State Of Washington, Respondent V. Timothy Conover, Appellant (Majority)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

C FILED RB OF Ay} DIVISION ff , y 7 2014 ALII CFrp UTY.. \ IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II No. 44175 -6 -II STATE OF WASHINGTON, ' Respondent, v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION TIMOTHY ALLEN . ONOVER, C Appellant. HUNT, . J. sentences for three Timothy Allen Conover appeals his jury convictions and standard range counts of delivering heroin within 1, 000 feet of a school bus route stop. He argues that the trial court ( 1) violated his right to a public trial by locking the courtroom door for a half hour instruction, 3) during jury which instructions; ( 2) erred in overruling his objection to the reasonable doubt included " an abiding belief in the truth of the charge," Br. of Appellant at 13; erred in calculating his offender score when the State failed to present any evidence of Conover' s prior criminal history, which error the State concedes; and ( 4) erred in running Conover' s bus route stop enhancements consecutively rather than concurrently under RCW 9. 94A.533. violation of For the first time on appeal, Conover also challenges the jury instruction on the the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (VUCSA) 1 as unconstitutionally vague and asks us to strike the jury' s aggravating factors findings, even though the trial court did not 1 Ch. 69. 50 RCW. No. 44175 -6 -II impose an exceptional sentence. We affirm Conover' s convictions. Accepting the State' s concession of error in failing to prove Conover' s prior convictions, we vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing. FACTS I. CONTROLLED BuYs On May 13, 2011, Cowlitz Wahkiakum County Drug Task Force Detective Russell Hanson and Detective Michael Meier organized a controlled buy using a confidential informant CI). The CI called Timothy Conover to arrange to . purchase heroin and told Hanson that Conover had ounce of a quarter - heroin for sale for $ 400. Hanson and Meier gave the CI $ 400 for the transaction. The CI met Conover in a motor home at Seventh and California Way, which was located within 1, 000 feet from a school bus route stop for the Longview School District. The CI gave the money to Conover, who gave the CI a clear plastic bag containing tar heroin. The CI turned over the heroin to the detectives. On May 31, Meier again worked with the CI to arrange another controlled buy from Conover, this time, chatted a little, ounce of a quarter - and " completed heroin for $ 350. the deal." Report of The CI went to Conover' s apartment, Proceedings ( RP) ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 22. On July 7, Meier organized a third controlled buy for the CI to purchase a quarter -ounce of heroin from Conover for $350. This transaction was recorded with a wire and a video camera. Again, the CI went into Conover' s home, talked, The State arrested Conover. 2 and " made the deal." RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 23. No. 44175 -6 -II II. PROCEDURE The State charged Conover with three counts of selling heroin within 1, 000 feet of a school 2 bus route The case proceeded to a jury trial. stop. A. Trial Detectives Hanson testified that, a " hit," a 11, 2012) based tenth at on his and experience with narcotics, ( of a gram, of 60; ( 3) 10 to 20 dollars Meier testified to the facts previously set forth. Hanson also 1) individuals could pay as low as $ 20 for heroin; ( 2) heroin users did not tend to " stockpile" heroin, RP ( Oct. users would usually buy enough heroin for only a day' s use, spending about at a time; ( 4) a quarter -ounce of heroin was more than anyone would use in a day; ( 5) someone who bought a quarter -ounce would probably break it up and sell it, keeping " a little bit of that for their own usage." The CI testified about his RP ( Oct. 11, 2012) at 38. three heroin purchases from. Conover. During the CI' s testimony, the State played the audio recording of the July 7 transaction, which included discussion of the $ 350 purchase price and to whom the CI would resell the drugs. Victoria Giles, dispatcher, driver, and trainer for the Longview School District, testified that the May 13 controlled buy location was on a school bus route stop for the Longview School District. Longview Police Corporal Timothy Watson, assigned to surveil all three transactions, testified that the May 31 and July 7 transactions took place on Niblett Way, within 1, 000 feet from a school bus route stop. He also testified that a typical dose of heroin for " maintenance" users was about 0. 2 to a half - ram or less if they were not " getting high" but " just maintaining" g to " stay well." RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 75 -76. People who " abuse the drug" to get high typically 2 VUCSA, ch. 69. 50 RCW. 3 No. 44175 -6 -II inject up to informants flags buy a gram or would would go ounce, an generally up." not half ounce, - them down into " be to sent RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at at 79; ( 2) eighth amounts, cut large buy quantities, at Watson explained that 76. such as a pound, because "[ r] ed 77. Watson also testified that ( 1) dealers who would quarter- ounce, or RP ( Oct.. 12, 2012) dealers," half. RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) a gram and a would "[ break] it down further to sell to street dealers who purchased quarter- ounces would likely break this in half ... an eighth of an ounce," equivalent to three- and- a-half grams, and then break them down even further to a sixteenth of an ounce, a " teener," about 3) 1. 