Larry Dale Reedy v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 124th District Court of Gregg County

NO. 12-03-00089-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS

LARRY DALE REEDY,

 
APPEAL FROM THE 124TH

APPELLANT

 

V.

 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

 
GREGG COUNTY, TEXASMEMORANDUM OPINION

Larry Dale Reedy ("Appellant") appeals the trial court's order revoking his probation, following which he was sentenced to imprisonment for eight years. Appellant raises one issue on appeal. We affirm.

 

Background

Appellant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and pleaded "guilty." The trial court found Appellant guilty and sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for eight years, but suspended the imposition of Appellant's sentence and placed Appellant on probation for eight years. On January 14, 2003, the State filed a motion to revoke Appellant's probation alleging that he had violated the terms of his probation by intentionally or knowingly possessing with intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of the law. Appellant pleaded "not true" to the allegations in the State's motion and a hearing was conducted on the matter. Following the hearing, the trial court found the allegations in the State's motion to be true, revoked Appellant's probation, and sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for eight years. This appeal followed.

 

Revocation of Probation

In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. The only question presented in an appeal from an order revoking probation is whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant's probation. See Lloyd v. State, 574 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). The standard of proof in a revocation proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence. Id. In order to satisfy its burden of proof, the State must prove that the greater weight of the credible evidence before the trial court creates a reasonable belief that a condition of community supervision has been violated as alleged in the motion to revoke. See Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

As a general matter, a trial court possesses broad discretion in supervising those defendants who are placed on community supervision. See Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Becker v. State, 33 S.W.3d 64, 66 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). The degree of the trial court's discretion extends to revocation proceedings such that the trial court has considerable discretion to modify, revoke, or continue the probation. Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Becker, 33 S.W.3d at 66. Given the trial court's wide discretion and the unique nature of community supervision revocation proceedings, examination of a revocation order for factually sufficient evidence is inappropriate. See, e.g., Becker, 33 S.W.3d at 66; Joseph v. State, 3 S.W.3d 627, 642 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Johnson v. State, 2 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); Liggett v. State, 998 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.); Johnson v. State, 943 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.); Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, pet. ref'd). As such, the trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and determines if the allegations in the motion are sufficiently demonstrated. See Greer v. State, 999 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order. Id.

In the instant case, the trial court heard testimony from confidential informant Justin Jackson ("Jackson") and two investigators, Dusty Flanagan ("Flanagan") and Blaine Shavers ("Shavers"), among others. The force of such testimony was that Appellant sold Jackson a quantity of methamphetamine. To the contrary, Appellant testified that his brother, James, sold the methamphetamine to Jackson. In his brief, Appellant argues that the testimony of the State's witnesses was not credible and that the trial court, therefore, abused its discretion in revoking Appellant's probation. We disagree.

The testimony of Jackson, Flanagan, and Shavers supports the trial court's finding that Appellant intentionally or knowingly possessed with intent to deliver a controlled substance. We iterate that we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order and that the trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and determines if the allegations in the motion are sufficiently demonstrated. See Greer, 999 S.W.2d at 486. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to create a reasonable belief that a condition of community supervision had been violated by Appellant as alleged in the motion to revoke. As such, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's probation. Appellant's sole issue is overruled.

 

Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant's sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

SAM GRIFFITH

Justice

 

Opinion delivered November 26, 2003.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and DeVasto, J.

 
(DO NOT PUBLISH)