State of WV v. Adams
Annotate this Case
January 1995 Term
____________
No. 22398
____________
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee
v.
SAMUEL E. ADAMS,
Defendant Below, Appellant
__________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Putnam County
Honorable Clarence L. Watt, Judge
Criminal No. 92-F-115
AFFIRMED
__________________________________________________
Submitted: January 17, 1995
Filed: February 17, 1995
Rosemary J. Humway
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellee
Daniel Corey
Poca, West Virginia
Attorney for Appellant
JUSTICE CLECKLEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON did not participate.
JUDGE FOX sitting by temporary assignment.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 1995 Term
____________
No. 22397
____________
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
EX REL. SAMUEL ADAMS,
Petitioner
v.
DELBERT HARRISON,
SHERIFF OF PUTNAM COUNTY,
Respondent
__________________________________________________
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
DENIED
__________________________________________________
Submitted: January 17, 1995
Filed: February 17, 1995
Samuel Adams
Pro se
Rosemary J. Humway
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for Respondent
JUSTICE CLECKLEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BROTHERTON did not participate.
JUDGE FOX sitting by temporary assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. A defendant has a right under the Grand Jury Clause
of Section 4 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution to be
tried only on felony offenses for which a grand jury has returned
an indictment.
2. To the extent that State v. McGraw, 140 W. Va. 547,
885 S.E.2d 849 (1955), stands for the proposition that "any" change
to an indictment, whether it be form or substance, requires
resubmission to the grand jury for its approval, it is hereby
expressly modified. An indictment may be amended by the circuit
court, provided the amendment is not substantial, is sufficiently
definite and certain, does not take the defendant by surprise, and
any evidence the defendant had before the amendment is equally
available after the amendment.
3. Any substantial amendment, direct or indirect, of an
indictment must be resubmitted to the grand jury. An "amendment of
form" which does not require resubmission of an indictment to the
grand jury occurs when the defendant is not misled in any sense, is
not subjected to any added burden of proof, and is not otherwise
prejudiced.
Cleckley, Justice:
The appellant and defendant below, Samuel E. Adams, was
convicted in June, 1993, by a jury in the Circuit Court of Putnam
County of one count of concealing stolen property and one count of
transferring stolen property.See footnote 1 On December 23, 1993, the defendant
was sentenced to indeterminate consecutive terms of one to ten
years on each count. On appeal, he argues that an amendment to
count one of the indictment which changed the name of the owner of
the stolen goods was unconstitutional. We disagree that the
defendant's right under Section 4 of Article III of the West
Virginia Constitution was violated, and we affirm his conviction on
count one. Similarly, we find the defendant's remaining
assignments of error to be without merit; and we affirm his
conviction on count two.See footnote 2
I.
In the summer of 1992, the Putnam County Sheriff's
Department investigated a series of breakings and enterings and
grand larcenies. The police questioned Christopher Randolph and he admitted that he and Dwayne Smith were involved in approximately
fifteen of those crimes. As part of their plea agreements, Mr.
Randolph and Mr. Smith testified on behalf of the State at the
defendant's trial.
The record reflects numerous incidents in which personal
property was stolen by Mr. Randolph and Mr. Smith that they later
sold to the defendant. On some occasions, the defendant sold the
merchandise to Eddie Stratton, the owner of Deals on Wheels, a car
lot in Putnam County. Specifically, the evidence regarding count
one of the indictment shows Mr. Randolph and Mr. Smith broke into
Ben's RV Center in Putnam County, a business owned by Jerry
Cunningham, and stole a hand saw, a weedeater, and a lawn mower.
It was later learned that the items belonged to Edward Morgan, Mr.
Cunningham's son-in-law. The men contacted the defendant to sell
the merchandise. The defendant instructed the men to hide the
items beside a cemetery on Poca River Road, and he led them to the
area.
The evidence regarding count two of the indictment shows
Mr. Randolph and Mr. Smith stole a lawn mower and a rototiller from
the residence of Houston Thornton. They transported the items to
a deserted field along Cow Creek Road in Putnam County. The
defendant later purchased the goods from the men and stored the
items at Deals on Wheels.
