Chrystal v. Charlie A. L.
Annotate this Case
January 1995 Term
_____________
No. 22507
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CHRYSTAL R. M.
Plaintiff Below, Appellant
v.
CHARLIE A. L.
Defendant Below, Appellee
___________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Wood County
Honorable George W. Hill, Jr., Judge
Civil Action No. 91-C-710
REVERSED AND REMANDED
___________________________________________________________
Submitted: May 3, 1995
Filed: June 21, 1995
Richard A. Bush, Esq.
Bush & Trippel
Parkersburg, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellant
Jan Dils Hughes, Esq.
Parkersburg, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellee
RETIRED JUSTICE MILLER, sitting by temporary assignment,
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON and JUSTICE RECHT did not participate.
JUDGE FOX sitting by temporary assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court
is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a
statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.
2. "Statutes relating to different subjects are not in
pari materia. Syllabus point 5, Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Citizens National Bank, 148 W. Va. 198, 133 S.E.2d 720 (1963)."
Syllabus point 1, Atchinson v. Erwin, 172 W. Va. 8, 302 S.E.2d 78
(1983).
3. Statements by the natural mother in an adoption
agreement that the adoptive father acknowledges paternity, when the
adoption agreement is subsequently not consummated, does not
constitute an acknowledgement of paternity under W. Va. Code, 48A-
6-6(b) (1990). Therefore, such statements do not bar a proceeding
on her part against the actual biological father to establish
paternity.
4. "Under W. Va. Code, 48A-6-3 (1992), undisputed blood
or tissue test results indicating a statistical probability of
paternity of more than ninety-eight percent are conclusive on the
issue of paternity, and the circuit court should enter judgment
accordingly." Syllabus point 5, Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., 192
W. Va. 345, 452 S.E.2d 436 (1994).
Miller, Justice:
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether
language by the mother in a written prenatal adoption agreement
stating, that the adoptive father is the natural father, should
prevail over blood tests that prove a third person, the appellee,
Charlie A.L. is the biological father.See footnote 1 By agreement dated
January 8, 1990, the appellant, Chrystal R.M., consented to allow
Mr. and Mrs. Ruble to adopt her child. In the agreement, the
appellant stated that she "hereby acknowledges that Gregory Emmitt
Ruble, . . . is the natural father of said child and agrees to
place his name on the initial birth certificate and necessary
hospital records at the time of her admission for the birth of the
child."See footnote 2 The adoption was never consummated.
In June of 1991, the appellant filed suit against the
appellee asserting that he was the biological father, and seeking
child support, reimbursement of birth expenses, and attorney fees.See footnote 3 The family law master eventually ordered blood tests to determine
the paternity issue. They revealed that Mr. Ruble was not the
biological father and that there was a 99.94% probability that the
appellee, Charles A.L., was the biological father.
The appellee defended against the paternity action by
asserting that the signed and notarized adoption agreement between
Mr. and Mrs. Ruble and Chrystal R.M., stating that Mr. Ruble was
the father, met the requirements of W. Va. Code, 48A-6-6(b) (1990)
which states:
A written acknowledgment by both the man and
woman that the man is the father of the named
child legally establishes the man as the
father of the child for all purposes and child
support can be established under the
provisions of this chapter.
The family law master concluded that this section was
designed to establish paternity where the mother and the putative
father acknowledged his paternity, but was not meant to cover
adoption agreements. On appeal the circuit court reversed because
it determined that the language in the adoption agreement met the
requirements of W. Va. Code, 48A-6-6(b) (1990). This appeal
clearly presents a question of law involving an interpretation of
a statute. Accordingly, we apply the de novo standard of review as
set out in syllabus point 1, in part, of Burnside v. Burnside, ___
W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 22399, March 24, 1995) which states that "questions of law and statutory interpretations are subject to
a de novo review."See footnote 4
Initially, the appellant argues that the applicable
language in the adoption agreement is void and unenforceable citing
Wyatt v. Wyatt, 185 W. Va. 472, 475, 408 S.E.2d 51, 54 (1991).
There we said that "[t]he duty of a parent to support a child is a
basic duty owed by the parent to the child, and a parent cannot
waive or contract away the child's right to support." We do not
find Wyatt to be applicable simply because the contract for
adoption was not consummated. Consequently, the mother neither
waived nor contracted away the child's right to support.
We disagree with the legal basis of the circuit court's
opinion that under W. Va. Code, 48A-6-6(b) (1990), there had been
a formal acknowledgment of paternity. We do not believe that this
subsection has some talismanic meaning that requires us to abandon both our logic and common sense. From a purely technical
viewpoint, it can be said that the adoption agreement did not carry
the "written acknowledgment by both the man and woman" as required
by this subsection. Certainly, Mr. Ruble did not admit that he was
the natural father because as earlier noted, this statement was
made only by the natural mother.See footnote 5
Of more importance, it must be remembered that this was
an adoption agreement and it is within this context that we judge
its purpose. The purpose of W. Va. Code, 48A-6-6(b) (1990),
allowing for acknowledgment of paternity by written agreement, is
to enable the biological father to acknowledge this fact without
the necessity of going through an expensive and often protracted
hearing to establish paternity. This can be seen by reading W. Va.