7 grams, closer to what an " end user might a maintenance user would one, point two break down a " teener" RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) and so on." be using," RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 79 -80; and at into 80. even smaller amounts, called a " point Watson opined that an " end user" would not be expected to buy a quarter -ounce at a time and that it was not common for end users to save their money to buy larger quantities at once. RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 80. B. Jury Instructions Outside the presence of the jury, the parties discussed the jury instructions with the trial Conover had earlier objected to the State' s proposed reasonable doubt instruction on court. grounds 2012) at that the definition 3.. He did not was sufficient without object to any of the the " abiding- belief' language. other jury instructions. RP ( Oct. 12, Overruling Conover' s objection, the trial court gave the State' s reasonable doubt instruction that included the " abiding belief' language. RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 4. The trial court also instructed the jury to consider that a separate crime was charged in each count and that the State had to prove each count beyond a reasonable doubt. For the special verdicts, the trial court instructed the jury to determine ( 1) whether Conover' s offenses took No. 44175 -6 -II place within a school bus route stop, and ( 2) whether the State had proved the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt ( whether the offense involved at least three separate transactions in which controlled substances were sold, transferred, or possessed with intent to do so and whether the offense involved an attempted or actual sale or transfer of controlled substances in quantities substantially larger than for personal use). C. Courtroom Locked Half Hour beyond Lunch Break After the jury was instructed, Conover' s counsel informed the trial court that the main entry door to the courtroom had been locked and a " Mr. Morgan" had tried to enter.3 RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 175 -76. The prosecutor responded that ( 1) the main entry door to the courtroom had been locked over the lunch hour because ( a) there were valuable items left in the courtroom and b) they closed the courtroom during the lunch hour as a safety precaution when there were no courtroom proceedings; and ( 2) it " seemed to be like about 15 maybe 15 minutes" that the door was locked and that when Mr. Morgan had tried to enter the courtroom, he " was let in almost immediately once [ they] discovered that it was locked." RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 176. The trial court found no harm in the inadvertent locking of the courtroom door, especially when as soon as it was known that Mr. Morgan was trying to enter, the door was immediately opened. Conover neither objected nor moved for a mistrial based on this incident. 3 More specifically, Conover' s counsel explained: We should probably just put on the record the issue with respect to and I can' t recall specific times, your Honor, but with respect to the main entry door that was locked. I don' t know what your Honor recalls, but the jury was seated, your Honor was reading jury instructions. If I recall correctly, the individual was trying to open the door right about the time you had completed reading jury instructions, I don' t recall specifics on that, but the door was locked. RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 175. 5 No. 44175 -6 -II D. Verdict and Sentencing The jury found Conover guilty finding also returned special verdicts of three counts of delivery of a controlled substance. It Conover had delivered the controlled substances that ( 1) within 1, 000 feet of a school bus route stop designated by a school district and ( 2) Conover' s crime was a major violation of the VUSCA, involving the attempted or actual sale or transfer of controlled substances in quantities substantially larger than for personal use. At sentencing, other than Conover' s mentioning that he might have three or four prior convictions, there was no further discussion about Conover' s offender score or criminal history. The State told the trial court months of confinement for that ( 1) each Conover' s initial standard sentencing range was 20 to 60 delivery count; ( 2) the three school bus route stop enhancements would add 24 months to the standard range sentence for each count, running consecutively for a total of 72 additional months; and ( 3) because the jury had found four different aggravating factors ( three of which were that Conover had delivered substantially more controlled substances than an amount for personal use), the State recommended that the trial court also impose exceptional 10 -year sentences for each count to run consecutively. The trial court sentenced Conover to a total of 120 months of confinement: 48 months for each of his three delivery convictions, to run concurrently with each other; and an additional 24 months ( school bus route stop enhancement) on each count, to run consecutively to each 48- 6 No. 44175 -6 -II month sentence for the underlying convictions. 