SER Coryell v. Gooden
Annotate this Case
January 1995 Term
___________
No. 22355
___________
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
EX REL. LINDA CORYELL,
Petitioner Below, Appellant
v.
PRESTON B. GOODEN, SHERIFF OF BERKELEY COUNTY,
AND DEBRA L. MILARD, AGENT OF THE GOVERNOR
OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Respondents Below, Appellees
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County
Honorable David H. Sanders, Judge
Civil Action No. 92-C-870 and 92-F-70
AFFIRMED
___________________________________________________
Submitted: January 24, 1995
Filed: March 27, 1995
Robert H. Stone
Steven M. Askin
Askin, Burke & Shultz
Martinsburg, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellant
Pamela Games-Neely
Prosecuting Attorney for Berkeley County
Janet L. Scalia
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Martinsburg, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellee, Preston B. Gooden
This Opinion was delivered PER CURIAM.
Justice Brotherton did not participate.
Judge Fox sitting by temporary assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "'In habeas corpus proceedings instituted to
determine the validity of custody where petitioners are being held
in connection with extradition proceedings, the asylum state is
limited to considering whether the extradition papers are in proper
form; whether there is a criminal charge pending in the demanding
state; whether the petitioner was present in the demanding state at
the time the criminal offense was committed; and whether the
petitioner is the person named in the extradition papers.' Point
2, Syllabus, State ex rel. Mitchell v. Allen, 155 W. Va. 530 [, 185 S.E.2d 355] (1971)." Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Gonzales v. Wilt,
163 W. Va. 270, 256 S.E.2d 15 (1979).
2. "'To be a "fugitive from justice," it is necessary
that the person charged as such must have been actually present in
the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime, or,
having been there, has then committed some overt act in furtherance
of the crime subsequently consummated, and has departed to another
jurisdiction. And, if the evidence be clear and convincing that
the accused was not personally in the demanding state at the time
of the commission of the offense charged, and has committed no
prior overt act therein indicative of an intent to commit the
crime, or which can be construed as a step in the furtherance of
the crime afterwards consummated, he should be discharged.' Syl.
pt. 2, State ex rel. Blake v. Doeppe, 97 W. Va. 203, 124 S.E. 667 (1924)." Syl. pt. 2, Lott v. Bechtold, 169 W. Va. 578, 289 S.E.2d 210 (1982).
3. "A rendition warrant issued by the Governor of this
State under W. Va. Code, 5-1-8(a) [1937], in response to a request
for extradition from the executive authority of a demanding state
pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, as amended, W.
Va. Code, 5-1-7 to 5-1-13, 'substantially recite[s] the facts
necessary to the validity of its issuance' with respect to the
crime charged therein, as required by W. Va. Code, 5-1-8(a) [1937],
if the rendition warrant contains a statement that gives the person
sought to be extradited reasonable notice of the nature of the
crime charged in the demanding state; and a circuit court, when
determining the sufficiency of a rendition warrant in a habeas
corpus proceeding challenging the validity of custody in connection
with extradition proceedings, may examine underlying documents
filed by the demanding state in support of its request for
extradition." Syl. pt. 2, Cronauer v. State, 174 W. Va. 91, 322 S.E.2d 862 (1984).
4. "In the absence of evidence to the contrary public
officers will be presumed to have properly performed their duties
and not to have acted illegally, but regularly and in a lawful
manner." Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Staley v. County Court, 137
W. Va. 431, 73 S.E.2d 827 (1952).
Per Curiam:
This action is before this Court upon the appeal of Linda
Coryell, the appellant and petitioner below, from a final order of
the Circuit Court of Berkeley County denying her petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Mrs. Coryell was seeking habeas corpus
relief from her arrest and custody pursuant to a rendition warrant
issued by the Governor of West Virginia in response to a request
from the Governor of Pennsylvania for her extradition to that state
for the crime of interference with custody of children. This
Court has before it the petition for appeal, all matters of record
and the briefs and argument of counsel. For the reasons stated
below, the order of the circuit court is affirmed.
