Michael v. Marion County BOE
Annotate this Case
September 1996 Term
____________
No. 23113
____________
SANDRA MICHAEL, AS EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF DONALD KELLY MICHAEL, AND
SANDRA MICHAEL, INDIVIDUALLY,
Plaintiff Below, Appellant,
v.
THE MARION COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant Below, Appellee
________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion County
Honorable Rodney B. Merrifield, Circuit Judge
Civil Action No. 93-C-308
AFFIRMED
_________________________________________
AND
____________
No. 23320
____________
ALLEN AYERSMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN PYLES, FLORENCE MEROW, AND
ELIZABETH MARTIN, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
COMMISSIONERS CONSTITUTING THE COUNTY COMMISSION
OF MONONGALIA COUNTY; AND
JOSEPH BARTOLO, IN HIS CAPACITY OF
SHERIFF OF MONONGALIA COUNTY,
Respondents
____________________________________________
Certified Question
CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED,
CASE DISMISSED
___________________________________________
AND
____________
No. 23362
___________
SHAWN MCKEMY,
Plaintiff Below, Appellant,
v.
THE CITY OF CHARLESTON,
A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; AND
THE CITY OF CHARLESTON,
A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
D/B/A METRO-911,
Defendants Below, Appellees
____________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
Honorable Irene C. Berger, Circuit Judge
Civil Action No. 95-C-2878
AFFIRMED
___________________________________________
Submitted: September 18, 1996
Filed: December 9, 1996
Brent E. Beveridge
Frances C. Whiteman
Fairmont, West Virginia
Attorneys for Sandra Michael
Stephen R. Brooks
Furbee, Amos, Webb & Critchfield
Fairmont, West Virginia
Attorney for the Marion County Board of Education
James Zimarowski
Morgantown, West Virginia
John F. Wiley
Reeder, Shuman & Wiley
Morgantown, West Virginia
Attorneys for Allen Ayersman
Michael Kozakewich, Jr.
Carolyn A. Wade
Steptoe & Johnson
Clarksburg, West Virginia
Attorneys for John Pyles, Florence Merow, Elizabeth
Martin, and Joseph Bartolo
Arden J. Curry II
Susan Curry Brasselle
Pauley, Curry, Sturgeon &
Vanderford
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Shawn McKemy
G. Kenneth Robertson
Shuman, Annand & Poe
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for the City of Charleston
JUSTICE WORKMAN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUDGE RECHT sitting by temporary assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "W. Va. Code 23-4-2(c) (1991) represents the wholesale
abandonment of the common law tort concept of a deliberate
intention cause of action by an employee against an employer, to be
replaced by a statutory direct cause of action by an employee
against an employer expressed within the workers' compensation
system." Syl. Pt. 2, Bell v. Vecellio & Grogan, Inc., __ W. Va.
__, 475 S.E.2d 138 (1996).
2. "W. Va. Code 23-4-2(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (1991) has blended
within the West Virginia workers' compensation scheme, the
directive that all employees covered by the West Virginia Workers'
Compensation Act are subject to every provision of the workers'
compensation chapter and are entitled to all benefits and
privileges under the Workers' Compensation Act, including the right
to file a direct deliberate intention cause of action against an
employer pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-2(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (1991). Syl.
Pt. 3, Bell v. Vecellio & Grogan, Inc., __ W. Va. __, 475 S.E.2d 138 (1996).
3. "Where the language of a statute is clear and without
ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to
the rules of interpretation." Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.
Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).
4. The immunity from liability extended to political
subdivisions by West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) (1992)
includes immunity from "deliberate intent" causes of action brought
pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)(2) (1994).
Workman, Justice:
Each of these three cases presents the issue of whether the
immunity from liability granted to political subdivisions by The
Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act ("Tort Claims
Act"), West Virginia Code §§ 29-12A-1 to -18 (1992), includes
immunity for "deliberate intent" actionsSee footnote 1 brought against municipal
and county governments pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-
2(c)(2) (1994).See footnote 2 After reviewing the pertinent statutory
provisions in conjunction with relevant case law, weSee footnote 3 determine
that West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) extends governmental
immunity to political subdivisions for actions brought under West
Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)(2).
Before engaging in an analysis of the issue, we briefly review
the facts of each case.
