Hose v. Berkeley County Planning Commission
Annotate this Case
January 1995 Term
___________
No. 22537
___________
LARRY B. HOSE AND DELORES F. HOSE,
Plaintiffs Below, Appellants
v.
THE BERKELEY COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION;
WILLIAM J. TEACH, P.E., COUNTY ENGINEER;
WILLIAMSPORT STORAGE BINS, INC., A MARYLAND CORPORATION;
TODD SNOOK; AND FOX AND ASSOCIATES, INC.,
A MARYLAND CORPORATION,
Defendants Below, Appellees
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County
Honorable Christopher Wilkes, Judge
Civil Action No. 92-C-198
AFFIRMED, IN PART;
REVERSED, IN PART.
___________________________________________________
Submitted: May 9, 1995
Filed: July 14, 1995
Carolyn Sue Daniel
Shepherdstown, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellants
Janet L. Scalia
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Martinsburg, West Virginia
Carol Ann Marunich
Furbee Amos Webb & Critchfield
Fairmont, West Virginia
Attorneys for Berkeley County Planning Commission
and William J. Teach
John M. Martirano
Patrick J. Nooney
Steptoe & Johnson
Hagerstown, Maryland
Attorneys for Williamsport Storage Bins, Inc. and Todd Snook
Anita R. Casey
Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for Fox and Associates, Inc.
CHIEF JUSTICE McHUGH delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON AND JUSTICE RECHT did not participate.
JUDGE FOX and RETIRED JUSTICE MILLER sitting by temporary
assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo." Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, ___ W. Va. ___,
451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
2. "'A motion for summary judgment should be granted
only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be
tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify
the application of the law.' Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W. Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963)." Syl. pt. 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187
W. Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992).
3. "'Where the language of a statute is clear and
without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without
resorting to the rules of interpretation.' Syllabus Point 2, State
v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1986)." Syl. pt. 1,
Peyton v. City Council of Lewisburg, 182 W. Va. 297, 387 S.E.2d 532
(1989).
4. Pursuant to W. Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2) [1986] and
W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986], a political subdivision is
immune from liability if a loss or claim results from licensing
powers or functions such as the issuance, denial, suspension or
revocation of or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or
revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar
authority, regardless of whether such loss or claim is caused by the negligent performance of acts by the political subdivision's
employees while acting within the scope of employment.
5. W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986] clearly
contemplates immunity for political subdivisions from tort
liability for any loss or claim resulting from licensing powers or
functions such as the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of
or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order or similar authority,
regardless of the existence of a special duty relationship.
6. While W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986] expressly
immunizes a political subdivision from liability if a loss or claim
results from licensing powers or functions such as the issuance,
denial, suspension or revocation of or failure or refusal to issue,
deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval,
order or similar authority, such immunity does not extend to
private individuals or entities to which a political subdivision
has issued, denied, suspended, or revoked or has failed or refused
to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order or similar authority.
McHugh, Chief Justice:
Appellants Larry and Delores Hose instituted an action in
the Circuit Court of Berkeley County, West Virginia seeking damages
from appellees for changing the flow of surface water which
resulted in the flooding of appellants' property. By order of
March 10, 1994, the circuit court granted appellees Berkeley County
Planning Commission and county engineer William Teach's motion for
summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity. In
separate orders dated May 11, 1994, the circuit court granted the
motions for summary judgment of appellees Williamsport Storage
Bins, Inc. and Todd Snook, its president, as well as of appellee,
Fox and Associates, Inc., an architectural firm.
This Court has before it the petition for appeal, all
matters of record and the briefs and argument of counsel. For the
reasons stated below, the order granting summary judgment in favor
of the Berkeley County Planning Commission and William Teach is
affirmed. However, the orders granting summary judgment in favor
of Williamsport Storage Bins, Inc. and Todd Snook and Fox and
Associates, Inc. are reversed.
I.