4 The trial court, however, did not impose an exceptional sentence based on the VUCSA aggravating factors under RCW 9. 94A.535 as the State had Although the State introduced no documentation and Conover did not recommended. stipulate to his prior convictions, Conover' s judgment and sentence included a list of his prior criminal history. Conover did not object. Conover appeals. ANALYSIS I. COURTROOM DOORS LOCKED DURING AND HALF HOUR BEYOND LUNCH BREAK For the first time on appeal, Conover argues that the trial court violated his First and Sixth Amendment rights to a public trial, asserting that the trial court locked the courtroom doors for half an hour " while the court instructed the jury" without first evaluating the Bone -Clubs factors. Br. of Appellant at 8 -9. Neither the law nor the record supports this argument. Whether a defendant' s right to a public trial has been violated is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Brightman, 155 Wn.2d 506, 514, 122 P. 3d 150 ( 2005). A trial court violates a defendant' s right to a public trial if it closes the courtroom during a public proceeding 4 RCW 9. 94A.533( 6) provides: An additional twenty four months shall be added to the standard sentence range for any ranked offense involving a violation of chapter 69. 50 RCW if the offense was also a violation of RCW 69. 50. 435 or 9. 94A. 827. All enhancements under this subsection shall run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions, for all offenses sentenced under this chapter. Emphasis added.) 5 State v. Bone -Club, 128 Wn.2d 254, 906 P. 2d 325 ( 1995). 7 No. 44175 -6 -II without at first determining The 258 -59. purposefully if closure closed to such closure of a is warranted under so Lormor, 172 Wn.2d 85, 93, 257 P. 3d that no Bone -Club, 128 Wn.2d occurs when the courtroom is completely and courtroom " spectators Bone- Club. 6 one may 624 ( 2011) ( one enter and no emphasis added). may leave." State v. These rules come into play when the public is fully excluded from proceedings within a courtroom. State v. Easterling, 157 excluded from the entire voir all spectators, including defendant and his counsel, 172, 137 P. 3d 825 ( 2006) ( Wn.2d 167, dire courtroom while codefendant plea- bargained); closed to all spectators); 100 P. 3d 291 ( 2004) ( entire voir dire Brightman, 155 Wn.2d at 511 In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 808, closed to all spectators); Bone -Club, 128 Wn.2d at 257, ( no spectators allowed in courtroom during a suppression hearing). Such a closure occurs only when the courtroom is " completely and purposefully closed to spectators so only one that no one may enter and no person from a courtroom does one not may leave "; thus, the inadvertent exclusion of constitute a " closure" for Bone -Club purposes. Lormor, 172 Wn.2d at 93 ( exclusion of defendant' s terminally ill daughter for fear of distraction 6 Before a trial court closes a proceeding to the public, it must consider the following factors and enter specific findings on the record: 1. The proponent of closure or sealing must make some showing [ of a compelling interest], and where that need is based on a right other than an accused' s right to a fair trial, the proponent must show a " serious and imminent threat" to that right. 2. Anyone present when the closure motion is made must be given an opportunity to object to the closure. 3. The proposed method for curtailing open access must be the least restrictive means available for protecting the threatened interests. 4. The court must weigh the competing interests of the proponent of closure and the public. 5. The order must be no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its purpose. Bone -Club, 128 Wn.2d at 258 -59. 8 No. 44175 -6 -II was not courtroom closure). See also State v. Berg, 177 Wn. App. 119, 126 -27, 310 P. 3d 866 2013) ( exclusion of defendants' friend from courtroom observation did not constitute courtroom closure), review denied, 179 Wn.2d 1028 ( 20.14). Here, the courtroom was not " completely and purposefully" closed to the public. Lormor, 172 Wn.2d doors at 93 ( emphasis added). or excluded anyone from The trial court never " court proceedings. purposefully" locked the courtroom Rather, the courtroom was locked over the lunch hour for security purposes, when there were no proceedings; and it remained locked inadvertently for about 30 minutes after the lunch break. Moreover, once the trial court realized that the courtroom was locked, it immediately opened the doors, thereby remedying the problem. We hold that no courtroom closure occurred and, thus, the trial court did not violate Conover' s right to a public trial. II. REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION Conover next argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the reasonable doubt instruction. it 7 stated He contends that the reasonable doubt instruction confused the jury because that the jurors had to have an " abiding belief in the truth of the charge." Jury Instruction 3 on reasonable doubt read: The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty... The State is the plaintiff and has the burden of proving each element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant has no burden of proving that a reasonable doubt exists. A defendant is presumed innocent. This presumption continues throughout the entire trial unless during your deliberations you find it has been overcome by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists and may arise from the evidence or lack of evidence. It is such a doubt as would exist in the mind of a reasonable person after fully, fairly and carefully considering all of the evidence or lack of evidence. If, after such consideration, you have an abiding belief in the truth of the charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. CP at29. 