Farley v. Farley
Annotate this CaseJanuary 1996 Term
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No. 23153
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JAMES R. FARLEY,
Plaintiff Below, Appellant,
v.
DONNA MAE FARLEY,
Defendant Below, Appellee
_______________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Raleigh County
Honorable John C. Ashworth, Judge
Civil Action No. 94-C-349-A
AFFIRMED
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Submitted: April 30, 1996
Filed: June 14, 1996
James R. Farley
Stanaford, West Virginia
Appellant acting pro se
Robert B. Sayre
The Sayre Law Offices, L.C.
Beckley, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellee
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "When the plaintiff's evidence, considered in the light most favorable to
him, fails to establish a prima facie right of recovery, the trial court should direct a verdict
in favor of the defendant." Syllabus point 3, Roberts v. Gale, 149 W.Va. 166, 139 S.E.2d 272 (1964).
2. "An appellant must carry the burden of showing error in the judgment of which he complains. This Court will not reverse the judgment of a trial court unless error affirmatively appears from the record. Error will not be presumed, all presumptions being in favor of the correctness of the judgment." Syllabus point 5, Morgan v. Price, 151 W.Va. 158, 150 S.E.2d 897 (1966).
Per Curiam:
The Circuit Court of Raleigh County granted the appellee in this proceeding,
Donna Mae Farley, a directed verdict in this action brought by the appellant, James R.
Farley, the appellee's former husband, for a declaration of ownership of a certain house
trailer. On appeal, the appellant, who is acting pro se, is apparently claiming that the circuit
court erred in directing the verdict and in not allowing his case to be proceed to a jury. He
is also claiming that certain members of the judiciary, as well as Mrs. Farley's attorney,
Robert B. Sayre, acted improperly in this matter. After reviewing the documents filed and
the questions raised, this Court cannot agree with the appellant's assertions. The decision
of the circuit court is, therefore, affirmed.
This Court's understanding of the issues and the underlying facts of this case
is considerably impaired by the fact that no record has been filed and by the fact that a very
brief handwritten petition and very brief handwritten pro se brief have been submitted by the
appellant, James A. Farley.
The papers do suggest that this action was initially instituted in magistrate
court and later removed to the Circuit Court of Raleigh County. It grows out of a claim of
ownership that the appellant has made to a house trailer which is in the possession of the
appellee, the appellant's former wife, Donna Mae Farley.
The documents filed indicate that Donna Mae Farley purchased the trailer in
question from Greta Boles in 1986 for $2,500.00. The appellant was and is claiming that he
provided the $2,500.00 for the purchase of the trailer by Mrs. Farley. Apparently he is also
claiming that, although Mrs. Farley may have title to the trailer and does have possession of
it, he is the true, and equitable, owner of it. In effect, he was and is taking the position that
he is entitled to the declaration of a resulting trust in the trailer, with Mrs. Farley being the
trustee and with his being the equitable owner.(1)
A trial was conducted in this case on February 1, 1995. During the trial, Mr.
Farley, who was presenting the case pro se, did not testify as a witness, and he did not
subpoena any witnesses on his own behalf. Instead, to develop his case in chief, he called
witnesses who had been subpoenaed by Mrs. Farley and who were present to testify in her
behalf. Those witnesses all testified that the trailer belonged to Mrs. Farley and apparently
failed or refused to testify that the appellant had provided his own funds for the trailer and/or
that Mrs. Farley had purchased it under the circumstances that would give rise to a resulting
trust. In addition, the appellant produced a bill of sale for the trailer, but the bill of sale
failed to indicate who the purchaser was.
At the conclusion of the appellant's case, Mrs. Farley moved for a directed
verdict, and the trial judge granted that motion.
In the present proceeding, as previously indicated, Mr. Farley takes the
position that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Mrs. Farley and that the trial court
should have allowed the case to go to the jury.
In syllabus point 3 of Roberts v. Gale, 149 W.Va. 166, 139 S.E.2d 272 (1964), this Court stated:
When the plaintiff's evidence, considered in the light
most favorable to him, fails to establish a prima facie right of
recovery, the trial court should direct a verdict in favor of the
defendant.
See Hines v. Hills Department Stores, Inc., 193 W.Va. 91, 454 S.E.2d 385 (1994).
Further, in a number of cases this Court has indicated that a party seeking to
establish a resulting trust in his favor must adduce evidence which shows the rightness of the
claim with "certainty and exactness" and the evidence must be "clear and unequivocal."
Wilcoxon v. Carrier, 132 W.Va. 637, 53 S.E.2d 620 (1949); Watts Brothers & Co. v. Firth,
79 W.Va. 89, 91 S.E. 402 (1916); and Cassady v. Cassady, 74 W.Va. 53, 81 S.E. 829
(1914).
In the present case, all the testimonial evidence adduced indicated that the
ownership of the trailer in question was vested in Mrs. Farley rather than the appellant and
failed to support the claim. The bill of sale shed no light on the identity of the owner of the
trailer.
In examining the documents filed, this Court cannot say that it can be said that
the evidence apparently presented during trial, even when considered in the light most
favorable to the appellant, established a prima facie case for recovery. In view of this, and
in light of the rule set forth in syllabus point 3 of Roberts v. Gale, supra, this Court cannot
conclude that the trial court erred in granting Mrs. Farley a directed verdict.
The Court notes that even if the actual facts below were not precisely as perceived by the Court from the very limited documents filed, this Court would not be constrained to reverse the circuit court's decision since, as stated in syllabus point 5 of Morgan v. Price, 151 W.Va. 158, 150 S.E.2d 897 (1966):
An appellant must carry the burden of showing error in
the judgment of which he complains. This Court will not
reverse the judgment of a trial court unless error affirmatively
appears from the record. Error will not be presumed, all
presumptions being in favor of the correctness of the judgment.
The Court also notes that the appellant claims certain members of the judiciary, as well as Mrs. Farley's attorney, acted improperly in this matter. It is unclear from the documents filed what the exact claim is. It appears that the appellant had a wholly separate case in a federal court presided over by Judge Sprouse, and the appellant says:
Former Judge Sprouse . . . was in contact with Judge
Ashworth and the day after Judge Ashworth told the jury that he
was making the decision in favor of Mr. Sayers and Donna
Farley Judge Sprouse (in the Appellate) Court of Richmond Va.
Denied my case against Pittston . . . .
In this Court's opinion, these allegations alone, by which the appellant seemingly implies that
members of the judiciary and bar acted improperly in a wholly distinct and separate case, do
not provide an adequate basis for reversing the decision of the circuit court in the present
case. Additionally, there is no competent evidence in the record to support the allegations.
Accordingly, there is no merit in this argument of error.
For the reasons stated, the decision of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
1. 1In Belmont Iron Works v. Boyle, 120 W.Va. 339, 198 S.E. 527 (1938), this Court indicated that a "resulting trust" is one which arises where the legal estate in property is disposed of, conveyed, or transferred, but the intent appears or is inferred from the terms of the disposition, or from the accompanying facts and circumstances, that the beneficial interest is not to go or be enjoyed with the legal title. Further, in the early case of Pumphrey v. Brown, 5 W.Va. 107 (1872), this Court recognized that a resulting trust arises where a purchaser pays purchase money, but takes title in another.
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