Facts
Since 1982, appellants Larry and Delores Hose have owned
approximately six acres of land located in Berkeley County, West
Virginia. They have operated a vehicular salvage, recycling and
repair business on the land since January 1988. Occasionally,
water approximately one-inch deep would accumulate on appellants' land as the result of surface run-off from the property lying
adjacent to and downstream from their property.
In July 1989, the property lying adjacent to and
downstream from appellants' was purchased by appellee Williamsport
Storage Bins, Inc., a Maryland corporation. In March 1990,
Williamsport's president, Todd Snook, through an agent, applied to
appellee Berkeley County Planning Commission (hereinafter "Planning
Commission") for approval of proposed construction plans for twelve
mini-warehouse buildings, a rental office and an eight-bay car
wash. Williamsport hired appellee Fox and Associates, Inc., an
architectural firm, to draft the site plans for the proposed
construction.
According to the depositions of appellee Todd Snook and
appellee William Teach who was acting solely within the scope of
his employment as engineer for Berkeley County, fill dirt which had
been hauled onto the Williamsport property by Williamsport's
predecessor in title blocked the natural drainage swale. Mr. Teach
indicated that this caused water to back up on the property
adjoining Williamsport's and created excessive water pressure
problems in the surrounding areas.
After reviewing the concept plan and preliminary plat
prepared by Fox and Associates and submitted by Willliamsport, the
Planning Commission required Mr. Snook to either remove the dirt or
to install a drainage pipe so as to return the flow of water from other landowners' property located upstream,See footnote 1 across the
Williamsport property, to its original and natural state. The
concept and site plans were subsequently amended to reflect the
addition of a thirty-six inch drainage pipe.See footnote 2 Mr. Snook and Mr.
Teach also testified that had the drainage pipe not been installed,
the Planning Commission would have required Williamsport to remove
the fill dirt.See footnote 3 In either case, all of the appellees herein
contend that the amount of water which flowed onto appellants' land
would have been the same.
Conversely, appellant Larry Hose testified that the
Williamsport property had previously been "flood land" and that the
appellees built an "earthen dam . . . with a 36 inch spillway through [it]. [Mr. Snook] blocks up all that water that used to
lay on here and runs it through that spillway and dumps it onto my
property."
A public hearing to discuss the proposed plans was
scheduled for July 19, 1990. The hearing date was published in the
Martinsburg Journal, a newspaper of general circulation in the
area, and the property was posted. Appellants contend that
appellee William Teach, the county engineer with whom appellants
had spoken on at least five occasions, had promised to personally
notify them of the public hearing date. Mr. Teach did not notify
appellants nor did they see the newspaper publication.
Consequently, appellants did not attend the public hearing.
In its March 10, 1994 order, the circuit court found that
at the July 19, 1990 hearing, Fox and Associates "defended the
project and their plans through its agents and advocated acceptance
of the plans, at which time the [Planning Commission] voted to
accept the staff recommendation to grant preliminary plat
Approval." On August 6, 1990, the Planning Commission voted to
accept the staff recommendation to grant final plat approval which
included the installation of the thirty-six inch drainage pipe.
Since implementation of the construction plans and
specifically, the thirty-six inch drainage pipe, appellants have
experienced an increase in the accumulation of surface water on
their property. Appellants thus contend that the two to three feet
of surface water which floods their property approximately three times per year is a direct result of the installation of this
pipe.See footnote 4
By order dated March 10, 1994, the circuit court granted
the Planning Commission and William Teach's motion for summary
judgment, concluding, inter alia, that Mr. Teach, as an employee of
a political subdivision acting within the scope of his employment,
was immune from personal tort liability, pursuant to W. Va. Code,
29-12A-13(b) [1986] and that the Planning Commission was similarly
immune pursuant to W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986].
