Gino's v. WV Human Right's Commission
Annotate this CaseJanuary 1992 Term
___________
No. 20084
___________
GINO'S PIZZA OF WEST HAMLIN, INC.,
Plaintiff Below, Appellee
v.
WEST VIRGINIA HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION AND LORI S. EVANS
Defendants Below, Appellants
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lincoln County
Honorable W. Jack Stevens, Judge
Civil Action No. 87-C-132
REVERSED AND REMANDED
___________________________________________________
Submitted: January 14, 1992
Filed: May 15, 1992
Charles R. Garten
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellant
Mark A. Sorsaia
Hurricane, West Virginia
Attorney for the Appellee
This Opinion was delivered PER CURIAM
Justice Neely dissents and would affirm the trial judge.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
"In order to prove 'quid pro quo' sexual harassment
at the workplace, the complainant must prove: (1) that the
complainant belongs to a protected class; (2) that the complainant
was subject to an unwelcome sexual advance by an employer, or an
agent of the employer who appears to have the authority to
influence vital job decisions; and (3) the complainant's reaction
to the advancement was expressly or impliedly linked by the
employer or the employer's agent to tangible aspects of
employment." Syl. pt. 1, Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Human Rights
Commission, 181 W. Va. 368, 382 S.E.2d 562 (1989).
"West Virginia Human Rights Commission's findings of
fact should be sustained by reviewing courts if they are supported
by substantial evidence or are unchallenged by the parties." Syl.
pt. 1, West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. United
Transportation Union, Local No. 655, 167 W. Va. 282, 280 S.E.2d 653
(1981).
"Upon judicial review of a contested case under the
West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 29A, article 5,
Section 4(g), the circuit court may affirm the order or decision of
the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The circuit
court shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the
agency if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings,
inferences, conclusions, decisions or order are: '(1) In violation
of constitutional or statutory provisions; or (2) In excess of the
statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon
unlawful procedures; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5)
Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.'" Syl. pt. 2, Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire
Dep't v. State ex rel. State Human Rights Commission, 172 W. Va.
627, 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983).
"Our original authorization in Human Rights
Commission v. Pearlman Rlty. Agcy., 161 W. Va. 1, 239 S.E.2d 145
(1977) of damages for humiliation, embarrassment, emotional and
mental distress, and loss of personal dignity, contemplated only
'incidental' awards. We approved $1,000 as an incidental award for
such damages. That figure may be adjusted for inflation, but the
Commission must be aware of its jurisdictional limitations because
awarding a higher amount impinges upon a defendant's constitutional
right to trial by jury." Syl. pt. 2, Bishop Coal Co. v. Salyers,
181 W. Va. 71, 380 S.E.2d 238 (1989).
Per Curiam:
This case is before the Court upon the appeal of Lori S.
Evans and the West Virginia Human Rights Commission ("the
Commission") from the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, which
reversed the decision of the Commission. The appellant contends
that the circuit court committed reversible error when it found
that the order of the Commission was not supported by substantial
evidence. The Commission had found that the appellee, Gino's Pizza
of West Hamlin, Inc. ("Gino's") had discriminated against the
complainant on the basis of her sex by terminating her employment
because she rebuked the unwelcome sexual advances of her
supervising manager. We reverse the decision of the circuit court,
and reinstate, in part, the decision of the Commission.
Lori Evans began working for Gino's in March, 1982. She
was employed as a cook/cashier/waitress until she quit in mid-1983.
Ms. Evans was rehired to the same position in December, 1983 and
continued in that position until May 17, 1985. Ms. Evans contends
she was terminated by Gino's the following day; Gino's contends Ms.
Evans effectively quit on May 17, 1985.
Ms. Evans filed a complaint with the Commission alleging
that she had been subjected to abusive behavior and sexual
harassment from her manager. After a hearing was conducted, the
hearing examiner issued a proposed order, which was thereafter
adopted (with minor amendments) by the Commission.
