providing for annual salary increases to State employees,
which closely resembles W. Va. 7-14-17c (1985), is contained in W. Va. Code 5-5-2 (1996).
W. Va. Code 5-5-2 (1984) provides:See footnote 4
Effective for the fiscal year beginning the first day of July, one
thousand nine hundred eighty-five, every eligible employee with
three or more years of service shall receive an annual salary
increase equal to thirty-six dollars times the employees' years of
service, not to exceed twenty years of service. In each fiscal
year thereafter and on the first day thereof, each such employee
shall receive an annual increment increase of thirty-six dollars
for such fiscal year: Provided, That every employee becoming
newly eligible as a result of meeting the three years of service
minimum requirement on the first day of July in any fiscal year
subsequent to one thousand nine hundred eighty-five, shall be
entitled to the annual salary increase equal to the aforesaid
thirty-six dollars times the employee's years of service, where he
has not theretofore received the benefit of any such increment
computation; and shall receive a single annual increment
increase thereafter of thirty-six dollars for each such subsequent
fiscal year. These incremental increases shall be in addition to
any across-the-board, cost-of-living or percentage salary
increases which may be granted in any fiscal year by the
Legislature. This article shall not be construed to prohibit other
pay increases based on merit, seniority, promotion or other
reason, if funds are available for such other pay increases:
Provided, however, That the executive head of each spending
unit shall first grant the herein mandated increase in
compensation to all eligible employees prior to the consideration
of any increases based on merit, seniority, promotion or other
reason.
We had occasion to address W. Va. Code 5-5-2 (1984) in State ex rel. Erwin
v. Gainer, No. 16791 (W. Va. Aug. 2, 1985), an unpublished order. In Erwin, which
addressed the issue of whether the State employees' incremental salary increases could be
made in lump sum payments, we found that the compensation provided under W. Va. Code
5-5-2 (1984) was "designed to supplement the regular pay of eligible State employees."
Erwin, No. 16791, slip op. at 2 (emphasis added). Accord Courtney v. State Dep't of Health,
182 W. Va. 465, 468, 388 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1989). The consideration of the incremental
salary increase as a salary supplement, and not an integral part of the base salary, is
consistent and compatible with interpreting W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985) in harmony with
W. Va. Code 5-5-2 (1984).
When we compare and contrast W. Va. Code 7-7-7 (1982) and our
interpretation of W. Va. Code 5-5-2 (1984), we can come to no other conclusion in
interpreting the legislative intent in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c (1985) as the Legislature's desire
to provide deputy sheriffs with an annual monetary supplement that increases based on years
of experience, which is not part of, nor does it affect the salary of, a deputy sheriff because
that determination is exclusively within the province of the county commission. We answer
the second certified question in the negative.
C.
The third question we are asked to address is whether "the annual calculation
of the increase/increment in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c for subsequent years of service
performed by compounding (as opposed to cumulative) approach."
We are asked to decide whether the annual salary increase is compounded each
year so that each annual increase becomes attached to the previous annual salary increases
which is then enhanced every year based upon the number of years of service.See footnote 5 W. Va. Code
7-14-17c (1985), which is titled "Salary increment," requires us to give plain meaning the
term "increment." An increment is "a series of regular consecutive additions." Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 611 (1984). Any formula that would result in
compounding the annual salary increase within W. Va. 7-14-17c (1985) which is not a series
of regular, consecutive additions, but instead, is an exponential or graduated increase,
growing beyond what would be contemplated within the meaning of incremental increase as
clearly expressed within the statute would be improper. "It is the duty of a court to construe
a statute according to its true intent, and give to it such construction as will uphold the law
and further justice. It is as well the duty of a court to disregard a construction, though
apparently warranted by the literal sense of the words in a statute, when such construction
would lead to injustice and absurdity." Syllabus Point 2, Click v. Click, 98 W. Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925); accord Syllabus Point 2, Pristavec v. Westfield Ins. Co., 184 W. Va. 331,
400 S.E.2d 575 (1990). Therefore, we answer this certified question in the negative.
D.
Because the second and third certified questions have been answered in the
negative, the fourth certified question is moot. See Yeager v. Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 192
W. Va. 556, 561, 453 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1994).
III.
CONCLUSION
After analyzing each of the certified questions from the Circuit Court of
Mercer County, we respond as follows:
1. Is W. Va. Code 7-14-17c vague and ambiguous?
ANSWER: Yes
2. Does the annual salary increase/increment provided
deputy sheriffs in W. Va. Code 7-14-17c become a part of the
deputy's base pay?
ANSWER: No
3. Is the annual calculation of the increase/increment in W.
Va. Code 7-14-17c for subsequent years of service performed
by a compounding (as opposed to cumulative) approach as
reflected in the attached chart?
ANSWER: No
4. For a claim arising under W. Va. Code 7-14-17c and
where deputies are employed pursuant only to written order only of County Commission, is the applicable period of
limitations, under W. Va. Code 55-2-6:
a. 5 years ANSWER: Moot.
b. 10 years ANSWER: Moot.
Certified questions answered.
Footnote: 1
The Honorable Arthur M. Recht resigned as Justice of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals effective October 15, 1996. The Honorable Gaston Caperton, Governor
of the State of West Virginia, appointed him Judge of the First Judicial Circuit on that same
date. Pursuant to an administrative order entered by this Court on October 15, 1996, Judge
Recht was assigned to sit as a member of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
commencing October 15, 1996 and continuing until further order of this Court.Footnote: 2
W. Va. Code 58-5-2 (1967) provides, in pertinent part:
Any question arising upon the sufficiency of a summons or return of service, upon a challenge of the sufficiency of a pleading or the venue of the circuit court, upon the sufficiency of a motion for summary judgment where such motion is denied, or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, upon the jurisdiction of the circuit court of a person or subject matter, or upon failure to join an indispensable party, in any case within the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court of appeals, may, in the discretion of the circuit court in which it arises, and shall, on the joint application of the parties to the suit, in beneficial interest, be certified by it to the supreme court of appeals for its decision, and further proceedings in the case stayed until such question shall have been decided and the decision thereof certified back.Footnote: 3 The deputy sheriffs filed an initial complaint on May 2, 1995.Footnote: 4 W. Va. Code 5-5-2 (1984) (subsequently amended in 1996), although addressing a different category of public employee, does address an identical subject matter in the form of incremental annual pay increases. Because they are parallel in scope, purpose and terminology, they should be interpreted consistently. See United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932).Footnote: 5 The calculation resulting from a compounding formula would be after year one, the deputy would receive for the upcoming year sixty dollars in addition to the annual salary received. In year two, while the base salary would remain the same as in year one, the deputy would receive the incremental increase of sixty dollars multiplied by two years for one hundred twenty dollars. However, the one hundred twenty dollars would be compounded, or added, to the previous year's incremental increase whereby the deputy would actually receive one hundred eighty dollars in addition to his annual salary for the upcoming year. This progression would result in an "incremental increase" after the sixteenth year of service in the amount of $8,160.00.
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