On count one, the grand jury returned an indictment which
identified Jerry Cunningham as the owner of the stolen items. On
May 28, 1993, the morning voir dire took place, the State moved to
amend the indictment to identify Mr. Morgan as the owner of the
goods. The circuit court allowed the amendment over the objection
of defense counsel. On appeal, the defendant requests we reverse
his conviction on both counts.
II.
The defendant's first assignment of error is that his
conviction on count one under the amended indictment was
unconstitutional. It is well settled law that a defendant has a
right under the Grand Jury Clause of Section 4 of Article III of
the West Virginia Constitution to be tried only on felony offenses
for which a grand jury has returned an indictment. In unbroken
precedent, this Court has stated: "'A valid indictment or
presentment can be made only by a grand jury; and no court can make
an indictment in the first instance or alter or amend the substance
of an indictment returned by a grand jury.' Syllabus Point 5,
State v. McGraw, 140 W. Va. 547, 85 S.E.2d 849 (1955)." Syllabus
Point 2, State v. Pruitt, 178 W. Va. 147, 358 S.E.2d 231 (1987).
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10, 7 S. Ct. 781, 786, 30 L. Ed. 849, ___ (1887), states the
reason for this rule:
"If it lies within the province of a court to
change the charging part of an indictment to
suit its own notions of what it ought to have
been, or what the grand jury would probably have made it if their attention had been
called to suggested changes, the great
importance which the common law attaches to an
indictment by a grand jury, as a prerequisite
to a prisoner's trial for a crime, and without
which the Constitution says 'no person shall
be held to answer,' may be frittered away
until its value is almost destroyed."See footnote 3
"This aspect of Bain has been reaffirmed in a number of subsequent
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622, 50
S. Ct. 424[, 425], 74 L.Ed. 1076[, 1077] (1930) (citing Bain for
the rule that 'nothing can be added to an indictment without the
concurrence of the grand jury by which the bill was found')."
United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 143, 105 S. Ct. 1811, 1818,
85 L. Ed. 2d 99, 109 (1985).See footnote 4
The State defends its pretrial amendment by suggesting:
(1) there was no invasion of the defendant's constitutional right
as a result of the amendment permitted by the circuit court; (2) the amendment did not change the nature of the offense; (3) the
amendment merely corrected the victim's name; (4) the amendment
related to a matter of form and not of substance; and (5) any error
committed by the amendment was harmless only.
In State v. McGraw, supra, we addressed the very
question raised by the defense.See footnote 5 We held that changing the name of
the owner of stolen property "rendered the indictment invalid, and
deprived that court of the power to try the accused on the
indictment as amended." 140 W. Va. at 559, 85 S.E.2d at 857.
Syllabus Point 4 of McGraw states:
"An amendment of an indictment which
charges a separate and distinct offense from
that charged in the indictment in its original
form may not be made or permitted by a court;
and such amendment, whether it relates to
matters of form or matters of surplusage,
invalidates the indictment and deprives the
court of the power to proceed under the
amended indictment."
Realizing that the holding in McGraw would be
dispositive, the State essentially asks us to reconsider the wisdom
of McGraw and to overrule it. We agree that McGraw must be
reconsidered, and we believe it should be modified.See footnote 6 To the extent that State v. McGraw stands for the proposition that "any" change
to an indictment, whether it be form or substance, requires
resubmission to the grand jury for its approval, it is hereby
expressly modified. Our decision today comports with those of the
vast majority of other jurisdictions that have recently addressed
this issue. The contemporary rule and the rule we adopt is that an
indictment may be amended by the circuit court, provided the
amendment is not substantial, is sufficiently definite and certain,
does not take the defendant by surprise, and any evidence the
defendant had before the amendment is equally available after the
amendment.See footnote 7
We start our analysis with the basic rule of law that any
substantial amendment, direct, indirect or constructive, of an
indictment must be resubmitted to the grand jury. An "amendment of
form" which does not require resubmission of an indictment to the grand jury occurs when the defendant is not misled in any sense, is
not subjected to any added burden of proof, and is not otherwise
prejudiced.
