State of WV v. Broughton
Annotate this CaseJanuary 1996 Term
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No. 22944
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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee
v.
WAYNE A. BROUGHTON,
Defendant Below, Appellant
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County
Honorable Thomas W. Steptoe, Circuit Judge
Civil Action No. 93-F-44
AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED
___________________________________________________
Submitted: January 17, 1996
Filed: April 8, 1996
Silas B. Taylor
Managing Deputy Attorney General
Noel P. Brock and
Audy M. Perry, Jr.
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for the State
Richard G. Gay
Law Office of Richard G. Gay, L.C.
Berkeley Springs, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellant
Justice Workman delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "'Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are largely within a trial court's sound
discretion and should not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.' State v.
Louk, 171 W. Va. 639, [643,] 301 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1983)." Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Peyatt, 173
W. Va. 317, 315 S.E.2d 574 (1983).
2. "'"'Upon motion to direct a verdict for the defendant, the evidence is to be viewed
in light most favorable to prosecution. It is not necessary in appraising its sufficiency that
the trial court or reviewing court be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
defendant; the question is whether there is substantial evidence upon which a jury might
justifiably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' State v. West, 153 W.Va.
325, 168 S.E.2d 716 (1969)." Syl. pt. 1, State v. Fischer, 158 W.Va. 72, 211 S.E.2d 666
(1974).' Syllabus Point 10, State v. Davis, 176 W.Va. 454, 345 S.E.2d 549 (1986)." Syl. Pt.
1, State v. Stevens, 190 W. Va. 77, 436 S.E.2d 312 (1993).
3. "In order for the State to prove a conspiracy under W.Va. Code, 61-10-31(1), it
must show that the defendant agreed with others to commit an offense against the State and
that some overt act was taken by a member of the conspiracy to effect the object of that
conspiracy." Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Less, 170 W. Va. 259, 294 S.E.2d 62 (1981).
4. "The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine
whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).
5. "A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction takes on a heavy burden. An appellate court must review all the evidence,
whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must
credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the jury might have drawn in favor of
the prosecution. The evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of
guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations
are for a jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set aside only
when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent that our prior cases are
inconsistent, they are expressly overruled." Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).
6. "The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution consists of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same
offense." Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Gill, 187 W. Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253 (1992).
7. "The Double Jeopardy Clause in Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia
Constitution, provides immunity from further prosecution where a court having jurisdiction
has acquitted the accused. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction. It also prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense." Syl. Pt. 1, Conner
v. Griffith, 160 W. Va. 680, 238 S.E.2d 529 (1977).
8. "Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is
whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." Syl.
Pt. 8, State v. Zaccagnini, 172 W. Va. 491, 308 S.E.2d 131 (1983).
9. "A claim that double jeopardy has been violated based on multiple punishments
imposed after a single trial is resolved by determining the legislative intent as to
punishment." Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Gill, 187 W. Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253 (1992).
10. "In ascertaining legislative intent, a court should look initially at the language of
the involved statutes and, if necessary, the legislative history to determine if the legislature
has made a clear expression of its intention to aggregate sentences for related crimes. If no
such clear legislative intent can be discerned, then the court should analyze the statutes under
the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306
(1932), to determine whether each offense requires an element of proof the other does not.
If there is an element of proof that is different, then the presumption is that the legislature
intended to create separate offenses." Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Gill, 187 W. Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253 (1992).
11. "Prior to imposition of a sentence of incarceration for a defendant convicted of
delivery of less than 15 grams of marihuana in violation of W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a), as
amended, who, although not within the 'without renumeration' exception of W.Va. Code,
60A-4-402(c), as amended, has no prior criminal record, a trial court must consider: (1)
whether the defendant has a history of involvement with illegal drugs; (2) whether the
defendant is a reasonably good prospect for rehabilitation; (3) whether incarceration would
serve a useful purpose; and (4) whether available alternatives to incarceration, such as
probation conditioned upon community service, would be more appropriate." Syl Pt. 6, State
v. Nicastro, 181 W. Va. 556, 383 S.E.2d 521 (1989).