9 Br. of No. 44175 -6 -II Appellant at Our Supreme Court has already reviewed and upheld this instruction in State v. 13. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 318, 165 P. 3d 1241 ( 2007), which controls here. Thus, Conover' s challenge fails. The trial court' s reasonable doubt instruction mirrored 11 Washington Practice: Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 4. 01, belief' language that Conover at instruction holding defining " 318. at 2008) ( WPIC 4. 01), which contains the " abiding See also State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 658, 904 abiding belief' language did not diminish the pattern that the " reasonable ed. Our Supreme Court expressly approved the use of challenges. WPIC 4. 01 in Bennett, 161 Wn.2d P. 2d 245 ( 1995) ( 85 ( 3d doubt "), denied, 518 U. S. 1026 ( 1996). cert. Moreover, in a recent Division One opinion, the defendant raised the same challenge that Conover raises here to the " abiding belief" language; and, like Conover, he argued that the language was similar to the impermissible " 2012). State speak the truth" remarks in State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 760, 278 P. 3d 653 v. Fedorov, Wn. 324 P. 3d 784, 790 ( 2014). App. , Relying on Bennett and Pirtle, Division One distinguished Emery, asserting that Emery' s " speak the truth" language was improper because it expressly misstated the jury' s role, whereas the " abiding belief' language accurately informed the jury that its job is to determine whether the State proved the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Fedorov, 324 P. 3d at 790. We find the Fedorov rationale persuasive and adopt it here. We hold that the trial court did not err in giving the reasonable doubt instruction containing the " abiding belief' language. 10 No. 44175 -6 -II III. SENTENCING A. Offender Score No Proof of Criminal History For the first time on appeal, Conover challenges the trial court' s calculation of his offender score. the State' s He contends that the trial court erred by calculating his offender score based on statement of criminal history submitted with no supporting evidence. The State concedes this error and agrees that we should remand the case to the trial court for resentencing, at which the State will have the opportunity to prove Conover' s prior convictions under State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 287 P. 3d 584 ( 2012). We accept the State' s concession and proposal for remand. B. Running School Bus Route Stop Enhancements Consecutively to Underlying Sentences Conover next argues that the trial court erred in running his school bus route stop enhancements consecutively to his sentences for his underlying crimes, rather than concurrently under RCW 9. 94A.533. This challenge also fails. Conover' s challenge requires us to look at the statute' s plain language to give effect to legislative intent. State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P. 3d 281 ( 2005). We determine a statute' s plain meaning from the ordinary meaning of its language, as well as from the statute' s general context, related provisions, and 600. the statutory scheme as a whole. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d at We also interpret statutes to give effect to all language in the statute, to render no portion meaningless or superfluous, and to avoid absurd results. State v. P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 J. P. 3d 318 ( 2003); State v. Neher, 112 Wn.2d 347, 351, 771 P. 2d 330 ( 1989). Our legislature has expressly and unequivocally provided mandatory enhanced sentences for certain drug offenses: 11 No. 44175 -6 -II An additional twenty -four months shall be added to the standard sentence range for any ranked offense involving a violation of chapter 69. 50 RCW if the offense RCW 69. 50. 435 was also a violation of 9. 94A. 827. or All enhancements under this subsection shall run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions, for all offenses sentenced under this chapter. RCW 9. 94A. 533( 6) ( w] ithin one that were emphasis thousand feet also violations added). of a school of Conover' s three counts of delivering drugs occurred bus route stop designated RCW 69. 50. 435( 1)( c), by [ a] school district," offenses which the above RCW 9. 94A.533( 6) enhancement provision expressly includes. We reject Conover' s argument that only other types of "drug- crime" enhancements listed in RCW 9. 94A.533 run consecutively with his base sentences for his underlying criminal convictions, not enhancements such as his school bus route stop enhancements. Br. of Appellant at 23. The plain language of the statute unambiguously requires the sentencing court to add 24 months to a criminal defendant' s standard range sentence for any offense under chapter 69. 50 RCW if the states that sentencing offense also violates all enhancements provisions. RCW 69. 