In Re : Jonathan Michael D.
Annotate this Case
JANUARY 1995 Term
_________
NO. 22732
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IN RE: JONATHAN MICHAEL D.
__________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Wood County
Honorable George W. Hill, Judge
Civil Action No. 93-J-28
AFFIRMED
____________________________________________________________
Submitted: May 2, 1995
Filed: May 18, 1995
C. Blaine Myers Susan D. Simmons
Burk, Myers & Zivkovich Berkeley L. Simmons
Parkersburg, West Virginia Elizabeth, West Virginia
Attorney for Jonathan Michael D. Attorneys for Sherry D.
Ernest M. Douglass Michele Rusen
Douglass, Douglass & Douglass Prosecuting Attorney for
Parkersburg, West Virginia Wood County
Attorney for Jonathan Brett D. Parkersburg, West Virginia
Attorney for W. Va.
Department of Health &
Human Resources
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON did not participate.
RETIRED JUSTICE MILLER and JUDGE FOX sitting by temporary
assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "'W. Va. Code, 49-1-3(a) (1984), in part, defines an
abused child to include one whose parent knowingly allows another
person to commit the abuse. Under this standard, termination of
parental rights is usually upheld only where the parent takes no
action in the face of knowledge of the abuse or actually aids or
protects the abusing parent.' Syl. pt. 3, In re Betty J.W., 179
W. Va. 605, 371 S.E.2d 326 (1988)." Syllabus Point 2, In re
Jeffrey R.L., 190 W. Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993).
2. "At the conclusion of the improvement period, the
court shall review the performance of the parents in attempting to
attain the goals of the improvement period and shall, in the
court's discretion, determine whether the conditions of the
improvement period have been satisfied and whether sufficient
improvement has been made in the context of all the circumstances
of the case to justify the return of the child." Syllabus Point 6,
In Interest of Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991).
Per Curiam:
Sherry D.,See footnote 1 the respondent below and appellant herein,
appeals a final order entered July 25, 1994, by the Circuit Court
of Wood County, which terminated her parental rights to her son,
Jonathan Michael D. She asserts the circuit court erred because
there was no evidence she knowingly allowed her husband, Jonathan
Brett D., to abuse their child; the evidence established she
complied with the terms of her improvement period; and the West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (Department) made
no reasonable efforts to reunify the family. After reviewing the
record, we find no reversible error and affirm the decision of the
circuit court.
I.
FACTS
In February, 1993, Karol Walton, a child protective
services worker with the Department, filed a petition pursuant to
W. Va. Code, 49-6-1 (1992),See footnote 2 alleging five-month-old Jonathan
Michael D. was an abused and/or neglected child according to W. Va.
Code, 49-1-3 (1992).See footnote 3 The petition set forth the following facts:
"On February 4, 1993, the above-named child
was taken to St. Joseph's Hospital and treated
for a spiral fracture in right femur which
injury was sustained when father was placing
the child in a swing and allegedly pulled the
child's leg and heard a snap. The respondent
father reports that the child has been bruised
on three previous occasions. In addition, the
father has a history of mental illness and
poor impulse control. Further, the
respondent-mother is aware of said abuse by
the respondent-father and has failed to
adequately supervise said child and does
nothing to prevent said abuse."
The circuit court determined that Jonathan was in
imminent danger and ordered temporary custody placed with the Department.See footnote 4 The child was placed with his great-aunt and
continues to reside in her home.
A preliminary hearing was held on February 11, 1993.
Adjudicatory hearings were held on March 26, 1993, and April 26,
1993. At the conclusion of the April 26, 1993, hearing, the
circuit court determined the Department had proved by clear and
convincing evidence that Jonathan was subject to child abuse: "The
totality of the evidence here shows a continuing and reoccurring
injuries to a child which are not normal and are inconsistent with
the father's explanation of any of the things that happened
according to the medical testimony." A dispositional hearing was
held May 21, 1993, and a twelve-month improvement period was
granted. On November 18, 1993, the circuit court reviewed the
progress of the improvement period and determined temporary custody
should remain with the Department. A final hearing was held on
July 14, 1994. By order entered July 25, 1994, Sherry D.'s and Jonathan Brett D.'s parental rights were terminated.See footnote 5 The evidence
taken at the hearings is summarized as follows.
Ms. Walton testified she filed the petition after
receiving information from the hospital that Jonathan received a
fracture to his right leg. Further examinations were conducted at
the hospital because child abuse was suspected, and an old injury
to the right arm and three old left rib fractures were revealed.