12. "Sentences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based
on some [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review." Syl. Pt. 4, State v.
Goodnight, 169 W. Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982).
13. Where a first-time offender who otherwise falls within the purview of State v.
Nicastro, 181 W. Va. 556, 383 S.E.2d 521 (1989), is simultaneously convicted of a
marijuana violation and a more serious offense, failure to consider the factors outlined in
Nicastro is not reversible error. In such instance, the offender can no longer be deemed a
small-time offender engaged in only a negligible amount of marijuana delivery, and the
rationale underlying the implementation of the Nicastro factors is no longer germane. Thus,
a determination regarding the appropriateness of examination of those factors is within the
sound discretion of the lower court.
14. "Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution, which contains the cruel
and unusual punishment counterpart to the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, has an express statement of the proportionality principle: 'Penalties shall be
proportioned to the character and degree of the offence.'" Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Vance, 164 W.
Va. 216, 262 S.E.2d 423 (1980).
15. "Punishment may be constitutionally impermissible, although not cruel or unusual
in its method, if it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks
the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity, thereby violating West
Virginia Constitution, Article III, Section 5 that prohibits a penalty that is not proportionate
to the character and degree of an offense." Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Cooper, 172 W. Va. 266, 304 S.E.2d 851 (1983).
16. "Disparate sentences for codefendants are not per se unconstitutional. Courts
consider many factors such as each codefendant's respective involvement in the criminal
transaction (including who was the prime mover), prior records, rehabilitative potential
(including post-arrest conduct, age and maturity), and lack of remorse. If codefendants are
similarly situated, some courts will reverse on disparity of sentence alone." Syl. Pt. 2, State
v. Buck, 173 W. Va. 243, 314 S.E.2d 406 (1984).
Workman, J.,
This is an appeal by Wayne Broughton (hereinafter "Appellant") from a July 11,
1994, order of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County sentencing him to consecutive sentences
of one to fifteen years for delivery of cocaine, one to fifteen years for delivery of marijuana,
and one to five years for conspiracy to deliver marijuana. The Appellant contends that the
lower court committed several errors which justify reversal of the final order. We affirm the
decision of the lower court, except to the extent that the one to fifteen year sentence for
delivery of marijuana was statutorily improper. This matter will therefore be remanded for
the correction of that sentencing error.
I.
Police officers monitoring an apartment(1) in Ranson, West Virginia, on May 14, 1993,
observed Mr. Robert W. Kaetzel, Jr., enter an apartment leased to Ms. Catherine Lohmeyer
and thereafter exit that apartment. Mr. Kaetzel was approached by the police officers, and
marijuana and cocaine were discovered in his possession. In exchange for cooperation in the
investigation of the apartment, Mr. Kaetzel was not charged with possession of marijuana
or cocaine. After wiring him, Ranson police officers provided Mr. Kaetzel with marked
money and sent him back into the apartment at 10:45 p.m. to consummate a drug purchase.
He returned at 10:50 p.m. with 5.76 grams of marijuana and .10 grams of crack cocaine. He
explained to the officers, and later testified at trial, that he had paid the Appellant for both
the marijuana and the cocaine but that the Appellant handed him only the cocaine and Mr.
Lee Townsley handed him the marijuana.
Officer Johnston remained outside the apartment while the other officers returned Mr.
Kaetzel to the police station for debriefing. Mr. Kaetzel informed the officers that the
Appellant would probably leave the apartment shortly, and the Appellant was indeed
observed exiting at approximately 12:15 a.m. on May 15, 1993. The Appellant was
approached by Officer Johnston, and the Appellant ran approximately 200 yards before being
apprehended.(2) A black wallet containing a third-party check made out to Mr. Townsley and
signed over to the Appellant was in the Appellant's possession.
A police dog trained in drug detection was brought to the scene of the Appellant's
apprehension at approximately 7:30 a.m. on May 15, 1993. The dog located $1840 in cash,
including the marked money, thirty-five to forty feet from the Appellant's point of
apprehension.
