Wilt v. Buracker
Annotate this Case
September 1993 Term
__________
No. 21708
__________
GLENN M. WILT AND SANDRA B. WILT,
Plaintiffs Below, Appellees
v.
ROBERT BURACKER, SHERIFF AS SUCCESSOR
IN INTEREST TO ROY E. THOMPSON, ADMINISTRATOR
TO THE ESTATE OF CHARLES W. NICKELSON, JR.,
Defendant Below, Appellant
_______________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County
Honorable Ronald E. Wilson, Judge
Civil Action No. 88-C-186
AFFIRMED, IN PART,
REVERSED, IN PART,
AND REMANDED
________________________________________________________
Submitted: September 28, 1993
Filed: December 13, 1993
John C. Skinner, Jr.
F. Samuel Byrer
Deborah L. Barr
Nichols & Skinner
Charles Town, West Virginia
Attorneys for Appellees
Walter M. Jones, III
E. Kay Fuller
Martin & Seibert
Martinsburg, West Virginia
Attorneys for Appellant
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE NEELY concurs and reserves the right to file a concurring
opinion.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. Under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, there is a category of expert testimony based on
scientific methodology that is so longstanding and generally
recognized that it may be judicially noticed and, a trial court
need not ascertain the basis for its reliability.
2. In analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony
under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the trial
court's initial inquiry must consider whether the testimony is
based on an assertion or inference derived from the scientific
methodology. Moreover, the testimony must be relevant to a fact
at issue. Further assessment should then be made in regard to
the expert testimony's reliability by considering its underlying
scientific methodology and reasoning. This includes an
assessment of (a) whether the scientific theory and its
conclusion can be and have been tested; (b) whether the
scientific theory has been subjected to peer review and
publication; (c) whether the scientific theory's actual or
potential rate of error is known; and (d) whether the scientific
theory is generally accepted within the scientific community.
3. "'"Whether a witness is qualified to state an
opinion is a matter which rests within the discretion of the
trial court and its ruling on that point will not ordinarily be
disturbed unless it clearly appears that its discretion has been
abused." Point 5, syllabus, Overton v. Fields, 145 W. Va. 797
[117 S.E.2d 598 (1960)].' Syllabus Point 4, Hall v. Nello Teer
Co., 157 W. Va. 582, 203 S.E.2d 145 (1974)." Syllabus Point 12,
Board of Education v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, 182 W. Va. 597,
390 S.E.2d 796 (1990).
4. The loss of enjoyment of life resulting from a
permanent injury is part of the general measure of damages
flowing from the permanent injury and is not subject to an
economic calculation.
5. "In an injury case where the manifestations of the
permanent injury may be obscure and the extent of the injury
itself may be obscure because of its character, positive medical
evidence to a degree of reasonable certainty that the injury is
permanent is sufficient to take the question to the jury and to
support an award of damages for the future effects of such
injury." Syllabus Point 13, Jordan v. Bero, 158 W. Va. 28, 210 S.E.2d 618 (1974).
6. "'If there be evidence tending in some appreciable
degree to support the theory of proposed instructions, it is not
error to give such instructions to the jury, though the evidence
be slight, or even insufficient to support a verdict based
entirely on such theory.' Syllabus Point 2, Snedecker v. Rulong,
69 W. Va. 223, 71 S.E. 180 (1911)." Syllabus Point 4, Catlett v.
MacQueen, 180 W. Va. 6, 375 S.E.2d 184 (1988).
7. "Prejudgment interest, according to West Virginia Code § 56-6-31 (1981) and the decisions of this Court interpreting that statute, is not a cost, but is a form of compensatory damages intended to make an injured plaintiff whole as far as loss of use of funds is concerned." Syllabus Point 1, Buckhannon-Upshur County Airport Authority v. R & R Coal Contracting, Inc., 186 W. Va. 583, 413 S.E.2d 404 (1991).
8. Expenditures for household services are included
within the phrase "similar out-of-pocket expenditures" used in
W. Va. Code, 56-6-31 (1981), and prejudgment interest may be
awarded under that section.
