Richard Colf, Appellant V. Clark County, Respondent (Majority)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

FILED COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION 11 201/ 1111 29 AV 11: 39 T OF WASHINGTON IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II No. 44818 -1 - II RICHARD COLF, Appellant, v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION CLARK COUNTY, Respondent. HUNT, J. hearing Richard Colf appeals the superior court' s affirmance of the Clark County examiner' s 40.260. 210( C)( 3) permit. in their interpretation 40. 260. 210( C)( 3) ( homes) order finding Colf in violation of Clark County Code ( CCC) for having a second mobile home on his property without the required temporary dwelling mobile and notice and of Colf argues that the superior court and hearing examiner both erred the Clark second mobile County home); Code and ( and violation. We finding ( 1) that he violated CCC 2) that CCC 14. 32A. 130( 3) ( " nonconforming" CCC 14. 32A. 140( 4) ( " preexisting this CCC 40. 260.210( C)( 3) in affirm. use" exemption) did not exempt him from No. 44818 -1 - II FACTS I. MOBILE HOME PERMIT On April 1, Lingafelt1 1993, Rachel applied for a temporary mobile home placement permit to install a second mobile home as a residence for her father on her Clark County property. Lingafelt' s application acknowledged that such a temporary permit would be valid for up to two years; that when the permit expired, it was subject to review; and that if she met all the original permit requirements, she could renew the permit for up to two more years. On May 5, 1993, the County home but for the second mobile permit actually lapsed and set approved it to expired Lingafelt' expire one year sooner, on 2 s " hardship " temporary dwelling permit later on May 5, 1994. This temporary 1993, because Lingafelt never November 5, requested or obtained the required inspections and approvals to support her original permit application. Nor did Lingafelt ever seek to renew her temporary permit after it expired. Almost five years later, in July 1998, Richard Colf purchased Lingafelt' s property and the two homes3 situated on mobile it. Colf made improvements to the mobile homes but never applied for or obtained a mobile home permit from the county. On October 3, 2011, " Clark inquiry County through its " Permit Service Center" issued for Colf' s property in 1993. 1 Code Enforcement" ( Code Enforcement) received an Rachel Lingafelt was known as Clerk' about the expired hardship mobile home permit Papers ( CP) s Rachel Cairns at 100. when she purchased On October the property 10, Code in 1987. She later changed her name to Rachel Butler. ¢ 2 3 Clerk' s Papers ( CP) at 6. Only the second mobile home, for which Lingafelt' s temporary permit expired, is at issue in this appeal. 2 No. 44818 -1 - II Enforcement Coordinator Kevin A. Pridemore issued a notice to Colf that ( 1) the original temporary dwelling permit for the second mobile home on his property had expired on May 5, 1994; ( 2) hardship such no hardship temporary longer existed, the permits require owner must remove renewal the mobile every two years; and ( 3) if the home. Colf replied to Pridemore CCC 14. 32A. 130( 3), the mobile home was lawful because Lingafelt had applied for that under and had been issued a Further correspondence between Colf and Code in 1993. permit Enforcement ensued. On June 4, 2012, Code Enforcement issued a notice to Colf that he had violated CCC 40.260. 210( C)( 3) by failing to obtain temporary occupancy approval for the mobile home, for which the previous permit ( Lingafelt' s) had expired on May 5, 1994. Code Enforcement ordered Colf to obtain a permit, to remove the mobile home for the property, or to appeal. II. PROCEDURE Colf appealed the Code Enforcement officer' s notice and order to a Clark County Code Enforcement hearing examiner. At the hearing, Pridemore testified that Code Enforcement had sent Colf three letters informing him of the mobile home permit' s 1994 expiration. Colf testified that ( 1) he had purchased the property with two manufactured homes on it; and ( 2) he had not obtained a permit for the mobile homes. The hearing examiner reviewed the parties' exhibits, including: the notice and order to Colf, correspondence between Colf and Clark County Code Enforcement, Colf s deeds, the real estate contract for the property, a description of and maps of Colf's property, Lingafelt' s 1993 application and approved temporary permit for her second mobile home, and printouts of relevant Clark County ordinances. 