The Department also received telephone calls indicating the child
was observed on at least three occasions with bruises on his face,
back, and his bottom near his scrotum.
Jonathan Brett D. testified his son was fussy the night
before the incident occurred and he had awakened very early the
next morning. He took Jonathan downstairs and put him in the child
swing. The baby's legs were folded up and he had to pull them down
through the leg holes in the swing. He testified he heard the leg
crack when he pulled it through. He stated that he asked Sherry
D.'s stepmother, a registered nurse, to examine the baby and she
believed his leg was alright.See footnote 6 Jonathan Brett D. explained the rib injuries probably occurred when he fell down a flight of stairs
while holding the baby and they both hit the wall. He attributed
the arm injury to an accident that occurred when he lifted the baby
out of a playpen and the baby fell back against the side of the
playpen and fell to the floor. He went on to relate the bruises to
Jonathan's bottom to an incident where he bounced the baby on his
knee. He explained that other bruises may have occurred when the
baby rolled around on their waterbed. Jonathan Brett D. denied
ever intentionally hitting his son.
Of particular significance is the fact that Jonathan
Brett D. admitted he was a victim of child abuse. He had undergone
counseling sessions with James D. Wells, a counselor at the
Worthington Center in Parkersburg, to help him work through his
anger toward his mother and father. He discontinued seeing Mr.
Wells when he lost his medical card because he could not afford the
therapy. Mr. Wells testified he counseled Jonathan Brett D.
briefly when the baby was approximately two months old. Mr. Wells
identified impulse control problems and diagnosed Jonathan Brett D.
as experiencing major depression.
At the April 26, 1993, hearing, Sherry D. testified she
never witnessed her husband abusing their son. She supported his explanation for the baby's injuries. She testified again at the
final hearing held July 14, 1994, and admitted that Jonathan's
injuries were serious. However, she denied any responsibility for
the injuries. Sherry D. went so far as to say it may have been
possible her husband intentionally caused the injuries, but she was
not certain. She still maintained it was possible the baby was
injured accidently. Eventually, she claimed to have separated from
Jonathan Brett D. and filed for divorce because she could not be
absolutely sure her son would be safe in the same house as his
father.
Jonathan's foster mother, Elizabeth M., testified Sherry
D. told her she was going to "play the game" with the Department
and tell them what they wanted to hear in order to get her son
back. The couple then planned to reunite and move to Ohio. Sherry
D. denied making those particular statements, although she admitted
she would do anything to regain custody. Sherry D. testified
Elizabeth M. offered her $10,000 to relinquish her parental rights
to Jonathan. Elizabeth M. denied such offer.
Dr. Min Liu, a pediatrician, testified the skeletal
survey report showed a nondisplaced spiral fracture of the right
leg,See footnote 7 old fractures of the left 5th, 6th, and 7th ribs, and
evidence of a healing right upper arm bone. It appeared to Dr. Liu that the bone scan only evidenced a broken leg; however, she
admitted a radiologist is better trained to interpret these
results. She testified these injuries were suspicious and may be
an indication of child abuse. Otherwise, her examination revealed
a healthy, well-nourished baby.
Dr. Anthony Twite, an orthopedist, testified the bone
scan showed abnormalities only in the leg and the X-rays showing
prior injuries to the ribs and upper right arm "may be called into
question" because the bone scan is a more accurate method of
detecting fractures.See footnote 8 However, his conclusions were discredited
by Dr. Paul VanDyke, a diagnostic radiologist who possessed more
training and experience in evaluating bone scans and X-rays.
Dr. VanDyke testified the X-ray skeletal survey
illustrated an old injury to the right humerus (upper arm) which
indicated a "good manifestation of trauma to the bone that didn't
result in fracture but resulted in injury to the bone[.]" He
opined the baby's rib injuries and right arm injury were in the
process of healing and could have been sustained anywhere from
weeks to months earlier. Furthermore, the spiral fracture of the right femur was the type of injury that would require "significant
trauma" to inflict because an infant's bones are more flexible than
an adult's. When questioned about the difference in the bone scan
and X-ray results, Dr. VanDyke explained the two reports were
actually consistent. A close examination of the bone scan revealed
the type of injuries more readily apparent from the X-ray. The rib
fractures were not as apparent from the bone scan because the
injury occurred much earlier and the ribs were in a later stage of
healing. Therefore, one would not expect to see heavy activity at
that site.