The appellant testified before the hearing examiner that
she had resided with the manager and his wife (also an employee of
Gino's) and their two children for four to six weeks beginning in
December, 1984. She alleged that the manager made sexual advances
to her on two occasions while she resided with him, and although
she rebuked him on both occasions, she felt compelled to move out
immediately thereafter.
Appellant further testified that the manager resumed
making sexual advances three and one-half months later (in mid-April, 1985) during work shifts when they were alone together.See footnote 1
Appellant contended that the manager frequently (six or seven times
per work shift) tried to touch her, and often made suggestive
comments to her; however, when she made it clear that she would not
submit to his advances,See footnote 2 the manager became increasingly critical
of her work performance. Appellant did not discuss the sexual
harassment with any other person until May 18, 1985.See footnote 3 The manager
never explicitly threatened appellant with the loss of her job for
failing to submit to the advances.
On May 15, 1985 appellant sought out the area supervisor
of Gino's and informed him that her manager had been unduly
critical of her work in front of customers. He agreed such
criticism was unwarranted, and advised her to take the following
day off, which she did.
On May 17, 1985 the manager again criticized appellant in
front of customers. She immediately left work although her shift
had not ended. She attempted to return to work the following day,
but was informed by the manager that she was no longer employed.
The manager denied ever touching or making sexually
suggestive comments of any kind. He further denied being overly
critical of appellant's work performance.See footnote 4 A co-employee, Judy
Goddard, testified that she had not noticed the manager criticizing
appellant in front of customers. The area supervisor acknowledged
that appellant was given the day off on May 16, 1985, but stated
she never informed him that the manager was being critical of her
work, only that she was "nervous." He did not inquire as to why
she was nervous.
The Commission found that appellant was terminated for
rejecting the unwelcome sexual advances of her manager, largely on
the basis of the perceived demeanor of appellant as compared to her
manager, and on the basis of inconsistencies in the testimony of
the witnesses for appellee. Most significantly the Commission
found that the manager could not adequately explain what he meant
when he stated on a company reprimand form (filed at the time
appellant's employment was terminated) that complainant could not
get along with others. The manager testified that he had the
impression that complainant and Ms. Goddard occasionally were not
speaking to each other, but he never asked why or got involved.
Beyond those instances, he testified, the two got along fine. He
also testified that complainant did not get along with his wife
(who was also employed by Gino's), although he admitted that,
during the time period in question, complainant did not work with
his wife.See footnote 5 The Commission noted that appellant's testimony also
contained inconsistencies, but found that they were minor and
related only to time.
As part of its cease and desist order, the Commission
awarded the complainant $5,000 for "humiliation, embarrassment,
emotional and mental distress and the loss of personhood and
dignity," resultant from the alleged discriminatory treatment. The
Commission ordered that complainant be reinstated to her former
position, and awarded her back wages.See footnote 6 The Commission also awarded
the complainant attorney's fees in the amount of $4,950.00 and
costs in the amount of $474.40.
Appellee appealed to the Circuit Court of Lincoln County
pursuant to W. Va. Code, 29A-5-4 [1964]. The circuit court
reversed the Commission in regard to the sexual harassment finding,
and, therefore, denied all relief.
The reasoning for the reversal of the Commission's order
was contained in the circuit court's order:
[T]he Court does hereby hold that the findings
of the Human Rights Commission in this case is
[sic] not supported by substantial evidence as
defined in the cases of Westmoreland Coal Co.
vs. WVHRC and Shirley A. Boone [382 S.E.2d 562] and Bishop Coal Co. vs. Slayers [sic]
[380 S.E.2d 238]. After a review of the
record, the court finds that the Appellee,
Lori S. Evans, made no complaints to no other
parties, including her relatives, coworkers,
immediate superiors, or to any other person in
support of her claim of sexual harassment,
made by her immediate supervisor, James Watts.
An examination of the record finds that there
was absolutely no testimony upon which Ms.
Evans' allegations of sexual harassment could
be corroborated. I do further find that to
charge an employer with such an award and the
award not being based upon substantial
evidence would be a miscarriage of justice.
We articulated the standard for "quid pro quo" sexual
harassment claims in syllabus point 1 of Westmoreland Coal Co. v.
