SER Foster v. City of Morgantown
Annotate this CaseJanuary 1993 Term
___________
No. 21671
___________
STATE EX REL. RUEL FOSTER,
LARRY SCHWAB, ROBERT CYPHERT, DONALD TREVORROW,
BARBARA HOCK AND BETTY McCLAIN,
Petitioners
v.
THE CITY OF MORGANTOWN,
Respondent
___________________________________________________
Petition for Writ of Mandamus
WRIT DENIED
__________________________________________
Submitted: May 4, 1993
Filed: June 10, 1993
Willard D. Lorensen
Morgantown, West Virginia
Attorney for the Petitioners
Stephen R. Fanok
Brent O. Burton
Morgantown, West Virginia
Attorney for the Respondent
JUSTICE McHUGH delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "W. Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969] controls the method by
which a city can amend a comprehensive zoning ordinance; that
section refers specifically to the procedures set forth in W. Va.
Code, 8-24-18 through 22 [1969], and since these cited sections do
not authorize a referendum on amendments to a zoning ordinance,
none is required or permitted." Syl., State ex rel. MacQueen v.
City of Dunbar, 167 W. Va. 91, 278 S.E.2d 636 (1981).
2. "The general rule of statutory construction requires
that a specific statute be given precedence over a general statute
relating to the same subject matter where the two cannot be
reconciled." Syl. pt. 1, UMWA by Trumka v. Kingdon, 174 W. Va.
330, 325 S.E.2d 120 (1984).
3. "'In the event of an inconsistency or conflict
between a provision of a city charter and a general law, the latter
will prevail.' Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Plymale v. City of
Huntington, 147 W. Va. 728, 131 S.E.2d 160 (1963)." Syl. pt. 2,
Miller v. Palmer, 175 W. Va. 565, 336 S.E.2d 213 (1985).
4. A municipal charter provision, granting to the
qualified voters of a municipality the power of referendum to
require reconsideration by the city council of any adopted
ordinance, may not supersede W. Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969], which
does not authorize a referendum with respect to amendments to
zoning ordinances.
McHugh, Justice:
In this original proceeding in mandamus, the petitioners,
Ruel Foster, et al., seek to have this Court compel the respondent,
the City of Morgantown, to either repeal a zoning ordinance
amendment adopted by the city or submit it to a city-wide
referendum. The zoning ordinance adopted by the city essentially
altered conditional uses of property within designated zones to
allow liquor to be served where only beer and wine sales were
previously allowed. Upon review of the case before us, we deny the
writ.
I
The City of Morgantown is a municipal corporation whose
charter was approved by the city's voters on April 29, 1977. The
charter of the City of Morgantown, section 1.02, provides that the
city shall have all of the powers granted to it under the charter
and "shall also have all the powers . . . granted to municipal
corporations and to cities of its class by the Constitution and
general laws of the State[.]" Section 2.13(b) of the city's
charter sets forth the procedure which must be followed by the city
council in adopting ordinances. Moreover, section 8.01(b) of the
city's charter provides the following power of referendum:
(b) Referendum. The qualified voters of the
City shall have power to require
reconsideration by the Council of any adopted
ordinance and, if the Council fails to repeal
an ordinance so reconsidered, to approve or
reject it at a City election, provided that
such power shall not extend to the budget or
capital program or any emergency ordinance or
ordinance relating to appropriation of money
or levy of taxes.
On January 5, 1993, the city council of the City of
Morgantown adopted an amended zoning ordinance officially titled
"AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTIONS 5 AND 19C AS WELL AS TABLE 11 OF
THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF MORGANTOWN AS THE SAME APPLIES
TO PRIVATE CLUBS AND CONDITIONAL USES." The amended zoning
ordinance essentially altered conditional uses of property within
designated zones to allow liquor to be served where only beer and
wine were previously served. At public hearings held before the
city council voted on the amended zoning ordinance,See footnote 1 the
petitioners urged the city council not to adopt the ordinance.
Following the adoption of the amended zoning ordinance by
the city council, the petitioners drafted a petition requesting
city council to reconsider the ordinance adopted, and obtained the
signatures of more than 1,066 registered voters in the City of
Morgantown. On February 10, 1993, the City Clerk of the City of
Morgantown certified that the petition contained enough signatures
of qualified voters to satisfy the requirements of the city's
charter.
The petition was taken into consideration by the city
council at its meeting on February 16, 1993. The petitioners
represent that, at that meeting, the city attorney advised the city
council that state law prohibited it from taking action on the
petition, and from either repealing the zoning ordinance amendment
or submitting it to a city-wide election under the provisions of
the city's charter. The city council rejected the petition by a
divided vote.
The petitioners contend that, under the City of
Morgantown's charter, the city council has a non-discretionary duty
to either repeal the ordinance or submit the issue to a city-wide
election.See footnote 2 The petitioners therefore seek a writ of mandamus from
this Court to compel the City of Morgantown to either repeal the
zoning ordinance amendment or submit it to a city-wide election.