9. "'Rule 59(a), [West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure], provides that a new trial may be granted to any of
the parties on all or part of the issues, and in a case where the
question of liability has been resolved in favor of the plaintiff
leaving only the issue of damages, the verdict of the jury may be
set aside and a new trial granted on the single issue of
damages.' Syl. pt. 4, Richmond v. Campbell, 148 W. Va. 595, 136 S.E.2d 877 (1964)." Syllabus Point 3, Gebhardt v. Smith, 187 W.
Va. 515, 420 S.E.2d 275 (1992).
10. Where liability is clearly established and the jury has made an erroneous over-calculation of damages, a remittitur may be directed on remand. If the plaintiff declines to accept the remittitur, then a new trial will be ordered solely on the issue of damages.
Miller, Justice:
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and final order of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County entered May 15, 1992, in favor of the appellees and plaintiffs below, Glenn M. Wilt and Sandra B. Wilt. The plaintiffs sustained permanent injuries when the automobile in which they were riding was struck by a vehicle driven by Charles W. Nickelson, Jr. Mr. Nickelson was killed in the collision, and this action was brought against his estate.
At trial, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of
several police officers who testified that Mr. Nickelson had an
empty bottle of "Wild Turkey" whiskey between his legs when they
removed his body from the accident scene. The officers also
testified that there were several other empty alcoholic beverage
containers found in the vehicle and that the smell of alcohol
coming from the vehicle was "extreme." Moreover, the deposition
testimony of Lori Hall, a passenger in Mr. Nickelson's car, was
read to the jury. It was to the effect that she and Mr.
Nickelson had been drinking "Wild Turkey" whiskey earlier in the
day, although she could not remember the quantity they had
consumed.
The plaintiffs also presented the testimony of John
Kaputska, who observed the Nickelson vehicle for several minutes
immediately prior to the accident. Mr. Kaputska testified that
the Nickelson vehicle caught his attention because it was being
driven erratically, was following his vehicle too closely, and
was not being driven in a straight line. The Nickelson vehicle
then passed Mr. Kaputska at a high rate of speed, and Mr.
Kaputska lost sight of the Nickelson vehicle as it went around a
curve in the road. As Mr. Kaputska came around the curve, he saw
that the Nickelson vehicle had struck the Wilt vehicle.
I.
The primary reason we accepted this appeal was to
determine whether the testimony of an economist calculating a
monetary amount of damages for the loss of enjoyment of life,
often called hedonic damages, is admissible evidence. This Court
held in Flannery v. United States, 171 W. Va. 27, 297 S.E.2d 433
(1982), that damages for the loss of enjoyment of life are a
valid element of recovery when a plaintiff has suffered a
permanent injury. "[O]nce a permanent injury has been
established . . . the plaintiff is entitled to additional damages
. . . for the permanent effect of the injury itself on 'the
capability of an individual to function as a whole man.'" 171
W. Va. at 30, 297 S.E.2d at 436, quoting Jordan v. Bero, 158
W. Va. 28, 51, 210 S.E.2d 618, 634 (1974). We went on to explain
in Flannery:
"[T]he loss of enjoyment of life is
encompassed within and is an element of the
permanency of the plaintiff's injury. To
state the matter in a slightly different
manner, the degree of permanent injury is
measured by ascertaining how the injury has
deprived the plaintiff of his customary
activities as a whole person. The loss of
customary activities constitutes the loss of
enjoyment of life." 171 W. Va. at 30, 297 S.E.2d at 436.
A.
Before we embark on a discussion of hedonic damages, it
is necessary to establish the test for admissibility of expert
testimony. Our cases contain some variation on this issue,
particularly after our adoption of Rule 702 of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence. We note that our Rule 702 is identical to
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Of some significance,
then, is the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), that discussed the
relationship of Rule 702 with the traditional federal evidentiary
rule on expert testimony that was first articulated in Frye v.