Dr. VanDyke further testified that the parents'
explanation for the baby's leg injury would be inconsistent with
the medical evidence because the amount of force used to effectuate
the fracture would necessarily be much more momentous than simply
pulling the leg through the hole in a baby swing. He noted the
injuries were clearly out of the range of expected injuries based
on a five-month-old's limited activity and lack of mobility. He
found the fact the baby suffered major injuries at different sites
at different times significant.
Joan George, a child protective services worker with the
Department, prepared a case report in June of 1994 and testified at
the final hearing held July 14, 1994. She recommended termination
of parental rights. Her primary concern was the parents' failure
to accept any responsibility for the baby's injuries. She believed they minimized the seriousness of the problems. Furthermore,
Sherry D. and Jonathan Brett D. continued to insist the injuries
were not intentionally inflicted, but were caused by accidents.
Ms. George testified the parents were inconsistent with following
through with their need for counseling. Sherry D. attended less
than ten counseling sessions during the course of the one-year
improvement period. The parents also demonstrated no ability to be
self-sufficient. They did obtain various employment, but lost
their jobs and had to live with relatives for most of the year.
On cross-examination, Ms. George admitted Sherry D.
essentially performed the tasks set forth in the family case plan.
However, she felt because Sherry D. failed to acknowledge
responsibility for her son's injuries, the issue could not be
addressed and worked on during the improvement period. In this
regard, she felt Sherry D. and Jonathan Brett D. had not attempted
to correct the behavior that caused the injuries. Accordingly, Ms.
George was unable to conclude that Sherry D.'s level of functioning
improved to the point that the safety of the child could be
ensured.
Cynthia Beck, the psychologist who evaluated Sherry D.,
reiterated the fact that Sherry D. continued to deny responsibility
for her son's injuries. Ms. Beck, however, did not recommend
termination of parental rights. She prepared a report recommending Sherry D. submit to counseling and undergo an evaluation to
determine if she should be placed on medication.
At the final hearing, the circuit court determined there
was no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect or abuse
resulting in the baby's injuries could be substantially corrected
in the future. Accordingly, parental rights were terminated. The
circuit court found the numerous injuries could not have been
inflicted accidentally and neither parent had accepted
responsibility for the baby's injuries. The circuit court found
that in the two months preceding the final hearing, Sherry D.'s
cooperation with the Department was not sincere. Furthermore, the
circuit court found her testimony was not credible. It stated
Sherry D. was "only going through the motions and playing a little
game with the department until such time when she gets her child
back, and then she's going to reunite with the father."
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an action is tried upon the facts without a jury,
the circuit court "shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . [and these]
[f]indings . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous[.]" W.Va.R.Civ.P. 52(a). "'A finding is "clearly
erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Board of
Educ. of County of Mercer v. Wirt, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ n.14, 453 S.E.2d 402, 413 n.14 (1994), quoting U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 2d 746, 765-66 (1948).
However, a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply
because it would have decided the case differently, and it must
affirm "[i]f the [circuit] court's account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety[.]"
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105
S. Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518, 528 (1985). Finally, "[w]hen
findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of
witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial
court's findings[.]" 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S. Ct. at 1512, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 529. Applying these principles to the facts of this
case, we are of the opinion that the circuit court's findings were
not clearly erroneous.
III.
FINDING OF ABUSE
Sherry D. first contends there was no evidence in the
record to support the circuit court's initial finding that her
conduct constituted child abuse or neglect. This Court has held
that parental rights may be terminated on account of abuse even if
the parent did not personally inflict the injuries. Syllabus Point
2 of In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W. Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993), sets forth the standard for when parental rights may be terminated for
failure to prevent abuse:
"'W. Va. Code, 49-1-3(a) (1984), in
part, defines an abused child to include one
whose parent knowingly allows another person
to commit the abuse. Under this standard,
termination of parental rights is usually
upheld only where the parent takes no action
in the face of knowledge of the abuse or
actually aids or protects the abusing parent.'
Syl. pt. 3, In re Betty J.W., 179 W. Va. 605,
371 S.E.2d 326 (1988)."
The circuit court found that Jonathan Brett D.
intentionally abused his son and that Sherry D. was aware of the
abuse and did nothing to prevent it. As we previously stated, this
Court accords deference to such findings of fact.See footnote 9
A review of the record does not reflect the circuit
court's findings were clearly erroneous. The medical evidence
shows the baby suffered three major injuries within the first five
months of his life, not to mention the numerous bruises about his
back, face, and bottom. Sherry D. may not have been present when
the abuse occurred, as she claims, but it could reasonably be
inferred she possessed knowledge the abuse was occurring. Other
family members questioned how the baby sustained the bruises and
reported their suspicions to the Department. Sherry D. was aware
her husband had received counseling for impulse control problems
after the birth of their son.See footnote 10 Standing alone this factor is not
determinative. However, considering the other evidence in this
case, we find the circuit court's determination that Sherry D. was
aware the abuse was occurring was substantially supported by the
record.