The Appellant was indicted on September 21, 1993, on one count of delivery of
cocaine, one count of delivery of marijuana, one count of conspiracy to deliver cocaine, and
one count of conspiracy to deliver marijuana.(3) On September 23, 1993, the Appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. During a June 3, 1994, trial, the Appellant testified that Mr.
Kaetzel had pulled a plastic wrapper from his breast pocket as he entered the apartment on
May 14, 1993, and had remained in the bathroom for four or five minutes with Mr. Townsley
before leaving the apartment. The Appellant further testified that Mr. Townsley had told the
Appellant that Mr. Kaetzel did not like the Appellant because of a derogatory comment the
Appellant had made about Mr. Kaetzel.
Subsequent to trial, the Appellant was found guilty of delivery of cocaine, delivery
of marijuana, and conspiracy to deliver marijuana. On July 11, 1994, the lower court
sentenced the Appellant to consecutive sentences of one to fifteen years for delivery of
cocaine, one to fifteen years for delivery of marijuana, and one to five years for conspiracy
to deliver marijuana.
The Appellant appeals to this Court and assigns the following errors: (1) improper
admission of $1840 in cash located by a police dog near the point of apprehension; (2)
insufficient evidence of conspiracy to deliver marijuana; (3) insufficient evidence of actual
delivery of either marijuana or cocaine; (4) improper sentencing to two consecutive
sentences for actions occurring within the same transaction, violating double jeopardy
principles; (5) statutory violation by sentencing to one to fifteen years on the delivery of
marijuana conviction; and (6) improper motivation of the lower court in sentencing and
disproportionality and excessiveness of the sentence.
II.
The Appellant contends that the $1840 in cash should not have been admitted because the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the evidence and because the evidence was not relevant or material to the matters at issue in the case. The Appellant emphasizes that the general rule with regard to evidence obtained through trained animals is that such evidence may be received where the State demonstrates the following with regard to the animal:
(1) they are pure blood and of a stock characterized by
acuteness of scent and power of discrimination, (2) they possess
these qualities and have been accustomed and trained to pursue
human tracks, (3) they have been found by experience reliable
in such pursuit, and (4) in the particular case they were put on
the trail of the guilty party [who] was pursued and followed
under such circumstances and in such a way as to afford
substantial assurance or permit a reasonable inference of
identification.
1 Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers, 4-12(F)(2)(a)
(3d ed. 1994); State v. McKinney, 88 W. Va. 400, 106 S.E. 894 (1921). The Appellant
maintains that this specific case does not fall within the purview of that general rule because
the police dog was put on the scent of drugs rather than the trail of the Appellant or any other
human. The Appellant argues that a standard such as that utilized in Hetmeyer v.
Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 894 (Va. App. 1994), should govern.
Expert testimony with respect to a dog's reaction to the odor of
narcotics is admissible when supported by a proper foundation.
Such foundation must establish the appropriate training and
reliability of the dog in the detection of specific drugs by odor
and the witness handler's expertise in interpreting the dog's
behavior, together with circumstances conducive to a
dependable scent identification by the animal and a credible
evaluation of its related behavior.
448 S.E.2d at 898. The Appellant in the present case contends that the State failed to prove
the relevance of this money and failed to establish a link or nexus between the Appellant and
the money. See Cleckley, supra, 4-1(E)(3).
Testimony at trial indicated that the police dog was unable to track the Appellant's
actual route through the baseball field due to the many different scents on the field. The dog
handler therefore put the dog on an article and drug search from the point of apprehension
and radiating outward in a circular pattern. The dog then alerted the handler and retrieved
the cash thirty-five to forty yards from the point of apprehension.
