Cox v. State of WV
Annotate this Case
January 1995 Term
______________________
Nos. 22484 & 22485
______________________
JACQUELINE BENNETT COX,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee
v.
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Defendant Below,
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
Appellant
___________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Tucker County
Honorable Andrew N. Frye, Judge
Civil Action No. 92-C-110
AFFIRMED
___________________________________________________________
Submitted: May 16, 1995
Filed: June 15, 1995
John W. Cooper, Esq.
Lori M. Hood, Esq.
Cooper & Preston
Parsons, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellee
Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Esq.
Attorney General
Stephen R. Van Camp, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellant
The Opinion of the COURT was delivered PER CURIAM.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON and JUSTICE RECHT did not participate.
RETIRED JUSTICE MILLER and JUDGE FOX sitting by
temporary assignment.
JUSTICE CLECKLEY and JUSTICE WORKMAN concur, and reserve
the right to file concurring opinions.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "'A motion for summary judgment should be granted
only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be
tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify
the application of the law.' Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W. Va. 160,
133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). Syllabus Point 1, Andrick v. Town of
Buckhannon, 187 W. Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992)." Syllabus Point
1, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___
(No. 22493, March 24, 1995), rehearing denied, May 11, 1995.
2. "Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the
totality of the evidence presented, the record could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as
where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing
on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to
prove." Syllabus Point 2, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., ___
W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 22493, March 24, 1995), rehearing
denied, May 11, 1995.
3. "If the moving party makes a properly supported
motion for summary judgment and can show by affirmative evidence
that there is no genuine issue of a material fact, the burden of
production shifts to the nonmoving party who must either
(1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked by the moving party,
(2) produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine
issue for trial, or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure." Syllabus Point 3, Williams v.
Precision Coil, Inc., ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (No. 22493,
March 24, 1995), rehearing denied, May 11, 1995.
4. "The imposition of sanctions by a circuit court
under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 37(b) for the failure of a party to obey the
court's order to provide or permit discovery is within the sound
discretion of the court and will not be disturbed upon appeal
unless there has been an abuse of that discretion." Syllabus Point
1, Bell v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 175 W. Va. 165, 332 S.E.2d 127,
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 936, 106 S. Ct. 299, 88 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1985).
5. "Where a party's counsel intentionally or with gross
negligence fails to obey an order of a circuit court to provide or
permit discovery, the full range of sanctions under W.Va.R.Civ.P.
37(b) is available to the court and the party represented by that
counsel must bear the consequences of counsel's actions." Syllabus
Point 4, Bell v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 175 W. Va. 165, 332 S.E.2d 127, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 936, 106 S. Ct. 299, 88 L. Ed. 2d 277
(1985).
Per Curiam:
The Division of Natural Resources of the State of West
Virginia appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Tucker County
granting Jacqueline Bennett Cox summary judgment and also
sanctioning the State by striking the State's pleadings, which
resulted in judgment on the pleadings. Ms. Cox sued the State to
quiet title to an 105.21 acre tract located in Canaan Valley State
Park. After the State failed to respond to Ms. Cox's summary
judgment motion, requests for admission and discovery requests, the
circuit court awarded Ms. Cox summary judgment and sanctioned the
State by striking its pleadings. On appeal, the State argues that
no evidence supports the finding that it willfully failed to
respond to discovery requests, that the circuit court failed to
hold an evidentiary hearing on discovery requests and that the
State will suffer prejudice if required to use eminent domain to
acquire the disputed tract.See footnote 1 Because the record shows no error, we
affirm the circuit court's decision.
I
On December 16, 1992, Ms. Cox filed suit to quiet title
to a 105.21 acre tract of land located in Canaan Valley State Park,
Tucker County, West Virginia (hereinafter the tract). In her
complaint, Ms. Cox alleges that she has title to the tract because
she and her predecessors in interest, under color of title, possessed the tract openly, notoriously and continuously for more
than 60 years. Ms. Cox maintains that the Division's placing
markings and signs and maintaining trails on her tract constitutes
an ongoing trespass. Ms. Cox also alleges that the Division's
development of the park had caused her tract to become surrounded
by park land. Attached to Ms. Cox's complaint is a March 16, 1964
letter from the Department of Natural Resources to John A. Bennett,
Ms. Cox's father and predecessor in interest, acknowledging that
the tract was subject to competing claims and offering to pay one-
half of the market price, as agreed to by the parties, for a
quitclaim deed.