United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
Before we adopted Rule 702, we recognized the Frye test
and set out our version of it in Syllabus Points 7 and 8 of State
v. Clawson, 165 W. Va. 588, 270 S.E.2d 659 (1980):
"7. In order for a scientific test
to be initially admissible, there must be
general acceptance of the scientific
principle which underlies the test.
"8. There are certain scientific
tests that have been widely used over a long
period of time, such that their general
acceptance in the scientific community can be
judicially noticed."
See also State v. Armstrong, 179 W. Va. 435, 369 S.E.2d 870
(1988); State v. Barker, 179 W. Va. 194, 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988).
As we stated in Syllabus Point 8 of Clawson, where the scientific
test is generally accepted, it can be judicially noticed and the
expert need not demonstrate its scientific validity. We also
stated in note 4 of State v. Armstrong, 179 W. Va. at 439-40, 369 S.E.2d at 874-75 (1988), that there is a general trend under Rule
702 to liberalize the Frye rule:
"An increasing number of the courts
and many of the leading commentators
interpret Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which is identical to our Rule 702,
as limiting the Frye 'general acceptance'
test to a test solely for determining whether
judicial notice can be taken of the
scientific test's general reliability. See
P. Giannelli and E. Imwinkelreid, Scientific
Evidence §§ 1-5, 1-5 (E)-(F), 1-6, 1-6(A)-(D)
(1986) (collecting authorities); Giannelli,
General Acceptance of Scientific Tests--Frye
and Beyond, in Scientific and Expert Evidence
11-32 (E. Imwinkelreid 2d ed. 1981).
Therefore, according to this view, a
scientific expert's testimony is admissible
if shown to involve relevant scientific tests
which assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence, even if such tests and the
underlying scientific principle(s) are not
yet generally accepted in the particular
scientific field." (Emphasis in original).
In Daubert, supra, the United States Supreme Court re-
examined the Frye standard and determined that it was too
stringent as applied to the admissibility of expert testimony in
light of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
plaintiffs in Daubert sought to introduce expert testimony
showing the relationship between a drug manufactured by the
defendant and birth defects in children whose mothers had taken
the drug while pregnant with those children. The defendant
argued that the expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs could
not meet Frye's "general acceptance" test. The trial court and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, with the Court of
Appeals stating that because the expert testimony proffered had
not been published or subjected to peer review, it could not be
shown to be a generally accepted scientific technique, and was
thus violative of the Frye standard.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the
Frye test was superseded by Rule 702 because the Frye test was
not included within Rule 702:
"Nothing in the text of [Rule 702] establishes 'general acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. . . . The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid 'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony.' Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. [153,] 169, [109 S. Ct. 439, 450, 102 L. Ed. 2d 445, 463 (1988)] (citing Rules 701 to 705)." 509 U.S. at ___, 113 S. Ct. at 2794, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 480. (Citation omitted.)
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court clearly concluded that
the standard established in Rule 702 would not "result in a
'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd
and irrational pseudoscientific assertions." 509 U.S. at ___,
113 S. Ct. at 2798, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 484. The Supreme Court
emphasized that in supplanting the Frye test by Rule 702, this
did not abandon all limits on the admissibility of purportedly
scientific evidence, but rather that, "under the Rules [of
Evidence] the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable." 509 U.S. at ___, 113 S. Ct. at 2795, 125 L. Ed. 2d at
480.
The Supreme Court outlined the various types of
considerations that a trial court must take into account when
determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule
702, and concluded that the inquiry must be a flexible one:
"[The] overarching subject [of Rule 702] is the scientific
validity--and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability--of
the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus,
of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not the
conclusions that they generate." 509 U.S. at ___, 113 S. Ct. at
2797, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 484.
The Court also recognized:
"[I]n practice, a gatekeeping role for the
judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on
occasion will prevent the jury from learning
of authentic insights and innovations. That,
nevertheless, is the balance that is struck
by Rules of Evidence designed not for the
exhaustive search for cosmic understanding
but for particularized resolution of legal
disputes." 509 U.S. at ___, 113 S. Ct. at
2798-99, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 485. (Footnote
omitted).