I
Pursuant to an agreement dated July 26, 1982, William and
Linda CoryellSee footnote 1 agreed that Mrs. Coryell would be given custody of
their two children.See footnote 2 The agreement, approved by the Court of
Common Pleas of Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania, granted Mr.
Coryell visitation privileges including "the right to have said
children with him at his residence from Friday night, at 7 P.M. to
the following Sunday at 7 P.M." and one week during the summer, as
well as "the right to visit the children at the residence of [Mrs. Coryell] on all holidays." On June 6, 1984, Mrs. Coryell's
parents, Raymond and Doris Pringle, were granted custody of the
children, by order of the Juvenile Court, Knox County, Tennessee.
The record before us reveals little of the circumstances
surrounding this change in custody.See footnote 3
On November 24, 1987, a bench warrant was issued against
Mrs. Coryell by the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County,
Pennsylvania, for failure to appear before the court pursuant to a
petition for contempt filed by Mr. Coryell. Mr. Coryell alleged
that Mrs. Coryell failed to comply with the aforementioned child
custody and visitation agreement.
On October 13, 1988, Mr. Coryell filed a criminal
complaint against Mrs. Coryell, in Pennsylvania, for violation of
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2904 (1983), Interference with Custody of
Children,See footnote 4 a felony in the third degree. The criminal complaintstates that on or about August 20, 1982, Mr. Coryell travelled to
the Sunrise Lake Campgrounds in an attempt to pick up his children
and to exercise his court-approved visitation rights. Mrs. Coryell
had apparently taken up temporary residence at the campground.
When Mr. Coryell arrived at the campground, he was, unwittingly,
detained on the road by Mrs. Coryell's parents, Mr. and Mrs.
Pringle, enabling Mrs. Coryell and her friend, Larry Meck, to drive
away with the children. Because Mr. Coryell had neither seen nor
heard from his children since that day in 1982, the criminal
complaint alleged the date of the offense to be "1982 to present
time."
On April 16, 1992, Mrs. Coryell was arrested in West
Virginia on a fugitive warrant. She appeared before a Berkeley
County magistrate and was subsequently incarcerated in the Eastern
Regional Jail in lieu of $20,000 bond. Bond was later reduced to
$5,000, which Mrs. Coryell paid, and she was released from jail.
On July 28, 1992, a Requisition of the Governor of
Pennsylvania for the return of Mrs. Coryell, a fugitive charged with the crime of interfering with custody of children, was sent to
the Honorable Gaston Caperton, Governor of the State of West
Virginia, demanding that she be delivered to Detective Debra
Milard, an appellee herein, for extradition to Pennsylvania.
Accordingly, on July 29, 1992, Governor Caperton issued a Warrant
of Rendition directing appellee Preston B. Gooden, Sheriff of
Berkeley County, to deliver Mrs. Coryell to Detective Milard for
extradition.
Pursuant to an agreement between Pamela Games-Neely,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney of Berkeley County, and Steven
Askin, Mrs. Coryell's attorney, Mrs. Coryell voluntarily appeared
in Berkeley County Circuit Court, on August 27, 1992, where she was
arraigned upon the charge that she was a fugitive from justice
standing charged, in Pennsylvania, with the crime of interference
with custody of children. Mrs. Coryell was subsequently served
with a Governor's Warrant from Governor Caperton demanding that she
be returned to Pennsylvania. Not wishing to waive extradition,
Mrs. Coryell requested leave to file a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to W. Va. Code, 5-1-9(a) [1937]. The circuit court
granted Mrs. Coryell's motion.
On September 30, 1992, Mrs. Coryell filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in Berkeley County Circuit Court.
Following the hearing on Mrs. Coryell's petition, the circuit court
ordered that she be extradited to Pennsylvania. It is from that
order that Mrs. Coryell appeals.
II
Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution
provides the basis for the extradition of fugitives between the
states:See footnote 5
A Person charged in any State with
Treason, Felony or other Crime who shall flee
from Justice, and be found in another State,
shall on Demand of the executive Authority of
the State from which he fled, be delivered up,
to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction
of the Crime.