In two subsequent orders, each dated May 11, 1994, the
circuit court granted Williamsport and Snook's joint motion for
summary judgment, as well as that of Fox and Associates. All of
the parties herein, with the exception of the Planning Commission
and Mr. Teach, have represented to this Court on appeal that the
May 11, 1994 orders indicate that the motions for summary judgment
of Williamsport, Snook and Fox and Associates were based upon the
governmental immunity previously afforded the Planning Commission
and Mr. Teach. However, our reading of the May 11, 1994 orders do
not so indicate. Unlike the March 10, 1994 order granting summary
judgment for the Planning Commission and Mr. Teach, these orders do
not contain any specific findings of fact or conclusions of law as
to either Williamsport, Snook or Fox and Associates.
II.
Standard of Review
As indicated above, the circuit court granted summary
judgment in favor of all of the appellees herein. As we stated in
syllabus point 1 of Painter v. Peavy, ___ W. Va. ___, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994), "[a] circuit court's entry of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo." A motion for summary judgment, under West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure 56, is to be granted by a circuit
court only when the moving party shows there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Accordingly, the standard for granting a motion for
summary judgment has been articulated by this Court as follows:
'A motion for summary judgment should be
granted only when it is clear that there is no
genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry
concerning the facts is not desirable to
clarify the application of the law.' Syllabus
Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co v. Federal
Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W. Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).
Syl. pt. 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W. Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992). At the summary judgment stage, the circuit
court's function is not "'to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial.'" Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., No. 22493,
___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (slip op. at 8) (Mar. 24, 1995)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 212 (1986)). This Court must,
therefore, draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Masinter v.
Webco, 164 W. Va. 241, 242, 262 S.E.2d 433, 435 (1980).
III.
Appellees Berkeley County Planning Commission and William Teach
A.
The stated purposes of the Governmental Tort Claims and
Insurance Reform Act, found in W. Va. Code, 29-12A-1, et seq., "are
to limit liability of political subdivisions and provide immunity
to political subdivisions in certain instances and to regulate the
costs and coverage of insurance available to political subdivisions
for such liability." W. Va. Code, 29-12A-1 [1986]. See O'Dell v.
Town of Gauley Bridge, 188 W. Va. 596, 425 S.E.2d 551 (1992);
Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dept., 186 W. Va. 336, 412 S.E.2d 737 (1991). Upon finding that "political subdivisions of the State
were unable to obtain affordable tort liability insurance coverage
without reducing the quantity and quality of traditional
governmental services[,] W. Va. Code, 29-12A-2[,]" the West
Virginia legislature "specified seventeen instances in which
political subdivisions would have immunity from tort liability. W.
Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)." O'Dell, 188 W. Va. at 600, 425 S.E.2d at
555. (footnote omitted).
It was pursuant to W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986]
that the circuit court concluded, as a matter of law, that the Planning CommissionSee footnote 5 was immune from liability in this case.
W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986] provides:
A political subdivision is immune from
liability if a loss or claim results from:
. . . .
Licensing powers or functions including,
but not limited to, the issuance, denial,
suspension or revocation of or failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any
permit, license, certificate, approval, order
or similar authority[.]
Appellants maintain, however, that the Planning
Commission's employee and county engineer, William Teach, was
negligent when he approved Williamsport's plans to install a
thirty-six inch drainage pipe in that he knew or should have known
that it would flood their property. Thus, it is appellants'
contention that the Planning Commission is not immune from
liability, under the aforementioned W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9)
[1986], where it has negligently approved plans and specifications.
Instead, appellants argue that the Planning Commission is
liable in damages for the flooding of their property under W. Va.
Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2) [1986], which states:
Subject to sections five and six [§§ 29-12A-5
and 29-12A-6] of this article, a political subdivision is liable in damages in a civil
action for injury, death, or loss to persons
or property allegedly caused by an act or
omission of the political subdivision or of
any of its employees in connection with a
governmental or proprietary function, as
follows:
. . . .
Political subdivisions are liable for
injury, death, or loss to persons or property
caused by the negligent performance of acts by
their employees while acting within the scope
of employment.
(emphasis added). We disagree and find W. Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2)
[1986] to be inapplicable to the case before us.
