Preece v. Preece
Annotate this Case
September 1995 Term
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No. 22861
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GRANT PREECE,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee,
v.
EVA PREECE,
Defendant Below, Appellant
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mingo County
Honorable Elliott E. Maynard, Circuit Judge
Civil Action No. 94D-279
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
__________________________________________________
Submitted: October 3, 1995
Filed: December 15, 1995
Chester Lovett
Lovett, Cooper & Glass
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellee
Michael V. Marlow
Montgomery & Marlow
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellant
JUSTICE WORKMAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "'W.Va. Code, 48-2-33 [1984], requires a full disclosure of one spouse's
financial assets to the other spouse at the time of divorce, and contemplates a meaningful
hearing on the subject of equitable distribution of property at which the spouse submitting
financial data may be cross-examined concerning the nature, origin and amount of assets.'
Syllabus point 1, Hamstead v. Hamstead, 178 W. Va. 23, 357 S.E.2d 216 (1987), overruled
on other grounds, Roig v. Roig, 178 W. Va. 181, 364 S.E.2d 794 (1987)." Syl. Pt. 2,
Metzner v. Metzner, 191 W. Va. 378 , 446 S.E.2d 165 (1994).
2. The Legislature's employment of the phrase "[i]n all divorce actions" as the
introductory language of West Virginia Code § 48-2-33 (1995) evidences the Legislature's
intent that financial disclosure should occur in all divorce cases, not only those in which no
separation agreement is executed. The existence of a separation agreement does not alter the
requirements of that statute, nor does West Virginia Code § 48-2-16(a) (1995), dealing
specifically with separation agreements, carve any exemption from disclosure for divorces
in which separation agreements are present.
3. "To meet the disclosure requirements of W.Va. Code 48-2-33 [1993], the West
Virginia Supreme Court, by order dated 18 February 1994, effective 1 March 1994, requires
the parties in a divorce or child support case to disclose their assets and liabilities, as
required by Rule 11(a) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Law [1993], on standard forms promulgated by this Court or 'on a form that substantially complies with the
form promulgated by the supreme court of appeals.' W.Va. Code 48-2-33(c) [1993]." Syl.
Pt. 2, State ex rel. Erickson v. Hill, 191 W. Va. 320, 445 S.E.2d 503 (1994).
4. "Generally the disclosure procedure in a divorce or child support case is as
follows: (1) both parties should provide the asset, liability and other relevant information
required under Rule 11 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Law [1993] on the
standard forms promulgated by this Court, that have been provided to the clerk of every
circuit court; and (2) if this disclosure is deemed insufficient, the party seeking additional
disclosure/discovery, must move the family law master for a discovery order under Rule
81(a)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1988]." Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel.
Erickson v. Hill, 191 W. Va. 320, 445 S.E.2d 503 (1994).
Workman, J.:
This is an appeal by Eva Preece (hereinafter "the Appellant") from an August 4, 1994,
final order of the Circuit Court of Mingo County granting a decree of divorce to the
Appellant and Grant Preece (hereinafter "the Appellee" or "the husband"). The Appellant
asserts that procedural irregularities occurring below rendered the filing of the divorce order
improper. Furthermore, the Appellant alleges that the lower court erred in finding the terms
of the separation agreement fair and equitable. We conclude that the lower court had
insufficient evidence upon which to base a decision regarding the fairness of the separation
agreement and remand this matter for further evaluation in accordance with this opinion.
I.
The Appellant and the Appellee were married in 1960, and three children, now
emancipated, were born of the marriage. On July 14, 1994, the Appellee filed a pro se no
fault divorce complaint, an acceptance of service, a pro se answer signed by the Appellant,
and a separation agreement executed by the Appellant. The acceptance of service, answer,
and separation agreement were dated July 13, 1994, the day before the complaint was filed.
Both parties acknowledged in the separation agreement that it was fair, reasonable, and
voluntarily executed. A hearing before the lower court was conducted on August 4, 1994,
with only the Appellee in attendance. The Appellant contends that she did not participate in the hearing because she did not receive written notice of its scheduled time and date. The
hearing was conducted in the Appellant's absence, and the lower court questioned the
Appellee regarding the irreconcilable differences which had arisen in the marriage, the
inability of the parties to salvage their marriage, and the fact that both parties had signed the
separation agreement. At the conclusion of the questioning, the lower court found that the
"property settlement agreement entered into between the parties is fair, just and equitable .