Sandra Michael
Appellant Sandra Michael filed a civil action against the
Marion County Board of Education (the "Board") following the death
of her husband,See footnote 4 formerly a teacher and principal of East Fairmont
High School from 1976 to 1990. In the complaint, Mrs. Michael
asserted a cause of actionSee footnote 5 based on the "deliberate intent"
exception to employer immunity which is codified in West Virginia
Code § 23-4-2(c)(2). Appellant's cause of action against the Board
stems from the July 1991 discovery that East Fairmont High School
contained massive amounts of chlordane, heptachlor, diazonon, and
dursban.
The Board filed a motion for summary judgment in January 1995,
arguing that the political subdivision immunity provision found in
West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) precluded Appellant from
bringing suit against it.See footnote 6 By order dated February 2, 1995, the
circuit court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment.
Through this appeal, Mrs. Michael seeks to obtain a reversal of
that ruling.
Allen Ayersman
Petitioner Ayersman was formerly a correctional officer at the
Monongalia County jail. Petitioner is partially disabled with
regard to the use of his arms as the result of being attacked and
beaten by an inmate on June 6, 1994. Petitioner filed a
"deliberate intent" claim against the jail based on the existence
of a facilities review panel interim report dated February 5, 1992,
recognizing the problems presented by inadequate staffing, and the
attacking inmate's written warning of his intent to commit violent
acts.
In response to the motion to dismiss brought by the Respondent
county commissioners and sheriff, the circuit court certified two
questions to this court:
"Does the immunity afforded a political
subdivision and its employees pursuant to WVA.
Code Section 29-12A-5[(a)](11), apply to
Mandolidis claims made by an employee when the
employee has received Workers' Compensation
benefits for the injury sustained?"
"Does the immunity afforded a political subdivision
and its employees pursuant to WVA. Code Section 29-
12A-5[(a)](14) apply to a claim made by a jail
employee where the alleged injury took place inside
a county jail during working hours?"
The trial court answered each of the certified questions
affirmatively.See footnote 7
Shawn McKemy
While employed as a 911 radio dispatcher for the City of
Charleston, Appellant McKemy came into contact with exposed conduit
and suffered a severe electrical shock. As a result of the shock,
Appellant was thrown backwards and sustained a closed-head injury
as well as injuries to his shoulders, arm, and back. Alleging that
the exposed wiring was known to his supervisors, Appellant filed a
civil action against the City of Charleston pursuant to the
"deliberate intent" exception of West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c).
The City of Charleston filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's
complaint, asserting immunity as a political subdivision under West
Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11). After hearing argument on the
motion to dismiss, the circuit court determined that Appellant's
deliberate intent claim was covered by workers' compensation law
within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) and
granted the motion to dismiss.
* * *
Common to each of these cases is the underlying issue of
whether the immunity afforded to political subdivisions by West
Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) includes immunity from "deliberate
intent" causes of action. W. Va. Code § 23-4-2(c)(2). The
language under examination states that "[a] political subdivision
is immune from liability if a loss or claim results from: . . .
(11) Any claim covered by any workers' compensation law or any employer's liability law[.]" W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11). Thus,
the statutory question presented is whether a "deliberate intent"
cause of action authorized by West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)
constitutes a claim covered by workers' compensation law or other
employer's liability law.
Appellants and Petitioner [hereinafter sometimes collectively
referred to as "Appellants"] seek to separate "deliberate intent"
cases from those cases included in the political immunity blanket
of West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11). To support their
position, Appellants argue that this Court's decision in O'Dell v.
Town of Gauley Bridge, 188 W. Va. 596, 425 S.E.2d 551 (1992),
limited the immunity provided by West Virginia Code § 29-12A-
5(a)(11) to those cases involving unintentional torts. In O'Dell,
a case that involved the consolidation of three personal injury
suits, we upheld the political subdivision immunity statute on
equal protection grounds. 188 W. Va. at 606, 425 S.E.2d at 561.
Included within that decision was a four-criteria test to identify
those limited individuals that would be affected by the political
subdivisionSee footnote 8 immunity provision of the Tort Claims Act:
First, the plaintiff must have been injured by
the negligence of an employee of a political
subdivision. Second, the plaintiff must have
received the injury in the course of and
resulting from his or her employment. Third,
the plaintiff's employer must have workers' compensation coverage. Fourth, the plaintiff
must be eligible for such benefits.
Id. at 603, 425 S.E.2d at 558.
The fact that each of the plaintiffs in O'Dell had received
injuries as a result of allegedly negligent acts readily explains
this Court's crafting of the four-part test in a negligence
context. Appellants' reliance on the use of the term "negligence"
in the O'Dell test is clearly misplaced, as the language of far
more significance to the issue before us is that found within the
statute. Importantly, West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11)
contains no language limiting its provisions to negligence actions.