In summary, the Supreme Court concluded:
"'[G]eneral acceptance' is not a necessary
precondition to the admissibility of
scientific evidence under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence--
especially Rule 702--do assign to the trial
judge the task of ensuring that an expert's
testimony both rests upon a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at
hand. Pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles will satisfy
those demands." 509 U.S. at ___, 113 S. Ct. at 2799, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 485.
We also note that the Court in Daubert found that
certain scientific theories could be judicially noticed. The
Court stated in note 11: "Of course, well-established
propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that are
novel, and they are more handily defended. Indeed, theories that
are so firmly established as to have attained the status of
scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics, properly are
subject to judicial notice under Fed. Rule Evid. 201." 509 U.S.
at __, 113 S. Ct. at 2796, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 482. See also note
5, supra. We also are of the view that, under Rule 702, there is
a category of expert testimony based on scientific methodology
that is so longstanding and generally recognized that it may be
judicially noticed, and, therefore, a trial court need not
ascertain the basis for its reliability.
Thus, we believe that Daubert is directed at situations
where the scientific or technical basis for the expert testimony
cannot be judicially noticed and a hearing must be held to
determine its reliability. We conclude that Daubert's analysis
of Federal Rule 702 should be followed in analyzing the
admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence. The trial court's initial inquiry
must consider whether the testimony is based on an assertion or
inference derived from scientific methodology. Moreover, the
testimony must be relevant to a fact at issue. Further
assessment should then be made in regard to the expert
testimony's reliability by considering its underlying scientific
methodology and reasoning. This includes an assessment of (a)
whether the scientific theory and its conclusion can be and have
been tested; (b) whether the scientific theory has been subjected
to peer review and publication; (c) whether the scientific
theory's actual or potential rate of error is known; and (d)
whether the scientific theory is generally accepted within the
scientific community.
B.
Our customary rule for determining whether a trial
court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony is
erroneous is contained in Syllabus Point 12 of Board of Education
v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, 182 W. Va. 597, 390 S.E.2d 796
(1990):
"'"Whether a witness is qualified
to state an opinion is a matter which rests
within the discretion of the trial court and
its ruling on that point will not ordinarily
be disturbed unless it clearly appears that
its discretion has been abused." Point 5,
syllabus, Overton v. Fields, 145 W. Va. 797
[117 S.E.2d 598 (1960)].' Syllabus Point 4,
Hall v. Nello Teer Co., 157 W. Va. 582, 203 S.E.2d 145 (1974)."
Applying Rule 702 to the case at bar, we must consider
whether the specialized knowledge of the plaintiffs' expert was
relevant to the calculation of damages for the plaintiffs'
loss of enjoyment of life such that it would "assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
Because we are not convinced that the testimony offered by the
plaintiffs' expert has any relevance whatsoever to a calculation
of damages for the loss of enjoyment of life, we conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the testimony
at trial.
The economic calculations for Mrs. Wilt's claim for
hedonic damages were presented through the testimony of economist
Michael Brookshire, Ph.D. Dr. Brookshire utilized a theory that
every human life has the same whole-life value. This "bench-
mark" whole-life value was arrived at by combining and averaging
the economic values arrived at in over 50 "willingness-to-pay"
studies. According to Dr. Brookshire, this whole-life value
is the same for all persons and is set at $2.5 million. From
this amount, he subtracts another average value that he terms the
"economic machine." The economic machine represents the value of
a person's average lifetime economic earnings, such as wages,
fringe benefits, and household services. This value is estimated
at $800,000, leaving as a "bench-mark" value $1.7 million, which
is contended to be the general value of the loss of enjoyment of
life to the average unknown American.
The plaintiffs also presented the testimony of a
psychologist who estimated that Mrs. Wilt, based upon loss-of-
enjoyment-of-life tests he had devised, had suffered a 51-60
percent loss of her enjoyment of life. Using the percentage
assigned by the psychologist, Dr. Brookshire then calculated Mrs.