Courts oftentimes must rely upon circumstantial evidence
in finding a parent liable for failing to protect his or her child
from abuse even though he or she never actively participated in the
abuse. Should the parents choose to support each other's version
of what transpired, there may be no direct evidence to the contrary. Particularly when the victim of the abuse is a baby, as
in this case, he or she cannot testify. In State v. Adams, 89 N.M.
737, 557 P.2d 586 (1976), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico
affirmed the defendant's criminal conviction of child abuse
resulting in the death of his twenty-eight-month-old daughter. The
Adamses had a rationalization for all the child's bruises and
injuries--from her playing with her brother to being accidently hit
on the head with a glider. The defendant supported his wife's
explanation for how their child was injured and eventually died.
The court found his claims to be unconvincing. The circumstances
leading to the child's death supported the inference that the
father knew the abuse was occurring and failed to take action to
stop it.See footnote 11 See also State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986) (mother failed to protect seven- and eight-year-
old children from their father's abuse after they reported the
abuse to her); but see Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054
(1979) (defendant's child abuse conviction reversed because she was
not within the class of persons specified by the statute, i.e., a
parent or guardian, even though she witnessed a friend beat her
baby to death and did nothing to stop it).
IV.
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Sherry D. contends the circuit court erred in terminating
her parental rights because she complied with the terms set forth
in the family case plan during the improvement period.See footnote 12 Ms. George
admitted Sherry D. performed the required tasks. However, the
recommendation to terminate parental rights was due to the fact
that Sherry D.'s attitude and beliefs did not change during the
improvement period. She never accepted responsibility for
Jonathan's injuries and only during the last few months of the
improvement period did she admit even the possibility that Jonathan
Brett D. intentionally inflicted the injuries. The family case
plan specifically provided "goal achievement will be measured by
the level of change effectuated by participation in the identified
tasks and not by mere compliance." Furthermore, this Court has
recognized it is possible for an individual to show "compliance
with specific aspects of the case plan" while failing "to improve
. . . [the] overall attitude and approach to parenting." W. Va.
Dept. of Human Serv. v. Peggy F., 184 W. Va. 60, 64, 399 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1990).
The assessment of the overall success of the improvement
period lies within the discretion of the circuit court "regardless
of whether or not the individual has completed all suggestions or
goals set forth in family case plans." In Interest of Carlita B.,
185 W. Va. 613, 626, 408 S.E.2d 365, 378 (1991). Syllabus Point 6
of Carlita B. states:
"At the conclusion of the
improvement period, the court shall review the
performance of the parents in attempting to
attain the goals of the improvement period and
shall, in the court's discretion, determine
whether the conditions of the improvement
period have been satisfied and whether
sufficient improvement has been made in the
context of all the circumstances of the case
to justify the return of the child."
Of particular concern to the circuit court was the fact that Sherry
D.'s behavioral change during the last few months of the
improvement period was an attempt to deceive the Department. There
was evidence she was merely going through the motions to appease
the Department while her true intentions were to reunite with
Jonathan Brett D. and move out of the State. The circuit court was
particularly concerned about the baby's safety should Sherry D.
reunite with her husband. Thus, the circuit court found there was
no substantial likelihood the conditions had changed. The circuit
court is in the best position to judge a witness's credibility, and
we find nothing in the record to lead this Court to a different
conclusion.
On the issue of the improvement period, we sua sponte
address an issue of particular concern to this Court. We have
stated: "During the improvement period, the status of the
child(ren) and the progress of the parent(s) in satisfying the
conditions of the improvement period should be monitored by the
circuit court on a monthly basis. To the extent possible, such
review should also incorporate the multi-disciplinary approach,
with social workers and other helping personnel present in the
court with attorneys and parties to review progress and assure the
program is being followed and improvement being made." Carlita B.,
185 W. Va. at 625, 408 S.E.2d at 377. (Emphasis added). The
improvement period was ordered in June of 1993. On November 18,
1993, the circuit court conducted its only hearing reviewing the
progress of the parents before the final hearing was held on July
14, 1994. It must be emphasized that at that point the child had
spent more than half of his life in foster care. A single six-
month review of a one-year improvement period is woefully
inadequate, especially where such a young infant is involved.