The statutory language at issue is couched solely in terms of
liability; there is no attempt to separate or distinguish the
immunity provided by reference to whether the tort involved is
intentional or unintentional.See footnote 9
Although there is no language within O'Dell that carves out
"deliberate intent" causes of action from the immunity extended to
political subdivisions, Appellant Michael finds significant the
Court's mentioning of the exception within workers' compensation
law that subjects employers to liability for "deliberate intent" causes of action. 188 W. Va. at 603, 425 S.E.2d at 558. Seeking
to analogize this distinction to political subdivision immunity,
Appellant Michael contends it logically follows that governmental
tort immunity should be approached consistent with workers'
compensation law by revoking immunity in those instances where
"deliberate intent" is alleged.See footnote 10 Upon examination, Appellant's
logic fails completely. A significant and fatal distinction
ignored by Appellant Michael is the express statutory removal of
"deliberate intent" causes of action from traditional workers'
compensation immunity. See W. Va. Code § 23-4-2(c)(2). In
contrast, the provisions of the Tort Claims Act fail to separate
"deliberate intent" actions from other causes of action that are
subject to political subdivision immunity. See W. Va. Code § 29-
12A-5(a)(11). Just as we declined in O'Dell to read the term
"employee" into West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) for the purpose
of limiting immunity to those cases in which a political
subdivision was sued by its own employee, we similarly refuse to
impose a statutory exception for "deliberate intent" causes of
action when such limiting language does not appear within the
statute. See 188 W. Va. at 610, 425 S.E.2d at 565.
An examination of the reference made in O'Dell to the workers'
compensation distinction reveals yet another flaw with Appellant's
logic. As part of its equal protection analysis, this Court was
compelled to reference the "deliberate intent" exception to the
general exemption from liability afforded by West Virginia Code §
23-2-6 to employers contributing to the workers' compensation
system. Id. at 603, 425 S.E.2d at 558. The exception was
tangentially mentioned in discussing the fact that equal protection
principles are not violated by permitting those who are not covered
by workers' compensation to sue their employers for full damages as
compared to the forfeiting of such right to sue by those
individuals covered by workers' compensation. Id. Thus, O'Dell is
completely devoid of any basis for Appellant Michael's suggestion
that the "deliberate intent" exception to the workers' compensation
scheme should be extended analogously to the Tort Claims Act.
Rather than viewing O'Dell in the limiting fashion that
Appellants advocate, Appellees and Respondent (hereinafter
sometimes collectively referred to as "Appellees") contend that the
immunity granted by West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) is
expansive in nature. As support for their position, Appellees cite
this Court's rejection in O'Dell of the suggestion that immunity
was only provided "to the extent that the plaintiff is compensated
for his or her injuries by the workers' compensation benefits he or
she receives." 188 W. Va. at 610, 425 S.E.2d at 565. Concluding
that the term "claim" cannot be viewed narrowly to mean solely a
claim for workers' compensation, this Court clarified in O'Dell that the immunity extended to political subdivisions was immunity
"for all damages arising from a tortious injury" and "not merely for
those compensated by workers' compensation." Id.
Appellees further argue that because West Virginia Code § 29-
12A-5(a)(11) extends its broad grant of immunity without
qualification, Appellants cannot rely on the principle of
statutory construction that liability is favored over immunity when
governmental tort legislation is called into question. We
explained in Randall v. Fairmont City Police Department, 186 W. Va.
336, 412 S.E.2d 737 (1991), that "the general rule of construction
. . . favor[s] liability, not immunity: unless the legislature has
clearly provided for immunity under the circumstances. . . ." Id.
at 347, 412 S.E.2d at 748 (emphasis supplied). Finding the
provisions of West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) free from
ambiguity, we previously determined in O'Dell that the Randall rule
favoring liability over immunity in certain instances was
inapplicable. 188 W. Va. at 609, 425 S.E.2d at 564.
Viewing the issue as dependent upon whether "deliberate intent"
cases are encompassed within the workers' compensation scheme or
whether they remain firmly ensconced within the common law, the
parties alternatively attempt to persuade or dissuade this Court
that "deliberate intent" causes of action are part of this state's
workers' compensation laws. In Bell v. Vecellio & Grogan, Inc., __
W. Va. __, 475 S.E.2d 138 (1996), we recently addressed the issue of whether the "deliberate intent" cause of action provided for by
West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)(2) is a part of the state workers'
compensation statutory scheme or whether it remains a part of the
common law. After analyzing the historical basis for the
"deliberate intent" exception to employer immunity, we concluded in
syllabus point two:
W. Va. Code 23-4-2(c) (1991) represents
the wholesale abandonment of the common law
tort concept of a deliberate intention cause
of action by an employee against an employer,
to be replaced by a statutory direct cause of
action by an employee against an employer
expressed within the workers' compensation
system.