We have consistently explained that "'[r]ulings on the admissibility of evidence are
largely within a trial court's sound discretion and should not be disturbed unless there has
been an abuse of discretion.' State v. Louk, 171 W. Va. 639, [643,] 301 S.E.2d 596, 599
(1983)." Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Peyatt, 173 W. Va. 317, 315 S.E.2d 574 (1983). We find that
the lower court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the $1840 in cash as authentic and
relevant evidence. The foundation presented by the State adequately established that the
marked bills were located by a trained, experienced police dog thirty-five to forty feet from
the point of the Appellant's apprehension just hours after that apprehension. That testimony
adequately established a nexus between the Appellant and the money, justifying its
introduction as evidence before the jury. As the State suggests, any issues regarding the
qualifications of the handler, the training of the dog, or the passage of time between the
apprehension and the recovery of the cash affect the weight of the evidence rather than its
admissibility.
III.
The Appellant asserts that the lower court erred in failing to direct a verdict in his favor with respect to the charge of conspiracy to deliver marijuana because the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support a conviction on that count separate and apart from the conviction for delivery of marijuana. In syllabus point one of State v. Stevens, 190 W. Va. 77, 436 S.E.2d 312 (1993), we explained the following with regard to the propriety of granting a directed verdict in favor of a defendant:
"'"Upon motion to direct a verdict for the defendant, the
evidence is to be viewed in light most favorable to prosecution.
It is not necessary in appraising its sufficiency that the trial
court or reviewing court be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the defendant; the question is whether there
is substantial evidence upon which a jury might justifiably find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. West,
153 W.Va. 325, 168 S.E.2d 716 (1969).' Syl. pt. 1, State v.
Fischer, 158 W.Va. 72, 211 S.E.2d 666 (1974)." Syllabus Point
10, State v. Davis, 176 W.Va. 454, 345 S.E.2d 549 (1986).
In syllabus point four of State v. Less, 170 W. Va. 259, 294 S.E.2d 62 (1981), we explained
that: "[i]n order for the State to prove a conspiracy under W.Va. Code, 61-10-31(1), it must
show that the defendant agreed with others to commit an offense against the State and that
some overt act was taken by a member of the conspiracy to effect the object of that
conspiracy." We also reasoned in Less that "[t]he agreement may be inferred from the words
and actions of the conspirators, or other circumstantial evidence, and the State is not required
to show the formalities of an agreement." 170 W. Va. at 265, 294 S.E.2d at 67.
The Appellant maintains that the testimony of Mr. Kaetzel is insufficient to prove a conspiracy between the Appellant and Mr. Townsley and that even if such testimony were considered justification for submitting the matter to the jury, the State's evidence is inadequate to support a jury verdict of guilty. The standard of review for adjudging the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict was recently enunciated in State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995). In syllabus point one of Guthrie, we explained:
The function of an appellate court when reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is
to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether
such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable
person of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, in syllabus point three of Guthrie, we elaborated as follows:
A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An
appellate court must review all the evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the
jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution. The
evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save
that of guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations are for a jury and
not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set aside
only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how
it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. To the extent that our prior cases are
inconsistent, they are expressly overruled.
We also explained in Guthrie that the "defendant must meet a heavy burden to gain reversal
because a jury verdict will not be overturned lightly." 194 W. Va. at ___, 461 S.E.2d at 174.
In the present case, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, we find that a "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt." See Guthrie, 194 W. Va. at ___, 461 S.E.2d
at 174. The State presented evidence, through the testimony of Mr. Kaetzel, that the
Appellant received payment for both the marijuana which Mr. Townsley(4) handed to Mr.
Kaetzel and the cocaine which the Appellant handed to Mr. Kaetzel. The State further
introduced evidence of a check found in the Appellant's possession at the time of his
apprehension that was made out to Mr. Townsley and signed over to the Appellant.(5)
IV.