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Miller, supra, deals with variance between the
charge and proof at trial, which is somewhat more problematic than
a pretrial amendment of an indictment. Miller permits a
"narrowing" of the charge, but not an alteration or enlargement.
The latter, of course, would interfere with the notice, double
jeopardy, and screening functions of a grand jury indictment. See
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 8 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1962).See footnote 8 Where there is a pretrial amendment to an indictment,
as there was in this case, the notice and double jeopardy functions
are not necessarily implicated, although the screening function of
the grand jury may be--would the grand jury have indicted the defendant if the grand jurors knew that the stolen property
actually belonged to Edward Morgan rather than James Cunningham,
who was originally named as owner in the indictment? The answer to
this question must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Considering
the specific facts of this case, the answer seems to be "yes," but
this might not always be the case where the identity of the victim
is changed. For example, in a fight involving multiple parties, a
defendant may have assaulted one person but not another; and it
would seem plausible that the grand jury should evaluate the
defendant's conduct with respect to the correct victim.
The holding in McGraw antedates Rule 7(e) of the West
Virginia Rules of Criminal ProcedureSee footnote 9 and appears to follow the
traditional form/substance distinction. In McGraw, this Court
stated: "Though it was not necessary to name the owner of the
stolen property the designation of the owner in the indictment in
its original form and in the indictment as amended is in each
instance a descriptive averment and constitutes a matter of
substance which can not be considered or rejected as surplusage."
140 W. Va. at 556, 85 S.E.2d at 855.
Rule 7(e), although limited to amendments of an
information, can be applied to indictments, as many courts have done.See footnote 10 This results in a prejudice/different offense approach.
Prejudice largely means surprise, i.e., lack of adequate notice.
In most cases, changing the name of the victim in the indictment
prior to trial should not raise this problem. Even if it were done
close to the trial date, a continuance could be granted where
necessary. The second prong of the test under Rule 7(e) is whether
the amendment states a different offense. Concededly, the
different offense part of the standard is more troublesome because
it contains a good deal of flexibility and, hence, discretion.
Obviously, there is a new offense if a different statutory
provision is offered. A new offense would also result if a new
theory or commission was suggested or a different series of events
was relied upon.See footnote 11 Beyond this, changes such as misnomers become
largely inconsequential.
This Court believes changing the name of the victim in an
indictment prior to trial generally falls in this latter category.
In such a situation, the notice and double jeopardy functions of
the grand jury are not undermined. As we have suggested, although
the grand jury screening function could be potentially implicated,
we do not find that to be the case sub judice. Duplication of
function in the preliminary hearing and grand jury is already
wasteful; requiring the prosecution to go back to the grand jury
for a new indictment alleging a different victim would just add
more waste without being of any real benefit to the defendant
except for the delay.See footnote 12 On the other hand, where the proposed
change in the victim's identity really does change the events
relied upon to constitute the charge, a new charge under the
"different offense" language of Rule 7(e) occurs; and the
prosecution must resubmit the case to the grand jury.See footnote 13 To preserve the integrity of the screening function of the grand jury in
deciding whether a different offense results from the amendment,
and in addition to those factors discussed above, it must be
determined whether the amendment is one of "form" and not of
"substance." The decision whether the change is merely as to form
as opposed to a new offense is best left to the discretion of the
circuit court. Thus, even though there is no indication of
prejudice, an amendment that falls short of changing the basic
offense can nonetheless be prohibited as an alteration of substance
if it changes "the pleading description of the criminal act, the
mens rea accompanying that act, or the consequences of that act."
Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.5 at
827 (2nd. ed. 1993).
Thus, in the final analysis, the issue before this Court
is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to
find that the amendment which changed the name of the owner of the
stolen goods so altered the indictment as to charge a different
offense from that found by the grand jury. For reasons discussed
above, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.