The United States Supreme Court has set forth limitations
on the scope of inquiry which may be pursued by a circuit court in
an extradition proceeding.See footnote 6 In Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282,
289, 99 S. Ct. 530, 535, 58 L. Ed. 2d 521, 527 (1978), the Court
stated:
Once the governor has granted extradition, a
court considering release on habeas corpus can
do no more than decide (a) whether the
extradition documents on their face are in
order; (b) whether the petitioner has been
charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named
in the request for extradition; and (d)
whether the petitioner is a fugitive. These
are historic facts readily verifiable.See footnote 7
(footnote added). See State ex rel Jones v. Warmuth, 165 W. Va.
825, 829, 272 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1980); State ex rel. Gonzales v.
Wilt, 163 W. Va. 270, 273-74, 256 S.E.2d 15, 17 (1979). See also
Cronauer v. State, 174 W. Va. 91, 94, 322 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1984).
Similarly, this Court has previously enunciated the
limited role of the asylum state in extradition matters. These
limitations are correlative to those pronounced in Doran. As we
stated in syllabus point 1 of Wilt, supra:
'In habeas corpus proceedings instituted
to determine the validity of custody where
petitioners are being held in connection with
extradition proceedings, the asylum state is
limited to considering whether the extradition
papers are in proper form; whether there is a
criminal charge pending in the demanding
state; whether the petitioner was present in
the demanding state at the time the criminal
offense was committed; and whether the
petitioner is the person named in the
extradition papers.' Point 2, Syllabus, State
ex rel. Mitchell v. Allen, 155 W. Va. 530
[, 185 S.E.2d 355] (1971).See footnote 8
(footnote added). See also syllabus, State ex rel. Drescher v.
Hedrick, 180 W. Va. 35, 375 S.E.2d 213 (1988); syl. pt. 1,
Cronauer, supra; syl. pt. 2, Wooten v. Hatfield, 169 W. Va. 401,
287 S.E.2d 516 (1982).
Mrs. Coryell's first assignment of error on appeal
concerns the third area of inquiry set forth by this Court
intitially in syllabus point 2 of State ex rel. Mitchell v. Allen,
supra: whether she was present in the demanding state of
Pennsylvania at the time the crime of interference with custody of
children was allegedly committed. Mrs. Coryell contends that there
was no "clear finding" of such presence and, accordingly, her
petition for a writ of habeas corpus should have been granted.
At the July 6, 1993 hearing on Mrs. Coryell's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, Mr. Coryell testified that in August
of 1982, the date he has alleged the crime of interference with
custody of children was committed, he went to the campground in
Pennsylvania where his children were residing with Mrs. Coryell to
visit them pursuant to the court-approved child custody and
visitation agreement. However, Mrs. Coryell drove away with the children before he could see them. Mr. Coryell's testimony was
consistent with the criminal complaint which he signed in October
of 1988 and which is discussed above.
Conversely, Mrs. Coryell contends that the testimony of
her father, Raymond Pringle, clearly establishes that she was not
in Pennsylvania in August of 1982 but was residing in Tennessee.
Specifically, Mrs. Coryell refers to her father's statement that
she was living in Tennessee in August of 1982 and that, though he
and Mrs. Pringle were at the Sunrise Lake Campgrounds in
Pennsylvania, Mrs. Coryell was not. However, Mr. Pringle also
testified that Mrs. Coryell moved from Pennsylvania to Tennessee
sometime in 1982, but that he could not recall the exact date. Mr.
Pringle conceded that it was possible that he was at the
Pennsylvania campground in August of that year.
This Court has previously held that one accused of being
a fugitive from justice must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that he or she was not in the demanding state at the time
the crime was committed in order to be released from custody. We
reiterated this principle in syllabus point 2 of Lott v. Bechtold,
169 W. Va. 578, 289 S.E.2d 210 (1982):
'To be a "fugitive from justice," it is
necessary that the person charged as such must
have been actually present in the demanding
state at the time of the commission of the
crime, or, having been there, has then
committed some overt act in furtherance of the
crime subsequently consummated, and has
departed to another jurisdiction. And, if the
evidence be clear and convincing that the
accused was not personally in the demanding
state at the time of the commission of the
offense charged, and has committed no prior overt act therein indicative of an intent to
commit the crime, or which can be construed as
a step in the furtherance of the crime
afterwards consummated, he should be
discharged.' Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Blake
v. Doeppe, 97 W.Va. 203, 124 S.E. 667 (1924).