Code, 48A-6-6(a) (1990), which outlines the more cumbersome
procedures that must be followed by a putative father seeking to
establish paternity.See footnote 6
Moreover, the paternity section, W. Va. Code, 48A-6-1 et
seq. (1993) is separate and distinct from the adoption section,
W. Va. Code, 48-4-1 et seq. (1985). They serve two entirely
different interests, and because of this they are not considered to
be in pari materia. We discussed the concept of in pari materia at
some length in Manchin v. Dunfree, 174 W. Va. 532, 535-36, 327 S.E.2d 710, 713-14 (1984) and observed that it was a rule of
statutory construction. We acknowledged the rule meant that
"[s]tatutes which relate to the same subject should be read and
applied together. . . ." 174 W. Va. at 535, 327 S.E.2d at 713. We
went on in Manchin, to recognize the corollary to the rule as set
out in syllabus point 1 of Atchinson v. Erwin, 172 W. Va. 8, 302 S.E.2d 78 (1983) stating that "[s]tatutes relating to different
subjects are not in pari materia. [Citations omitted.]"
Consequently, we customarily do not consider language in paternity
statutes to be applicable to adoption agreements.
Finally, from a public policy standpoint, we do not
believe that W. Va. Code, 48A-6-6(b) (1990) can be used to thwart
the rights of a natural father. It would be unjust to allow the
biological mother to join with another man who is not the biological father and file an acknowledgment under this section
which would bar the rights of the biological father. As evidenced
by Simmons v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530 (1993), we have
been reluctant to accord a nonbiological father any preferential
standing. Simmons dealt with the right of a putative father to
claim a parental relationship with a child whose natural mother had
represented to him that he was the biological father; she then
rejected his attempt to sustain a continuing relationship with the
child.
Of more direct importance, however, is the constitutional
right accorded to the biological parent not to be deprived of his
paternal right without notice and some appropriate due process
hearing, as we explained in In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973), relying on, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972); see also In re Jeffrey R.L.,
190 W. Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 60 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1983). But see
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed 91
(1989). Thus, we conclude that statements by the natural mother in
an adoption agreement that the adoptive father acknowledges
paternity, when the adoption agreement is subsequently not
consummated, does not constitute an acknowledgement of paternity
under W. Va. Code, 48A-6-6(b). Therefore, such statements do not bar a proceeding on her part against the actual biological father
to establish paternity.
In the final analysis, this case was a paternity issue.
Blood tests were ordered under W. Va. Code, 48A-6-3 (1992) and, as
earlier noted, the appellee was found by a 99.94% probability to be
the father and the tests excluded Mr. Ruble. Under W. Va. Code,
48A-6-3(a)(3)(1992), such an undisputed finding, when filed,
"legally establish(es) the man as the father of the child for all
purposes. . . ."See footnote 7 Recently, in acknowledgement of this section, we
stated in syllabus point 5 of Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., supra,
note 1:
Under W. Va. Code, 48A-6-3 (1992),
undisputed blood or tissue test results
indicating a statistical probability of
paternity of more than ninety-eight percent
are conclusive on the issue of paternity, and
the circuit court should enter judgment
accordingly.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Wood County and remand this case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Footnote: 1
In accord with our prior practice, we do not use the last
names of the parties in domestic cases that involve sensitive
facts. See e.g. Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., 192 W. Va. 345, 452 S.E.2d 436 (1994); Nancy Viola R. v. Randolph W., 177 W. Va. 710,
356 S.E.2d 464 (1987).Footnote: 2
The relevant language of the adoption agreement was:
The party of the second part hereby
acknowledges that Gregory Emmitt Ruble, one of
the parties of the first part hereto, is the
natural father of said child and agrees to
place his name on the initial birth
certificate and necessary hospital records at
the time of her admission for the birth of the
child.Footnote: 3
The right to recover these items as a part of a paternity
action is statutory as we explained in Kathy L.B. v. Patrick J.B.,
179 W. Va. 655, 371 S.E.2d 583 (1988).Footnote: 4
The entire text of syllabus point 1 of Burnside v. Burnside,
supra, is:
In reviewing challenges to findings made by
a family law master that also were adopted by
a circuit court, a three-pronged standard of
review is applied. Under these circumstances,
a final equitable distribution order is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard; the underlying factual findings are
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard;
and questions of law and statutory
interpretations are subject to a de novo
review.
As the syllabus in Burnside indicates, the circuit court had
concurred with the family law master's findings. However, where
a disagreement exists as in this case and the issue is one of law
a de novo review is still the correct standard.
Footnote: 5
For the text, see supra, note 2. The appellant, Chrystal
R.M., stated in the adoption agreement that Mr. Ruble was the
natural father. However, Mr. Ruble never explicitly claimed he was
the father of Chrystal R.M.'s child.Footnote: 6
W. Va. Code, 48A-6-6(a) (1990) states:
The natural father of a child may file an
application to establish paternity in circuit
court when he acknowledges that the child is
his or when he has married the mother of the
child after the child's birth and upon consent
of the mother, or if she is deceased or
incompetent, or has surrendered custody, upon
the consent of the person or agency having
custody of the child or of a court having
jurisdiction over the child's custody. The
application may be filed in the county where
the natural father resides, the child resides,
or the child was born. The circuit court, if
satisfied that the applicant is the natural
father and that establishment of the
relationship is for the best interest of the
child, shall enter the finding of fact and an
order upon its docket, and thereafter the
child is the child of the applicant, as though
born to him in lawful wedlock.Footnote: 7
W. Va. Code, 48A-6-3(a)(3) (1992) states:
Undisputed blood or tissue test results which show a statistical probability of paternity of more than ninety-eight percent shall, when filed with the court, legally establish the man as the father of the child for all purposes and child support may be established pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
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