The Appellant also contends that the lower court erred in failing to direct a verdict in
favor of the Appellant with regard to the charges of delivery of cocaine and delivery of
marijuana because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on either of those
two counts. Applying the principles enumerated above regarding the propriety of directing
a verdict in favor of the Appellant and the sufficiency of evidence necessary to sustain a jury
verdict, we find that the evidence presented by the State supports the guilty verdict on both
delivery charges. Mr. Kaetzel testified that the Appellant accepted payment for both the
marijuana and the cocaine and actually handed the cocaine to Mr. Kaetzel. The Appellant
attempts to discredit and devalue Mr. Kaetzel's testimony because Mr. Kaetzel was an
informant who purchased the drugs only because he had been apprehended earlier that
evening and had agreed to cooperate in the police investigation. As the State emphasizes,
it is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the credibility of witnesses. Guthrie, 194 W.
Va. at ___, 461 S.E.2d at 175 n.9. The fact that Mr. Kaetzel was an informant working in
cooperation with the police may affect the credibility of his testimony, as determined by the
jury, but it does not render his testimony less capable of supporting a verdict of guilt.
V.
The Appellant maintains that the lower court erred in sentencing the Appellant to two
consecutive sentences of one to fifteen years for delivery of marijuana and delivery of
cocaine where both deliveries occurred during the same criminal transaction, such that
multiple punishments would constitute double jeopardy. In syllabus point one of State v.
Gill, 187 W. Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253 (1992), we explained as follows:
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution consists of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.
In syllabus point one of Conner v. Griffith, 160 W. Va. 680, 238 S.E.2d 529 (1977), we noted those principles as applied through the West Virginia Constitution:
The Double Jeopardy Clause in Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution, provides immunity from further prosecution where a court having jurisdiction has acquitted the accused. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. It also prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense.
In State v. Zaccagnini, 172 W. Va. 491, 308 S.E.2d 131 (1983), we addressed a
defendant's contention that his convictions for possession with intent to deliver cocaine and
possession with intent to deliver LSD related to the same transaction and could not be
punished separately. The defendant maintained that under State v. Barnett, 168 W. Va. 361,
284 S.E.2d 622 (1981), simultaneous delivery of two controlled substances to the same
person is one offense for purposes of the double jeopardy clause. In Zaccagnini, however,
this Court distinguished Barnett and explained that the Barnett scenario involved
"simultaneous delivery of two controlled substances that violated the same statutory
provision and carried the same penalty." 172 W. Va. at 499, 308 S.E.2d at 139. By contrast,
Zaccagnini presented this Court with a situation in which the defendant had violated two
statutory provisions requiring different evidence to sustain a conviction. Id. at 500, 308 S.E.2d at 140. We determined that possession with intent to deliver a narcotic drug was a
separate and distinct offense from that of possession with intent to deliver another controlled
substance, and we concluded that an offender could be separately punished for each without
violating double jeopardy principles "because there is embodied within the penalty provision,
W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a)(i), a separate definitional provision: 'a controlled substance . .
. which is a narcotic drug.'" Id. at 502, 308 S.E.2d at 142. We summarized as follows in
syllabus point eight of Zaccagnini: "Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not." See also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
We elaborated upon these principles in syllabus point seven of Gill, stating that "[a] claim that double jeopardy has been violated based on multiple punishments imposed after a single trial is resolved by determining the legislative intent as to punishment." In syllabus point eight of Gill, we further explained:
In ascertaining legislative intent, a court should look initially at the language of the involved statutes and, if necessary, the legislative history to determine if the legislature has made a clear expression of its intention to aggregate sentences for related crimes. If no such clear legislative intent can be discerned, then the court should analyze the statutes under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), to determine whether each offense requires an element of proof the other does not. If there is an element of proof that is different, then the presumption is that the legislature intended to create separate offenses.
This determination based upon the elements of proof encompassed within the statutory framework was adeptly explained in State v. Myers, 171 W. Va. 277, 298 S.E.2d 813 (1982). "What we have described is essentially the 'same evidence' test, see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977), applied to the double jeopardy bar against multiple punishments for the same offense." 171 W. Va. at 280-81, 298 S.E.2d at 817. Under this analysis, multiple punishments are permissible "as long as each charge meriting punishment requires at least one piece of evidence that is not needed to prove other charges." Id. at 281, 298 S.E.2d at 817.