Mrs. Coryell's claim that she proved, by clear and
convincing evidence, her absence from the demanding state of
Pennsylvania in August of 1982, the alleged date of the crime
charged, is without merit. As recounted above, the circuit court
was presented with conflicting evidence on this issue. Mr.
Coryell's testimony expressly placed Mrs. Coryell at the
Pennsylvania campground in August of 1982. Mr. Pringle's testimony
indicated, however, that, while he was at the campground, possibly
in August of 1982, his daughter was not. Mr. Pringle's testimony
was, arguably, less definitive than Mr. Coryell's in that Mr.
Pringle could not state with certainty when, in 1982, his daughter
left Pennsylvania for Tennessee. What the record contains, then,
is an obvious conflict as to Mrs. Coryell's whereabouts in August
of 1982.
As the United States Supreme Court stated in Munsey v.
Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 375, 25 S. Ct. 282, 285, 49 L. Ed. 515, 518
(1905):
[T]he court will not discharge a defendant
arrested under the governor's warrant where
there is merely contradictory evidence on the
subject of presence in or absence from the
State, as habeas corpus is not the proper
proceeding to try the question of alibi, or
any question as to the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Accord South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 421, 53 S. Ct. 667,
671, 77 L. Ed. 1292, 1297 (1933). We find, therefore, that Mrs.
Coryell failed to successfully carry her burden of proving, by
clear and convincing evidence, her absence from the demanding state
of Pennsylvania at the time the alleged offense was committed.
Mrs. Coryell also contends that the evidence below was
insufficient as to the date of the alleged offense. Specifically,
she argues that the application for requisition to the Governor of
Pennsylvania from the district attorney of Susquehanna, County did
not indicate either the day or month in 1982 of the alleged
offense.See footnote 9
However, the Governor of Pennsylvania's requisition was
not based solely upon the application for requisition. In syllabus
point 2 of Cronauer, supra, we held:
A rendition warrant issued by the
Governor of this State under W. Va. Code, 5-1-
8(a) [1937], in response to a request for
extradition from the executive authority of a
demanding state pursuant to the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, as amended, W. Va.
Code, 5-1-7 to 5-1-13, 'substantially
recite[s] the facts necessary to the validity
of its issuance' with respect to the crime
charged therein, as required by W. Va. Code,
5-1-8(a) [1937], if the rendition warrant
contains a statement that gives the person
sought to be extradited reasonable notice of
the nature of the crime charged in the
demanding state; and a circuit court, when
determining the sufficiency of a rendition
warrant in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging the validity of custody in
connection with extradition proceedings, may
examine underlying documents filed by the
demanding state in support of its request for
extradition.
Among the underlying documents that accompanied the
rendition warrant and were part of the record considered by the
circuit court during the habeas corpus proceeding were the
requisition for extradition from the Governor of Pennsylvania; the
application for said requisition from the district attorney of
Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania; a copy of the criminal complaint
filed by Mr. Coryell against Mrs. Coryell and certified by District
Justice Peter Janicelli in Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania; a
warrant issued by District Justice Janicelli for the arrest of Mrs.
Coryell;See footnote 10 and the child custody and visitation agreement entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna, County on July 27,
1982.
Though the application for requisition indicates the
alleged crime was committed in 1982 and is silent as to the
specific day and month, the underlying criminal complaint, dated
October 13, 1988, states that Mrs. Coryell violated the penal laws
of Pennsylvania on or about "1982 to present time." Moreover, the
complaint details Mr. Coryell's attempt to visit his children in
Pennsylvania on or about August 20, 1982 and Mrs. Coryell's
simultaneous flight with the children in tow. The complaint was
verified by Mr. Coryell before Susquehanna County District Justice Janicelli, who found the complaint to be properly completed and
probable cause for issuance of process to exist.