. . ." A final divorce decree, incorporating the terms of the separation agreement, was
entered by the lower court on August 4, 1994, and specifically stated the court's conclusion
that the agreement was in all respects fair, just, and equitable. The Appellant appeals that
order to this Court.
II.
The Appellant contends that the manner in which the Appellee filed the complaint,
acceptance of service, answer, and separation agreement violated Rule 81(a)(2) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.See footnote 1 Specifically, the Appellant maintains that because the
complaint was not filed until July 14, 1994, she could not possibly have accepted valid service of process of that complaint on July 13, 1994. The Appellant also argues that the
ineffective service of process invalidates the final order of the lower court and thwarts the
purpose of the provision in Rule 81 requiring a minimum of twenty days between the date
of acceptance of service and the date of the final divorce order.
The Appellant also asserts that the separation agreement is unfair, inequitable, and
was forced upon her by her husband. West Virginia Code §§ 48-2-16(a) (1995) and 48-2-
32(b) (1995) require the court to examine a separation agreement or property settlement
agreement to assure that it is fair and reasonable and not obtained through fraud or duress.See footnote 2 The Appellant contends that the lower court did not possess sufficient background to
properly determine the issues of fairness, equity, or duress, and erred in finding that the
terms of the agreement were equitable when sufficient background inquiry was not made to
justify that conclusion. The Appellant emphasizes that financial disclosures were not filed
and that the Appellant was not even present at the hearing.See footnote 3 No testimony was taken
regarding the assets of the parties, the allocation of those assets, or the understanding of the
parties regarding the division of assets.
Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 48-2-16(a), a lower court shall conform its order
to the separation agreement of the parties "if the court finds that the agreement is fair and reasonable, and not obtained by fraud, duress or other unconscionable conduct by one of the
parties . . ." and also finds that the parties have expressed themselves in terms which would
be enforceable by a court in future proceedings. In Gangopadhyay v. Gangopadhyay, 184
W. Va. 695, 403 S.E.2d 712 (1991), we addressed the court's obligation to determine the
fairness of an oral property settlement agreement. While our discussion in Gangopadhyay
focused on the heightened necessity of court review created by the oral nature of that
agreement, we elucidated several general principles applicable to the present case. Id. at ___,
403 S.E.2d at 715-16. We emphasized that the court's inquiry into the issue of whether the
agreement is fair and reasonable "requires a disclosure of the financial background of the
parties sufficient to justify the conclusion of the court or master." Id. at ___, 403 S.E.2d at
716. The foundation of that particular requirement is based in statutory law, not simply in
common law arising from the oral nature of the agreement in Gangopadhyay. Id. Thus, that
inquiry by the court, while discussed in Gangopadhyay in the context of oral agreements, is
necessary in all divorce cases involving a separation agreement.
In addition to the requirements of West Virginia Code § 48-2-16(a), West Virginia
Code § 48-2-33(a) (1995) also provides the following guidance regarding financial disclosure
in all divorce cases: "In all divorce actions and in any other action involving child support,
all parties shall fully disclose their assets and liabilities within forty days after the service of
summons or at such earlier time as ordered by the court." In syllabus point two of Metzner
v. Metzner, 191 W. Va. 378, 446 S.E.2d 165 (1994), we explained as follows:
W.Va. Code, 48-2-33 [1984], requires a full disclosure of one
spouse's financial assets to the other spouse at the time of divorce, and
contemplates a meaningful hearing on the subject of equitable
distribution of property at which the spouse submitting financial data
may be cross-examined concerning the nature, origin and amount of
assets.
191 W. Va. at ___, 446 S.E.2d at 166 Syl. Pt. 2 (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Hamstead v. Hamstead,
178 W. Va. 23, 357 S.E.2d 216 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Roig v. Roig, 178 W.
Va. 781, 364 S.E.2d 794 (1987)). The Legislature's employment of the phrase "[i]n all
divorce actions" as the introductory language of West Virginia Code § 48-2-33 evidences the
Legislature's intent that financial disclosure should occur in all divorce cases, not only those
in which no separation agreement is executed. The existence of a separation agreement does
not alter the requirements of that statute, nor does West Virginia Code § 48-2-16(a), dealing
specifically with separation agreements, carve any exemption from disclosure for divorces
in which separation agreements are present.