In the present case, the Appellant was convicted of two violations emanating from the
same criminal transaction. However, as in Zaccagnini, one conviction involved a narcotic
drug and one conviction involved a non-narcotic drug. Each offense violates a separate
provision of West Virginia Code 60A-4-401(a) (1992), and each conviction is properly
considered separate for purposes of punishment and the application of double jeopardy
principles. Consequently, we find no violation of double jeopardy principles and no error
by the lower court in sentencing the Appellant to two separate, consecutive sentences for
delivery of cocaine and delivery of marijuana.
VI.
The Appellant also contends that the lower court erred in sentencing him to one to
fifteen years for delivery of marijuana since the statutorily mandated punishment for that
offense is only one to five years. The State concedes that the one to fifteen year sentence is
inappropriate and that this matter should be remanded for resentencing to comport with the
statute.
As a related assignment of error, the Appellant maintains that the lower court improperly failed to consider factors outlined in State v. Nicastro, 181 W. Va. 556, 383 S.E.2d 521 (1989), prior to sentencing. In syllabus point six of Nicastro, we explained:
Prior to imposition of a sentence of incarceration for a
defendant convicted of delivery of less than 15 grams of
marihuana in violation of W.Va. Code, 60A-4-401(a), as
amended, who, although not within the 'without renumeration'
exception of W.Va. Code, 60A-4-402(c), as amended, has no
prior criminal record, a trial court must consider: (1) whether
the defendant has a history of involvement with illegal drugs;
(2) whether the defendant is a reasonably good prospect for
rehabilitation; (3) whether incarceration would serve a useful
purpose; and (4) whether available alternatives to incarceration,
such as probation conditioned upon community service, would
be more appropriate.
In the present case, the Appellant was convicted of delivering 5.76 grams of marijuana, and
the presentence report indicated that the Appellant had no prior criminal convictions.(6)
However, where an offender, as in the present case, is simultaneously convicted of a more
serious offense, failure to consider the Nicastro factors is not reversible error. In such
instance, the offender can no longer be deemed a small-time offender engaged in only a
negligible amount of marijuana delivery, and the rationale underlying the implementation
of the Nicastro factors is no longer germane. A determination regarding the appropriateness
of examination of those factors on remand is within the discretion of the lower court in this
matter.
VII.
Finally, the Appellant asserts that the lower court manifested improper motives in imposing sentence and that the sentence was excessive and disproportionate to the offense committed. The Appellant correctly notes that "[s]entences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review." Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Goodnight, 169 W. Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982). The Appellant asserts that the following statement by the lower court evidences an impermissible motivation allegedly compelling the lower court in its sentencing determination:
We have several convictions of offenses which have caused
great difficulty here in this area. We have found ourselves
inundated with drugs from outside sources which has created a
subculture of crime where there was none before. We even
have had a police officer shot and wounded. Sort of things that
one would expect in the metropolitan area has come to sleepy
little Charles Town. And I don't know if there is anyway [sic]
that we are ever going to be able to stop it, but I do know if the
Courts don't lean on these issues when they come up, that we
don't have any hope of ever stopping them.
The Appellant seeks to parlay this declaration into a discriminatory remark based upon the
Appellant's status as a non-resident of West Virginia and as a Jamaican national. We find
no justification for such an inference and discern no impermissible basis in the lower court's
determination of sentence. We have previously recognized the pertinence of community
impact as a consideration in sentencing. In Nicastro, for instance, we explained that
"[w]hether the controlled substance involved is of a type which creates a severe community
problem may also be considered in sentencing." 181 W. Va. at 562, 383 S.E.2d at 527.
The Appellant also maintains that the sentence imposed upon him is excessive and disproportionate to the degree and character of the offense and to the sentences imposed upon other individuals involved in this same drug transaction. In syllabus point eight of State v. Vance, 164 W. Va. 216, 262 S.E.2d 423 (1980), we recognized:
Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution,
which contains the cruel and unusual punishment counterpart to
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, has an
express statement of the proportionality principle: 'Penalties
shall be proportioned to the character and degree of the offense.'
