Chloe Huehlefeld v. The State of Texas Appeal from 117th District Court of Nueces County (memorandum opinion)

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NUMBER 13-18-00688-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG CHLOE HUEHLEFELD, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. On appeal from the 117th District Court of Nueces County, Texas. MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras A jury convicted appellant Chloe Huehlefeld of murder and engaging in organized criminal activity, and the trial court sentenced her to fifty-five years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02, 71.02. Huehlefeld’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief stating there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm. I. ANDERS BRIEF Pursuant to Anders, Huehlefeld’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Huehlefeld’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court, in writing, that counsel has: (1) notified Huehlefeld that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided Huehlefeld with a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw; (3) informed Huehlefeld of her rights to review the record to file a pro se response and to seek discretionary review if this Court finds that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided Huehlefeld with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record 2 with instructions to file the motion in this Court. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. An adequate amount of time has passed, and Huehlefeld has not filed a pro se response. II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We may determine the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion after reviewing the record and finding no reversible error. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Alternatively, if we determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist, we must remand for the appointment of new counsel to brief those issues. Id. at 827. We have conducted an independent review of the record, including appellate counsel’s brief, and find no reversible error. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826–27. We agree with counsel that the record presents no arguably meritorious grounds for review and the appeal is frivolous. See Garner, 300 S.W.3d at 766; Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW ln accordance with Anders, Huehlefeld’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also ln re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must 3 withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Huehlefeld and to advise her of her right to file a petition for discretionary review. 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also ln re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). DORI CONTRERAS Chief Justice Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 25th day of July, 2019. No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Huehlefeld wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, she must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by the Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see id. R. 68.3 and should comply with the requirements of the Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4. 1 4

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