We have recently provided specific guidance to lower courts regarding the practical
application of the requirements expressed in West Virginia Code § 48-2-33. In syllabus
point two of State ex rel. Erickson v. Hill, 191 W. Va. 320, 445 S.E.2d 503 (1994), we
explained as follows:
To meet the disclosure requirements of W.Va. Code 48-
2-33 [1993], the West Virginia Supreme Court, by order dated
18 February 1994, effective 1 March 1994, requires the parties
in a divorce or child support case to disclose their assets and
liabilities, as required by Rule 11(a) of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure for Family Law [1993], on standard forms promulgated by this Court or 'on a form that substantially
complies with the form promulgated by the supreme court of
appeals.' W.Va. Code 48-2-33(c) [1993].
191 W. Va. at ___, 445 S.E.2d at 504-05. Syllabus point 3 of Erickson provides
additional instruction regarding the requirements of disclosure, as follows:
Generally the disclosure procedure in a divorce or child
support case is as follows: (1) both parties should provide the
asset, liability and other relevant information required under
Rule 11 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Law
[1993] on the standard forms promulgated by this Court, that
have been provided to the clerk of every circuit court; and (2) if
this disclosure is deemed insufficient, the party seeking
additional disclosure/discovery, must move the family law
master for a discovery order under Rule 81(a)(2) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1988].
191 W. Va. at ___, 445 S.E.2d at 505. Rule 11(a) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for
Family Law provides that each party in a proceeding for divorce shall provide the
information required to be disclosed by West Virginia Code § 48-2-33 and shall serve that
information on the opposing party and file it with the clerk of the lower court within forty
days after service of process. It further provides that "[i]f the final hearing is held within the
forty-day period, the information shall be served and filed no less than five (5) days prior to
the hearing." Id.
In the present case, while we do not find that the procedural irregularities necessarily
render the order unenforceable per se, we conclude that the lower court engaged in
insufficient inquiry, as required by West Virginia Code §§ 48-2-16(a) and 48-2-32(b), to determine whether the separation agreement was fair and reasonable and to assure that the
financial disclosure requirements of West Virginia Code § 48-2-33(a) were observed. We
therefore remand this matter to the Circuit Court of Mingo County for further consideration.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Footnote: 1
Rule 81(a)(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent
part, as follows: "A divorce or annulment action shall not be tried or heard prior to the
expiration of the maximum period of time within which the defendant in such action is
required to file his answer as provided in Rule 12." The Rule 12 requirement for the filing
of an answer in the present case was twenty days. See W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(a).Footnote: 2
West Virginia Code § 48-2-16(a) provides:
In cases where the parties to an action commenced under
the provisions of this article have executed a separation
agreement, if the court finds that the agreement is fair and
reasonable, and not obtained by fraud, duress or other
unconscionable conduct by one of the parties, and further finds
that the parties, through the separation agreement, have
expressed themselves in terms which, if incorporated into a
judicial order, would be enforceable by a court in future
proceedings, then the court shall conform the relief which it is
authorized to order under the provisions of sections thirteen and
fifteen of this article to the separation agreement of the parties.
West Virginia Code § 48-2-32(b) (1995) provides as follows:
In cases where the parties to an action commenced under
the provisions of this article have executed a separation
agreement, then the court shall divide the marital property in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, unless the court
finds:
(1) That the agreement was obtained by fraud, duress, or
other unconscionable conduct by one of the parties, or
(2) That the parties, in the separation agreement, have not
expressed themselves in terms which, if incorporated into a
judicial order, would be enforceable by a court in future
proceedings, or
(3) That the agreement, viewed in the context of the
actual contributions of the respective parties to the net value of
the marital property of the parties, is so inequitable as to defeat
the purposes of this section, and such agreement was inequitable
at the time the same was executed.
Footnote: 3
The Appellant contends that she did not receive written notice of the hearing, and that
contention is not contradicted by the Appellee. However, the Appellee maintains that the
Appellant had actual knowledge of the hearing and simply chose not to attend.
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