50. 435. RCW 9. 94A.533( 6). under RCW RCW 9. 94A.533( 6) 9. 94A. 533( 6). The statute also plainly shall run consecutively to all other In addition to the plain meaning of this enhancement statute, the legislature amended RCW 9. 94A.533( 6) in 2006 to require drug- related sentencing enhancements LAws of 2006, ch. to be served consecutively " to all other sentencing provisions." See 339, § 301. Here, the jury found Conover guilty of three counts of delivery of a controlled substance, heroin, under RCW 69. 50. 401, and that these three offenses took place within 1, 000 feet of a school bus route stop designated by a school district, in violation of RCW 69. 50.435( 1)( c). Thus, RCW 9. 94A.533( 6) required the trial court to run his school bus route stop enhancements 12 No. 44175 -6 -II consecutively" to his base sentences and to each other. See CP at 65, RP ( Oct. 24, 2012) at 19. We hold that the trial court did not err in running these sentencing enhancements consecutively. C. VUCSA Conover next argues Factor Findings, " Major Violations" Aggravating that we should strike the jury' s aggravating VUCSA factor findings8 from his record because his convictions were not " major violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act." heroin sales Br. of Appellant because ( 1) each at He asserts that this aggravator does not apply to his 24. the three of convictions was a separate " offense" that did not involve three transactions, and ( 2) the State failed to prove that the quantities of heroin involved were " substantially larger than for personal use." Br. of Appellant at 26. Conover acknowledges that the trial court did not impose an exceptional sentence based on the jury' s finding of aggravating factors. record." Instead, he challenges these aggravator findings because " they are on his Br. of Appellant at 24. These challenges fail. 1. Three separate transactions Conover argues that the first challenged statutory aggravating factor does not apply under a plain reading of RCW 9. 94A.535( 3)( e)( i) because ( 1) this statutory factor requires a " current offense" with that " involved three separate " at least three current separate offenses" transactions," and ( 2) the State chose to charge him rather than a single offense comprising three separate 8 RCW 9. 94A.535 lists aggravating circumstances that constitute substantial and compelling reasons for an upward circumstances 9. 94A. 535( 3)( as a " major is e). departure from the when the defendant' s standard range current sentencing offense is a " guidelines. major One of those VUCSA." RCW The presence of any of the six statutory factors may identify a current offense VUCSA." RCW 9. 94A. 535( 3)( e)( i) -( vi). Conover challenges two of these six statutory factors that the jury considered in determining that his current offense was a " major VUCSA": ( 1) that his current offense involved at least three separate transactions, and ( 2) that the quantities involved were substantially larger than for personal use. 13 No. 44175 -6 -II Br. transactions. of Appellant at 25 ( citing RCW 9. 94A.535( 3)( e)( i)). Because Conover cites no authority to support his " plain meaning" argument, we need not consider it. RAP 10. 3( a)( 6). Nevertheless, we note that a plain reading of the statute shows RCW 9.94A.535( 3)( e)( i) there applies when Reynolds, 80 Wn. the heard jury 10: sold " twice are three separate transactions App. 851, 856, 912 P. 2d 494 ( 1996). evidence in involving of May 2011 three " 9 a controlled substance. See State v. Here, Conover was charged with and separate transactions in which controlled substances were and once in July 2011. Thus, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury to consider whether Conover' s offense involved at least three separate transactions in which controlled substances were sold, transferred, or possessed with intent to do so. 2. Quantity " substantially larger than for personal use" Conover argues that the second challenged aggravator does not apply because the State failed to prove that the quantities of heroin he sold were " substantially larger than for personal use." Br. of Appellant at 26 ( quoting RCW 9. 94A. 535( 3)( e)( ii)). We disagree. In determining whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we consider " whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [ State], any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the [ charged] crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P. 2d 628 ( 1980) ( quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 9 Melina Reynolds was charged with two counts of delivery of a controlled substance and one count of delivery of a material in lieu of a controlled substance. Reynolds, 80 Wn. App. at 853. The issue was whether Reynolds' third transaction constituted an actual " sale" because it did not involve an actual 9. 94A. 533( 3)( substances, e)( i) Noting that the plain language of former RCW required at least three separate transactions involving actual controlled controlled substance. we held that Reynolds' third transaction did not count. Nevertheless, we affirmed her exceptional sentence based on a different qualifying factor that established a major violation of the controlled substances act. Reynolds, 80 Wn. App. at 856, 859. 10 RCW 9. 94A.535( 3)( e)( i). 