Wilt's net economic loss of enjoyment of life by applying it to
the bench-mark figure of $1.7 million and factoring in Mrs.
Wilt's life expectancy. Mrs. Wilt's net economic loss of
enjoyment of life was fixed at $685,493.
Our initial concern is that the willingness-to-pay
studies upon which Dr. Brookshire's calculations are based have
no relevance to the particular loss of enjoyment of life suffered
by a plaintiff due to a given permanent injury. The willingness-
to-pay studies that were used did not involve persons suffering a
permanent injury in a personal injury context. Moreover, the
willingness-to-pay studies did not use methodology designed to
calculate the loss of enjoyment of life, but were nonetheless
extrapolated by Dr. Brookshire into what he claimed to be valid
data for calculating damages for Mrs. Wilt's loss of enjoyment of
life.
The underlying studies were not presented into evidence
and are not a part of the record. Consequently, it is not
possible to determine their precise methodology. Certainly,
under any Rule 702 analysis, without a detailed explanation of
the underlying studies' methodology, the expert testimony would
not meet the reliability standard and the testimony should be
excluded.
Even if we were to assume that Dr. Brookshire's
explanation of the reliability of the willingness-to-pay studies
was sufficient, the question would then be whether the studies
were sufficiently relevant to support his calculations on loss of
enjoyment of life. In his testimony, Dr. Brookshire gave an
example of the loss-of-enjoyment-of-life methodology. This
example was based on wage-versus-risk studies and involved a
hypothetical illustration of 10,000 window washers working on
skyscrapers and the risk of death between those working on the
first-floor windows and those working on the top floors. From
federal statistics, he found a 1 in 10,000 greater chance of
death for top-floor window washers than other window washers. He
then assumed a wage differential of $300 per year for top-floor
washers. Thus, the bottom-floor washers were willing to accept
$300 less a year to avoid the top-floor work. He concluded that
if the 10,000 workers were willing to accept $300 less, then the
value of one life in that context is $3,000,000.
Although the foregoing illustration was not taken from
any of the willingness-to-pay studies, Dr. Brookshire testified
that it was designed to illustrate the methodology used in a
wage-versus-risk study approach to determine the total value of a
life. Even if we were to assume that this methodology has some
valid economic basis, we reject it from a legal standpoint
because it has nothing to do with defining the particular value
of the loss of enjoyment of life in this case.
Moreover, the calculations are based on assumptions
that appear to controvert logic and good sense. Anyone who is
familiar with the wages of coal miners, policemen, and
firefighters would scoff at the assertion that these high risk
jobs have any meaningful extra wage component for the risks
undertaken by workers in those professions.
The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed whether expert testimony based upon willingness-to-pay studies is relevant to one's loss of enjoyment of life have concluded that such testimony is inadmissible. The most thorough analysis of this issue was made by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 871 (7th Cir. 1992):
"[W]e have serious doubts about [the]
assertion that the studies [relied] upon
actually measure how much Americans value
life. For example, spending on items like
air bags and smoke detectors is probably
influenced as much by advertising and
marketing decisions made by profit-seeking
manufacturers and by government-mandated
safety requirements as it is by any
consideration by consumers of how much life
is worth. Also, many people may be
interested in a whole range of safety devices
and believe they are worthwhile, but are
unable to afford them. More fundamentally,
spending on safety items reflects a
consumer's willingness to pay to reduce risk,
perhaps more a measure of how cautious a
person is than how much he or she values
life. Few of us, when confronted with the
threat, 'Your money or your life!' would,
like Jack Benny, pause and respond, 'I'm
thinking, I'm thinking.' Most of us would
empty our wallets. Why that decision
reflects less the value we place on life than
whether we buy an airbag is not immediately
obvious." (Emphasis in original).
The Mercado court also addressed the relevancy of other
studies that have been used to support calculations for hedonic
damages. Those studies were similar to the ones used by Dr.