Frequent monitoring enables a speedy return of the child should the
parents demonstrate substantial improvement. "[T]he significance
of a six-month period in the first three years of life must once
again be viewed as an extremely vital time in the course of a
child's human development." Carlita B., 185 W. Va. at 624, 408 S.E.2d at 376. It also allows the circuit court to see to it that
the Department is making reasonable efforts toward the goal of family reunification and to assure the child is receiving all
necessary services.
We do not, however, find reversible error in the circuit
court's lack of diligence in monitoring this case. We are not
convinced that additional proceedings before the circuit court
would have made any difference in the final outcome of this case
because Sherry D. failed to ever acknowledge that Jonathan was an
abused child. Without such revelation, the circuit court found it
unlikely Sherry D. would take steps to prevent further abuse from
occurring.
V.
DUTY OF DEPARTMENT
Sherry D.'s final argument is that the Department failed
to make a reasonable effort to reunify the family pursuant to
W. Va. Code, 49-6-5 (1992). This assignment of error is without
merit. The Department promptly prepared the family case plan,See footnote 13
submitted the plan to the circuit court in May of 1993, and took
immediate steps to offer services. Sherry D. failed to take
advantage of the opportunity to work with the Department until the
end of the improvement period and even then did not truly accept the fact that the abuse occurred. The failure to reunify the
family in this case does not lie with the Department.See footnote 14 Sherry D.
failed to bear the responsibility of demonstrating to the
Department and the circuit court sufficient progress and
improvement in order to regain custody.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find the Circuit Court of
Wood County did not abuse its discretion in terminating the parental rights of Sherry D. Accordingly, the judgment is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1
We follow our traditional practice in child abuse and
neglect matters and other cases involving sensitive facts and do
not use the last names of the parties. See, e.g., Matter of
Scottie D., 185 W. Va. 191, 406 S.E.2d 214 (1991); State ex rel.
Div. of Human Serv. by Mary C.M. v. Benjamin P.B., 183 W. Va.
220, 395 S.E.2d 220 (1990).Footnote: 2
W. Va. Code, 49-6-1(a), states, in part:
"If the state department or a
reputable person believes that a child is
neglected or abused, the department or the
person may present a petition setting forth
the facts to the circuit court in the county
in which the child resides, or to the judge
of such court in vacation. The petition
shall be verified by the oath of some
credible person having knowledge of the
facts. The petition shall allege specific
conduct including time and place, how such
conduct comes within the statutory definition
of neglect or abuse with references thereto,
any supportive services provided by the state
department to remedy the alleged
circumstances and the relief sought. Upon
filing of the petition, the court shall set a
time and place for a hearing and shall
appoint counsel for the child." Footnote: 3
W. Va. Code, 49-1-3(a), defines an "abused child":
"'Abused child' means a child whose
health or welfare is harmed or threatened by:
"(1) a parent, guardian or
custodian who knowingly or intentionally
inflicts, attempts to inflict, or knowingly
allows another person to inflict, physical
injury, or mental or emotional injury, upon
the child or another child in the home; or
"(2) Sexual abuse or sexual
exploitation; or
"(3) The sale or attempted sale of
a child by a parent, guardian, or
custodian[.]"
W. Va. Code, 49-1-3(g)(1), defines a "neglected child":
"'Neglected child' means a child:
"(A) Whose physical or mental
health is harmed or threatened by a present
refusal, failure or inability of the child's
parent, guardian or custodian to supply the
child with necessary food, clothing, shelter,
supervision, medical care or education, when
such refusal, failure or inability is not due
primarily to a lack of financial means on the
part of the parent, guardian or custodian; or
"(B) Who is presently without
necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, education or supervision because of the
disappearance or absence of the child's
parent or custodian[.]"
The statute was amended in 1994. The minor changes do not affect
our determination of this case.Footnote: 4
See W. Va. Code, 49-6-3 (1992), which states, in part:
"(a) Upon the filing of a petition,
the court may order that the child alleged to
be an abused or neglected child be delivered
for not more than ten days into the custody
of the state department or a responsible
relative, which may include any parent,
guardian or other custodian pending a
preliminary hearing, if it finds that: (1)
There exists imminent danger to the physical
well-being of the child, and (2) there are no
reasonably available alternatives to removal
of the child[.]"Footnote: 5
Jonathan Brett D.'s petition for appeal to this Court was
denied. Footnote: 6
Barbara M., Sherry D.'s stepmother, testified Jonathan
Brett D. was concerned about his son's injury and asked her to
look at the baby's leg. Barbara M. failed to recognize the leg
was broken and attributed the child's behavior to constipation.