14 No. 44175 -6 -II A claim of insufficient evidence admits the 307, 339, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 ( 1979)). truth of the State' s evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom. State v. We must defer to the trier of fact on issues Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P. 2d 1068 ( 1992). the persuasiveness of of conflicting testimony, credibility v. 75, 83 P. 3d 970 ( 2004) ( Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874 - of witnesses, and the evidence. State citing State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 367, 693 P. 2d 81 ( 1985)). Here, the record shows that the State presented sufficient evidence that the quantities of drugs he sold were ounce a quarter - of substantially larger than for heroin was more than personal use. anyone Detective Hanson testified that ( 1) would use in one day; ( 2) if an individual purchases a quarter -ounce it is probably for resale purposes, keeping " a little bit of that for their own usage," RP ( Oct. 11, 2012) at 38; and ( 3) heroin users do not tend to " stockpile" heroin, instead buying enough for one or a few days at a time, spending about 10 to 20 dollars at a time. RP ( Oct. 11, 2012) at Corporal Watson testified that ( 1) 60. a typical dose of heroin for maintenance users was about 0. 2 to about 0. 5, or a half gram or less if " they' re just maintaining" and up to a gram or gram and a half for people who chose to abuse the drug, RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 76; ( 2) dealers further to sell to who street buy an ounce, half ounce, or dealers," RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) ounce quarter - at 79; ( 3) usually "[ break] it down dealers who purchase quarter - ounces would likely break it down to an eighth of an ounce, about three- and -a -half grams, and break that down about 1. 7 even further to grams, closer to a sixteenth of an ounce, a " what an " end user teener," RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 79, might be using," RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 80; ( 4) a maintenance user would break down a ` teener" into even smaller amounts called a " point one, point two and so on," RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 80; and ( 5) an end user would not be expected to buy 15 No. 44175 -6 -II a quarter -ounce at a time and it was not common for end users to save their money to buy larger quantities at once. RP ( Oct. 12, 2012) at 80. Conover' s three involved transactions quarter ounce sales, more than the amount generally purchased for personal use: Conover was selling quarter- ounces of heroin, whereas an likely end user would possess about a sixteenth of an ounce. The State thus presented sufficient evidence to show that the quantities of heroin Conover sold were substantially larger than for personal for use, purposes proving the RCW 9. 94A.535( 3)( of e)( ii) aggravator and, thus, supporting the jury' s finding. 3. Conover Jury Instruction on " Substantially Larger than for Personal Use" also argues for the first time on appeal aggravating factor is unconstitutionally personal use" that the " Br. vague. substantially larger than for Appellant of at 27. Conover contends that the absence of "legally fixed standards" accorded the jury " standardless discretion" to decide this factor, violating due process. Br. of Appellant at This argument fails; this 28. aggravating factor is not unconstitutionally vague as applied here. We may refuse to review a claim of error that the defendant did not raise below unless the error show is RAP 2. 5( manifest and affects a constitutional right. that the alleged error was not harmless beyond Wn.2d 682, 687, 757 P. 2d 492 ( 1998). instructs the jury on ( 1) a)( 3). a reasonable The defendant must also doubt. State v. Scott, 110 Due process principles are usually satisfied if a trial court each element of the charge, and ( 2) that the State must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Scott, 110 Wn.2d at 690. The constitution does not require that the meanings of particular terms used in an instruction be specifically defined. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 16 at 691. Accordingly, jury instructions that No. 44175 -6 -II do not define particular terms are not " manifest" constitutional errors that can be raised for the first time on appeal. Scott, 110 Wn.2d at 688; see also State v. O' Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 107, 217 P. 3d 756 ( 2009) ( failure to provide statutory definition of malice when jury was instructed on all elements of the crime did not constitute manifest constitutional error). Conover did not object to any jury instruction other than the reasonable doubt instruction. Because the trial court instructed the jury about each element of the crime charged, including the aggravating factors, its failure to provide a specific definition of " substantially larger than for personal use" does not amount to constitutional error. Thus, Conover cannot raise this vagueness issue for the first time on appeal. RAP 2. 5( a)( 3). We affirm Conover' s convictions, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing. 11 A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2. 06. 040, it is so ordered. We concur: 11 At the resentencing hearing, the State may prove Conover' s criminal history for purposes of establishing his correct offender score.. 17

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.