II
This Court has specifically held that W. Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969] controls the method by which a city can amend a
comprehensive zoning ordinance. State ex rel. MacQueen v. City of
Dunbar, 167 W. Va. 91, 278 S.E.2d 636 (1981).See footnote 3 We explained in the
syllabus of State ex rel. MacQueen that, under the Zoning Enabling
Act, specifically W. Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969], there are no
provisions authorizing a public referendum on an amendment to a
zoning ordinance:See footnote 4
W. Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969] controls the
method by which a city can amend a
comprehensive zoning ordinance; that section
refers specifically to the procedures set
forth in W. Va. Code, 8-24-18 through 22
[1969], and since these cited sections do not
authorize a referendum on amendments to a
zoning ordinance, none is required or
permitted.
The legislature, under the Zoning Enabling Act, has
provided a detailed procedure for adopting amendments to zoning
ordinances. First, prior to the adoption of an amendment to the
zoning ordinance, the planning commission is required to issue
notice and conduct a public hearing on the proposed amendment.See footnote 5
W. Va. Code, 8-24-18 [1969]. Next, after the public hearing has
been held, the planning commission may, by resolution, adopt the
amendment to the zoning ordinance. W. Va. Code, 8-24-19 [1969].
Upon certifying and presenting the proposed zoning ordinance
amendment to the municipal governing body, W. Va. Code, 8-24-2
[1969], the governing body must consider the ordinance and either
adopt, reject or amend it. W. Va. Code, 8-24-21 [1969].See footnote 6
The petitioners recognize that the Zoning Enabling Act
does not authorize a referendum on amendments to a zoning
ordinance. They argue, however, that the referendum powers granted
under the Home Rule Powers for Cities, W. Va. Code, 8-12-4 [1969],
supersede the ordinance amendment procedure specifically delineated
in the Zoning Enabling Act.See footnote 7
W. Va. Code, 8-12-4 [1969], which was enacted in 1937,
provides, in pertinent part:
Any city may by charter provision provide
for any or all of the following:
(1) The initiation of ordinances by
petition bearing the signatures, written in
their own handwriting, of not less than ten
percent of the qualified voters of such city;
(2) The submission to the qualified
voters of such city of a proposed ordinance at
a regular municipal election or special
municipal election upon petition bearing the
signatures, written in their own handwriting,
of not less than ten percent of the qualified
voters of such city or upon resolution of the
governing body of such city[.]
(emphasis added).
W. Va. Code, 8-12-4 [1969], which was enacted prior to
the enactment of the Zoning Enabling Statute, is a general statute
which does not specifically address the referendum issue with
respect to the adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance by
the city council. Two rules of statutory construction must be
considered here. First, there is a presumption that the
legislature, when it enacts legislation, is familiar with its prior
enactments. Hudok v. Board of Education, 187 W. Va. 93, 415 S.E.2d 897 (1992); Pullano v. City of Bluefield, 176 W. Va. 198, 342 S.E.2d 164 (1986); Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885
(1953). Second, and in this context more importantly, is the long-established rule of statutory construction that a specific statute
will take precedence over a general statute which deals with the
same subject matter. West Virginia Dept. of Human Services v.
Boley, 178 W. Va. 179, 182, 358 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1987) (citing
cases). We succinctly stated this rule in syllabus point 1 of UMWA
by Trumka v. Kingdon, 174 W. Va. 330, 325 S.E.2d 120 (1984): "The
general rule of statutory construction requires that a specific
statute be given precedence over a general statute relating to the
same subject matter where the two cannot be reconciled."
We utilize these traditional rules of statutory
construction in evaluating the petitioners' arguments herein.
W. Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969] specifically sets forth the procedure
to be followed in amending a zoning ordinance, and was enacted by
the legislature after W. Va. Code, 8-12-4 [1969]. Clearly, with
respect to amending zoning ordinances, W. Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969]
preempts W. Va. Code, 8-12-4 [1969].
Furthermore, municipalities have no inherent power with
regard to their exercise of governmental functions; their power
depends solely upon the acts of the Legislature. Syllabus point 1,
in part, State ex rel. Plymale v. City of Huntington, 147 W. Va.
728, 131 S.E.2d 160 (1963). W. Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969] is a
general law that operates and applies uniformly to all cities in
the State, and limits any exercise of municipal power in any
municipality in this state with respect to zoning ordinance
amendments. Section 8.01(b) of the Morgantown City Charter, which
reserves the power of referendum to the qualified voters of the
City to require reconsideration by the city council of any adopted
ordinance, is clearly inconsistent with W. Va. Code, 8-24-23
[1969], which does not authorize a referendum to challenge
amendments to zoning ordinances.See footnote 8 When a charter provision is
inconsistent with a general law, the general law is controlling as
we stated in syllabus point 2 of Miller v. Palmer, 175 W. Va. 565,
336 S.E.2d 213 (1985): "'In the event of an inconsistency or
conflict between a provision of a city charter and a general law,
the latter will prevail.' Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Plymale v.
City of Huntington, 147 W. Va. 728, 131 S.E.2d 160 (1963)."