Nevertheless, Sherry and Jonathan Brett D. transported the baby
to the hospital.
The family lived with the stepmother when these
incidents took place. As a registered nurse, she felt confident
she would have noticed any indications of child abuse, and she
felt none were present.Footnote: 7
A nondisplaced spiral fracture means the leg bone sustained
a break but was still in proper alignment.Footnote: 8
Dr. Paul VanDyke, a diagnostic radiologist at St. Joseph's
Hospital, explained that in a bone scan, a radioactive label is
used on a substance that goes to the bone and illustrates the
entire skeletal system at one time. The substance accumulates at
the sites of osteoplastic activity (where bone cells are laying
down bone to repair injuries). By using the information from the
X-rays and the bone scan, medical professionals are able to
identify bone fractures and traumas and estimate how long ago the
injury occurred.Footnote: 9
As we recognized in In re Elizabeth Beth H., ___ W. Va.
___, ___, 453 S.E.2d 639, 642 (1994):
"Consistent with our cases in other
areas, we give appropriate deference to
findings of the circuit court. In this
regard, the circuit court has a superior
sense of what actually transpired during an
incident, by virtue of its ability to see and
hear the witnesses who have firsthand
knowledge of the events. Appellate oversight
is therefore deferential, and we should
review the circuit court's findings of fact
following an evidentiary hearing under the
clearly erroneous standard. If the circuit
court makes no findings or applies the wrong
legal standard, however, no deference
attaches to such an application. Of course,
if the circuit court's findings of fact are
not clearly erroneous and the correct legal
standard is applied, the circuit court's
ultimate ruling will be affirmed as a matter
of law."Footnote: 10
Studies indicate that victims of child abuse are at a
greater risk of becoming perpetrators of abuse to their own
children. Child abusers that were victims themselves liken abuse
with proper parenting skills. See Dean M. Herman, A Statutory
Proposal to Prohibit the Infliction of Violence Upon Children, 19
Fam.L.Q. 1, 20-21 (1985) (parents justify the abuse they inflict
on their children by the treatment they received and such
justifications are very difficult to overcome).Footnote: 11
In Santillanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 849 P.2d 358
(1993), the Supreme Court of New Mexico held the application of
the civil negligence standard went beyond the intended scope of
the criminal child abuse statute. Mr. Adams' conviction was not
reversed, however, because the court declined to retroactively
apply the criminal negligence standard. Footnote: 12
The family case plan submitted by Ms. George in May of
1993 outlined numerous goals and tasks for Mr. and Mrs. D. They
were to read booklets entitled All That a Child Can Be and
Toddlers and prepare various reports for the Department. For
instance, they were required to prepare reports detailing the
reasons they felt the Department removed the baby from their care
and explain their understanding of what must be accomplished in
order for them to regain custody. Sherry D. was required to
participate in individual therapy sessions on a monthly basis and
apprise her social worker of her efforts to comply with the case
plan. Footnote: 13
The purpose of the family case plan "'is to clearly set
forth an organized, realistic method of identifying family
problems and the logical steps to be used in resolving or
lessening these problems.'" State ex rel. W. Va. Dept. of Human
Serv. v. Cheryl M., 177 W. Va. 688, 693, 356 S.E.2d 181, 186
(1984), quoting W. Va. Code, 49-6D-3(a) (1984).Footnote: 14
Victor I. Vieth in The Mutilation of a Child's Spirit: A
Call for a New Approach to Termination of Parental Rights in
Cases of Child Abuse, 20 William Mitchell L. Rev. 727, 731
(1994), recognizes the arduous task faced by social services in
attempting to reunite the family:
"It is often difficult, however, to
reunite victims of physical or sexual abuse
with their offending parents. Parents
charged with abuse or neglect of a child 'are
not candidates for quick change' and often
require 'long-term treatment and long-term
support in order to achieve any measure of
success.' One study concludes that the
success rate of treating abusive parents may
be as low as forty percent.
"For social workers, the greatest
challenge may be to help a nonoffending
parent accept the fact that abuse has taken
place. Typically, '[n]on-offending parents
tend to lie to cover for the guilty parent
because of their emotional ties to that
person.'" (Emphasis in original; footnotes
omitted).
Although there is generally a strong public policy in favor of encouraging loyalty in one spouse to the other, a parent's first commitment must be to the protection of his or her child.
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