Brookshire and included the amount of extra salary paid to those
who perform risky work. Another study focused on government
estimates concerning increased costs for complying with health
and safety regulations:
"To say that the salary paid to those who
hold risky jobs tells us something
significant about how much we value life
ignores the fact that humans are moved by
more than monetary incentives. For example,
someone who believes police officers working
in an extremely dangerous city are grossly
undercompensated for the risks they assume
might nevertheless take up the badge out of a
sense of civic duty to their hometown.
Finally, government calculations about how
much to spend (or force others to spend) on
health and safety regulations are motivated
by a host of considerations other than the
value of life: is it an election year? how
large is the budget deficit? on which
constituents will the burden of the
regulations fall? what influence and
pressure have lobbyists brought to bear?
what is the view of interested constituents?
And so on." 974 F.2d at 871. (Emphasis
added).
In Foster v. Trafalger House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284
(La. App. 1992), the court recognized, as we did in Flannery,
that the loss of enjoyment of life is an element of general
damages. That court went on to elaborate on the nature of the
task of determining the amount of such damages:
"[C]ompensation [for general damages] is
never a true measure or a true compensation
for what is lost. The task of awarding
general damages is a uniquely human endeavor,
not only calling upon the trier of fact to
consider the host of factors unique to each
individual case, but also requiring the trier
of fact to draw upon the virtually unlimited
factors unique to us as human beings. . . .
"[E]conomic theories which attempt to
extrapolate the 'value' of human life from various
studies of wages, costs, etc., have no place in the
calculation of general damages." 603 So. 2d at 286.
See also Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (applying North Carolina law); Sterner v. Wesley College, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 263 (D. Del. 1990) (applying Delaware law); Fetzer v. Wood, 211 Ill. App. 3d 70, 84, 155 Ill. Dec. 626, ___, 569 N.E.2d 1237, 1246 (1991) ("the jury is in a better position to decide without imposing an expert's theory as to valuation.").
Finally, in order to lay to rest any future confusion
over whether a different methodology can make this type of
evidence admissible under Rule 702, we believe this issue is
similar to that addressed in Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961). In Crum, we held that, from a substantive law
standpoint, testimony could not be introduced placing a monetary
value on a plaintiff's pain and suffering. As we stated in
Syllabus Point 4 of Crum: "In the trial of an action for damages
for personal injuries based in part on pain and suffering,
testimony attempting to place a money value on pain and suffering
is inadmissible."
Moreover, not unlike the situation addressed in Crum,
in Flannery, supra, we discussed the question of loss of
enjoyment of life in terms of a subjective jury evaluation issue
rather than as an objective calculable item:
"Here, however, we have an element, a
component, of damages that may be considered by a jury
in determining the amount of its award. Just as a jury
may consider the nature, effect and severity of pain
when fixing damages for personal injury, or may
consider mental anguish caused by scars and
disfigurement, it may consider loss of enjoyment of
life." 171 W. Va. at 32, 297 S.E.2d at 438. (Emphasis
in original; citations omitted).
Consequently, we conclude that the loss of enjoyment of life
resulting from a permanent injury is part of the general measure
of damages flowing from the permanent injury and is not subject
to an economic calculation.
II.
A.
Future Dental Expenses
The defendant also cites as error the admission of the
testimony of the plaintiffs' dental expert, Dr. Leroy Jackson,
who testified concerning the future dental expenses that Mr. Wilt
would incur. The defendant contends that Dr. Jackson was unable
to testify with a reasonable degree of certainty about Mr. Wilt's
future dental expenses. The jury awarded Mr. Wilt $5000 under
this category of damages. Dr. Jackson stated that while Mr. Wilt
had dentures prior to the car accident, those dentures would have
to be replaced because, prior to the accident, Mr. Wilt required
only a partial-plate denture, and after the accident, he required
a full-plate denture. Dr. Jackson testified that, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, he was certain that Mr.
Wilt would require one or two additional upper dentures in his
lifetime. Dr. Jackson was not asked to separate the
difference between Mr. Wilt's dental impairment before and after
the accident.