III
Thus, for the reasons stated above, we hold that a
municipal charter provision, granting to the qualified voters of
the municipality the power of referendum to require reconsideration
by the city council of any adopted ordinance, may not supersede W.
Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969], which does not authorize a referendum
with respect to amendments to zoning ordinances. Accordingly, we
deny the writ.
Writ denied.
Footnote: 1 The respondent represents that "at least three public
hearings were held by the Planning Commission in which voiced
concerns of citizens were acknowledged and to a large extent
incorporated into the zoning ordinance amendment proposal which was
later presented to Morgantown City Council for consideration." The
respondent further represents that the city council also held a
public hearing on the proposed amendment pursuant to W. Va. Code,
8-11-4 [1969], prior to its adoption.
Footnote: 2 While it is clear that the petitioners believe Section
8.01(b) imposes a non-discretionary duty upon the city to hold a
referendum, it is not clear as to which charter provision the
petitioners believe imposes a non-discretionary duty upon the city
to repeal the zoning ordinance amendment.
Footnote: 3 This Court did recognize in State ex rel. MacQueen v.
Dunbar that W. Va. Code, 8-24-48 [1969] does authorize a public
referendum, but only for the initial adoption of a comprehensive
zoning ordinance.
Footnote: 4 The petitioners contend that the United States Supreme
Court has clearly ruled that zoning decisions may be subject to
public referendum without violation of any constitutional
provision. In the United States Supreme Court case cited by the
petitioners, City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 96 S. Ct. 2358, 49 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1976), the federal
question presented to the court was whether a city charter
amendment allowing voters to decide whether the zoned use of
property could be altered was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power violative of federal due process guarantees
because voters were given no standards to guide their decision.
The Court held that the charter amendment was not invalid on
federal constitutional grounds.
City of Eastlake is distinguishable from the case now
before us because the Ohio Constitution specifically reserved the
power of referendum to the people of each municipality on all
questions the municipality was allowed to control by legislation.
It is important therefore to note that article VI, section 39(a) of
the West Virginia Constitution creating the Home Rule for
Municipalities does not reserve to the people of each municipality
in this State the power of referendum with respect to all questions
that the municipality is authorized to control by legislation.
Footnote: 5 The planning commission consists of individuals "who
shall be qualified by knowledge and experience in matters
pertaining to the development of the municipality, who shall
include representatives of business, industry and labor[.]" W. Va.
Code, 8-24-5 [1986].
Footnote: 6 The detailed procedure to be followed in amending a
zoning ordinance makes sense for several reasons. First of all, in
preparing a comprehensive plan, the planning commission is charged
with the duty to make "careful and comprehensive surveys and
studies of the existing conditions and probable future changes of
such conditions within the territory under its jurisdiction." W.
Va. Code, 8-24-16 [1969]. The comprehensive plan is created
with the general purpose of guiding and
accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted and
harmonious development of the area which will,
in accordance with present and future needs
and resources, best promote the health,
safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity
or general welfare of the inhabitants, as well
as efficiency and economy in the process of
development[.]
W. Va. Code, 8-24-16 [1969] (emphasis added). Any amendments to
zoning ordinances must harmonize with the comprehensive plan.
State ex rel. MacQueen v. City of Dunbar, supra. Thus, the
detailed procedure set forth under W. Va. Code, 8-24-18 through 22
[1969] is crucial to the comprehensive planning envisioned by the
Zoning Enabling Act. In contrast, a public referendum on an
isolated issue relating to municipal zoning is inconsistent with
comprehensive planning.
Footnote: 7 The petitioners also contend that, three decades ago,
this Court settled the law on referendum of zoning matters in State
ex rel. Schreyer v. City of Wheeling, 146 W. Va. 467, 120 S.E.2d 389 (1961). In that case, which predates the Zoning Enabling Act,
the Court held that an ordinance submitted by petition signed by
the requisite number of voters, proposing the repeal of an
ordinance adopted by the city council, should, if not adopted by
the council without alteration, be submitted to a vote of the
people in the manner so provided. Schreyer, however, is easily
distinguishable from the case now before the Court. Schreyer is
not a zoning case. Schreyer involved an effort by citizens to
rescind an ordinance ordering the demolition of two buildings; the
issue of zoning was not involved. In the present case, the
petitioners seek to have a referendum on an amended zoning
ordinance that had been adopted by the city council pursuant to the
Zoning Enabling Act. Thus, the holding in Schreyer is not
controlling, nor relevant, in the present case.
Footnote: 8 Section 8.01(b) appears to be "inconsistent or in
conflict with" W. Va. Code, 8-24-23 [1969] only insofar as it would
allow a referendum after the adoption of an amended zoning
ordinance. W. Va. Code, 8-1-2(b)(9) provides:
(9) 'Inconsistent or in conflict with'
shall mean that a charter or ordinance
provision is repugnant to the Constitution of
this State or to general law because such
provision (i) permits or authorizes that which
the Constitution or general law forbids or
prohibits, or (ii) forbids or prohibits that
which the Constitution or general law permits
or authorizes[.]"
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