Hager v. Hager
Annotate this Case
September 1993 Term
___________
No. 20728
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GRADY D. HAGER,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee,
v.
PAULINE K. HAGER,
Defendant Below, Appellant
_______________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County
Honorable E. Lee Schlaegel, Circuit Judge
Civil Action No. 89-C-367
REVERSED AND REMANDED
_______________________________________________
Submitted: September 15, 1993
Filed: December 10, 1993
Peter A. Hendricks
Madison, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellee
Michael V. Marlow
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellant
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
"Where an oral separation agreement is dictated on the record,
additional inquiries must be made by the court or the family law
master to ascertain that the parties understand its terms and have
voluntarily agreed to them without any coercion. Furthermore, the
court or the family law master must find that the terms of the
agreement ar fair and equitable. This latter inquiry requires a
disclosure of the financial background of the parties sufficient to
justify the conclusion of the court or the family law master."
Syl. Pt. 2, Gangopadhyay v. Gangopadhyay, 184 W.Va. 695, 403 S.E.2d 712 (1991).
Per Curiam:
This is an appeal by Pauline Kay Hager from an August 5, 1991,
final order of the Circuit Court of Boone County finding that the
terms of an oral property settlement agreement between the
Appellant and her former husband, Appellee Grady D. Hager, were
fair and equitable and that the Appellant fully understood and
consented to the terms of the agreement. The Appellant contends
that the terms of the agreement were not fair and equitable and
should therefore not be enforced against her. We agree with the
contentions of the Appellant and reverse and remand the decision of
the lower court.
I.
Pauline and Grady Hager were married on January 1, 1964, and
Mr. Grady (hereinafter referred to as the Appellee or Mr. Grady)
initiated a divorce complaint on August 25, 1989. A temporary
hearing was held before Family Law Master Susan Shelton Perry on
October 5, 1989, and the Appellant was awarded $800.00 per month as
temporary support. The parties attended a divorce hearing on
February 7, 1990, before Family Law Master Perry. During this
hearing, an oral property settlement agreement was dictated on the
record. Prior to its presentation on the record, the Appellant was
asked whether she felt that the terms of the agreement were fair
and equitable. At that time, she answered in the affirmative.
Upon questioning her counsel immediately after the hearing and upon
learning the actual terms of the agreement, however, she informed
her counsel that the terms were not acceptable.See footnote 1
Pursuant to the oral property settlement agreement, the
Appellant was to receive the following: $475.00 per month for one
year, a 1987 Chrysler New Yorker with outstanding indebtedness of
$387.00 per month to be paid by the Appellant, and the marital
home.See footnote 2 The parties' furniture and personal property were to be
divided equally, and the Appellee was to receive a 1982 Ford pickup
truck, a 1978 Ford pickup truck, a Gravely tractor, a fishing boat,
various tools, and his CSX Railroad pension and retirement plan.
II.
The Appellant contends that the lower court abused its
discretion in finding that the terms and conditions of the oral
settlement agreement were fair and equitable and in failing to
engage in sufficient background inquiry to justify that conclusion.
The Appellant's argument is actually two-fold; first, the Appellant
contends that she did not truly enter into the oral settlement
agreement, and second, she maintains that the terms of the
agreement itself were so inequitable as to defeat the proposed
settlement. In syllabus point 2 of Gangopadhyay v. Gangopadhyay,
184 W.Va. 695, 403 S.E.2d 712 (1991),See footnote 3 we explained the following:
Where an oral separation agreement
is dictated on the record, additional
inquiries must be made by the court or the
family law master to ascertain that the
parties understand its terms and have
voluntarily agreed to them without any
coercion. Furthermore, the court or the
family law master must find that the terms of
the agreement are fair and equitable. This
latter inquiry requires a disclosure of the
financial background of the parties sufficient
to justify the conclusion of the court or the
family law master.
The Appellee contends that the lower court considered and
specifically addressed the issues raised in Gangopadhyay by
initially remanding this case to the Family Law Master for
reconsideration. Indeed, prior to the lower court's August 5,
1991, final order approving of the settlement agreement, this
matter was remanded to the family law master for additional
inquiries. The primary thrust of those additional proceedings,
however, appeared to be the ascertainment of whether the Appellant
had voluntarily entered into the agreement. While we adopt the
findings of the lower court with regard to the Appellant's
voluntary consent to the agreement, we do not accept the lower
court's conclusion that sufficient inquiry was made into the
fairness of the agreement.
The evidence introduced before the family law master indicated
that the parties were married for twenty-five years prior to the
initiation of the divorce. Two children, both of whom are now
emancipated, were born of the marriage. The Appellee was employed
by CSX Railroad as a yard master, with net income of approximately
$1800.00 per month.See footnote 4 The Appellee also apparently earns extra
income as an automobile mechanic. He was forty-six years of age at
the time of the divorce, and the Appellant was forty-five years of
age. The Appellant had never been employed outside the home, had
no high school education, and possessed no formal job skills.