This issue is controlled by the following traditional
principle of statutory analysis: "'Where the language of
a statute is clear and
without ambiguity the
plain meaning is to be
accepted without
resorting to the rules of
interpretation.'
Syllabus Point 2, State
v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571,
165 S.E.2d 108 (1986)."
Syl. pt. 1, Peyton v.
City Council of
Lewisburg, 182 W. Va.
297, 387 S.E.2d 532
(1989).
The plain language of W. Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2) [1986]
expressly provides that the liability of a political subdivision
for injury to property allegedly caused by the negligent
performance of acts by their employees is "[s]ubject to sections
five and six [§§ 29-12A-5 and 29-12A-6] of this article." Thus,
pursuant to W. Va. Code, 29-12A-4(c)(2) [1986] and W. Va. Code, 29-
12A-5(a)(9) [1986], a political subdivision is immune from
liability if a loss or claim results from licensing powers or
functions such as the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of
or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order or similar authority,
regardless of whether such loss or claim is caused by the negligent
performance of acts by the political subdivision's employees while
acting within the scope of employment.
B.
Alternatively, appellants maintain that the Planning
Commission is not immune from tort liability in this case based
upon their special relationship with the Planning Commission's
agent and employee, William Teach. Appellants contend that Mr.
Teach breached the duty arising from that relationship, causing
injury to appellants' property.
In Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 182 W. Va. 253, 387 S.E.2d 307 (1989), the plaintiffs' home was destroyed by fire as a result
of the failure of the city's fire department to respond to
plaintiffs' emergency fire call. This Court discussed, in detail,
the public duty doctrine and those circumstances under which a "special relationship" exists between a local governmental entity
and an injured party. Under the public duty doctrine, "a local
governmental entity's liability for nondiscretionary governmental
functions may not be predicated upon the breach of a general duty
owed to the public as a whole[.]" Id., 182 W. Va. at 256, 387 S.E.2d at 310. On the other hand,
'[i]f a special relationship exists between a
local governmental entity and an individual
which gives rise to a duty to such individual,
and the duty is breached causing injuries,
then a suit may be maintained against such
entity.' Syl. pt. 3, Benson v. Kutsch, 181
W. Va. 1, 380 S.E.2d 36 (1989).
Syl. pt. 1, Wolfe, supra.See footnote 6
Subsequently, in Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dept.,
186 W. Va. 336, 412 S.E.2d 737 (1991), we discussed whether a
special duty relationship existed and was breached where one person
was killed and another injured by an individual who had previously threatened and harassed one of the victims and on whom there was an
outstanding arrest warrant. Though one of the victims had
previously reported to the police her fear for her safety and life,
the police took no action to either apprehend or arrest the
perpetrator who ultimately shot the victims, ironically, in the
police department parking lot.
Our determination of whether there existed a special duty
relationship in that case was based primarily upon our reading of
W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(5) [1986], the statute which immunizes a
political subdivision from tort liability for "failure to provide,
or the method of providing, police, law enforcement or fire
protection[.]" We heeded the following "general rule of
construction in governmental tort legislation cases favoring
liability, not immunity: unless the legislation has clearly
provided for immunity under the circumstances, the general common-
law goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by
negligent acts must prevail." Randall, 186 W. Va. at 347, 412 S.E.2d at 748 (citations omitted and emphasis added). We thus held
in syllabus point 8:
W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(5) [1986], which
provides, in relevant part, that a political
subdivision is immune from tort liability for
'the failure to provide, or the method of
providing, police, law enforcement or fire
protection[,]' is coextensive with the common-
law rule not recognizing a cause of action for
the breach of a general duty to provide, or
the method of providing, such protection owed
to the public as a whole. Lacking a clear
expression to the contrary, that statute
incorporates the common-law special duty rule
and does not immunize a breach of a special duty to provide, or the method of providing,
such protection to a particular individual.
Id. (emphasis added).