The rendition warrant issued by Governor Caperton stated
that Mrs. Coryell "stands charged with the crime of Interference
with Custody of Children" committed in Pennsylvania. We believe
that this statement substantially recites the facts necessary to
the validity of the issuance of the rendition warrant as required
by W.Va. Code, 5-1-8(a) (1937)See footnote 11 as it gave reasonable notice to
Mrs. Coryell of the nature of the crime with which she is charged
in Pennsylvania.See footnote 12 Furthermore, the circuit court clearly examined
the underlying documents in addition to the requisition from the Governor of Pennsylvania and, accordingly, determined that they
constituted a valid basis for issuing a rendition warrant.
III
Mrs. Coryell's second assignment of error suggests that
Governor Caperton improperly considered the November 24, 1987 bench
warrant against her in his decision to issue the rendition warrant.
As indicated above, the bench warrant was issued against Mrs.
Coryell by the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County,
Pennsylvania for failure to appear pursuant to a petition for civil
contempt filed by Mr. Coryell. Mr. Coryell alleged that Mrs.
Coryell failed to comply with the child custody and visitation
agreement made between the parties. Mrs. Coryell contends that, in
that this warrant was included among the documents presented to
Governor Caperton, it may have influenced his decision to order her
extradition. Thus, she requests that the matter be remanded to the
governor for reconsideration.
W. Va. Code, 5-1-7(b) [1937], provides, in relevant part,
that it is
the duty of the governor of this state to have
arrested and delivered up to the executive
authority of any other state . . . any person
charged in that state with treason, felony, or
other crime, who has fled from justice and is
found in this state: Provided, That the
demand or application of . . . the executive
authority of such other state is made in good
faith for the punishment of crime[.]"
W. Va. Code, 5-1-7(c) [1937] requires that the demanding state
allege, in writing, that the accused was present in the demanding
state at the time the crime was committed, that he then fled from the State, accompanied by, in this case, "a copy of an affidavit
made before a magistrate or justice there, together with a copy of
any warrant which was issued thereupon[.]" This affidavit must
"substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a
crime under the law of that state[.]" Id.
As previously discussed, Governor Caperton was presented
with a certified copy of the criminal complaint filed by Mr.
Coryell which indicates that Mrs. Coryell is charged with violating
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2904 (1983), Interference with Custody of
Children; a copy of the text of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2904
(1983); and the requisition from the Governor of Pennsylvania and
the application therefor, both of which state that Mrs. Coryell
stands charged with the crime of "Interference with Custody of
Children." Finally, the rendition warrant issued by Governor
Caperton states that the charge against Mrs. Coryell is that of
interference with custody of children.
As we stated in syllabus point 2 of State ex rel. Staley
v. County Court, 137 W.Va. 431, 73 S.E.2d 827 (1952), "[i]n the
absence of evidence to the contrary public officers will be
presumed to have properly performed their duties and not to have
acted illegally, but regularly and in a lawful manner." See Syl.
pt. 3, Brammer v. Human Rights Comm'n, 183 W. Va. 108, 394 S.E.2d 340 (1990). Extradition may only be sought and ordered upon the
commission of a crime. The supporting documents clearly stated
that the offense for which extradition was sought was criminal in
nature. The mere fact that the November 24, 1987 bench warrant, issued for a civil contempt charge, was, inexplicably, among the
documents presented to Governor Caperton is simply not sufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption that Governor Caperton
properly ordered Mrs. Coryell's extradition to Pennsylvania.
In addition, Mrs. Coryell asserts that, because the penal
law at issue, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2904 (1983), Interference
with Custody of Children, was amended in 1984, two years after the
initial offense, Governor Caperton may have had insufficient
evidence to determine which law was applicable to this case.
Apparently, Governor Caperton was presented with a copy of the
amended statute and not the version in effect in 1982.
Mrs. Coryell refers to the portion of appellee Detective
Debra Milard's testimony in which she is unable to identify which
portion of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2904 (1983) had been amended.
Mrs. Coryell fails to acknowledge, however, that Detective Milard
subsequently states, under cross-examination by Mrs. Coryell's
attorney, that only subsection (c), concerning the grading of the
offense, was modified in 1984. See n. 4, supra. Governor
Caperton acted within his authority in ordering Mrs. Coryell's
extradition to Pennsylvania. Mrs. Coryell's suggestion that
Governor Caperton may have been under some misapprehension as to
the grading of the offense is merely another way of requesting that
her guilt or innocence be determined by the asylum state.