Human Rights Commission, 181 W. Va. 368, 382 S.E.2d 562 (1989):
In order to prove 'quid pro quo' sexual
harassment at the workplace, the complainant
must prove: (1) that the complainant belongs
to a protected class; (2) that the complainant
was subject to an unwelcome sexual advance by
an employer, or an agent of the employer who
appears to have the authority to influence
vital job decisions; and (3) the complainant's
reaction to the advancement was expressly or
impliedly linked by the employer or the
employer's agent to tangible aspects of
employment.See footnote 7
By virtue of the facts as found by the Commission,
appellant has met all three criteria outlined by Westmoreland.
First, as a woman, she is a member of a protected class. Second,
the manager, an agent of the employer who had authority to
influence vital job decisions (such as termination), made unwelcome
sexual advances to appellant. Third, by undeservedly criticizing
appellant's work performance and terminating her employment as a
response to her rebukes of the manager's sexual advances,
appellant's reaction to the sexual advancement was impliedly linked
by the employer's agent to tangible aspects of employment.
The most important assignment of error made by the
appellant is the assertion that the circuit court erred in ruling
that the findings of fact of the Commission were not supported by
substantial evidence.See footnote 8 The general rule in this jurisdiction was
stated in syl. pt. 1 of West Virginia Human Rights Commission v.
United Transportation Union, Local No. 655, 167 W. Va. 282, 280 S.E.2d 653 (1981): "West Virginia Human Rights Commission's
findings of fact should be sustained by reviewing courts if they
are supported by substantial evidence or are unchallenged by the
parties."
The principal issue before this Court is whether the
circuit court erred by finding the Commission's order unsupported
by substantial evidence. In syllabus point 2 of Shepherdstown
Volunteer Fire Dep't v. State ex rel. State Human Rights
Commission, 172 W.Va. 627, 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983), we stated:
Upon judicial review of a
contested case under the West
Virginia Administrative Procedure
Act, Chapter 29A, article 5, Section
4(g), the circuit court may affirm
the order or decision of the agency
or remand the case for further
proceedings. The circuit court
shall reverse, vacate or modify the
order or decision of the agency if
the substantial rights of the
petitioner or petitioners have been
prejudiced because the
administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions, decisions or order are:
"(1) In violation of constitutional
or statutory provisions; or (2) In
excess of the statutory authority or
jurisdiction of the agency; or (3)
Made upon unlawful procedures; or
(4) Affected by other error of law;
or (5) Clearly wrong in view of the
reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or (6)
Arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion
or clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion."
In this case the circuit court ruled that because
appellant did not complain of the harassment to any other person,
and because no other person witnessed the harassment, the
Commission's findings of fact were not supported by substantial
evidence. This ruling misinterprets our law concerning substantial
evidence.
We articulated the "extremely limited scope of review"
permitted of a court reviewing administrative decisions or orders
under W. Va. Code, 29A-5-4(g)(5) [1964] in Frank's Shoe Store v.
W. Va. Human Rights Commission, 179 W. Va. 53, ___, 365 S.E.2d 251,
254 (1986). We stated:
[A] reviewing court must evaluate the record
of the agency's proceeding to determine
whether there is evidence on the record as a
whole to support the agency's decision. The
evaluation is conducted pursuant to the
administrative body's findings of fact,
regardless of whether the court would have
reached a different conclusion on the same set
of facts. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518, 528 (1985).
. . . .
Pursuant to W. Va. Code, 29A-5-4(g)(5)
[1964], the rejection of administrative
findings is sanctioned only when 'an order of
an administrative body based upon a finding of
facts . . . is contrary to the evidence, or is
not supported by the evidence, or is based
upon a mistake of law, . . .' Guine v. Civil
Service Commission, 149 W. Va. 461, 469, 141 S.E.2d 364, 369 (1965). Otherwise, if in
reviewing administrative decisions or orders
in contested cases, the courts routinely
substitute their judgments for those of the
agencies, the utility of administrative
adjudication would be lost. A. Neely,
Administrative Law in West Virginia § 5.57 at
438 (1982).