During the marriage, the Appellant provided homemaking services for
the family and raised two children. She presently suffers from
physical deformities of the left side of her body, including a club
left foot and a left leg that is shorter than the right leg. The
Appellant will have no medical insurance upon the granting of the
divorce.
The oral agreement approved by the lower court as fair and
equitable provides alimony for one year only, in the amount of
$475.00 per month. The agreement further makes the Appellant
responsible for a $375.00 per month car payment, leaving the
Appellant with only $88.00 to support herself. Even this sparse
amount would last only one year under the lower court's order.
In enunciating standards for the evaluation of oral property
settlements of this nature in Gangopadhyay and in our subsequent
decision of Summers v. Summers, 186 W.Va. 635, 413 S.E.2d 692
(1991), we emphasized the need for court evaluation and approval of
oral agreements entered into between parties to a divorce.See footnote 5 This
evaluation is not to be a perfunctory overview or rubber-stamp
approval of the decisions of the parties. It must consist of a
reasoned and thorough inquiry into the background financial status
of the parties. To thereafter determine that the parties have
resolved the issues in a fair and equitable manner, the court or
family law master must examine the proposed resolution in light of
evidence adduced regarding the financial status of the parties.
That formula was concisely enunciated in Gangopadhyay. See 184
W.Va. at 699, 403 S.E.2d at 716.See footnote 6
The circuit court determined that the Appellant voluntarily
entered into the agreement, but erred, however, in its
determination that the agreement was fair and equitable. The
Appellee attempts to explain the agreement by asserting that the
Appellant desired the marital abode and was willing to forego any
permanent alimony and any portion of the Appellee's pension to
assure that she would remain in that home. Perhaps the Appellant
did want the marital abode, and perhaps she was willing to enter
into any type of agreement to obtain it. Because such an agreement
was inequitable on its face under all the circumstances, however,
certainly additional inquiry into whether the Appellant understood
her rights and the implications of the agreement was warranted.
Furthermore, since the parties did not reduce this agreement to
writing, they subjected themselves to the more stringent
requirements of Gangopadhyay.See footnote 7
The Appellee also implies, in his attempt to justify the
agreement, that the Appellant's present circumstance could be
altered if she remarries soon. While that is true, it is
irrelevant to the considerations properly before this Court. The
determination of the fair and equitable nature of the agreement in
question is to be based upon facts as they presently exist, not
speculation as to potential future events.
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the lower
court and remand this matter for resolution consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Footnote: 1Although it is unclear from the record before this Court,
it does not appear that the Appellant's counsel informed the
family law master or the court of the Appellant's contention that
the agreement was inequitable until exceptions to the family law
master's decision were filed with the circuit court in May 1990.
Footnote: 2The Appellant alleges that the marital home suffered
extensive foundation damage as a result of mine blasting prior to
the divorce. The record on appeal is devoid of any evidence on
the value of the home.
Footnote: 3The Gangopadhyay decision was rendered subsequent to the
initial reading of the agreement onto the record but prior to the
final decision of the lower court.
Footnote: 4The Appellant contends that the Appellee presently earns
approximately $50,000.00 per year in his employment with CSX
Railroad.
Footnote: 5In Summers, we noted that the review requirement is "an
obvious recognition of the important interests that are at stake
in a typical settlement agreement and the concomitant need to
ensure that one party does not take advantage of the other when
these interests are being compromised." 186 W.Va. at 640, 413 S.E.2d at 697.
Footnote: 6Our imposition of this responsibility onto judicial
officers should in no way minimize the responsibility of a
litigant's own lawyer. It is difficult to understand why a
lawyer would advise a client to enter into an obviously unfair
agreement, and an individual whose lawyer is negligent may have a
cause of action for malpractice. In the case of pro se
litigants, however, courts may have an even heightened
responsibility to see to it that domestic relations agreements
are equitable.
Footnote: 7As we recognized in Gangopadhyay, certain additional
"safeguards should attend the acceptance of an oral separation
agreement." 184 W.Va. at 699, 403 S.E.2d at 716. A written
settlement agreement is certainly to be scrutinized to ascertain
whether it is fair and reasonable and not obtained through fraud,
duress, or other unconscionable conduct, pursuant to West
Virginia Code §§ 48-2-16(a) and 48-2-32(b). However, the
principles set forth in Gangopadhyay are designed to establish
greater safeguards for oral agreements since "[c]ertainly, a
greater inquiry is demanded where the agreement is oral instead
of written and where there are allegations of fraud, duress, or
coercion." Id.
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