In Syllabus Point 13 of Jordan v. Bero, supra, we
stated:
"In an injury case where the
manifestations of the permanent injury may be
obscure and the extent of the injury itself
may be obscure because of its character,
positive medical evidence to a degree of
reasonable certainty that the injury is
permanent is sufficient to take the question
to the jury and to support an award of
damages for the future effects of such
injury."
It is clear that Dr. Jackson testified to a degree of reasonable
certainty that Mr. Wilt had suffered a permanent dental injury as
a result of the accident. Thus, it was not error for the trial
court to allow Dr. Jackson's testimony to be considered by the
jury and the jury was free to award damages for the future
effects of Mr. Wilt's injury.
B.
Punitive Damages
The jury verdict included an itemized award of $500,000 in punitive damages to each of the plaintiffs. The defendant contends that such a large award of punitive damages was violative of constitutional due process safeguards. The defendant also contends that it was error, under the evidence presented at trial, for the trial court to instruct the jury that driving under the influence of alcohol was evidence of reckless negligence and that punitive damages could be awarded therefor.
The instruction given by the trial court regarding
driving under the influence of alcohol was as follows: "By
statute in W. Va. a person may not drive a vehicle in this State
while he is under the influence of alcohol and a person may not
drive a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others."
The defendant contends that giving such an instruction was error
because no direct evidence was admitted at trial to the effect
that Mr. Nickelson was intoxicated or driving under the influence
of alcohol. We disagree. The instruction given by the trial
court is in line with several of our cases where we recognized
that a person who drives while under the influence of alcohol in
reckless disregard of the safety of others may be subject to an
award of punitive damages. See Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 168 W.
Va. 172, 283 S.E.2d 227 (1981). Cf. Perry v. Melton, 171 W. Va.
397, 299 S.E.2d 8 (1982).
There was abundant testimony to the effect that Mr.
Nickelson had been drinking "Wild Turkey" whiskey shortly before
the accident, and that the "Wild Turkey" bottle was between his
legs at the time of the accident. Moreover, the investigating
police officers noticed an "extreme" smell of alcohol coming from
the vehicle, and Mr. Nickelson was observed driving "erratically"
and at a "high rate of speed" immediately before the accident.
As we stated in Syllabus Point 4 of Catlett v. MacQueen, 180
W. Va. 6, 375 S.E.2d 184 (1988):
"'If there be evidence tending in some appreciable degree to support the theory of proposed instructions, it is not error to give such instructions to the jury, though the evidence be slight, or even insufficient to support a verdict based entirely on such theory.' Syllabus Point 2, Snedecker v. Rulong, 69 W. Va. 223, 71 S.E. 180 (1911)."
Clearly, the evidence presented by the plaintiffs was sufficient
to instruct the jury that driving under the influence of alcohol
is prohibited by statute in this State, and the trial court did
not commit error by giving that instruction.
The defendant also contends that the award of punitive
damages violated constitutional due process guarantees because
the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury so as to
protect the defendant from a punitive award "grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the offense or to accomplish
society's goals of punishment and deterrence[.]" Our general
rule on the adequacy of jury instructions concerning punitive
damages was stated in Syllabus Point 13 of TXO Production Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 187 W. Va. 457, 419 S.E.2d 870
(1992), aff'd, 509 U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2711, 125 L. Ed. 2d 366
(1993). We find that the jury instruction was adequate under TXO
and, under this standard, the amount of punitive damages awarded
was not improper even if the hedonic damage evidence had been
excluded.
C.
Prejudgment Interest
The defendant argues that the trial court erred when it awarded the plaintiffs prejudgment interest on their award of damages for the loss of household services. There was undisputed testimony at trial that a cousin of Mr. Wilt's performed those services because Mrs. Wilt was unable to do so, and that the cousin accepted significantly less compensation from the plaintiffs than the going rate for those services . The defendant contends that household services are not "special damages" under W. Va. Code, 56-6-31 (1981), and thus prejudgment interest may not be paid on that award. We disagree.