In O'Dell v. Town of Gauley Bridge, 188 W. Va. 596, 425 S.E.2d 551 (1991), three civil actions against various governmental
entities were consolidated for decision by this Court regarding
whether W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986] immunizes political
subdivisions in personal injury actions where the claim or loss
results from a claim covered by workers' compensation or employer's
liability laws. Following our methodology in Randall, supra, we
examined the applicable statute, W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11)
[1986], which provides that a political subdivision is immune from
tort liability for "'any claim covered by any workers' compensation
law or employer's liability law.'" O'Dell, 188 W. Va. at 609, 425 S.E.2d at 564 (emphasis provided), to determine whether the
legislature had clearly provided for immunity "'regardless of the
existence of a special relationship/special duty.'" Id.(citing
Randall, 186 W. Va. at 348, 412 S.E.2d at 748).
We found there to be no ambiguity in the pertinent
statute which would require us to interpret it in favor of the
plaintiffs injured by the governmental tortfeasors. Id. We thus
gave the words in the statute their common, ordinary and accepted
meanings, particularly the word "any," syl. pts. 1 and 2, Thomas v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 164 W. Va. 763, 266 S.E.2d 905 (1980),
and held that "W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) clearly contemplates
immunity for political subdivisions from tort liability in actions involving claims covered by workers' compensation[.]" O'Dell, 188
W. Va. at 609, 425 S.E.2d at 564.
Applying the aforementioned principles to the case before
us then, the pertinent inquiry is whether W. Va. Code, 29-12A-
5(a)(9) [1986], which provides, in relevant part, that a political
subdivision is immune from tort liability for losses or claims
resulting from "the issuance . . . of . . . any permit . . . [or]
approval," expressly provides for immunity regardless of the
existence of a special relationship/special duty. We find that W.
Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986] contains no ambiguity as to the
immunity afforded a political subdivision.
As we stated in O'Dell, supra:
'1. In the absence of any specific
indication to the contrary, words used in a
statute will be given their common, ordinary
and accepted meanings. Syl. pt. 1, Tug Valley
Recovery Center v. Mingo County Commission,
[164 W. Va. 94], 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979).
'2. The word "any," when used in a
statute, should be construed to mean any.'
O'Dell, 188 W. Va. at 609, 425 S.E.2d at 564 (quoting Thomas v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 164 W. Va. 763, 266 S.E.2d 905
(1980)).
We hold, therefore, that W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9)
[1986] clearly contemplates immunity for political subdivisions
from tort liability for any loss or claim resulting from licensing
powers or functions such as the issuance, denial, suspension or
revocation of or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or
revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authority, regardless of the existence of a special duty
relationship.
C.
As our discussion above indicates, the Planning
Commission and Mr. Teach are immune from tort liability in this
case pursuant to W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986] and 29-12A-
13(b) [1986]. Though the circuit court correctly came to this
conclusion, it, inexplicably, went on to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the issue of negligence which were irrelevant
to its decision. The circuit court found, inter alia:
6. Fill dirt had been hauled onto the
south end of the Snook property, which blocked
the natural drainage swale.
7. Because the natural drainage of water
was blocked, a pipe was necessary pursuant to
The Berkeley County Subdivision Regulations.See footnote 7
8. The installed pipe only carried the
natural drainage that would normally have gone
onto Mr. Hose's property had the fill dirt not
been deposited there.
. . . .
11. The Plaintiffs did not attend the
public hearing which discussed the proposed
plans on July 19, 1990, even though the
hearing date was published in the Martinsburg
Journal, a newspaper of general circulation in
the area, and the land was posted.
12. The Plaintiffs and [Mr. Teach] have
had at least five conversations where Mr.
Teach informed them that the natural flow of
water would go onto their property and that
they would be notified about the public
hearing because the land would be posted and
it would be published in the newspaper.
(footnote added). The circuit court concluded, as a matter of law,
that fill dirt had been hauled onto the Snook property and blocked
the natural drainage swale thereby necessitating the installation of a pipe, pursuant to the Berkeley County Subdivision Regulations.