3 No. 44818 -1 - II The hearing examiner also considered CCC 40.260.2.10( C)( 3) and former chapter 18. 413 CCC4 ( language similar to CCC 40. 260. 210), both of which provide that a temporary dwelling permit is valid for two years and may be renewed for two years upon written substantiation by the applicant. The hearing examiner also considered CCC 14. 32A.130( 3) and CCC 14. 32A. 140, which describe the types of property exempt from chapter 14. 32A (mobile /manufactured home) requirements. The hearing examiner ruled that the County had sustained its burden of proving that Colf was in violation of CCC 40. 260. 210( C)( 3). The hearing examiner noted that ( 1) the second mobile home had been placed on the property as a temporary dwelling under former chapter 18. 413 CCC; ( 2) the temporary permit, on its face, had expired on May 5, 1994; and ( 3) this 5 temporary Colf' s 750 permit was appeal; ( as the not renewed. The hearing 2) affirming Code Enforcement' accrued penalty; ( examiner s order; ( issued a final order ( 1) denying 3) requiring Colf to pay Clark County 4) ordering Colf to remove the second mobile home from the property or to apply for a boundary line adjustment to locate the second mobile home on a separate parcel; and ( 5) in the latter situation, if a boundary line adjustment was approved, to obtain all required inspections and approvals for the second mobile home. 4 Repealed by Clark County Ordinance 2003- 11 - 01, § 5. 5 In response to Colf' s argument that the second mobile home was a prior nonconforming use and, therefore, exempt from chapter 14. 32A CCC requirements, the hearing examiner ruled that the second manufactured home was not legally on the property as of the effective date of chapter 14. 32A CCC, October Colf s 13, 2003, citing CCC 14. 32A. 130( 3) home and CCC 14. 32A. 140( 4). In temporary dwelling" because it was permanently attached to the property, the hearing examiner noted that the meaning of the term was clear from the context of CCC 40.260. 210. CP at 11. response to argument that the second mobile 4 was not a " No. 44818 -1 - II The superior court affirmed the hearing examiner' s order, ruling that Colf had not sustained his burden of proof under the Land Use Petition Act ( LUPA) 6 to show that the hearing examiner had erroneously interpreted the law, lacked substantial evidence to support his final order, or erroneously applied the law to the facts of the case. Colf appeals. ANALYSIS Colf argues that the superior court and the hearing examiner erred in their interpretation of Clark the Code County and in that he had finding violated CCC 40. 260. 210( C)( 3) in maintaining the second mobile home on his property without the required permit because the home second mobile was exempt from the code requirements under CCC 14. 32A. 130( 3) and CCC 14. 32A. 140( 4). These arguments fail. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW LUPA Pierce County 2003). body governs or In a ex rel. LUPA officer judicial Dep' t of review of Washington land Planning & the highest level decisions. HJS Dev., Inc. v. Land Servs., 148 Wn.2d 451, 467, 61 P. 3d 1141 appeal, an appellate court reviews with use of the decision authority to make of the the " local jurisdiction' s determination." RCW 36. 70C.020( 2) 7; Citizens to Pres. Pioneer Park, LLC v. City of Mercer Island, 106 Wn. App. 461, 470, 24 P. 3d 1079 ( 2001). We stand " in the shoes of the superior court," limiting our 6 Ch. 36.70C RCW. 7 The legislature LAws OF 2010, amended ch. 59, § 1. RCW 36. 70C. 020 in 2009 and 2010. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 419, § 1; The amendments did not alter the statute in any way relevant to this case; accordingly, we cite the current version of the statute. 