The State filed a timely answer denying the allegations
and claiming title to the tract through the will of Sarah Maude
Kaemmerling, which the State alleges is superior to Ms. Cox's
title.
On April 21, 1993, Ms. Cox served the State with a set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
According to Ms. Cox, after the State failed to respond, her lawyer
contacted Russell M. Hunter, the Assistant Attorney General
representing the State, who said that the State would respond
during the week of June 21, 1993. On June 23, 1993, the circuit
court scheduled a jury trial for August 30, 1993.
Because the State failed to response to Ms. Cox's
discovery requests, on August 10, 1993, Ms. Cox filed motions to
compel discovery and to continue the jury trial. After a hearing on August 20, 1993, which was not attended by the State's lawyerSee footnote 2,
on August 26, 1993, the circuit court ordered the State to comply
with Ms. Cox's discovery requests on or before August 31, 1993 or
"its Answer and other pleadings will be stricken and Plaintiff will
be granted summary judgment and Plaintiff's prayers for relief in
the Counts of the Complaint will be granted." The circuit court
also rescheduled the jury trial for December 16, 1993.
On August 31, 1993, the State answered at least some of
the interrogatories and produced at least some of the documents.See footnote 3
One of the documents that the State failed to produce was the
Division's March 16, 1964 letter that had been attached to Ms.
Cox's complaint.
By letter dated September 3, 1993, Ms. Cox's lawyer
requested the State to provide entire copies of the plats for comparison. No answer was received. On September 24, 1993, Ms.
Cox served the State with 55 Requests for Admission, to which the
State made no response.
On October 28, 1993, Ms. Cox filed a motion for summary
judgment based on the State's answer, facts admitted, tax maps and
County Assessor's records. Ms. Cox also filed a motion for
sanctions alleging that the State failed to comply with discovery
requests. Both motions were noticed for a hearing on November 12,
1993. The State did not respond to either motion, did not request
a continuance, and did not file any evidentiary rebuttal. During
the November 12, 1993 hearing, the Tucker County Assessor testified
that according to official tax maps, the disputed tract "is outside
the [State Park] boundary. . . ." Mr. Hunter, the State's lawyer,
said he had a copy of the State's title report, which was available
at the hearing, and he agreed that partial maps had been supplied.
The State argued that the existence of a material issue of fact
concerning adverse possession precluded summary judgment, but
failed to present any counter affidavit(s) or any additional
document(s) or to retract explicitly any of its admissions.
By order dated November 19, 1993, the circuit court
granted Ms. Cox's motion for summary judgment and motion for
sanctions by striking all of the State's pleadings and awarding Ms.
Cox judgment on the pleadings. Ms. Cox was also awarded an
easement because the disputed tract was landlocked by virtue of the
State's previous land acquisitions.
On February 7, 1994, the State, now represented by
Shirley A. Skaggs, Senior Assistant Attorney General, filed a
motion to reconsider. Attached to the motion were several
additional documents and plats that had been requested in
discovery; however, no title report or abstract was attached.See footnote 4 At
the March 18, 1994 hearing,See footnote 5 the State argued that its title is
superior to Ms. Cox's title and that summary judgment was premature
and not a proper sanction for failure to respond to discovery
requests. The State also said that the "State's responses to the
admissions and amended admissions are being prepared and will be
submitted to the court for its review in the near future."See footnote 6 Ms.
Cox argued that the State's motion to reconsider was untimely
because Rule 59(e) [1978] of the W.Va.R.Civ.P. requires the motion to be filed within 10 days and no ground for a Rule 60(b) motion
was asserted. Ms. Cox also asserts that the attachment of
documents, exhibits and an affidavit was solely to augment the
record for appeal.
After the hearing, by order dated May 9, 1994, the
circuit court denied the State's motion to reconsider. The State
then appealed to this Court.