Unless a defendant can demonstrate prejudice, a circuit court may amend an indictment in a manner that does not strike any
substantive portion of the charging paragraph and does not change
the offense charged. As to what is the substance of the charge,
United States v. Denny, 165 F.2d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 844, 68 S. Ct. 662, 92 L. Ed. 1127 (1948), states:
"Every fact which must be proved to make the act complained of a
crime is [a] matter of substance, and . . . all else is formal."See footnote 14
In light of the foregoing, the proper disposition of this
case is clear. What was changed in the indictment was not
essential to the offense on which the jury convicted. Thus, we
hold the amended indictment was valid and the defendant's right to
be tried only on the offense for which a grand jury returned an
indictment was not violated.
III.
In the second assignment of error, the defendant argues
that count two of the indictment should have been dismissed because
no evidence was presented to the grand jury that he transferred the
stolen goods. The defendant raised this issue below. The circuit
court reviewed the grand jury minutes and found that evidence was
presented on count two.
"Generally speaking, the finding by the grand jury that
the evidence is sufficient is not subject to judicial review." I
Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on West Virginia Criminal Procedure
Grand Jury and Indictments I-651 (2d ed. 1993). Cases are legion
supporting the proposition that a defendant may not challenge a
facially valid indictment returned by a legally constituted grand
jury on the basis that the evidence presented to the grand jury was
legally insufficient. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974); Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359, 76 S. Ct. 406, 100 L. Ed. 397 (1956).
This Court reviews indictments only for constitutional
error and prosecutorial misconduct. Significantly, the defendant
does not assert the grand jury was biased against him or motivated
by impermissible factors. Neither is there an allegation of
prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury.
In United States v. Mills, 995 F.2d 480, 487 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 283, 126 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1993),
the Court of Appeals stated:
"The longstanding rule of law that
courts may not 'look behind' grand jury
indictments if 'returned by a legally
constituted and unbiased grand jury . . .' is
the touchstone for any inquiry into the
legality of indictments. Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S. Ct. 406, 408,
100 L.Ed. 397[, 402] (1956). The Costello
Court was urged, but declined to hold, that
defendants may 'challenge indictments on the
ground that they are not supported by adequate
or competent evidence.' Id., 350 U.S. at 364,
76 S. Ct. at 409[, 100 L. Ed. at 402]."
Furthermore, when we consider the defendant was convicted on both
counts, it is odd that he would now argue the sufficiency of the
evidence before the grand jury. Having been held to the higher
standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before an impartial
jury, the defendant "can hardly be heard to complain that he is the
innocent victim of a grand jury gone mad." Mills, 995 F.2d at 489.
Accordingly, we decline to disturb the circuit court's decision on
this matter.
IV.
The defendant's third assignment of error relates to a
discussion that was overheard by an alternate juror. The alternate
juror sent a note to the circuit judge requesting to speak to him.
Upon receiving the note, the circuit judge called defense counsel,
the defendant, and the prosecutor into chambers and the alternate
juror informed them that, during a recess in the trial, she observed Detective Roger Blankenship, a deputy, and another man
apparently discussing the testimony of Deputy William Gillespie.
The alternate juror did not discuss what she overheard with the
other jurors. She stated the event would not affect her judgment
one way or the other.See footnote 15
The defendant now contends the circuit court erred in
disregarding a violation of its sequestration order and, as a
result, the trial was rendered partial and unfair. The State
responds that defense counsel was allowed to question the alternate
juror to determine if any prejudice resulted from the conversation.
Furthermore, the defendant declined to make a motion to prevent
Detective Blankenship from testifying or to request a new trial.
After reviewing the matter, we find the defendant failed
to preserve this ground for appellate review. "'Our general rule
is that nonjurisdictional trial error not raised in the trial court
will not be addressed on appeal.' Syllabus Point 9, State v.
Humphrey, 177 W. Va. 264, 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986)." Syllabus Point
4, State v. Smith, 178 W. Va. 104, 358 S.E.2d 188 (1987).