IV
In her final assignment of error, Mrs. Coryell argues
that the circuit court should only have denied her petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the condition that the State of
Pennsylvania agree not to prosecute her on the November 24, 1987
bench warrant. Specifically, Mrs. Coryell asks this Court to adopt
the Doctrine of Specialty, a principle of international extradition
requiring that one who is extradited be tried in the demanding
state only upon the charge for which extradition was granted. See
18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1988).
As previously discussed, in habeas corpus proceedings
instituted to determine the validity of custody where an accused is
being held in connection with extradition proceedings, the asylum
state is limited to considering whether the extradition papers are
in proper form, whether there is a criminal charge pending in the
demanding state, whether the accused was present in the demanding
state at the time the criminal offense was committed, and whether
the petitioner is the person named in the extradition papers. Syl.
pt. 1, Wilt, supra; syl. pt. 2, Allen, supra. We have already
determined that the circuit court properly resolved these inquiries
and, accordingly, denied Mrs. Coryell's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
Mrs. Coryell's request that this Court adopt a principle
of international extradition is misplaced, as "[i]t is not the
province of the courts to make or supervise legislation, and a
statute may not, under the guise of interpretation, be modified,
revised, amended, distorted, remodeled, or rewritten[.]" State v.
General Daniel Morgan Post, No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars of
the United States, a Corp., 144 W.Va. 137, 145, 107 S.E.2d 353, 358 (1959) (citations omitted). Thus, the legislature, and not this
Court, is the proper entity to take up such a principle of
extradition.See footnote 13
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of the
Circuit Court of Berkeley County, denying Mrs. Coryell's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1
It is unclear whether the couple is actually divorced.
In her brief to this Court, Mrs. Coryell states that they were
divorced in 1982 while Mr. Coryell contends that they were never
divorced. Whatever the case, the couple's marital status is not
germane to this opinion.Footnote: 2
The children, a girl and a boy, are now aged 15 and
13, respectively.Footnote: 3
According to the petition filed in Tennessee juvenile
court, Mrs. Coryell had left the two children in the care of her
parents, Mrs. and Mrs. Pringle, for six months. Mrs. Coryell had
contacted neither her parents nor her children during that time.
At the time the petition was filed, the whereabouts of both Mr.
Coryell and Mrs. Coryell were unknown.Footnote: 4
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2904 (1983) provides:
Interference with custody of children.
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits
an offense if he knowingly or recklessly
takes or entices any child under the age of
18 years from the custody of its parent,
guardian or other lawful custodian, when he
has no privilege to do so.
(b) Defenses.--It is a defense that:
(1) the actor believed that his action
was necessary to preserve the child from
danger to its welfare; or
(2) the child, being at the time not
less than 14 years old, was taken away at its
own instigation without enticement and
without purpose to commit a criminal offense
with or against the child; or
(3) the actor is the child's parent or
guardian or other lawful custodian and is not
acting contrary to an order entered by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
(c) Grading.--The offense is a
misdemeanor of the second degree unless the
actor, not being a parent or person in
equivalent relation to the child, acted with
knowledge that his conduct would cause
serious alarm for the safety of the child, or
in reckless disregard of a likelihood of
causing such alarm, in which case the offense
is a misdemeanor of the first degree.
The statute cited above was in effect in 1982, the date of the
alleged offense. See discussion, infra. Subsection (c) was
rewritten in 1984 and reads as follows:
(c) Grading.--The offense is a felony of
the third degree unless:
(1) the actor, not being a parent or
person in equivalent relation to the child,
acted with knowledge that his conduct would
cause serious alarm for the safety of the
child, or in reckless disregard of a
likelihood of causing such alarm. In such
cases, the offense shall be a felony of the
second degree; or
(2) the actor acted with good cause for
a period of time not in excess of 24 hours;
and
(i) the victim child is the subject of a
valid order of custody issued by a court of
this Commonwealth;
(ii) the actor has been given either
partial custody or visitation rights under
said order; and
(iii) the actor is a resident of this
Commonwealth and does not remove the child
from the Commonwealth.