5 No. 44818 -1 - II review to the record before the hearing Pavlina v. City of Vancouver, 122 Wn. App. examiner. 520, 525, 94 P. 3d 366 ( 2004); RCW 36. 70C. 120( 1). A party seeking relief from a hearing examiner' s land use decision must establish one of six bases listed in RCW 36. 70C. 130( 1) 8: a) The body or officer that made the land use decision engaged in unlawful procedure or failed to follow a prescribed process, unless the error was harmless; b) The land use decision is an erroneous interpretation of the law, after allowing for such deference as is due the construction of a law by a local jurisdiction with expertise; c) The land use decision is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court; d) The land use decision is a clearly erroneous application of the law to the facts; e) The land use decision is outside the authority or jurisdiction of the body or officer making the decision; or f) The land use decision violates the constitutional rights of the party seeking relief. Colf asserts that the hearing examiner' s decision was an erroneous interpretation of the law under RCW 36. 70C. 130( 1)( b). question of law, Whether a decision is an erroneous interpretation of the law is a which we review de novo. Lauer v. Pierce County, 173 Wn.2d 242, 252, 267 P. 3d 988 ( 2011). We interpret local ordinances using the same rules of construction that apply to statutes. Sleasman v. City of Lacey, 159 Wn.2d 639, 643, 151 P. 3d 990 ( 2007). unambiguous, we give effect 42, App. 636, 641 = 8 The legislature to the plain 984 P. 2d 1064 ( 1999), amended meaning review of an ordinance. When an ordinance is State v. Villarreal, 97 Wn. denied, 140 Wn.2d 1008 ( 2000). RCW 36. 70C. 130 in 2009. LAWS OF 2009, ch. That two or 419, § 2. The amendments did not alter the statute in any way relevant to this case; accordingly, we cite the current version of the statute. 6 No. 44818 -1 - II more interpretations Family Farmers v. are conceivable does not render an ordinance State, 173 Wn.2d 296, 305, 268 P. 3d 892 ( 2011). ambiguous. Five Corners We find no ambiguity here. II. " TEMPORARY DWELLING" Asserting that a " temporary dwelling" encompasses more than a manufactured or mobile home, Colf challenges the superior court' s and the hearing examiner' s interpretation of temporary dwelling" under CCC 40. 260. 210( C)( 3). 9 This code provision sets forth the following limitations for a " temporary dwelling permit ": A temporary dwelling permit shall be valid for two (2) years, and may be renewed by the issuing body for successive two ( 2) year periods upon written substantiation by the applicant to the continuing hardship or need justification. Upon the expiration of the two ( 2) year period, or at the end of each successive two ( 2) year period( s), if granted, the applicant shall notify the responsible official in writing that the temporary dwelling has been removed and, further, said notice shall include a request for an inspection to determine that the temporary dwelling has, in fact, been removed in compliance with the permit. CCC 40. 260. 210( C)( 3). Colf incorrectly dwelling." Br. asserts of Appellant at . 8. that the Clark County Code does not define " temporary CCC 40.260.210(B)( 1)( c) defines a " temporary dwelling" as a temporary structure such as a mobile home designed, constructed and maintained in a manner which will facilitate its removal at such time as the justifying hardship or need no longer exists." The record shows that ( 1) the mobile home in question on Colf's property had been a temporary home for Lingafelt' s father, for which the County had granted a temporary dwelling permit on hardship grounds; ( Lingafelt did not 2) by its own terms this temporary permit automatically expired in one year if apply for another permit; ( 3) 9 Br. of Appellant at 8. 7 Lingafelt' s temporary permit actually expired No. 44818 -1 - II before this year one - date when she failed to submit the required inspections; ( 4) neither Lingafelt nor Colf notified the County that the temporary hardship condition had ceased or continued; and 5) neither had applied for a permit to retain the mobile home on the property. Colf fails to show that the hearing examiner and superior court erroneously interpreted the term " temporary dwelling" under CCC 40.260.210( C)( 3) or misapplied that code provision to the second mobile home on his property, for which he had no permit. Thus, his challenge fails. III. PREEXISTING MOBILE HOME NOT EXEMPT UNDER CHAPTER 14. 