Appellants maintain, however, that there is conflicting
evidence as to what the natural drainage would normally have been
and that, not only did the thirty-six inch drainage pipe not return
the water to its natural flow, but it created a totally different
flow of surface water across the Williamsport property. Moreover,
the appellants maintain that the appellees violated Berkeley County
Subdivision Regulation 713.5, which requires, in relevant part,
that
all developments provide management measures
necessary to maintain the post-development
peak discharges for a 24 hour, 2- and 10-year
frequency storm event at a level that is equal
to or less than the respective 24 hour, 2- and
10-year pre-development peak discharge rates,
through Storm Water Management practices[.]
(emphasis added). Though the circuit court's order referred
generally to this and other subdivision regulations, it did not
specifically find that this regulation had been met. Indeed,
appellants maintain that the flooding of their property is evidence
that the post-development storm water level exceeds pre-
development, in violation of the aforementioned regulation.
While the circuit court properly granted the Planning
Commission and Mr. Teach's motion for summary judgment based upon
their immunity from tort liability under W. Va. Code, 29-12A-
5(a)(9) [1986] and 29-12A-13(b) [1986], it inappropriately
determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to
the negligence of the appellees herein. See Lenox v. McCauley, 188
W. Va. 203, 423 S.E.2d 606 (1992) (where evidence is conflicting or such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from facts,
issue of negligence is a question for jury determination).
IV.
Appellees Williamsport, Todd Snook and Fox and Associates
It is the contention of appellees Williamsport, Todd
Snook and Fox and Associates that they installed the thirty-six
inch drainage pipe at the direction of the Planning Commission and
the Berkeley County Subdivision Regulations. Thus, they maintain
that the statutory immunity afforded the Planning Commission and
William Teach should be extended to them under the principles of
the government contractor defense.See footnote 8
As a general proposition, "'one who contracts with a
public body for the performance of public work, if not guilty of
negligence or wilful tort . . . is entitled to share the immunity
of the public body from liability for incidental injuries
necessarily involved in the performance of the contract.'" Perdue
v. S.J. Groves and Sons Company, 152 W. Va. 222, 227-28, 161 S.E.2d 250, 254-55 (1968) (quoting 9 ALR 3d § 3 p. 389). See Beaver
Valley Power v. National Eng., 883 F.2d 1210, 1216 (3d Cir. 1989).
By their own admission, these appellees had not contracted with a
public body for the performance of public work, but are private
entities which submitted construction plans to the Planning
Commission for their approval in pursuit of a private business venture. In that these appellees are undisputedly not government
contractors, we find their reliance on the government contractor
defense to be without merit.
Moreover, we have previously stated that where a
statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we will not resort to
the rules of interpretation but rather we will accept its plain
meaning. Syl. pt. 1, Peyton v. City Council of Lewisburg, 182
W. Va. 297, 387 S.E.2d 532 (1989); syl. pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152
W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1986). As we previously indicated, W.
Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986] expressly immunizes a political
subdivision from liability if a loss or claim results from
licensing powers or functions such as the issuance, denial,
suspension or revocation of or failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order
or similar authority. However, W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986]
does not expressly confer similar immunity upon private individuals
or entities to which a political subdivision has issued, denied,
suspended, or revoked or has failed or refused to issue, deny,
suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order
or similar authority.
Accordingly, we hold that while W. Va. Code, 29-12A-
5(a)(9) [1986] expressly immunizes a political subdivision from
liability if a loss or claim results from licensing powers or
functions such as the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of
or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order or similar authority, such immunity does not extend to private individuals or entities to
which a political subdivision has issued, denied, suspended, or
revoked or has failed or refused to issue, deny, suspend or revoke
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar
authority.
V.
For reasons discussed herein, the March 10, 1994 order
granting the Berkeley County Planning Commission and William
Teach's motion for summary judgment is hereby affirmed only insofar
as it determined that they were immune from liability pursuant to
W. Va. Code, 29-12A-5(a)(9) [1986] and 29-12A-13(b) [1986].
However, the May 11, 1994 orders granting Williamsport Storage
Bins, Inc. and Todd Snook's joint motion for summary judgment and
Fox and Associates, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment are hereby
reversed.