II
The circuit court awarded Ms. Cox judgment on two
separate grounds: (1) summary judgment; and (2) a sanction, imposed
on the State for failure to comply with a discovery order, striking
the State's pleadings and then awarding Ms. Cox judgment on the
pleadings.See footnote 7 Although the State contends that summary judgment was
contingent on the sanction award, the circuit court granted Ms. Cox
summary judgment independently of the sanction award.See footnote 8 We first
consider whether the award of summary judgment was proper.
"A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed
de novo." Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). In accord Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., ___ W. Va.
___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (Slip op. at 4) (No. 22493 March 24,
1995), rehearing denied, May 11, 1995. Our traditional standard
for granting summary judgment is stated in Syl. pt. 3, Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of N.Y., 148 W. Va. 160,
133 S.E.2d 770 (1963):
A motion for summary judgment should be
granted only when it is clear that there is no
genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry
concerning the facts is not desirable to
clarify the application of the law.
In accord Syl. pt. 1, Williams, supra; Syl. pt. 2, Painter, supra;
Syl. pt. 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W. Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992).
Recently in Williams and Painter, we clarified the
application of our long settled principles regarding summary
judgment under Rule 56 [1978] of the W.Va.R.Civ.P. Subsection c of
Rule 56 states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."
In Williams, we said that at the summary judgment stage
the circuit court's function "is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is
a genuine issue for trial.'" Williams, ___ W. Va. at ___, ___
S.E.2d at ___, Slip. op. at 8, quoting, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 212
(1986). See Syl. pt. 3, Painter, supra. We concluded that "we
must draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in
the most favorable light to the party opposing the motion.
[Citations omitted.]" Williams, ___ W. Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at
___, Slip op. at 8.
Syl. pt. 2, Williams, states:
Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the
totality of the evidence presented, the record
could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party, such as where
the nonmoving party has failed to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of
the case that it has the burden to prove.
See also Syl. pt. 4, Painter, supra.
Syl. pt. 3, Williams, states:
If the moving party makes a properly
supported motion for summary judgment and can
show by affirmative evidence that there is no
genuine issue of a material fact, the burden
of production shifts to the nonmoving party
who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence
attacked by the moving party, (2) produce
additional evidence showing the existence of a
genuine issue for trial, or (3) submit an
affidavit explaining why further discovery is
necessary as provided in Rule 56(f) of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
In this case, Ms. Cox supported her motion for summary
judgment with the facts admitted by the State including the
following:
(1) Ms. Cox and her predecessors in interest held title
to the tract continuously since 1919 and paid real estate taxes on
the tract since 1926.
(2) Although the State acquired title through eminent
domain to other real estate owned by Ms. Cox's father, her
predecessor in interest for this tract, the State failed to condemn
or otherwise acquire the tract.
(3) Ms. Kammerling, who devised various real estate in
Tucker County to the State and who, allegedly was State's
predecessor in interest on the tract, had "never purchased or
acquired title" to the tract; and,
(4) The State had never received a deed to the tract and
according to State tax maps, the tract was outside Canaan Valley
State Park and listed under the names of Ms. Cox and her
predecessors in interest.
Given the admissions of the State, we agree with the
circuit court that Ms. Cox make a properly supported motion for
summary judgment. Once, Ms. Cox met her initial burden of
production and persuasion, the burden of production shifted to the
State, which did nothing. The State failed (1) to retract its
admissions or otherwise attempt to rehabilitate the evidence; (2)
produce additional evidence; or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further discovery was necessary. See Syl. pt. 3, Williams,
supra.
The State's allegation of superior title to the tract was
contradicted by its own admissions. See Williams, ___ W. Va. at
___ n.12, ___ S.E.2d at ___ n.12, Slip op. at 11-12 n.12, noting
that "[a] conflict of evidence does not create a 'genuine issue of
fact' if it unilaterally is induced." In this case, there is no
conflict of evidence; rather a conflict between an allegation and
admitted facts. We also note that the State did not request a
continuance. See Williams, ___ W. Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___,
Slip op. at 14, discussing the relief provided by Rule 56 (f) "when
a party needs additional information or time to respond to a motion
for summary judgment. [Footnote and citation omitted.]"
Rule 56 (e) [1978] states, in pertinent part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.
When these Rule 56 principles are applied to the case at
bar, we find that the circuit court's award of summary judgment was
proper.