32A CCC Colf next the argues second mobile that home under on CCC 14. 32A. 130( 3) his property did and ( 4), not violate and under CCC 14. 32A. 140( 4), any Clark County ordinances. More specifically, he contends that the mobile home was exempt from needing a new temporary dwelling permit under previously CCC 14. 32A. 130( 3) obtained a permit for the CCC 14. 32A. 140( 4) because ( 1) and second mobile home; ( Lingafelt had 2) by virtue of this permit, she had legally" placed the mobile home on the property in 1993; and ( 3) therefore, the mobile home had been "` applicable legally installed, ordinances, within 10] placed, or existing the meaning of prior[ to "' the 2003 CCC 14. 32A. 140( 4). effective date of the Br. of Appellant at 11 quoting CCC 14. 32A. 140( 4)). 10 Colf further asserts that the word " prior" in CCC 14. 32A. 140( 4) means that a manufactured home is exempt if at any time before the 2003 effective date of chapter 14. 32A CCC, the mobile home is deemed legally installed, legally placed, or legally existing. Br. of Appellant at 13. Colf is incorrect. 8 No. 44818 -1 - II We do not consider Colf' s contention that chapter 14. 32A CCC exempts him from having to different for the homer l second mobile because the County charged him with violating a CCC 40. 260.210( C)( 3) ( temporary dwelling permit for second mobile home). obtain a permit code, And under its plain language, CCC 14. 32A. 130( 4) exemptions apply only to " the requirements forth in [ chapter 14. 32A CCC]. " set Thus, chapter 14. 32A CCC exemptions do not shield Colf 13 from his CCC 40. 260. 210( C)( 3) 11 12 violation. We recognize that both the hearing examiner and the superior court addressed the merits of chapter 14. 32A CCC exemption argument. We, however, do not find it necessary to Colf' s reach this issue. 12 CCC 14. 32A. 130( 3) provides: All manufactured homes installed in Clark County before the effective date of ordinance codified in this chapter which do not comply with the requirements set forth in this chapter are deemed to be nonconforming. Emphasis added). 14. 32A. 140( 4) or existing this not provides a prior to the is exemption 14. 32A. 140 ( Addressing limited limited to violations of a. single mobile for "[ m] anufactured exemption date effective of this chapter, as from " the exemption home on a property, CCC homes legally installed, placed, described in Section 14. 32A. 130( 3)"; requirements of this chapter." but CCC By this plain language, this chapter 14. 32A CCC exemption does emphasis added). apply to placement charged under other chapters, such as Colf' s violation of CCC 40. 260. 210( C)( 3). 13 We however, that note, 14. 32A. 140( 4) that the show provision' s permit exemptions, manufactured 2003 for the effective even his if Colf arguments home. could would claim fail. the CCC 14. 32A. 130( 3) and CCC Under CCC 14. 32A. 140( 4) Colf must legally installed, placed, or existing prior to" that As we have already explained, Lingafelt' s temporary dwelling home on the property expired on November 5, 1993. Accordingly, was " date. second mobile absent an application for renewal of this permit, the second mobile home' s placement on Colf' s property CCC' set s was no 2003 longer " legal" enactment. forth in [ this chapter after the permit' s 1993 expiration, well before chapter 14. 32A Thus, the second mobile home did " not comply with the requirements 14. 32A CCC]," and the second mobile home was not eligible for the CCC 14. 32A. 140( 4), m] anufactured homes legally . installed, placed, or existing prior to the effective date of this chapter." exemptions under which 9 apply only to "[ No. 44818 -1 - II We affirm both the hearing examiner' s ruling and order and the superior court' s affirmance of the hearing examiner. A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2. 06. 040, it is so ordered. We concur: 10

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.