Affirmed, in part;
reversed, in part.
Footnote: 1
Located upstream from the Williamsport property are a
trailer court, a convenience store and an industrial park.Footnote: 2
The pipe is an underground solid pipe open only at
each end. One end of the pipe opens up approximately five feet
from appellants' property. It is essentially appellants'
argument that the flow of water has been diverted such that it
now flows upstream through the pipe.
Though Mr. Teach testified that he informed
Williamsport that subdivision regulations require that a pipe be
installed to carry the upstream drainage through the property, he
did not specifically recommend a thirty-six inch pipe. See
Berkeley County Subdivision Regulation 608, paragraph 3, infra,
at n. 7. However, he did review the pipe size and concluded that
the pipe, which would carry a one hundred year storm, exceeded
the minimum requirement that it carry a twenty-five year storm. Footnote: 3
Mr. Teach indicated that he had previously been
contacted by the Berkeley County Public Service Sewer District
because the fill dirt deposited by Williamsport's predecessor in
title, James Jones, had blocked the water upstream from the
Williamsport property. According to Mr. Teach, the Berkeley
County Public Service Sewer District had considered filing a
civil action against Mr. Jones to require him to remove the fill
dirt and to restore the natural drainage swale. Footnote: 4
As a result of this flooding, the number of vehicles
appellants are able to store in their salvage yard has been
greatly reduced.Footnote: 5
Though appellants have foregone their claim against
Mr. Teach individually, they maintain that his actions, as the
agent and employee of the Planning Commission nevertheless
resulted in harm to their property. The circuit court
specifically found in its March 10, 1994 order that under W. Va.
Code, 29-12A-13(b) [1986], which states, in relevant part, that
"'[i]n no instance may an employee of a political subdivision
acting within the scope of his employment be named as a
defendant[,]'" Mr. Teach could not be individually liable. We
agree with this conclusion.Footnote: 6
In syllabus point 2 of Wolfe, supra, this Court
adopted the following general test for determining whether a
special relationship exists:
To establish that a special relationship
exists between a local governmental entity
and an individual, which is the basis for a
special duty of care owed to such individual,
the following elements must be shown: (1)
an assumption by the local governmental
entity, through promises or actions, of an
affirmative duty to act on behalf of the
party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the
part of the local governmental entity's
agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3)
some form of direct contact between the local
governmental entity's agents and the injured
party; and (4) that party's justifiable
reliance on the local governmental entity's
affirmative undertaking.
Footnote: 7
Findings of fact 13, 14 and 15 specifically cited the
following subdivision regulations:
Paragraph 3 of Berkeley County Subdivision
Regulation 608 states:
The subdivision developer/owner shall
construct and/or install such drainage
structures and/or pipes as are necessary to
prevent erosion damage and to satisfactorily
carry off surface waters.
Berkeley County Subdivision Regulation
609.4(e) states that each person,
corporation, or other entity which makes any
surface changes shall be required, among
other things, to:
(1) Collect on-site surface runoff and
dispose of it to the point of discharge into
the common natural watercourse of the
drainage area.
(2) Handle existing off-site runoff
through his development by designing it to
adequately handle storm runoff from a fully
developed area upstream.
Berkeley County Subdivision Regulation 713.5
provides, in relevant part:
1. Minimum Control Requirements
A. Areas not in a mapped local hazard zone, as contained herein, shall require that all developments provide management measures necessary to maintain the post-development peak discharges for a 24 hour, 2- and 10-year frequency storm event at a level that is equal to or less than the respective 24 hour, 2- and 10-year pre-development peak discharge rates, through Storm Water Management practices that control the volume, timing, and rate of flows.Footnote: 8 As we previously indicated, the two May 11, 1994 orders granting these appellees' respective motions for summary judgment were void of any findings of fact or conclusions of law for our review.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.