__ W. Va. at __, 475 S.E.2d at 138. We further held in syllabus
point three of Bell that:
W. Va. Code 23-4-2(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (1991)
has blended within the West Virginia workers'
compensation scheme, the directive that all
employees covered by the West Virginia
Workers' Compensation Act are subject to every
provision of the workers' compensation chapter
and are entitled to all benefits and
privileges under the Workers' Compensation
Act, including the right to file a direct
deliberate intention cause of action against
an employer pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-
2(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (1991).
__ W. Va. at __, 475 S.E.2d at 138-39.
Following our ruling and extensive analysis of "deliberate
intent" causes of action in Bell, there appears to be little need
for further examination of whether a "deliberate intent" cause of
action is a claim covered by workers' compensation law or other employer's liability law.See footnote 11 Given this Court's ruling in Bell that
"deliberate intent" causes of action have been blended within the
workers' compensation scheme, it seems beyond dispute that
"deliberate intent" actions, as part of this state's workers'
compensation laws, are "covered" by such laws within the plain
meaning of that term.See footnote 12 Having earlier determined that West
Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) contains no language that precludes
its application to "deliberate intent" actions, we adhere to our
cardinal rule of statutory construction that "[w]here the language
of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to
be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation."
Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).
Accordingly, we determine that the immunity from liability extended
to political subdivisions by West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11)
includes immunity from "deliberate intent" causes of action brought
pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)(2). Had the Legislature
intended to except "deliberate intent" actions from the immunity
provisions of West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11), they easily
could have included limiting language to that effect.See footnote 13
Appellants argue that a contrary result was reached by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Arthur v. E. I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co., 58 F.3d 121 (4th Cir. 1995). The issue before the
court in Arthur was whether a "deliberate intent" action was subject
to the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1994), prohibiting the
removal to federal court of a "civil action . . . arising under
the workmen's compensation laws of . . . [this] State[.]" Id. The
specific issue the court examined in Arthur was the intent of
Congress in 1958 when it drafted the removal statute. The court
"conclude[d] that the ordinary (shorthand) meaning of 'workmen's
compensation laws' in 1958 was this: a statutorily created
insurance system that allows employees to receive fixed benefits,
without regard to fault, for work-related injuries." 58 F.3d at
125. The court proceeded to determine that "the 1958 Congress
would not have considered section 23-4-2(c)(2) a workers'
compensation law." Id. at 127; but see Knox v. Laclede Steel Co.,
861 F. Supp. 519, 523 (N.D. W. Va. 1994) ("find[ing] that the West
Virginia deliberate intention statute arises under the West
Virginia workers' compensation laws for purposes of [28 U.S.C.] §
1445(c)"). The determination by the court in Arthur that a
"deliberate intent" claim does not arise under this state's workers'
compensation laws for removal purposes is not the equivalent of a
ruling that "deliberate intent" causes of action are not covered by
workers' compensation or other employer liability law within the
meaning of West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11). Accordingly, we do not find Arthur to be at odds with the result reached in this
case.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the ruling of the Circuit
Court of Marion County; answer the certified questionSee footnote 14 presented
by the Circuit Court of Monongalia County in the affirmative and
dismiss that action from the docket of this Court; and affirm the
ruling of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.