II
Because we affirm the circuit court award of summary
judgment, our discussion of the sanction applied in this case is
limited. Rule 37(b) [1988] of the W.Va.R.Civ.P. is designed to
ensure prompt and adequate responses to discovery requests. See
Syl. pt. 1, Shreve v. Warren Assoc., Inc., 177 W. Va. 600, 355 S.E.2d 389 (1987).
Rule 37(b) permits a circuit court to impose the
following sanctions for failure to comply with an order compelling
discovery:
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is
Pending.-- If a party or an officer, director,
or managing agent of a party or a person
designated under Rules 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to
testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery,
including an order made under subdivision (a)
of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails
to supplement as provided for under Rule
26(e), or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which
the action is pending may make such orders in
regard to the failure as are just, and among
others are the follows:
(A) An order that the matters regarding
which the order was made or any other
designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in
accordance with the claim of the party
obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the
disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting
him from introducing designated matters in
evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or
parts thereof, or staying further proceedings
until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
rendering a judgment by default against the
disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders
or in addition thereto, an order treating as a
contempt of court the failure to obey any
orders except an order to submit to a physical
or mental examination; . . .
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in
addition thereto, the court shall require the
party failing to obey the order or the
attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, caused by the failure, unless the court
finds that the failure was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.See footnote 9
A circuit court's decision to impose sanctions under Rule
37(b) for a party's failure to obey a court order to provide or to
permit discovery is within the court's sound discretion. Syl. pt.
1, Bell, supra note 9, states:
The imposition of sanctions by a circuit
court under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 37(b) for the
failure of a party to obey the court's order
to provide or permit discovery is within the
sound discretion of the court and will not be
disturbed upon appeal unless there has been an
abuse of that discretion.
See State ex rel. Rusen v. Hill, ___ W. Va. ___, ___, 454 S.E.2d 427, 434 (1994), discussing standard of review for imposition of
sanctions under Rule 16(d)(2) of the W.Va.R.Crim.P.; Vincent v.
Preiser, 175 W. Va. 797, 804, 338 S.E.2d 398, 405 (1985).
Bell also recognized that because of the constitutional
limitations and the purposes of Rule 37, "[a]s a general rule, the
rendering of judgment by default as a sanction under Rule 37(b)
should be used sparingly and only in extreme circumstances," in
order to effectuate the "policy of the law favoring the disposition
of cases on their merits. [Citations omitted.]" Bell, 175 W. Va. at
172, 332 S.E.2d at 134, quoting, Affanto v. Merrill Brothers, 547 F.2d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 1977). Davis v. Sheppe, 187 W. Va. 194,
417 S.E.2d 113 (1992); Hulmes by Vest v. Catterson, 182 W. Va. 439,
442, 388 S.E.2d 313 (1989) (per curiam).
The circuit court is required to hold an evidentiary
hearing and consider the entire record in order to determine if the
"the failure to comply has been due to willfulness, bad faith or
fault of the disobedient party and not the inability to comply and,
further, that such sanctions are otherwise just." Syllabus Point
2, in part, Bell. Once the party seeking the sanction has met his
burden of establishing noncompliance with the order compelling
discovery, the burden shifts to "the disobedient party to avoid the
sanctions sought under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 37(b) by showing that the
inability to comply or special circumstances render the particular
sanctions unjust." Syl. pt. 3, in part, Bell.
Bell also recognized that the actions of a party's
counsel can justify the imposition of sanctions. Syl. pt. 4, Bell,
supra note 9, states:
Where a party's counsel intentionally or
with gross negligence fails to obey an order
of a circuit court to provide or permit
discovery, the full range of sanctions under
W.Va.R.Civ.P. 37(b) is available to the court
and the party represented by that counsel must
bear the consequences of counsel's actions.
In Doulamis v. Alpine Lake Property Owners Ass'n, Inc.,
184 W. Va. 107, 112, 399 S.E.2d 689, 694 (1990)(per curiam), we
noted that "W.Va.R.Civ.P. Rule 37 [1988] provides various sanctions
and that dismissal, the harshest sanction, should be used sparingly
and only after other sanctions have failed to bring about
compliance."
In this case, the circuit court conducted a hearing on
the motion for sanctions and Ms. Cox established that the State had
not complied with the circuit court's order compelling discovery.