In syllabus point five of State v. Cooper, 172 W. Va. 266, 304 S.E.2d 851 (1983), we explained:
Punishment may be constitutionally impermissible,
although not cruel or unusual in its method, if it is so
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of
human dignity, thereby violating West Virginia Constitution,
Article III, Section 5 that prohibits a penalty that is not
proportionate to the character and degree of an offense.
We also identified two tests in Cooper for determining whether a sentence is so disproportionate that it violates Article III, Section five of the West Virginia Constitution. We explained as follows:
The first [test] is subjective and asks whether the sentence for the particular crime shocks the conscience of the court and society. If a sentence is so offensive that it cannot pass a societal and judicial sense of justice, the inquiry need not proceed further. When it cannot be said that a sentence shocks the conscience, a disproportionality challenge is guided by the objective test we spelled out in Syllabus Point 5 of Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205 (1981):
In determining whether a given sentence violates
the proportionality principle found in Article III,
Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution,
consideration is given to the nature of the offense,
the legislative purpose behind the punishment, a
comparison of the punishment with what would
be inflicted in other jurisdictions, and a
comparison with other offenses within the same
jurisdiction.
172 W. Va. at 272, 304 S.E.2d at 857. In State v. Ross, 184 W. Va. 579, 402 S.E.2d 248
(1990), we described the second test slightly differently, explaining that "[w]hen it cannot
be said that a sentence shocks the conscience, a disproportionality challenge should be
resolved by more objective factors which include the consideration of the nature of the
offense, the defendant's past criminal history, and his proclivity to engage in violent acts."
184 W. Va. at 581-82, 402 S.E.2d 250-51.
The Appellant emphasizes that when comparing his sentence with those of the other individuals involved in this drug transaction, the excessiveness and disproportionality also becomes apparent. In syllabus point two of State v. Buck, 173 W. Va. 243, 314 S.E.2d 406 (1984), we stated:
Disparate sentences for codefendants are not per se
unconstitutional. Courts consider many factors such as each
codefendant's respective involvement in the criminal transaction
(including who was the prime mover), prior records,
rehabilitative potential (including post-arrest conduct, age and
maturity), and lack of remorse. If codefendants are similarly
situated, some courts will reverse on disparity of sentence alone.
Ms. Catherine Lohmeyer was convicted of possession of marijuana and was sentenced to six
months incarceration which was suspended, permitting her to serve three years of probation.
Mr. Lee Townsley pled guilty to delivery of marijuana and received a suspended sentence
of one to ten years and three years probation. The Appellant, by contrast, was convicted of
delivery of marijuana, delivery of cocaine, and conspiracy to deliver marijuana. Thus, for
purposes of sentencing for their convictions, the Appellant, Mr. Townsley, and Ms.
Lohmeyer were not similarly situated. The Appellant's sentence of three to twenty-five years
for the three violations for which he was convicted is not unconstitutional on the basis of
either excessiveness or disproportionality.
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the lower court, except to the
extent that the one to fifteen year sentence for delivery of marijuana was statutorily
improper. This matter will therefore be remanded for the correction of that sentencing error.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
1. 1The apartment was under observation by police officers due to previous information concerning possible illegal drug activity at that residence.
2. 2The Appellant testified at trial that he ran from the officer because he had a small bottle of vodka in his pocket.
3. 3Although the Appellant was indicted on both conspiracy to deliver cocaine and conspiracy to deliver marijuana, the conspiracy to deliver cocaine was not pursued based upon the State's determination that a conviction on such a count might be duplicitous of a conspiracy to deliver marijuana conviction.
4. 4Mr. Townsley did not testify at the Appellant's trial.
5. 5The State also emphasizes that the Appellant visited the apartment frequently, admitted to being present on the night in question, and admitted that he knew that drug activity was being consummated in the apartment.
6. 6The Appellant has previously been charged with criminal conduct, but those charges were ultimately dismissed, and no criminal convictions were obtained.
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