Affirmed;
Certified
Question Answered
and Dismissed; and
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1
While many continue to refer to such actions as Mandolidis-type actions, Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries,
Inc., 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978), we clarified in Bell v. Vecellio & Grogan, Inc., __ W. Va. __, 475 S.E.2d 138 (1996), that Mandolidis and its common-law progeny are no longer controlling because of the 1983
amendment of West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c), which defined statutorily the factors necessary to prove
"deliberate intent." __ W. Va. at __, 475 S.E.2d at 143. Accordingly, the proper reference to this type of
case is "deliberate intent" rather than Mandolidis, as the statutory delineation of the elements necessary to
establish "deliberate intent" supersedes the common-law definition of this concept. Bell, __ W. Va. at __,
475 S.E.2d at 144, n.12, see State ex rel. Riffle v. Ranson, 195 W. Va. 121, 128, 464 S.E.2d 763, 770 (1995).Footnote: 2
West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)(2) provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he immunity from suit provided under
this section [§ 23-4-2] and under section six-a [§ 23-2-6a], article two of this chapter, may be lost only if
the employer or person against whom liability is asserted acted with 'deliberate intention'."Footnote: 3
The Honorable Arthur M. Recht resigned as Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals effective October 15,
1996. The Honorable Gaston Caperton, Governor of the State of West Virginia, appointed him Judge of the First
Judicial Circuit on that same date. Pursuant to an administrative order entered by this Court on October 15,
1996, Judge Recht was assigned to sit as a member of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals commencing
October 15, 1996 and continuing until further order of this Court.Footnote: 4
Diagnosed with thyroid cancer in 1979, Mr. Michael died on November 7, 1990, at the age of 44. Footnote: 5
She also sought relief for alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and
past medical expenses incurred by her deceased husband. Footnote: 6
As further support for its position, the Board cited Ball v. Joy Manufacturing Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344
(S.D.W. Va. 1990), aff'd, 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992), a case in which the
district court determined that exposure to toxic chemicals in the work place was not a compensable injury under
this state's workers' compensation laws. 755 F. Supp. at 1357. The Board further relied on Ball to argue that
Mrs. Michael's failure to file a workers' compensation claim relating to her cause of action prohibited the
maintenance of her "deliberate intent" cause of action against the Board. See id. at 1357-58 (recognizing that
Mandolidis-type plaintiff must first file workers' compensation claim before instituting "deliberate intent"
cause of action against employer). We find it unnecessary to address the Ball holdings to resolve the issue
at hand. Footnote: 7
We choose to address only the first of the two certified questions. Footnote: 8
There is no dispute that each of the employers in these three cases qualifies as a political subdivision.
That term is defined, in relevant part, by West Virginia Code § 29-12A-3(c) as "any county commission,
municipality and county board of education." Footnote: 9
Appellees note that because certain provisions of the Tort Claims Act do distinguish between negligent
and intentional acts, there can be no doubt that the Legislature fully considered intentional types of actions
when drafting the particular immunity provisions found within the Act. See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(a)(12)
(extending immunity for misrepresentations provided they are "unintentional"); W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(b)(2)
(revoking immunity where employee's acts or omissions are achieved "with malicious purpose"). Appellees contend
additionally that, because it is more difficult and expensive to purchase insurance for intentional acts as
compared to claims predicated on negligence, to suggest that immunity is nonexistent for "deliberate intent"
actions in the absence of express statutory language providing accordingly is inconsistent with the stated
purpose of the Tort Claims Act--to enable political subdivisions to purchase affordable and adequate insurance.
See W. Va. Code § 29-12A-1, -2. Footnote: 10
As further support for this argument, Appellant Michael cites the exception within West Virginia Code
§ 29-12A-5(b)(2) that removes the cloak of immunity from an employee of a political subdivision when that
employee's "acts or omissions were [accomplished] with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or
reckless manner[.]" As the Appellee Board
explains, the limiting of immunity for certain acts or omissions of an employee of a political subdivision does
not affect the overall grant of immunity to the political subdivision itself. Neither does it indicate a
legislative intent to remove immunity for political subdivisions for "deliberate intent" actions. In fact, the
contrary result is suggested. Because the employee conduct that is statutorily provided to be outside the
protection of West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(b) parallels that type of conduct subject to "deliberate intent"
actions under West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c)(2), the absence of comparable language in subsection (a) of West
Virginia Code § 29-12A-5 suggests that the Legislature, with full consideration of "deliberate intent" causes
of action, chose not to include this limitation for the political subdivisions. Cf. W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5(a)
to -5(b). Footnote: 11
Appellee Board observes that the insurance policies that are purchased to provide protection for
"deliberate intent" causes of action are referred to in the insurance industry as "employer's liability"
policies. We observe that the language within West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) which states "or any
employer's liability law" received little discussion by the parties. If in fact, the Legislature was referring
to "deliberate intent" causes of action by this reference, then such actions are expressly included within the
blanket of immunity provided by West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11). Footnote: 12
The meaning of the term "covered" that is connoted within the parlance of West Virginia Code § 29-12A-
5(a)(11) is "to afford protection against or compensation for." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 300
(1983).Footnote: 13
We find significant the fact that the Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1986, three years after the pertinent
amendments to West Virginia Code § 23-4-2(c). Because the Legislature is presumed to be aware of its own laws,
we can only assume that the omission of any limiting language from West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(11) is
indicative of an intention to provide a broad, all-encompassing type of immunity. Footnote: 14
See supra note 6.
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