Maxey v. Maxey
Annotate this Case
September 1995 Term
___________
No. 22107
___________
CAROLYN ANN MAXEY,
Plaintiff Below, Appellant
v.
TEDDY CURTIS MAXEY,
Defendant Below, Appellee
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Raleigh County
Honorable John C. Ashworth, Judge
Civil Action No. 85-D-681
AFFIRMED, IN PART;
REVERSED, IN PART.
____________________________________________________
Submitted: September 19, 1995
Filed: November 17, 1995
Richard E. Hardison
Harry G. Camper, Jr.
Beckley, West Virginia
Attorneys for the Appellant
C. Elton Byron, Jr.
Abrams, Byron, Henderson & Richmond
Beckley, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellee
This Opinion was delivered PER CURIAM.
JUSTICE ALBRIGHT did not participate.
RETIRED JUSTICE MILLER sitting by temporary assignment.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "Equitable distribution under W.Va. Code, 48-2-1, et seq., is a three-step
process. The first step is to classify the parties' property as marital or nonmarital. The
second step is to value the marital assets. The third step is to divide the marital estate
between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in W. Va. Code, 48-2-32.".
Syl. pt. 1, Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W. Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990).
2. "Unless the parties have made a joint stipulation or property settlement
agreement, under Rule 52(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure the circuit court
is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in its final order which reflect
each step of the equitable distribution procedure. The same obligation is imposed upon a
family law master under W. Va. Code, 48A-4-4(d)." Syl. pt. 2, Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.
Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990).
Per Curiam:
This divorce action between the appellant, Carolyn Ann Maxey, and the
appellee, Teddy Curtis Maxey, is before this Court upon an appeal from the final order of
the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, West Virginia, entered on April 5, 1993. The appellant
contends in this appeal that the circuit court committed reversible error with regard to the
distribution of the parties' marital assets. Those assets included United States Savings Bonds,
stocks, a coin collection and a gun collection. For the reasons set forth below, the final order
is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.
I
A review of the record reveals that this action has suffered a long and
convoluted history and includes voluminous financial records and testimony. However, this
appeal has been submitted to us without much assistance from counsel. No appellant brief
has been filed, and the petition for appeal, excluding the cover page and the certificate of
service, consists of two and one-half pages. Similarly, the appellee's brief consists of three
and one-half pages. Regrettably, that part of the final order of concern is also somewhat
cursory. This Court, therefore, must expiscate or "fish out" from the record the details and
circumstances surrounding the respective assertions of the parties. As indicated above, this
controversy is limited to four types of marital assets: (1) United States Savings Bonds, (2)
stocks, (3) a coin collection and (4) a gun collection.
The parties were married in 1963 in Pearisburg, Virginia, and, later on, lived
in the town of Mabscott, Raleigh County, West Virginia. During the marriage, the appellant worked for the United States Postal Service, and the appellee worked for the federal Mine
Safety and Health Administration. The parties ultimately earned annual salaries of
approximately $35,000 each. While married, the parties accumulated substantial amounts
of real and personal property. The record indicates that the appellee exercised principal
control of the assets during the marriage. The parties' only child is emancipated, and is not
involved in this action.
The marriage deteriorated, and, in June 1985, the appellant and the appellee
separated. In October 1985, the appellant filed a complaint for divorce on the ground of
irreconcilable differences. W. Va. Code, 48-2-4(a)(10) [1981]. The action was decided by
the circuit court and never referred to a family law master.
The subsequent delay in the resolution of this action is surprising, in view of
the several matters which were not contested between the parties. No controversy arose
between the parties concerning the receipt of their respective employment pension funds, and
there was no controversy concerning the parties' motor vehicles or household furnishings.
Neither party sought alimony, and no issues existed concerning children. In particular, the
final order of April 5, 1993, lists ten parcels of real property acquired by the parties, worth
$123,100 in total, and divides the same equally. The final order describes each parcel in
detail and places a value upon each, all totalling $123,100. No issue is raised concerning the
distribution of the real property.
The final order, however, is somewhat vague with regard to the assets in
dispute, i.e., the United States Savings Bonds, the stocks, the coin collection and the gun
collection. The only language found in the final order relevant to those matters states:
Inasmuch as the [appellee] has had access to the rents
from the aforesaid real estate and to the coins, stocks and mutual
funds acquired as marital assets, and has paid the taxes and
insurance upon the said real estate, and has born the burden of
the overseeing of such assets, his receipt of income from rent,
fees or sale proceeds of and from such items shall be balanced
off against his expenses and costs accrued by his possession and
control of them, therefore neither party shall be entitled to, or
receive any balance of any resulting payment in equitable
distribution from the other.
II
In this appeal, the appellant contends that the ruling of the circuit court, as
reflected in the above language, constitutes reversible error. Specifically, the appellant
asserts that, in contemplation of the parties' 1985 separation and until the time of the entry
of the divorce order, the appellee wrongfully disposed of, hid and squandered the United
States Savings Bonds, stocks and coin and gun collections, all of which were marital assets.
The appellant asserts that the value of, or amounts realized, from those assets were not used
by the appellee to pay the parties' expenses. The appellant contends that, therefore, the circuit
court should have ordered the appellee to compensate the appellant for those assets.
The appellee, on the other hand, asserts that, after the parties were separated,
certain bonds were redeemed and stocks were sold in order to maintain other assets of the
parties and pay tax liabilities and joint obligations accumulated by the parties during their marriage. In particular, the appellee asserts that, during the period in question, he paid
approximately $23,000 upon the joint obligations of the parties.