Nevertheless, even if we consider this assignment of error, a
review of the record does not demonstrate the ensuing testimony of
Deputy Blankenship had an unfair prejudicial effect on the
defendant's case. Furthermore, the defendant does not state with particularity how the violation of the sequestration order caused
him prejudice or rendered his trial unfair. See Syl. pt. 4, State
v. Steele, 178 W. Va. 330, 359 S.E.2d 558 (1987). Accordingly, we
find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in this matter.
V.
In his remaining assignment of error, the defendant
argues that Putnam County was the wrong venue in which to try this
case because the crime charged in count one as to the concealment
of stolen property occurred, if at all, at his residence in Kanawha
County. This assignment of error is without merit. Rule 18 of the
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure states: "Except as
otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution
shall be had in a county in which the offense was committed."
The record reflects the crime charged in count one of the
indictment did occur in Putnam County. Mr. Randolph and Mr. Smith
stole the goods from Ben's RV Center, which is located in Putnam
County. They met with the defendant who led them to a cemetery off
Poca River Road in Putnam County to hide the goods. Therefore, the
jury finding that the defendant concealed the stolen property in
Putnam County is supported by the record.
VI.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the
defendant's conviction on both counts one and two of the
indictment.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1
A grand jury returned a six-count indictment charging the
defendant with: (1) concealing stolen property, (2) transferring
stolen property, (3) receiving stolen property, (4) third degree
arson, (5) receiving stolen property, and (6) conspiracy to
commit grand larceny. A severance was granted. Counts one and
two were tried together and are the subject of this appeal.Footnote: 2
An amended petition for appeal in Case No. 22397 was filed
which incorporates with the present case the issues raised in the
defendant's writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.Footnote: 3
We recognize that the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution is not applicable to
the states and, therefore, only Section 4 of Article III of the
West Virginia Constitution pertains to this inquiry. See Hurtado
v. People of the State of California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S. Ct. 111,
28 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1884). But see Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d 330, 339
(6th Cir. 1977) (while the grand jury provision of the Fifth
Amendment does not apply to the states, "[t]o allow the
prosecution to amend the indictment at trial so as to enable the
prosecution to seek a conviction on a charge not brought by the
grand jury unquestionably constitute[s] a denial of due process
by not giving appellant fair notice of criminal charges to be
brought against him"). Footnote: 4
Bain involved a substantive amendment to the indictment,
but its decisional language is extremely broad. A close reading
of most recent cases over the last twenty-five years reveals that
the excessive strictness of some of the dicta in Bain regarding
amendment to indictments has been moderated. Footnote: 5
The holding in McGraw was affirmed in State v. Pruitt, 178
W. Va. 147, 358 S.E.2d 231 (1987).Footnote: 6
We find it unnecessary to overrule McGraw in its entirety.
The actual holding of McGraw is very narrow and many of the
points made in the text of that opinion are reaffirmed by our
decision in this case. Under the particular facts of McGraw,
this Court found the owner's identity was essential to a proper
description and identification of the stolen property. In
McGraw, we found this revision to be an amendment of substance.
This part of McGraw is not affected by today's opinion. We
continue the form/substance criterion as a relevant factor to be
considered in determining whether a proposed amendment to an
indictment has to be resubmitted to the grand jury. However, we
include in the equation other factors such as whether the
amendment results in prejudice to the defendant and whether the
amendment charges a different crime. Footnote: 7
The modified rule that we adopt applies to both felony and
misdemeanor indictments. We agree with the court in United
States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526 (3rd Cir. 1974), where it held
that a material variance between an indictment for a misdemeanor
and proof was fatal to the conviction, even though the government
could have proceeded by information. While an amendment to an
information is generously permitted, having elected to proceed by
indictment, the government was bound by the rules applicable to
an indictment. Footnote: 8
In reviewing the sufficiency of an indictment, we are
guided by basic principles: (1) the indictment must contain a
statement of essential facts constituting the offense charged;
(2) it must contain allegations of each element of the offense
charged, so that the defendant is given fair notice of the charge
that he must defend against; and (3) the allegations must be
sufficiently distinctive so that an acquittal or conviction on
such charges can be pleaded to bar a second prosecution for the
same offense. See W. Va. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1); Hamlin v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1974); State
v. Knight, 168 W. Va. 615, 285 S.E.2d 401 (1981). If an
indictment contains multiple counts, each count is viewed as a
separate indictment for purposes of determining its sufficiency.