Although the State argues that no evidentiary hearing was held, the
record contains a transcript of the November 12, 1993 hearing
during which the circuit court consider Ms. Cox's motion for
sanctions and the State's reasons for not complying.
The State also argues that its failure to disclose a 1964
letter already in Ms. Cox's possession was not prejudicial to her
case. Although we agree that the State's failure to disclose the
1964 letter was not prejudicial, we note that the State's failure
to disclose title reports and abstracts, the contents of which were
not known to Ms. Cox, could have been prejudicial. Finally, we
note that the State was given several opportunities, informal and
formal, to comply before the sanction was imposed. Indeed the circuit court's order compelling discovery indicated that the
failure to comply would be the imposition of this sanction.
The State maintains that its failure to comply with the
discovery requests was not willful. Given the State's different
explanations (see supra note 3) and failure to comply, we find that
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
sanction of striking the State's pleading.
For the above stated reasons, the decision of the circuit
court of Tucker County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1
The State does not address the merits of the circuit court's
grant of summary judgment.Footnote: 2
According to Ms. Cox's brief, counsel for the State failed to
notify either the Court or Ms. Cox's lawyer that the State would
not appear at the August 20, 1993 hearing. Judge Frye and Ms.
Cox's lawyer were present in open court and after waiting 45
minutes, Judge Frye instructed Ms. Cox's lawyer to telephone
counsel for the State. When contacted, Mr. Hunter said he would
not appear and did not oppose the granting of either motion. Footnote: 3
Ms. Cox maintains that the State's August 31, 1993 responses
were either incomplete or missing. Ms. Cox noted that no answer
was provided to one interrogatory and that the State failed to
provide its title abstracts, files, reports or complete copies of
maps and plats.
The State maintains that the omitted material was
insignificant and because Ms. Cox already knew of the Division's
1964 letter, she suffered no prejudice.
In support of its Motion to Reconsider filed on February 7,
1994, the State submitted as exhibits over one hundred pages of
documents which Ms. Cox alleges should have been disclosed in
discovery. Footnote: 4
The State gave conflicting accounts on why the material was
not produced earlier. During the November 18, 1993 hearing, Mr.
Hunter, the State's lawyer at the time, said, "I copied and
furnished what file was provided me by the agency. . . there has
been no intentional pigeonholing of any documents by counsel or
anybody else. . . ." During the March 18, 1994 hearing, the State,
now represented by Ms. Scaggs, said, "[A] lot of that information
was prepared and given to the attorney and never made its way to
Mr. Cooper [Ms. Cox's lawyer]." However, Ms. Scaggs also said that
the agency "prepared a first set of copies of information that was
requested and that information was never picked up from his office
and never forwarded to Mr. Cooper."Footnote: 5
According to the transcript, the State scheduled a hearing
for about two weeks earlier. When the State failed to appear, the
circuit court said he "personally called your [the State's
lawyer's] office and the secretary said well she called in sick
today, she is not going to be here, so nobody called me to tell me
you had called in sick."Footnote: 6
The record on appeal contained no response from the State to
Ms. Cox's requests for admission. Footnote: 7
Although the circuit court does not articulate the bases for
judgment, we interpret this action to be a Judgment on the
Pleadings under Rule 12(c) [1994] of the W.Va.R.Civ.P.Footnote: 8
The November 18, 1993 order of the circuit court first
addressed Ms. Cox's motion for sanctions and then her motion for
summary judgment. Although the State argues that during the
November 12, 1983 hearing, the circuit court's grant of summary
judgment resulted from the circuit court's imposition of sanctions,
the court's written order indicated that judgment was awarded on
both bases. Indeed, in its May 9, 1994 order denying the State's
motion to reconsider, the circuit court said that its November 18,
1993 order "granted simultaneous judgments in favor of the
Plaintiff on two separate grounds and bases:. . . " (1) sanctions
and (2) summary judgment. Footnote: 9
Rule 37 of the W.Va.R.Civ.P. is virtually identical to Rule
37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Bell v. Inland Mut.
Ins. Co., 175 W. Va. 165, 332 S.E.2d 127, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 936, 106 S. Ct. 299, 88 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1985).
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