In this case the reviewing court did not make a finding
that the Commission's ruling was "clearly wrong," and indeed, under
the evidence presented, could not do so. We have never suggested,
as does the circuit court, that to succeed in a sexual harassment
proceeding, a complainant must produce witnesses to the harassment
or must disclose the harassment to others during the immediate time
period surrounding its occurrence. By its very nature, sexual
harassment rarely occurs in plain view, and victims of sexual
harassment, fearing reprisals, are reluctant to disclose it. The
appellant presented evidence that she had been the victim of sexual
harassment and that her employment had been terminated in response
to her rebuke of the sexual harassment. The appellee denied
committing any sexual harassment. The Commission found the
testimony of the appellant credible and the testimony of the
appellee incredible due to major inconsistencies in the testimony
of appellee's witnesses. The Commission cannot be said to have
been "clearly wrong," and its ruling was supported by substantial
evidence.See footnote 9 Therefore, we reverse the October 17, 1990, order of
the Circuit Court of Lincoln County. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction the simple substitution of the reviewing court's judgment
for that of the administrative agency, thereby losing the utility
of the administrative adjudication. Frank's Shoe Store, supra.
However, as appellee correctly argues, the Commission
exceeded its authority when it awarded appellant $5,000.00 for
compensatory damages for humiliation, embarrassment, emotional and
mental distress and the loss of personhood and dignity as a result
of appellee's discriminatory treatment. In syllabus point 2 of
Bishop Coal Co. v. Salyers, 181 W. Va. 71, 380 S.E.2d 238 (1989),
we stated:
Our original authorization in Human
Rights Commission v. Pearlman Rlty. Agcy., 161
W. Va. 1, 239 S.E.2d 145 (1977) of damages for
humiliation, embarrassment, emotional and
mental distress, and loss of personal dignity,
contemplated only 'incidental' awards. We
approved $1,000 as an incidental award for
such damages. That figure may be adjusted for
inflation, but the Commission must be aware of
its jurisdictional limitations because
awarding a higher amount impinges upon a
defendant's constitutional right to trial by
jury.
We noted in Bishop Coal that: "Allowing for an adjustment to that
amount [$1,000.00] for inflation, the Commission today is
authorized to award up to $2,500 in damages, but absolutely no more
other than to make adjustments from time to time to conform to the
consumers' price index." 181 W. Va. at ___, 380 S.E.2d at 246-47.
Therefore, the $5,000.00 awarded by the Commission as compensatory
damages must be reduced to $2,500.00. This reduction conforms with
our law allowing the Commission to award only incidental damages.
Appellee contends that an award of any amount, inclusive
of back pay and attorney fees, beyond $2,500.00, violates its right
to trial by jury pursuant to W. Va. Constitution art. III, § 13. We
disagree. We expounded at great length the rationale behind the
constitutionality of an award for back pay, incidental damages and
attorney fees by the Human Rights Commission in Bishop Coal Co. v.
Salyers, supra. We decline to depart from the precedent
established by Bishop Coal. Furthermore, an award of back pay is
specifically authorized by W. Va. Code, 5-11-10 [1987].See footnote 10
In this case the Commission ordered the claimant reinstated to her former position and awarded her back pay until reinstatement occurred. The Commission found that the appellant had mitigated her losses by looking for work and had worked for a limited time earning $500.00. However, because of the great length of time which has passed since the Commission's order of February 19, 1987, and the lack of any record or testimony concerning claimant's attempts at mitigation beyond the September 19, 1986 hearing before the hearing examiner, we will remand this case for evidence of claimant's employment or attempts at mitigation beyond September 19, 1986. She is to be awarded back pay until reinstated, minus any amount of mitigation. Evidence is also to be adduced as to appellant's reasonable attorney fees beyond February 19, 1987, and such reasonable attorney fees are to be awarded. Damages shall be assessed with 10% interest per annum added.
This case is reversed and remanded for ruling and
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Footnote: 1 It was stipulated by the parties that Ms. Evans and her
manager worked alone together once or twice a week during this
period.