See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S. Ct. 189, 76 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1932). In sum, an indictment must be the work of
the grand jury. It must be sufficient to give a defendant notice
of the charge, so that he can defend against it and plead an
acquittal or conviction as a bar to a subsequent effort to
prosecute him for the same offense. Footnote: 9
Rule 7(e) states: "Amendment of Information. The court
may permit an information to be amended at any time before
verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is
charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not
prejudiced." Footnote: 10
Most jurisdictions treat the amendment of an indictment no
differently than the amendment of an information. Either a Rule
7(e)-type standard is applied to both informations and
indictments or a substance/form standard is applied to both.
However, the federal courts and several states draw a sharp
distinction between amendments of indictments and amendments of
informations and allow considerably less latitude for amendments
to indictments. Indeed, some of these jurisdictions are commonly
said to follow "the historic rule that an indictment may not be
amended." None actually go so far as to adhere to the early
common law prohibition that barred even amendments to cure
misnomers, but they do follow what is sometimes described as the
"rule of Ex parte Bain." See Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel,
Criminal Procedure § 19.5 at 824-29 (2nd ed. 1993). Footnote: 11
Miller reaffirmed two traditional rules regarding
indictments: "[N]ew allegations cannot be added to indictment
except by the grand jury and a defendant cannot be convicted on
the basis of evidence proving matters not alleged in the
indictment." Charles H. Whitebread & Christopher Slobogin,
Criminal Procedure § 23.06(d) at 572 (3rd ed. 1993). Footnote: 12
We believe it is important, in view of the increasing
demands upon the State's treasury, that the expense of
administering justice not be augmented unnecessarily by overly
technical procedural rules that serve no useful purpose in
criminal litigation. Similarly, requiring resubmission to the
grand jury of all revisions to an indictment contributes to
slowing up the already overburdened machinery of the prosecution.
Thus, to require resubmission to the grand jury of the change
proposed in this case would be not only a waste of money, but
also a waste of time and energy. National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission), Report on
Prosecution 34-37 (1931). Footnote: 13
In Pruitt, supra, the defendant was charged with obtaining
property in return for a worthless check in violation of W. Va.
Code, 61-3-39 (1977). The original indictment charged "that Mr.
Pruitt had written a check to Bandy's, Inc., in the amount of
$1169.00, drawn on the Bank of Raleigh of Beckley, 'when he the
said David Pruitt knowingly did not have sufficient funds on
deposit in or credit with the Bank of Raleigh.'" This Court held
that adding to the indictment the words "'and as agent for Cash
Sales, Inc., a corporation, knew that he and said corporation did
not have sufficient funds on deposit in or credit with the said
Bank of Raleigh'" was an impermissible amendment of substance
under McGraw. 178 W. Va. at 148, 358 S.E.2d at 232. It is
obvious that the change to the indictment in Pruitt constituted a
new description of the offense and definitely added to the
defendant's burden of proof. Footnote: 14
In this case it was unnecessary for the grand jury to
return an indictment which alleged the name of the victim.
W. Va. Code, 61-3-18 (1923), states:
"If any person buy or receive from
another person, or aid in concealing, or
transfer to a person other than the owner
thereof, any stolen goods or other thing of
value, which he knows or has reason to
believe has been stolen, he shall be deemed
guilty of the larceny thereof, and may be
prosecuted although the principal offender be
not convicted."
Accordingly, there is no significance whatsoever in who was the actual owner of the goods taken from Ben's RV Center.Footnote: 15 The alternate juror did not participate in jury deliberations.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.