W. Va. Code 56-6-31, states, in pertinent part:
"[I]f the judgement or decree, or any part
thereof, is for special damages, as defined
below, or for liquidated damages, the amount
of such special or liquidated damages shall
bear interest from the date the right to
bring the same shall have accrued, as
determined by the court. Special damages
includes lost wages and income, medical
expenses, damages to tangible personal
property, and similar out-of-pocket
expenditures, as determined by the court."
(Emphasis added).
As we stated in Syllabus Point 1 of Buckhannon-Upshur
County Airport Authority v. R & R Coal Contracting, Inc., 186
W. Va. 583, 413 S.E.2d 404 (1991):
"Prejudgment interest, according to
West Virginia Code § 56-6-31 (1981) and the
decisions of this Court interpreting that
statute, is not a cost, but is a form of
compensatory damages intended to make an
injured plaintiff whole as far as loss of use
of funds is concerned."
It is clear to us that expenditures for household services are
included within the phrase "similar out-of-pocket expenditures"
used in W. Va. Code, 56-6-31, and prejudgment interest may be
awarded under that section. They are out-of-pocket funds the
plaintiffs lost due to the negligence of the defendant's decedent
and are intended to make the plaintiffs whole. Thus, household
services expenditures are special damages for the purposes of
W. Va. Code, 56-6-31, and the trial court did not err by awarding
prejudgment interest upon those damages.
III.
Because the hedonic damage evidence was improperly
admitted, this case must be remanded. We recognized in Syllabus
Point 3 of Gebhardt v. Smith, 187 W. Va. 515, 420 S.E.2d 275
(1992), that where liability has been clearly established and, on
appeal, error has been found to have occurred, a new trial may be
awarded on that issue alone:
"'Rule 59(a), [West Virginia Rules
of Civil Procedure], provides that a new
trial may be granted to any of the parties on
all or part of the issues, and in a case
where the question of liability has been
resolved in favor of the plaintiff leaving
only the issue of damages, the verdict of the
jury may be set aside and a new trial granted
on the single issue of damages.' Syl. pt. 4,
Richmond v. Campbell, 148 W. Va. 595, 136 S.E.2d 877 (1964)."
In Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hospital, Inc., 176 W. Va. 492,
345 S.E.2d 791 (1986), the jury awarded damages in the amount of
$10 million in a wrongful death claim of a two-and-one-half-year-
old child. We found the award excessive and remanded the case
with directions to the circuit court "to enter a remittitur of
$7,000,000 and enter judgment on the verdict for $3,000,000 or,
in the alternative, at the option of the plaintiff, to award a
new trial." 176 W. Va. at 504, 345 S.E.2d at 804.
Another approach was taken in Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 169 W. Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d 692 (1982). There, the jury returned a verdict in a personal injury case, which was broken down into various components. Upon analyzing the various damage components of the award, we found that some were not legally authorized under the facts of the case. The total award of damages was $80,000; however, we determined that the correct award should have been $25,000 and came to this conclusion:
"We, therefore, accord the right of
remittitur to the plaintiff on the basis that
he may accept within forty-five days from the
mandate of this Court a judgment of $25,000
together with interest thereon from the date
of the jury verdict against the Bank and
Wilson or the judgment will be set aside and
he shall be entitled to a new trial on the
issue of damages." 169 W. Va. at 698, 289 S.E.2d at 706.
Thus, these cases illustrate the principle that where
liability is clearly established and the jury has made an
erroneous over-calculation of damages, a remittitur may be
directed on remand. If the plaintiff declines to accept the
remittitur, then a new trial will be ordered solely on the issue
of damages.
Consequently, we conclude that because the plaintiffs
offered substantial evidence supporting all their damage claims
except for Mrs. Wilt's claim for loss of enjoyment of life, which
was assessed separately by the jury, we remand the case with
instructions that if the plaintiffs wish to remit the hedonic
damage award, judgment may be entered on the remaining
damages. If not, then the plaintiffs may have a new trial on
the damage issue alone because liability clearly has been
established.
Therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Jefferson County is affirmed, in part, reversed, in part, and
remanded.
Affirmed, in part;
reversed, in part;
and remanded. .
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