As this Court recently observed in Hinerman v. Hinerman, ___ W. Va. ___,
460 S.E.2d 71 (1995), the definitions of "marital property" and "separate property" are
statutory and are found in W. Va. Code, 48-2-1 [1992]. As W. Va. Code, 48-2-1(e)(1)
[1992], provides, "marital property" means all property and earnings "acquired by either
spouse during a marriage . . . real or personal, regardless of the form of ownership [.]" A
similar definition appeared in an earlier version of W. Va. Code, 48-2-1, in effect during the
period concerning this action. "Separate property" is not an issue herein. Provisions
concerning the disposition of marital property are also statutory and are found in W.Va.
Code, 48-2-32 [1984]. Those statutes were discussed by this Court in Whiting v. Whiting,
183 W. Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990), syllabus point 1 of which states:
Equitable distribution under W.Va. Code, 48-2-1, et seq.,
is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties'
property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value
the marital assets. The third step is to divide the marital estate
between the parties in accordance with the principles contained
in W. Va. Code, 48-2-32.
See also syl. pt. 1, Signorelli v. Signorelli, 189 W. Va. 710, 434 S.E.2d 382 (1993); Kapfer
v. Kapfer, 187 W. Va. 396, 400, 419 S.E.2d 464, 468 (1992); Kimble v. Kimble, 186 W. Va.
147, 150, 411 S.E.2d 472, 475 (1991); syl. pt. 2, Hamstead v. Hamstead, 184 W. Va. 272,
400 S.E.2d 280 (1990).
Pursuant to W. Va. Code, 48-2-32 [1984], a circuit court, in dividing marital
property between the parties in a divorce action, may consider the extent to which each
party, during the marriage, may have "conducted himself or herself so as to dissipate or
depreciate the value of the marital property of the parties [.]" See syl. pt. 1, Somerville v.
Somerville, 179 W. Va. 386, 369 S.E.2d 459 (1988), stating that a court may consider
"conduct by either party that lessened the value of marital property." In any event, W. Va.
Code, 48-2-32(f) [1984], provides:
In any order which divides or transfers the title to any property,
determines the ownership or value of any property, designates
the specific property to which any party is entitled, or grants any
monetary award, the court shall set out in detail its findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and the reasons for dividing the
property in the manner adopted.
As this Court stated in syllabus point 2 of Whiting, supra:
Unless the parties have made a joint stipulation or
property settlement agreement, under Rule 52(a) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure the circuit court is required to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law in its final order
which reflect each step of the equitable distribution procedure.
The same obligation is imposed upon a family law master under
W. Va. Code, 48A-4-4(d).
Rule 52(a) provides that in actions "tried upon the facts without a jury or with
an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon [.]" Under Rule 52(a), findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous. See also syl. pt. 2, Signorelli, supra; syl. pt. 3, Wood v. Wood, 184 W. Va. 744,
403 S.E.2d 761 (1991); syl. pt. 2, Somerville, supra.
We recently described the nature of our review of equitable distribution orders
in Burnside v. Burnside, ___ W.Va. ___, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995). Although, in that case,
we referred to the West Virginia family law master system, which is not involved in this
action, we stated in syllabus point 1:
In reviewing challenges to findings made by a family law
master that also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged
standard of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a
final equitable distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and
statutory interpretations are subject to a de novo review.
In this action, the record demonstrates that from the time of the parties'
separation in 1985 until the entry of the divorce order in 1993, the appellee engaged in
numerous and substantial financial activities concerning the parties' marital assets, over
which he had theretofore exercised control. The final order of April 5, 1993, however, makes
no findings concerning sums of money the appellee may have received upon the redemption
of the United States Savings Bonds or upon the sale of stocks, and the final order makes no
reference to the $23,000 which the appellee states he paid upon joint obligations of the
parties.
The lengthy period of time between the parties' separation and the divorce
order makes an accounting of marital assets difficult. Numerous factual questions are left
unresolved in this record, and the amounts of money relating thereto are not de minimis. For
example, the record indicates that, based upon tax returns, the appellee received
approximately $4,000 upon the redemption of savings bonds and realized a capital gain upon the sale of $34,000 worth of stock. The appellant, however, testified that she did not know
what had happened to the parties' savings bonds, which she indicated were worth, in total,
between $10,000 and $20,000. Furthermore, the appellant testified that she did not know
what had happened to the parties' stock holdings. The appellee responded by indicating that
he redeemed some of the savings bonds and stocks to meet the parties' joint obligations and
expenses.
In particular, the expenses relating to the parties' real property, prior to the
entry of the divorce order, remain unclear. Although the parties owed relatively little as to
the purchase of the various parcels, the buildings and grounds pertaining thereto were largely
of poor quality and, no doubt, generated expenses. Rents from all the real estate totalled
approximately $300 per month. The appellant testified, however, that the appellee allowed
the real property to deteriorate during the period in question. The final order does not
resolve this matter.
Finally, the appellee indicated that much of the coin and gun collections had
been stolen and, thus, were not available for distribution between the parties. The appellant,
on the other hand, indicated that the loss from the theft was relatively minor. Although the
final order mentions the coin collection, it makes no finding as to its value. The final order
does not mention the gun collection.
In view of the evidence and the assertions of the appellant concerning the
United States Savings Bonds, the stocks and the coin and gun collections, all of which the
parties do not dispute were marital assets, the circuit court committed error in failing to make more detailed findings. Such error is especially apparent in light of the substantial sums of
money involved concerning those assets and because the issues relating to those assets were
aggressively litigated by the parties. The final order of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County,
entered on April 5, 1993, is, therefore, reversed, and this action is remanded to that court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion, and, in particular, for findings concerning the
United States Savings Bonds, the stocks, the coin collection and the gun collection. In all
other respects, including the circuit court's distribution of the real property, the final order
is affirmed.
Affirmed, in part.
reversed, in part.
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