Footnote: 2 At one point claimant slapped the manager in order to
ward off his advances.
Footnote: 3 By her own admission, appellant did not inform anyone
else of the harassment until after she realized she was no longer
employed by appellee. At that point she informed her father that
she had been sexually harassed.
Footnote: 4 The manager testified that appellant was a good worker
(as did her co-worker, Ms. Goddard), but was sometimes moody.
Footnote: 5 The Commission also noted that the manager testified
that appellant phoned him twice after walking out May 17, yet his
reprimand write-up does not reflect those calls. Furthermore, the
Commission interpreted Ms. Goddard's recollection of the events of
May 17 as contradicting the manager and supporting appellant. Ms.
Goddard testified that she never had any problems with the
appellant.
Footnote: 6 Appellant's back wages were to be calculated in the
amount of $120.75 per week multiplied by the number of weeks since
the date of complainant's termination up to the date of her
reinstatement. This amount was to be offset by $500.00 complainant
earned in the interim. The final amount was to include 10%
interest per annum until paid.
Footnote: 7 In footnote 3 of Westmoreland, 181 W. Va. at ___, 382 S.E.2d at 565, we stated:
There are two recognized forms of sexual
harassment in the workplace. The first form
of sexual harassment involves an employee who
is consistently subjected to sexual innuendo
or contact, thereby creating a hostile
environment for employment. The second form
of sexual harassment involves an employer or
agent of the employer demanding sexual
consideration in exchange for job benefits,
so-called 'quid pro quo' harassment. For
either type of sexual harassment to be
actionable, the harassment must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive. Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67,
106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405-06, 9l L. Ed. 2d 49, 59-60 (1986).
It should be noted that the Meritor court declined to address the
full extent of employer liability in "hostile environment" cases.
Footnote: 8 Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to dismiss appellee's appeal from the
Commission's order for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant contends
that W. Va. Code, 5-11-11 [1987] was in effect at the time the
appeal was filed. That provision was amended in March, 1987 to
give jurisdiction for appeals from decisions of the Human Rights
Commission (with some inapplicable exceptions) to the Supreme
Court. The provision specifically states that appeal to the
Supreme Court is the exclusive remedy for cases filed after April
1, 1987. This case was filed with the Circuit Court of Lincoln
County on May 19, 1987. However, the Acts of the Legislature,
Extraordinary Session 1986, Regular Session 1987 notes that the
amendment was passed on March 14, 1987 and was not to take effect
for ninety days. Apparently, in order to clear the confusion
created by these contrary statements of legislative intent, the
West Virginia legislature again amended W. Va. Code, 5-11-11 in
1989, stating, in pertinent part:
[A]ppeals filed erroneously in the circuit
court after the first day of April, one
thousand nine hundred eighty-seven, and prior
to the first day of July, one thousand nine
hundred eighty-nine, may be prosecuted in the
supreme court of appeals without regard to the
time limits specified herein[.]
Because the instant appeal is appropriately before us on
either the appeal of the appellant or the appellee, the error cited
is both harmless and moot.
Footnote: 9 It should be noted that in Harper v. State Workmen's
Compensation Comm'r, 160 W. Va. 364, 369, 234 S.E.2d 779, 782
(1977), we reviewed the meaning of "common evidentiary standards."
We stated, "[t]he term 'substantial evidence' is used in the Social
Security Act, where it has been held to mean '. . . more than a
scintilla, but less than preponderance.' Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964)." In this case, there was clearly more
than a "scintilla" of evidence and it was error for the trial court
to reverse the Commission.
Footnote: 10 W. Va. Code, 5-11-10 [1987] states, in pertinent part:
If, after such hearing and consideration
of all of the testimony, evidence and record
in the case, the commission shall find that a
respondent has engaged in or is engaging in
any unlawful discriminatory practice as
defined in this article, the commission shall
issue and cause to be served on such
respondent an order to cease and desist from
such unlawful discriminatory practice and to
take such affirmative action, including, but
not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or
upgrading of employees, with or without back
pay[.]
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