In such cases, the offense shall be a
misdemeanor of the second degree.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2904 (Supp. 1994).
Footnote: 5
Though interstate extradition is primarily controlled
by federal law, the extradition clause is generally implemented
by consistent state laws which regulate and detail extradition
procedures. See generally 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extradition §§ 4 and 8
(1989). With some minor variations, West Virginia has adopted
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. W. Va. Code, 5-1-7 to 5-1-
13. See Brightman v. Withrow, 172 W. Va. 235, 304 S.E.2d 688
(1983). Footnote: 6
The intent of the extradition clause is "to enable
each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in
the state where the alleged offense was committed[,]" State ex
rel. Gonzalez v. Wilt, 163 W. Va. 270, 274, 256 S.E.2d 15, 17
(1979), thereby ensuring that no state becomes a sanctuary for
fugitives from another's criminal justice system. California v.
Superior Court of California, 482 U.S. 400, 406, 107 S. Ct. 2433,
2437, 96 L. Ed. 2d 332, 339 (1987). Footnote: 7
The Doran court deemed a governor's grant of
extradition "prima facie evidence that the constitutional and
statutory requirements have been met[,]" and that once
extradition has been granted, the issues that an asylum state may
consider are limited to those articulated above. 439 U.S. at
289, 99 S. Ct. at 535, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 527. The Court reasoned
that "[t]o allow plenary review in the asylum state of issues
that can be fully litigated in the charging state would defeat
the plain purposes of the summary and mandatory procedures
authorized by Art. IV, § 2." Doran, 439 U.S. at 290, 99 S. Ct.
at 536, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 528 (citations omitted).Footnote: 8
Notwithstanding the differences in phrasing by the
United States Supreme Court in Doran and by this Court initially
in Mitchell, the scope of inquiry is essentially the same.
Warmuth, 165 W. Va. at 830 n. 4, 272 S.E.2d at 448 n. 4.
Specifically, "one clause of our formulation is 'whether the
petitioner was present in the demanding state at the time the
criminal offense was committed,' whereas the counterpart in the
federal formulation states 'whether the petitioner is a
fugitive.'" Id. (citations omitted). We concluded that "the
difference in the West Virginia and the federal formulation is in
reality only alternate expressions of the same points." Id. Footnote: 9
The application for requisition states that Mrs.
Coryell stands charged "with the crime of Interference with
Custody of Children committed in the County of Susquehanna
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, on or about the ____ day of ____,
1982."Footnote: 10
According to the testimony of Detective Milard, in
Pennsylvania, the criminal complaint and warrant are contained in
the same document.Footnote: 11
W.Va. Code, 5-1-8 [1937], Governor's warrant of
arrest, provides, in relevant part:
(a) If the governor decides that the
demand should be complied with, he shall sign
a warrant of arrest which shall be sealed by
the secretary of state with the great seal of
this state, and be directed by the governor
to any peace officer or other person whom he
may think fit to entrust with the execution
thereof. The warrant must substantially
recite the facts necessary to the validity of
its issuance.
Footnote: 12
In Cronauer, 174 W. Va. at 96, 322 S.E.2d at 867-68,
we recounted numerous cases in which courts upheld the validity
of rendition warrants upon the determination that the warrants
gave the accused reasonable notice of the nature of the crime
charged. See, e.g., Griggs v. State, 481 P.2d 388 (Alaska 1971)
(rendition warrant charging the accused with "robbery" was
sufficient even though the accused was wanted for parole
violations of previous robbery conviction); Ex parte Chapman, 435 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (rendition warrant charging
accused with "child desertion" held to be substantial recitation
of facts); Ex parte Hagar, 434 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)
(rendition warrant charging accused with "child abandonment" held
to be substantial recitation of facts). Footnote: 13
Mrs. Coryell briefly asserts that physical abuse
inflicted upon her and her children by Mr. Coryell was the cause
of her departure from Pennsylvania. She argues that a duress
defense should be more fully explored by the Circuit Court of
Berkeley County. As discussed in the text of this opinion, the
asylum state's role is limited and does not include this type of
inquiry. See syl. pt. 2, Allen, supra.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.